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Is it possible for the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia to have an extradition treaty or an arrangement 
whereby they can mutually secure the return of fugitives? This paper argues that such an 
agreement between these two strikingly different legal systems is possible. In answering this 
question, this paper also examines whether they can adjust their extradition systems to 
accommodate the emerging norms of international law and concerns about human rights. The 
possibility of a U.K.-Saudi Arabia extradition treaty would signal hope to the international 
community and could be a giant step toward an international extradition convention. The larger 
argument in this paper, thus, is that there is a dire need for the international community to forge 
an international extradition convention.1 By working with and improving the existing United 
Nations Model Extradition Treaty,2 such an international extradition convention is possible as 
demonstrated by the very specific case study between the U.K. and Saudi Arabia.  
Increasing global threats have led to the increased need for international co-operation and effort, 
regardless of differences between nations. Extradition, for one, is recognised as an effective way 
of combating international crime. This study looks at how extradition can be used to enhance 
global co-operation to fight crimes of an international nature, using Saudi Arabia and the U.K. as 
an example. In doing so, it addresses the questions of whether the extradition systems of these 
two countries are functioning effectively, whether failure in either of these systems are related to 
its intrinsic nature, whether extradition arrangements are possible between an Islamic and a non-
Muslim country, how both systems can benefit from each other’s experience, in what way they 
can be effective to tackle organised crime at an international level, and, finally, how extradition 
systems can be used as a means for global co-operation against international crime, including 
terrorism. Throughout, the available literature is examined to look at major issues in the field of 
                                                 
 
1
 Another possibility as proposed by Plachta is to identify specific “core fair trial rights” applicable to the extradition 
context. Plachta, however, disregards what this paper elaborates, that some extradition systems (i.e. administrative 
systems) may not even provide a trial or hearing, but simply an administrative proceeding, as discussed further in 
this paper. Plachta’s suggestion, however, is helpful in setting out what minimum rights should be included in an 
international extradition convention. See generally M. Plachta, ‘Contemporary Problems of Extradition: Human 
Rights, Grounds for Refusal and the Principle of Aut Dedere Aut Judicare,’ (2007) 114th Int’l Training Course 
Visiting Experts’ Paper, Resource Material Series No. 57, 64-70. 
2
 United Nations General Assembly, Model Treaty on Extradition, 68th plenary meeting, UN Doc A/RES/45/116, 
(1990). (Hereafter ‘UN Model Treaty’). 
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extradition practice and procedures, touching on new norms and trends in international law as 
well as human rights standards. 
The historical evolution of extradition is presented, but note is also made of the historical origins 
of extradition in Islam. This paper argues that the historical development of extradition parallels 
the development of human rights protection in international law. Formal arrangements such as 
treaties, however, are important to achieve common aims and to reconcile differing approaches, 
especially to balance the aims of extradition and the protection of human rights.  
 
An important component of this study is a description of the essence of extradition, in theory and 
in practice. Definitions of extradition, in both the Western and Islamic worlds are examined, with 
the former laying some stress on the idea of reciprocity, particularly as international law lays no 
obligation at all on countries to extradite. Extradition as an activity is a process, and because of 
the different processes employed by nations, different types of extradition system have 
developed. This paper then proposes a definition for extradition that takes into account human 
rights obligations, and the adoption of a dual judicial-administrative extradition system, which 
would also encourage the protection of human rights.  
 
Additionally, the paper looks at the relationship between extradition and international law with a 
primary focus on the shortcomings of the current international extradition system,3 especially 
toward the protection of human rights.4 An increasingly important aspect of international law is 
human rights. Accordingly, this paper discusses the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
European Human Rights Convention, and related human rights obligations. Some of the 
international and regional bodies involved with extradition are examined. The paper discusses a 
disturbing international trend toward the increasing use of alternatives to extradition and the 
                                                 
3
 It should be noted at the outset that this paper does not look at an extradition request from an international court 
like the ICC, seeking assistance from states for the prosecution of crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction. Instead, this 
thesis looks at extradition requests between or among states in the context of international crimes committed in 
those states, and that would be prosecuted by those states and not an international court. For a discussion of 
extradition and the ICC, see G. Sluiter, ‘The Surrender of War Criminals to the International Criminal Court’, 
(2003) 25 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 605 at 613.  
4
 See J. Dugard and C. Van den Wyngaert, ‘Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights,’ (ASIL 1998) 92 AJIL 
187-212 (stating that there is an inevitable tension between the protection of human rights in extradition and the 
need to curtail crime).  
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increasing erosion of exceptions to extraditions. These trends are the symptoms of an 
international extradition system in need of immediate repair at the expense of individual rights.   
This paper is hopeful that an international extradition convention is possible. The international 
community can begin with existing templates like the United Nations Model Extradition Treaty.5 
Issues like jurisdiction could be used to create initial consensus through the recognition of a 
universal extradition, following the universality theory. Jurisdiction is a complex issue, so a 
number of relevant concepts are analysed in theory and in reality as they not only impact the 
possibility of an international extradition conventions, but also the case study between the U.K. 
and Saudi Arabia.  
 
For purposes of a case study that could work as a model for creating consensus toward an 
international extradition convention, this paper examines the U.K. and Saudi Arabian extradition 
systems in detail. The overriding importance of Islam in the latter is at length, as it has a profound 
effect, which cannot be over-stated, on how Saudi Arabia creates and amends its laws. A 
comparison of the British and Saudi systems demonstrates the differences, in systems and in 
perceptions, but also some of the surprising similarities. Using the UN Model Treaty on 
Extradition as a benchmark, this paper assesses to what extent each system measures up to 
modern international law obligations and how well they function. 
 
Ultimately, this paper leads to an examination of whether a treaty between Saudi Arabia and the 
U.K. is possible, and whether the two countries have anything to learn from each other. A formal 
treaty between an Islamic country (Saudi Arabia) and the U.K. (a Western power) has significant 
importance for global co-operation. The analysis presented in this study concludes that despite 
flaws and limitations in their current practices, a formal extradition treaty is very possible 
between Saudi Arabia and the U.K., and that such a treaty could have a profound positive effect 
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The development and transformation of fragmented feudal societies into the modern-day nation 
states occurred partly through the introduction of more sophisticated systems of governance. Of 
course, this has only been possible because of the implementation of complex legal concepts, 
rules, principles, and practices, and the establishment of institutions for resolving conflicts 
between individuals and between individuals and the state. 
Conflicts between states, however, require appropriate legal rules, procedures, practices, and 
other mechanisms to facilitate peaceful resolution of disputes. Although in principle, in the 
presence of such rules and procedures, a peaceful environment should prevail in which 
international commercial activity can flourish; in practice, this is not the case, as is all too 
obvious from the conflicts that occur between states, often culminating in war. 
On the other hand, despite implementing divergent legal systems, states do co-operate for mutual 
benefits and common interests, as illustrated by the treaties and agreements signed on a range of 
issues, including extradition and drug trafficking. International bodies like the United Nations 
have even been instituted to create a forum in which states are able to co-operate and collaborate 
with each other. 
The means of communication that have developed, like information technology, have also turned 
the world into a global village. But while modern globalisation has opened up new opportunities 
for international co-operation in the exchange of resources and technical know-how, it has also 
created a new set of challenges. Globalisation has facilitated movement and instantaneous 
communication throughout the world, but it has simultaneously created opportunities for 
organised criminal activities at an international level. Crimes such as money laundering, Internet 
fraud, terrorism, and human trafficking no longer recognise international boundaries. Knowledge 
and facilities intended for the benefit of humanity have been harnessed as instruments of 
violence and international criminal activities.  
 2 
The 9/11 and 7/7 incidents have comprehensively shown how modern technical knowledge can 
be recruited to cause destruction and misery. It is becoming evident how the international 
network of negative forces can link to commit or repeat terrorist attacks of this magnitude. These 
incidents in particular, point to the kind of challenges that confront the world today and the level 
of co-operation and co-ordinated efforts required among governments at an international level to 
meet the challenge head-on before it assumes even greater abominable proportions. There is 
scarcely anywhere which is safe from this threat. 
Although modern globalisation allows different states to take advantage of modern developments 
and share resources for the greater benefit of humanity, they are also required to pool their 
efforts for the prevention and curtailment of crime at a global level.6 Therefore, just as an 
effective judicial mechanism is required for smooth and harmonious internal social interactions, 
it is now accepted that an equally effective legal mechanism is required for international 
dealings. Shaw, for example, notes an “assumption of an analogy between the national system 
and the international order.”7 
As noted above, increased mobility and developments in communication have facilitated 
organised crime at an international level. Consequently, this threat requires a response on a 
matching scale. No one nation can fight the unparalleled magnitude of the menace single-
handedly. Regardless of the deep differences among nations in terms of history, values, culture, 
and philosophy, the control of international offenders worldwide requires international co-
operation and collaboration to co-ordinate efforts and counter organised crime internationally.  
Perhaps, a true international criminal justice system is overdue. This paper, however, only 
proposes a modest measure, though very relevant to contemporary practice.8 Given the lack of 
                                                 
6
 For a discussion of international criminal organizations, see generally C. Guymon, ‘International Legal 
Mechanisms for Combating Transnational Organized Crime: The Need for a Multilateral Convention,’ (2000) 18 
Berkeley J. Int'l L. 53. 
7
 M. Shaw, International Law, 4th ed. (Cambridge: Grotius, CUP, 1997), at 3.  
8
 See M. Plachta, note 1, at 72, explaining the importance of this type of paper in contemporary international law 
because it could help “convince both the government officials and the politicians, most notably the members of the 
national parliaments, that, possibly, the time has come to change their approach to and their way of thinking about 
extradition and the grounds for refusal thereof. Most importantly, such a study should contribute to the common 
understanding that the so-called traditional grounds for refusal, based on the rationale which itself is rooted in the 
‘old days’ concepts and notions, may be preserved and accommodated insofar as they are compatible with the 
modern approach to extradition.” 
 3 
enforcement power and limited jurisdictional scope of international criminal courts, international 
criminal justice must rely on the legal assistance of states.9 In this regard, extradition may 
arguably be the one type of legal assistance that is of utmost importance to create a more 
effective international criminal justice system.10 This thesis adds to the contemporary debates 
surrounding the need to revisit the international extradition system, especially in light of human 
rights. 
This paper generally argues that extradition treaties are essential to combating modern 
international criminals. Yet, countries should adhere to their international obligations when 
extraditing individuals. The extradition system today is insufficient to safeguard individual rights 
within the framework of international law. This paper argues that there is a need for the 
international community to enter into a convention that addresses the needed balance11 among 
protecting individual rights, fighting international criminals, and safeguarding state sovereignty. 
The European Court of Human Rights expressed this need for a balance in Soering v. United 
Kingdom, where the court explained that the growing internationalization of crime requires “a 
search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interests of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights.”12 
There are, however, numerous challenges in crafting an international convention on extradition 
able to maintain this balance. To highlight the challenges that countries face in arriving at an 
extradition agreement, despite their well intentioned desire to co-operate in the face of 
globalising criminal enterprises, this paper specifically compares two countries with contrasting 
legal traditions and extradition systems as a case study: the U.K. and Saudi Arabia. The 
possibility of an extradition treaty between the U.K. and Saudi Arabia would spark hope for a 
multilateral extradition treaty between Arab countries and the West, and later for an international 
extradition convention. This paper examines the possibility of a U.K.-Saudi extradition treaty 
within the framework of their international obligations, primarily focusing on human rights 
obligations, which may arguably be one of the more prominent and politically charged obstacles 
                                                 
9
 See J. Godinho, ‘The Surrender Agreements Between the U.S. and the ICTY and ICTR: A Critical View’, [2003] 




 See Dugard, n. 4, at 187 (stating that “it is necessary to strike a balance between the two so as to establish a 
system in which crime is suppressed and human rights are respected.”).   
12
 Soering v. United Kingdom (1989) 161 E.C.H.R. (ser. A), at para. 89.  
 4 
to such an extradition agreement. Some international obligations like human rights may trump 
the national interests of these two countries. Customary international law may also impose a duty 
on both countries to extradite, limited however by a higher international obligation to protect 
human rights. 
In the end, this paper concludes that it would be possible for the U.K. and Saudi Arabia to reach 
an extradition treaty because both countries can overcome human rights, religious, and 
procedural hurdles within the framework of international law. Both countries should craft the 
extradition treaty considering their international human rights obligations, especially in light of 
various types of alternatives to extradition that violate international law and individual rights. 
Despite common misconceptions, both countries’ normative principles do recognise the 
protection of human rights and the necessity of an extradition system. Instead, the primary 
obstacle in both countries entering into an extradition treaty is the Islamic rule prohibiting the 
extradition of Muslims to non-Muslim states and vice versa. This paper argues that there is 
support in Islamic law for an exception to this prohibition, specifically if Saudi Arabia, or other 
Islamic countries, enters into extradition agreements like an international extradition convention.  
1.1 Extradition treaties are essential to combating international criminals. 
Extradition is a formal legal process where one nation surrenders an individual to another nation, 
usually for criminal prosecution.13 International law, however, does not oblige a state to 
surrender an alleged criminal to a foreign state. One principle of sovereignty is that every state 
has legal authority over the people within its borders.14 Under customary international law, a 
state has no obligation to extradite a person to a requesting state unless an extradition treaty 
                                                 
13
 “The process of extradition can be defined simply as the surrendering of a criminal or accused criminal by one 
sovereign to another.” J. Soma, T. Muther, and H. Brissette, ‘Transnational Extradition for Computer Crimes: Are 
New Treaties and Laws Needed?’, (1997) 34 Harv. J. on Legis. 317. For further discussion see M. Bassiouni, 
International Extradition and World Public Order (New York: Oceana Pub., 1974), at 1; see E. Martin and J. Law 
(ed.) Oxford Dictionary of Law (Oxford: OUP 2006), from Oxford Reference Online, available at 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t49.e1503 (last accessed 21 March 
2010); see K.B. Weissman, ‘Extraterritorial Abduction: The Endangerment of Future Peace,’ (1994) 27 U.C. Davis 
L. Rev. 459, 467;  see Y. Zilbershats, ‘Extraditing Israeli Citizens to the United States – Extradition and 
Citizenship Dilemmas,’ (2000) 21 Mich. J. Int'l L. 297, 298-299, citing Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law (1986) at 475 and introductory note, at  556-557; Terlinden v. Ames, (1902) 184 U.S. 270, 289 (U.S. Supreme 
Court); Draft Convention on Extradition (Supp. 1935) 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 66. 
14
 See Bassiouni, n. 13, at 204. 
 5 
exists between states.15 Thus, extradition primarily occurs through a bilateral agreement16 
between states.  While there are multilateral treaties, and attempts have been made at creating a 
comprehensive convention on extradition, many factors such as differing legal systems and 
conflicting political goals have frustrated past efforts.17  
In 1990, the United Nations under its obligations to create model laws, adopted the United 
Nations Model Extradition Treaty and urged Members states to either adopt it or to improve its 
extradition laws in light of the model treaty.18 This Model Treaty, however, is only a model and 
is not legally binding on any U.N. member, including the U.K. and Saudi Arabia.19 In other 
words, each U.N. member would have to adopt the Model Treaty, or any of its parts, and use it as 
a bilateral or multilateral treaty with other countries. Thus, there is yet no comprehensive 
convention on extradition. 
It is also important to note that no country in the world has an extradition treaty with all other 
countries. For example, Bassiouni listed 113 bilateral treaties between the U.S. and other 
countries in 2007.20 This still leaves a significant number of countries without a bilateral 
extradition treaty with the U.S. - the People’s Republic of China and North Korea, for example. 
This paper later describes in more detail the history of extradition and its developments for a 
better understanding of the challenges that face countries when adopting a bilateral or 
multilateral extradition treaty, much less an international convention on extradition. The history 
of extradition will then be helpful in analyzing the obstacles countries like the U.K. and Saudi 
Arabia may face when entering into an extradition treaty.  
Two measures of international co-operation are necessary for the effective combating of 
international crime. The first is to put in place machinery for the extradition21 of criminals who 
commit a crime in one territory and escape to another, and concomitantly to rid the extradition 
                                                 
15
 See K. Rebane, ‘Extradition and Individual Rights: The Need for an International Criminal Court to Safeguard 
Individual Rights’, (1996) 19 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1636. 
16
 Most extradition treaties are bilateral.  
17
 See Rebane, n. 15, at 1649. 
18
 UN Model Treaty, n.2. 
19
 See generally, ibid.  
20
 See M. Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice, 4th ed. (New York: Oceana, 2002), 
at 985-981. 
21
 The history of extradition and its processes are discussed in some detail in Chapter 2.  
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process of unnecessary procedural hurdles to achieve a speedy extradition of fugitives. The 
second is the re-aligning of extradition systems into a standardised form which results in the 
greater success of legitimate requests. The importance of extradition in reducing crime22 has 
been accepted and recognised in the literature, and is a containment solution for international 
terrorism.23 One of the determinants that led to the creation of the United Nations Model 
Extradition Treaty24 was the conviction that bilateral and multilateral extradition arrangements 
would greatly contribute to the development of more effective international co-operation for the 
control of crime. Adoption of the United Nations Model Treaty recognises extradition as an 
instrument for dealing effectively with the complex aspects and serious consequences of crime, 
especially in its new forms and dimensions. 
With regard to current developments, however, especially after the 9/11 attack in the U.S. and 
the 7/7 bombings in the U.K. (indicative of international crime and terrorism), the existing 
extradition treaties or the U.N. Model Extradition Treaty did not help to prevent or reduce crimes 
internationally. Such prevention or reduction primarily requires common will, genuine co-
operation, and co-ordination among sovereign states. Unfortunately, under the current world 
system, widespread co-operation is still not possible.  
Interestingly, world-shocking events often create solidarity, regardless of ideological differences. 
Good illustrative examples in this context are the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., the London bombings 
of July 2007, and the Mumbai massacres in 2009. Similarly, extradition as a form of request to 
seek the return of a fugitive criminal reflects the willingness of states to engage in co-operative 
efforts aimed at the suppression of crime.25 Few countries want to become a place of refuge for 
another state’s criminals,26 but countries without an enforced extradition treaty with another 
country find themselves unable to extradite offenders and criminals. Countries that do not have 
                                                 
22
 C. Blakesley, Terrorism, Drugs, International Law and the Protection of Human Liberty 171 (New York: 
Transnational Publishers 1992). He cites the eighteenth-century Italian jurist, Beccaria, who believed extradition 
could play an important role in diminishing crime but was concerned about the uneven distribution of justice. 
Blakesley argues that the spread of international crime and terrorism increases states’ motivation to join in 
international crime control agreements and thus leads to an increased volume of extradition.  
23
 K. Wellington, ‘Extradition: A Fair and Effective Weapon in the War on Terrorism,’ (1990) 51 Ohio St. L. 
J.1447-1460. 
24
 UN Model Treaty, n.2. 
25
 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon 1998), at 318.  
26
 G. La Forest, Extradition To and From Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Books 1977), at 182. 
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any such agreements27 would automatically become a safe refuge for genuine international 
criminals.  
Yet, even despite the willingness of countries to co-operate for a more effective international 
justice system, there are numerous legal, cultural, and political obstacles to complete co-
operation.  Even between two particular states who want to co-operate for purposes of 
extradition, there might be a number of constraints (legal, administrative, or both), which pose 
barriers to securing prompt extradition. Such barriers can be varied and numerous. They may 
derive from the basic constitutional or statutory provisions governing extradition, or the legal 
processes involved in extradition, but sometimes a country may simply refuse the request of 
another country, or do so in order to put pressure on the latter. The U.K. still refuses to return the 
Algerian fugitive Al Khalifa to Algeria (for the alleged embezzlement of public funds), in an 
attempt to make Algeria provide more information on suspected Al Qaeda operatives in London 
and Europe.28 Likewise, Egypt refused to extradite a suspect involved in the London bombings, 
especially in the absence of an extradition treaty between Egypt and the U.K.29 
1.2 Using the framework of the United Nations Model Extradition Treaty, the U.K. and 
Saudi Arabia should enter into an extradition treaty that balances the concerns of both 
nations.  
After discussing the importance of extradition treaties in combating international criminal 
activities, it becomes relevant to consider and compare the procedures and regulations for 
extradition in two relevant countries: Saudi Arabia and the U.K. So far there exists no formal 
bilateral treaty between these latter two countries for extradition arrangements. They have only 
                                                 
27
 P. Barkham, ‘What is Extradition?’, The Guardian (London 5 Jan 2000), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/jan/05/pinochet/chile (accessed 20 March 2010) (“According to a 1998 
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Mongolia, Namibia, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, UAE, 
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signed a Memorandum of Understanding,30 which has been drawn up in very general terms. It 
does not address the specific extradition processes to be followed. It is very important to note 
here that a U.K.-Saudi Arabia extradition treaty is impossible in the absence of any genuine 
agreement with flexible administrative and legal procedures and a strong will to implement them. 
This paper argues that it would be possible for the U.K. and Saudi Arabia to reach an extradition 
treaty executed within the framework of the United Nations Model Extradition Treaty if both 
countries overcome crucial hurdles. 
This paper will discuss the crucial obstacles to a U.K.-Saudi Arabia bilateral extradition treaty. 
Many of these constraints need to be removed before a bilateral arrangement can be put in place. 
These two countries may have inconsistent constitutional and procedural paradigms for 
extradition. Other difficulties may stem from the fact that the two countries derive their legal 
systems from different sources and backgrounds. For instance, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
being an Islamic country, derives its constitution from the Shari’a,31 discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5. In contrast, the U.K. is a non-Muslim country. Its legal system stems from a 
combination of common law, and governed by statutory provisions enacted by Parliament. 
“Traditionalists claim that the U.K. constitution is a happy and pragmatic outcome of an 
evolution towards democracy ordered by benevolent customs.”32 
One of the most complex obstacles, and one that requires a more complex comparison, are the 
legal systems and traditions of Saudi Arabia and the U.K. In the context of comparing Saudi 
Arabia and the U.K., it becomes necessary to consider the history, religion, and monarchy of 
both countries.  
Bearing in mind its history, one should view Saudi Arabia as a newly-formed nation-state whose 
constitution is still not fully settled. With a long history and born after the Ottoman collapse in 
the Arabian peninsula, Saudi Arabia is today, as its state and royal decree documents reveal, an 
Arab and Islamic state.33 The country, under the King, fully adheres to the tenets of Islamic 
Shari’a law and rules. Whether this monarchical system is strictly in keeping with the spirit of 
                                                 
30
 It was, further, signed by the two countries on April 12, 1989. See Bazzi, ibid. 
31
 Chapter 5 examines Shari’a and how it governs the constitution of the Kingdom. 
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 J. Alder, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 6th ed. (London: Macmillan, 2007), at 67. 
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 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ‘The Basic Law of Governance’, art. 1, 17 (Translation of Saudi Laws, Series II), 
(Riyadh: Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers, 2003). 
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true Shari’a is perhaps debatable, and a number of Muslim critics like Osama bin Laden and Al-
Qaeda members do not entirely accept the legitimacy of the Saudi Kingdom.34 Nonetheless, 
according to its regulations and the amended Basic Law of 1982, the Saudi Kingdom sees itself 
as a Muslim country and its’ King as servant and saviour in respect of the two holy shrines 
Mecca and Medina. The King’s role is discussed in detail in the next chapter, but in accordance 
with the Islamic spirit, he rules by royal decree and in close consultation with the ulema, or 
religious scholars, who also have considerable influence in most areas. This system, from a 
Western perspective, looks like a theoretical power endorsed by an overdose of royal supremacy. 
Closer scrutiny especially of the process of this rule, however, reveals that neither the King nor 
the ulema would overrule or contradict the Shari’a law and Islamic spirit. One might grasp these 
two powers as being the sole bodies entitled to interpret Shari’a, but the reality in Islamic 
tradition is that mutual consultation, shura, and the diversity of religious interpretation are 
respected. If it were not so then the situation would become politicised and possibly partisan. 
In contrast, the U.K. was a colonial, imperial, island power with but few competitors whose 
empire faded away. The emergence of the industrial revolution and the amalgam of fast 
development with its important secular legacy ensured that religion has no formal rule in law-
making or supremacy, “neither Christianity nor any other religion is part of the law as such.”35 
Further, the monarchy is represented in the person of the Queen but she does not rule (“she 
cannot make law except as required by Parliament”36) – unlike the case of Saudi Arabia. Despite 
its traditional power and influence, royalty in the U.K. today is more representative of national 
patrimony, pride, and heritage than of supremacy. 
Within this framework, the differences and disparities between the U.K. and Saudi Arabia, as 
well as their distinctions and peculiarities, raise a number of interesting questions. These 
questions form an integral part of the main hypothesis in this modest research paper. The above 
mentioned issues suggest a number of other assumptions. For instance, if the two countries are so 
                                                 
34
 A. Mayer,  ‘Conundrums in Constitutionalism: Islamic Monarchies in an Era of Transition,’ (2002) 1 UCLA J. 
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diametrically different in their legal systems and their administrative procedures, then their 
approach to extradition, their judicial heritage, and legal regulations must also be diverse and 
different from each other. Would it be possible, therefore, to reach an understanding? 
Such theoretical assumptions suggest that different entities may not enjoy a close relationship 
and mutual interests, owing to their differing objectives, but when an emergency situation 
requires it, protocols may become flexible to the point of abandonment of principles. Recent 
threats to both Saudi Arabia37 and the U.K. illustrate this. Whether the threats were real or 
imaginary, both countries (with no previous formal agreement) quickly intensified their 
diplomatic efforts to confront international terrorism. The U.K. and Saudi Arabia may be willing, 
for example, to share intelligence on terrorism investigations.38 
Different sovereign entities may not wish to compromise their ideas, especially if these are of 
national interest or character. Nonetheless, under the fast-growing movement of peoples and 
goods marked by aggressive economic globalisation and the technological media revolution, the 
world of individual states has come closer to being one global village, breaching a number of 
obstacles, national taboos, and some religious practices that were once very uncompromising. 
The fact is that diversity and change killed rigid conformity to national ideals. For instance, 
traditional concepts of state paternalism (prevalent in third world countries) have retreated in the 
face of a growing private and market economy. 
It is reasonable to assume that differences between countries can also cause obstacles in better 
understanding despite the fact of existing common will. One illustration of the problem would be 
the statutory force of British extradition law whereby a fugitive may not be returned to a state 
where the death penalty is imposed.39 Like many other places around the world, such as some 
U.S. states or Pakistan, the death penalty is sanctioned in Saudi Arabia by virtue of the state’s 
                                                 
37
 For example, the Khobar shootings in Saudi Arabia. See O. Bowcott, ‘They killed two security guards then shot at 
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constitution.40 British law could therefore prove to be an insurmountable barrier to securing the 
extradition of a fugitive Saudi national from the U.K., and thus an impediment to these two 
countries entering into a viable bilateral arrangement. 
For the U.K., the issue of the death penalty as it relates to extradition is also an issue of human 
rights and international law obligations. Would the U.K. violate its international obligations if it 
extradited a person to Saudi Arabia, and who later received the death penalty? The U.K. has 
obligations under the European Conventions on Human Rights41 (“ECHR”) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights42 (“ICCPR”), and for which Saudi Arabia does not have a 
comparable international obligation because it is not a signatory to these conventions. Since 
Saudi Arabia, however, is also a signatory to some international conventions like the United 
Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment,43 and under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,44 as a U.N. Member; there 
may be a way to arrive at an agreement.  
Aside from the death penalty, it is also worth noting that the legal punishment for the 
infringement of a particular criminal law in one state may seem to be reasonable and justified, 
whereas in another state it may be considered to be draconian and inappropriate. For example, in 
the United Kingdom the maximum sentence for theft that can be imposed on a criminal is seven 
years imprisonment.45 In Saudi Arabia, however, theft is punished by the amputation of the 
offender’s hand. Punishment too, then, raises human rights and international obligation concerns.  
As a corollary, the extradition practices and procedures of the two countries are also different 
from each other. A preliminary comparison of the extradition systems practised in both countries 
reveals some striking differences. For example, Saudi Arabia has adopted the administrative type 
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of extradition system, whereas the U.K. now has a purely judicial system, although it originally 
began as administrative.46 
Given this scenario, it would be interesting to see if, despite the differences in sources and legal 
processes, it is possible for the two countries to have an extradition treaty or an arrangement 
whereby they can mutually secure the return of fugitives and equally importantly, if they can 
adjust their extradition machineries to accommodate the emerging norms of international law and 
concerns about human rights. 
In order to answer this question, it will be crucial to research a number of related issues which 
constitute the core of the current hypothesis. The necessity for an extradition treaty would 
therefore be a pre-condition for any effective management of alleged international offenders, not 
only between the U.K. and Saudi Arabia, but also between other nations. To fulfil this task, it is 
necessary to discuss in detail the core questions of what an extradition system is, its 
implementation in Saudi Arabia and the U.K., how the two countries perceive suspects and 
human rights, and the main questions and administrative challenges that confront the two 
countries through their extradition processes and related procedures. 
1.3 Objectives of the Study  
To develop and establish the hypothesis in this paper, this paper will attempt to address the 
following questions: 
(a) Judged from the perspective of their performance, are the extradition systems in the two 
countries, one founded on a theological basis, the other secular, functioning effectively? 
(b) Are failures in either of the systems, if any, attributable to their foundation? 
(c) Are extradition arrangements possible between an Islamic and a non-Muslim country? 
(d) How can both systems benefit from each other’s experiences and in what ways can they 
be turned into a more effective tool for the curtailment and prevention of organised 
crime at an international level? 
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(e) How can extradition systems be used as a means of enhancing global co-operation 
against international crimes, particularly with reference to global terrorism and human 
rights protection? 
In order to develop these questions, they must be discussed individually and collectively. For 
instance, question (a) looks into whether one system is working better than the other simply 
because it is based on religion, or if the other system is more efficient because it has a secular 
basis. A thorough investigation of the processes involved in each system would be illuminating 
for the legal systems prevalent in both countries. Question (b) is related to question (a) and 
addresses whether the shortcomings characterising each system, if any, stem from the fact that 
they have different origins and are based on different philosophies and approaches. 
Question (c) is geared towards exploring the possibility of whether extradition agreements or 
treaties between a Muslim and a non-Muslim state are allowable. In particular, it would be of 
considerable significance for Islamic states if the study were able to establish an answer in the 
affirmative. It may open up new avenues for international co-operation between Islamic and non-
Islamic states. 
Question (d) aims to examine how both systems, founded on very different philosophies and 
approaches, can learn from each other’s experience. This is the over-riding concern of this study. 
Numerous insights are expected to arise from this comparison as the countries follow different 
extradition frameworks. The outcome would be of greater benefit to Saudi Arabia, as the U.K. is 
a much more experienced country as far as extradition is concerned. 
The question in (e) seeks to learn how global co-operation in fighting international organised 
crimes can be attained. Perhaps the biggest benefit would be to investigate how the extradition 
system can be made an effective instrument for the prevention of organised crime and how 
concerted efforts could be made by both countries to contribute towards securing peace and 
security at the international level. Should the study be able to suggest a route for close co-
ordination between the two countries, other Islamic states could follow suit. 
This last question is important in the context of a growing trend where states are urged to 
conform to emerging international norms and standards. In this context, the United Nations has 
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produced a United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition, the only instrument recognised and 
accepted so far as a universal standard for extradition.47 The United Nations Model Treaty places 
a great deal of emphasis on the protection of human rights and promoting a uniform practice of 
extradition. This study adopts the United Nations Model Treaty of Extradition as a basic criterion 
for judging the extradition systems of Saudi Arabia and the U.K. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The larger hypothesis of this paper on extradition and human rights is steeped in both 
comparative and international law.48 It is of comparative law because the thesis looks at the 
current international paradigm of unifying and harmonizing49 the international extradition system 
vis-á-vis the United Nations Model Extradition Treaty. The thesis is also comparative because it 
compares two legal systems’ extradition laws (the U.K. and Saudi Arabia), the solutions offered 
by each system toward extradition, the obstacles faced by both systems in creating an extradition 
treaty, the causal relationships between the two legal system’s extradition paradigm, and the 
legal evolution and current stage of extradition in each system.50 Finally, while previous scholars 
avoided a comprehensive comparison of particular legal systems,51 this thesis uses a 
methodology of comparative law analysis based on testing a hypothesis through the comparison 
of two legal systems because this author believes that a specific comparison of two legal systems 
like Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom is has now become ripe52 and can contribute to 
contemporary discourse on this topic.  
 
At the same time, the thesis is steeped in international law methodology.  While the thesis does 
not delve into customary international law, except tangentially in the historical portion, the paper 
aims to frame the methodology within the framework of the realist approach by examining 
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international codification through bilateral and multilateral agreements.53 This choice was made 
in light of the current stage of extradition laws, still limited by the positivist approach. The paper 
aims to move the dialogue towards the trend of a Universalist approach to extradition, where an 
international extradition system would thrive. 
In order to achieve the goals set out above, the following steps have been taken: 
(a) A survey has been made of the published literature, legal journals and academic works, and 
descriptions of the origins and developments in the field of extradition. The focus is on 
characterising the various extradition practices and procedures prevalent in world 
administrative or judicial systems. Other types of alternative means for returning accused 
fugitives, such as rendition and abduction are also examined. These alternatives to 
extradition often violate international obligations to protect human rights. In light of the 
views of various experts and writers on the subject, each system’s strengths and weaknesses 
are outlined. As discussed subsequently, the abundance of material from the U.K. and other 
Western sources is in stark contrast to a marked shortage of materials for Saudi Arabia. 
(b) From the available literature, after the origins and important landmarks have been traced, 
major issues in extradition practice and procedures are described, including the issue of 
jurisdiction and exceptions for political offences. This paper examines the debates and 
various theories of jurisdiction surrounding these issues. It is also necessary to discuss the 
different judicial views and approaches to extradition in general and other concepts related 
to extradition vis-à-vis the political offence exception. This review is undertaken in order to 
determine what kind of approaches to jurisdiction the U.K. and Saudi Arabia follow. The 
literature is also studied from the perspective of identifying emerging norms and trends in 
international law and human rights standards. For this purpose, the existing principles of 
international law are highlighted and human rights protection enshrined in various 
conventions and other instruments of extradition is summarised and discussed subsequently.  
An analysis of the United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition is also undertaken, with a 
view to finding an instrument, or document, which can be recognised and accepted as a 
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standard to be incorporated by all states in bilateral and multilateral extradition 
arrangements, including conventions and treaties. The focus is on what the United Nations 
Model Treaty requires states to adopt as obligations and what kind of exceptions should be 
observed. The United Nations Model Treaty is vital for this current study, as it is used as a 
criterion for comparing and contrasting the British and Saudi extradition systems, and 
particularly for ascertaining which is closer to the criteria laid down by the United Nations. 
The investigation also serves to show how far the two countries have accommodated 
principles of international law and human rights protection in their respective extradition 
systems. 
It is also crucial to compare the legal systems of both the U.K. and Saudi Arabia, including 
their basic sources of law. To this end, the United Nations Model Treaty is used as a 
standard to see which of the systems adheres to the principles of international law and 
human rights more stringently, and how they compare and contrast with each other in this 
respect.  
(c) The study moves on to investigate the U.K. extradition system with a focus on the U.K. 
Extradition Law of 2003. Various stages of extradition proceedings in light of the statutory 
provisions of the U.K. Extradition Law of 2003 are then analysed. The issues of human 
rights as embedded in the U.K. Extradition Law are discussed. 
(d) Discussion is dedicated to Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law, although it must be noted that this law 
is very brief and does not furnish any details with regard to the procedures and proceedings 
of extradition. Within this context, the treaties and bilateral and multi-lateral extradition 
arrangements between Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region, including other 
Islamic countries with which Saudi Arabia has a similar arrangement, are also examined. It 
is important to note that the Saudi Basic Law provides for concluding treaties and 
extradition arrangements with other countries and does not make a distinction between 
Islamic and non-Islamic countries in this respect.  
Focusing on Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law, the chapter analyses various treaties and security 
agreements to which Saudi Arabia is a signatory, and investigates what kind of extradition 
arrangements have been concluded between the member states. The focus is also on how 
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extradition applications are processed by the Saudi Arabian Government and which offices 
are involved in the process.  
(e) Finally, a comparative study deals with the British and Saudi extradition law(s) starting first 
with the common ground between the two countries with regard to extradition practices and 
procedures. Attention is paid, however, to the differences between the two. The 
commonalities and differences of the two systems having been laid bare, discussion of the 
earlier questions takes place. The United Nations Model Treaty Extradition is used as a 
point of reference for judging which of the two countries is closer to the ideal. From the 
findings, an answer is attempted to the question of whether the two countries could conclude 
an extradition arrangement between them, and whether there are any religious or political 
hurdles which need to be tackled in order to accomplish what would be an unprecedented 
arrangement. An answer is also provided as to how extradition arrangements between these 
countries, both of which occupy very important positions in their regions, can lead to 
enhanced, global co-operation in combating organised crime at a regional, and international 
level. In order to understand and answer all these questions, the core concept of extradition 
itself must be examined. One of the immediate questions is to define extradition. This 
prompts investigation of its historical meanings, its development, its distinction from other 











The Extradition Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
It is necessary to consider the historical and definitional evolution of extradition to get a full 
grasp of the complexity of forging modern extradition agreements. In other words, this chapter 
traces the historical and definitional developments of extradition law within the context of the 
strengthening of individual rights in the international law system. After the Second World War, 
the naturalist theory54 of individual rights, which recognized a universal natural set of rights for 
individuals, replaced the positivist theory,55 which recognized individual rights only when 
explicitly set out in treaties or rules of nations, as the dominant view.56 In parallel to the 
developments of extradition agreements, the protection of individual rights through international 
agreements gradually increased.57 Therefore, “as extradition law developed, international law 
recognized the importance of individual rights.”58 
Historically, extraterritoriality, which recognized the right of nations to regulate activities within 
its territory, was the key rule of international law, within which extradition agreements were 
framed.59 It is the rule of extraterritoriality, for example, that renders the use of abduction illegal 
under international law.60 Recent covert use by the U.S., in co-operation with the agents of some 
European governments, of abduction and illegal irregular rendition drew severe criticism and 
                                                 
54
 D. Sylvester, ‘Customary International Law, Forcible Abduction, And America’s Return to the “Savage State”’, 
(1994) 42 Buffalo L. Rev. 608.  
55
 Ibid at 608. 
56
 See Rebane, n.15, at 1639-1643. 
57
 Arguably, the focus in international law on individual rights in the context of extradition remained strong at least 
until 9/11, when the concern for individual rights became secondary to the war on terrorism. See Plachta, n. 1, at 
64, stating that “[t]he growth and expansion of the human rights concept have inevitably led it to cover the vast 
area of international co-operation in criminal matters whose most renowned form, extradition, has been for 
centuries dominated by considerations and concerns deeply rooted in state interests, such as sovereignty, 
maintaining power and domestic order, keeping external political alliances, etc. Human rights have been granted 
protection only in so far as that would correspond with these stated priorities. The human rights movement with its 
unequivocal emphasis on their protection as such, has changed that perspective.” 
58
 See Rebane, n. 15, at 1638. See also L. Sohn, ‘The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals 
Rather Than States,’ (1982) 32 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, at 11.  
59
 See Rebane, n.15, at 1646-1651. 
60
 Ibid at 1647; J. Shen, ‘Responsibilities and Jurisdiction Subsequent to Extraterritorial Apprehension,’ (1994) 23 
Denver J. of Int’l L. and Pol’y 44 (arguing that abduction violates international law). 
 19 
even led to the prosecution of CIA operatives engaged in these illegal renditions by an Italian 
court.61 Under international law, a violation of the rule of extraterritoriality is much more 
intolerable than the criminal conduct of an individual.62  
 
The post-9/11 era, however, ushered a complex rearrangement and interplay among 
extraterritoriality, individual rights, and extradition. It is, thus, necessary to revisit where the 
concept of extradition came from and how it evolved through its three thousand years of history. 
More specifically, it is important to examine the roots of extradition generally, the roots of 
extradition in Islamic law, the roots of extradition in the U.K. and/or England, and the evolution 
of the purpose and use of extradition. Tracing the history of extradition, this paper, through this 
chapter, argues that extradition evolved from the practice of state co-operation into a legally 
formalised set of agreements, increasingly concerned with individual rights.63 This argument, 
based on an historical analysis, paves the way for a suggestion that the possibility of a U.K.-
Saudi Arabia extradition treaty, or any other extradition treaty between or among countries for 
that matter, must strike a balance between the modern aims of extradition (combating 
international criminals) and contemporary international law concerns like human rights.  Any 
country looking to engage in an extradition treaty must recognize that the law of extradition 
evolved side by side with the laws protecting individual rights.  
 
This is often a difficult balancing act for states.  One could view the process of balancing all the 
interests involved as a doubled layer analysis.64 First, one must balance the need to protect 
human rights against the needs of law enforcement and international co-operation.65 Second, one 
must also balance the human rights of the alleged fugitive against the human rights of others and 
society.66  This chapter and this thesis in general only focus the analysis on the first layer: 
balancing the need to protect human rights, and the need for a more effective international 
extradition system. It is important to note, however, that “the incremental and casuistic response 
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of extradition law”67 to the parallel development of human rights protection has made it difficult 
to create a proper legal framework where the international community can properly strike a 
balance between human rights and combating international crimes.  
This chapter also looks at the definitional problem for extradition, and how this definitional 
problem raises concerns for achieving an international extradition treaty, or bilateral treaties 
between countries like the U.K. and Saudi Arabia, that ought to strike a balance between the 
goals of extradition and protecting individual rights under international obligations. This chapter 
proposes a definition for extradition that takes into account this balance.  
Finally, this chapter argues that the international community ought to adopt a hybrid judicial-
administrative extraditions system, otherwise called a dual system, in order to create flexibility 
for countries to adopt an international extradition treaty. More importantly, this dual system 
would reconcile the goals of extradition while adhering to international obligations to individual 
rights.  
2.2 The History of Extradition 
The historical development of extradition law has been haphazard, often influenced by politics 
and the needs of the states. The first ever recorded extradition agreement in the world dates from 
around 1280 B.C.68 An agreement, providing for the return of prisoners, war refugees, and 
criminals who had fled from one part of a territory to another, was made within a peace treaty 
document between Rameses II of Egypt and the Hittite King Hattusili III.69 One important 
feature of this agreement was that extradition was only part of a larger document, designated for 
wider purposes, which is “characteristic of most early examples of extradition, or rendition 
agreements.”70  
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Extradition seems to have been a universal phenomenon.  It occurred in all religions and all parts 
of the world. According to Gilbert, extradition occurred among the Romans up to about 100 
BC.71 The Hindu Code of Manu provided for the return of criminal fugitives.72 Scholars agree 
that earlier extraditions or renditions were “politically motivated” and linked to ancient laws of 
war and peace agreements.73 It was uncommon to pursue fugitives who had committed criminal 
acts: “common criminals were the least sought after species of offenders.”74 Banishment of 
criminals was viewed as a blessing as it meant the removal of unwanted elements from society 
and it was not considered worth the effort to seek the return of criminals.75 Besides, common 
criminals were most frequently subject to private justice or individual reprisals.76 Sometimes, 
wars were waged against criminals who had absconded and fled a jurisdiction.  This is 
exemplified by the famous epic Greek story of the abduction of Helen by Paris, which led to the 
Trojan War in an attempt to retrieve her.77 
2.3 The Early History of Extradition Under Islamic Law 
Much of the discussion in this chapter is about Western, particularly British, developments in 
extradition. It is not possible to describe parallel developments in the Middle East, particularly 
Saudi Arabia. As noted by Jones and Doobay for the student of the history of criminal law,78 the 
student of history of Saudi Arabian criminal law will recognize the unrewarding character of the 
search for sources. It can be said that there are currently very few academic legal materials or 
writings in respect to the origins, evolution, application of extradition law and practice in Saudi 
Arabia. Any examination of extradition under Islamic law would have to begin and proceed 
through the sources of Islamic law like the Koran, and the speeches of the Holy Prophet 
Mohammad (hereinafter “Prophet Mohammad”).  
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The concept of extraditing individuals has historical roots in the Islamic context. For example, 
over fourteen centuries ago (in the sixth year of Hijra), the Prophet Mohammad [SAW]79 made 
the Houdibiyah Pact80 with the leaders of Mecca which stipulated that: 
“There would be one-sided extradition – the Makkans taking refuge with the 
Prophet [in Madina] would be handed over on demand to the Quraish [the rulers 
of Makkah], but Muslims taking refuge in Makkah would not be handed over to 
the Prophet.”81  
Another example is when, because of religious persecution, a small group of Muslims, on the 
advice of the Prophet, migrated to Abyssinia (now Ethiopia), the Makkans under the leadership 
of Amr Ibnul Aas and Abdullah Ibne Abu Rabi’ah unsuccessfully petitioned Negus, the 
Ethiopian King, for the extradition of migrated Muslims.82 
Indeed, even in the Qur’an there are oblique references to the concept of refugee women, which 
can be interpreted as a form of extradition. The guidance on how to treat refugee women is 
contained in the following verses:  
“… When come unto you believing women – refugees, then ye examine them; 
return ye not them onto the disbelievers, neither these women are not lawful for 




The reference to the refugees in the above quotation points to the fact that extradition, in one 
form or another, occurred and is, therefore, permitted under Islamic law because of the above 
historical precedent, albeit the historical precedents for extradition under Islamic law are focused 
primarily on religious persecution. 
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2.4 The Early History of Extradition Under English Law 
Historically, the position adopted by, for instance, early English jurists was that extradition was 
not compatible with the common law. It was noted in this respect that 
“It is held, and hath been so resolved, that divided kingdoms under several kings in 
league one with another are sanctuaries for servants or subjects flying for safety from one 
kingdom to another, and upon demand made by them, are not by the laws and liberties of 
kingdoms to be delivered: and this (some hold) is grounded upon the law of 
Deuteronomy. Non trades servum domine suo, qui ad te configuerit.”84   
It was also noted  that “English courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an action: (1) for the 
enforcement, either directly or indirectly, of a penal, revenue or other public law of a foreign 
state; or (2) founded on an act of state.”85  
According to Jones and Doobay, “the executive surrender of criminals to and by foreign 
jurisdictions may have been more common and less controversial in earlier times than the 
common lawyers acknowledged.”86 To some degree, this view is not always the case. Some 
variation is inevitable, because countries, influenced by pragmatism and social pressures, as well 
as by administrative and judicial constraints, do not easily let go. 
Therefore, the usefulness of the earlier approach should not be underestimated. Easy extradition 
of alleged criminals from one country to another and without any obstacles is an ideal for any 
requesting country that is still tracking down wanted offenders. There is some evidence that the 
U.K. has sought to develop such arguments in the courts, along with other common law 
jurisdictions like the U.S.87 It is submitted that the problem with such an approach being 
meaningful, effective, and fair is that (a) it undermines the very foundation, purpose, and 
safeguards built into extradition treaties; (b) such treaties enjoy the authority of Parliament in the 
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U.K., a western democratic state making efforts towards greater transparency and accountability; 
and (c) it blurs certainty of legal conduct at an international level for alleged criminals and states. 
Jones and Doobay88 refer to the treaty of 1174 between Henry II of England and William of 
Scotland allowing for the exchange of criminals fleeing from one country to another, with an 
alternative of such criminals being arrested and tried within the other country. This approach, it 
is submitted, can only effectively work when the relevant ‘extradition’ crimes are the same in 
substance (as well as being recognised by both states as being the same in substance as distinct 
from the label or description of the crime), and the rules of evidence and procedure in criminal 
matters, even if different, ensure equivalent safeguards for such suspected or actual criminals. 
Otherwise, there is a danger of fundamental unfairness by states between themselves exchanging 
such persons, as well as fundamental unfairness to the individual. Therefore, what might be a 
crime in one state may not be in another, or even if they are, the approach to the standard and 
quality of evidence and procedure may be substantially different, so that extraditing would be 
fundamentally unfair or unsafe to the person concerned and unfair or unsafe between states.  
Other English treaties included the treaty of 1303 between Edward I and France; the “Intercusus” 
between Henry VII and the Flemings of 1497; treaties with Portugal in 1373, France in 1498; 
Spain in 1499; France in 1559; and Spain in 1630.89 Shearer has suggested that these did not 
represent a systematic international effort to suppress crime but were rather a reflection of 
gestures of international friendship and co-operation.90 It is submitted that this is significant and 
relevant to the modern debate too, in that extradition treaties which do exist demonstrate perhaps 
a willingness to create workable treaties motivated by economic and political friendship between 
states, for example, which do not have a common law tradition in parallel with the U.K., but 
have an inquisitorial tradition like France, Spain, and indeed Saudi Arabia.  
However rare the extradition of common criminals was, history suggests that it occurred within 
formalised frameworks, such as treaties – mostly subsumed under a larger political or religious 
agreement - and this practice lingered through the Middle Ages. Extradition as part of a formal 
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arrangement became a more common, if still infrequent, practice.91 As indicated by the Treaty of 
1174 between Henry II of England and William of Scotland and the 1303 Treaty of Paris 
between Edward II of England and Philippe the Fair of France, earlier extradition treaties 
focused solely on political offenders.92 The treaty between Charles the Wise, King of France, and 
the Count of Savoy in 1376 marks a break from the general trend of limiting to political 
offenders, in that it provided “the reciprocal rendition of ‘malefactors promptly upon the first 
request’ specifying that the perpetrators of common crimes would be delivered up.”93  This could 
be taken to be the first arrangement dealing with the ‘common’ crimes of murder, rape and theft. 
The basic objectives of extradition, thus, were to maintain internal order of the respective states; 
“international co-operation for the preservation of world societal interest”94 was not the main 
concern at this stage – a notion that would emerge between the sixteenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  On this view, “the law of extradition evolved from the perception that an affront to the 
gods, or to the leader’s authority, had to be avenged, to the desire to promote international co-
operation to combat crime.”95 
2.5 Extradition Evolved From Ad-Hoc State Co-operation Over Political Offences to the 
Extradition of Criminals by Statute or Treaty 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there was a shift away from an “exclusive focus 
on the extradition of political offenders”96 towards a new focus on the extradition of common 
criminals. Prior to the eighteenth century, as discussed earlier, extradition consisted of ad-hoc 
state agreements of courtesy. From the eighteenth century to the nineteenth century, with a 
growing shift towards extraditing common criminals and not for political offences, extradition 
grew to be based more on formalised bilateral and multilateral treaties.97 These treaties became 
ever more concerned with protecting individual rights, in step with the increased interest and 
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theoretical shift in international law toward the recognition of natural and individual human 
rights. In Europe alone, more than ninety treaties stipulating the reciprocal surrender of offenders 
were signed between 1718 and 1830.98 For example, the treaty between France and Wurttemberg 
in 1759 was cited as the model for subsequent extradition treaties.  
Blakesley noted that “rules and procedures of extradition established in these conventions endure 
in the law of extradition to this day. The rules required extradition requests to be made through 
the diplomatic channel or at least through specific frontier authorities. Exact reciprocity was 
demanded.”99 All these provision survive partly or wholly to the present day. The 1759 treaty in 
this sense is seminal, and lays the foundation of contemporary extradition procedures. 
Generally, extradition with all its forms and patterns witnessed an impressive historical 
development. For instance, Parry heavily criticised Coke’s suggestion that from earliest times, 
(based on the English treaties of 1661-1662 with Denmark and Holland for the recovery of 
English regicides) extradition originated as a device for the punishment of treason and rebellion 
(i.e. in modern terms what are considered to be political offences or crimes).100 This idea was 
further discussed by Jones and Doobay,101 who argued that many recorded surrenders, or 
unsuccessful requests, appeared to have involved what were recognised in later legislation as 
political offences. Finally, this idea was weakened as they suggested, and was therefore removed 
from later legislation. Early examples included the Earl of Suffolk being surrendered from Spain 
to Henry VII and then executed; the King of Scotland refusing to surrender Perkin Warbeck 
“The Pretender” to Henry VII; Queen Elizabeth I promising the Scots that she would either 
surrender Boswell, or send him into exile; the States-General of Holland surrendering some 
alleged regicides/political offenders without treaty (although one was later agreed in 1662);102 
and in 1792, the Senate of Hamburg surrendering the Irish nationalist, Napper Tandy to the 
British Government, who was tried and then acquitted.103  
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For example, in the case of East India Co. v. Campell and Murev Kay, Jones and Doobay, 
quoting Chitty On Criminal Law (1826), noted that “an English magistrate may also cause to be 
arrested, and committed for trial, an offender against the Irish law or accused of having 
perpetrated a crime in a foreign country” and also “if a prisoner, having committed a felony in a 
foreign country, come into England, he may be arrested here and conveyed and given up to the 
magistrate of the country against the laws of which the offence was committed.”104 It is 
important to note here that the English legal approach to extradition moved from the exercise of 
executive powers and prerogatives to extradition statutes.105 However, it was apparent that this 
move to statutory authority was not a condition of establishing a treaty with another state, 
regardless of whether or not this latter approached the subject in the same way. Shearer, on the 
other hand, referred to 92 treaties concluded internationally from 1718 to 1830. These treaties 
provided for the surrender of criminals, mostly between neighbouring states in Europe. He 
compared these to the more complex procedural approach of common law systems, which was 
cumbersome. He suggested that it was geographical isolation as an island nation that had led to a 
jealous protection of traditions of asylum/sanctuary in what became the U.K.106 
Jones and Doobay107 argued that the first modern British treaty was the Jay Treaty (1794-1807) 
that provided for the mutual exchange of offenders between the U.S. and Great Britain 
(especially in British Colonies). However, in practice, only a few fugitives were surrendered 
under the said treaty, but extraditions still took place afterwards. This suggests that either the 
treaty was largely ineffective, or it happened that there were very few cases warranting 
extradition. This was further argued by Jones and Doobay, who noted that the Jay Treaty was an 
instrument of ‘Amity, Commerce and Navigation’ and that Article 27 embodied a recognisably 
modern requirement to produce prima facie evidence of guilt.108  
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Historically, by 1802 Great Britain and other signatories to the Peace of Amines, that is France, 
Spain and Holland, agreed to the mutual surrender of offenders for particular offences, these 
being murder, forgery, or fraudulent bankruptcy. 
Jones and Doobay109 argued that the British law of extradition can be said to date from the 
bilateral extradition statues of 1843. Initially, from 1824 to 1828, attempts were made to 
negotiate a new treaty between the United Kingdom and the United States, but it failed because 
of the unwillingness of the United Kingdom to undertake the return of runaway slaves.110 This 
incident confirms that the existence of a mutual co-operation, amity and commerce treaty or 
understanding between two nations is not a guarantee of success. In the British and American 
case, the United Kingdom’s moral and legal position on the issue of runaway slaves was contrary 
to the United States’ position and practice. The different attitudes as well as definitions and 
defining concepts of offences remained the main obstacle for nation-states to reach an 
agreement.  
In the absence of any agreement or treaty, the situation would undoubtedly be rather difficult, as 
suggested by Clarke111 when studying the British-American case but generally, as noted earlier, 
countries do sometimes exchange or extradite criminals on the basis of an existing friendly 
agreement, even if it lacks an explicit extradition provision. 
Clarke revealed important problems in treating the Creole case.112 When a number of slaves 
revolted on an American ship, murdered a slave master, injured the captain and the crew, then 
took the ship to the Bahamas (a British possession), the British governor refused to surrender 
them to the American authorities; and this was again due to an absence of a treaty between the 
two countries. This led to an interesting debate in the House of Lords.113  
It was the unanimous view of the House of Lords that extradition without an order of Parliament 
was unlawful. This appears to suggest that criminals from one country are able to escape from 
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justice when they commit an offence in another country.  The problem with handing over such 
criminals in the absence of a treaty is that the rule of law is not upheld.  It was Lord Brougham 
who emphasised that when laws exist giving powers to both sides to a treaty it is provided under 
“…due regulation and safeguards.”114 
Jones and Doobay115 argued that these statutes were largely ineffective since extraditing courts 
would often not allow extradition to occur, on the basis that they were not satisfied by the prima 
facie case. 
It was the case of In re Winsor,116 which demonstrated the limitations of the types of crime for 
which extradition was available under the Ashburton Treaty.  The Court of the Queen’s Bench 
held that conduct defined as forgery in a statute of the State of New York, but not within the 
federal law of the United States, was not forgery in English law, although it amounted to the 
English offence of fraud.  Extradition might be granted only for the listed offences against the 
law of England and the general law of the United States, and not for offences made criminal only 
by the laws of a particular state in the American union.  In the relevant statute of the 1870 Act, 
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the comparison of offences, therefore, was not permitted.117 This demonstrates that if an offence 
is to be eligible under the terms of an extradition treaty, the definitions must be agreed upon or 
accepted by each signatory nation, otherwise alleged offences may not properly be recognised by 
either party.  
It is important to note, in the evolution of signatories to treaties, that between 1862 and 1866, key 
treaties were signed between Britain and two other European nations (with Denmark in 1862 and 
with Prussia in 1864). However, the agreements reached at that time were not fully a success. As 
Jones and Doobay argued,118 the lack of success of extradition cases between Great Britain and 
other nations was affected by the physical insularity of the country, as opposed to physically 
neighbouring nations like the U.S. and Canada, where judges appeared to be more willing to co-
operate with one another.  However, they argued that there had always been an aversion to the 
surrender of political offenders or refugees, as debates and discussions upon the passing of the 
Extradition Act of 1870 made clear.119 
Historical cases of the establishment of extradition treaties despite legal diversity between 
nations also occurred. An example to note here is when Great Britain established a treaty with 
China known as the Treaty of Nankin or as the Treaty of Bogue. This made provision for the 
return from Hong Kong to China of Chinese people who had committed offences against their 
own government “on proof, or admission of their guilt.”120 The Treaty of Nankin demonstrates 
that Great Britain was perfectly capable of establishing a treaty with a country with a very 
different legal system. 
2.6 Modern Day Extradition Agreements 
Political and economic forces are said to be the motivating factors in the development of modern 
extradition laws. The element of political force can be attributed to the emergence of the modern 
nation state and the early notions of the comity of nations. However, economic concerns seem to 
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“have the most impact in driving states towards mutual co-operation on extradition.”121 As 
argued by Bassiouni, extradition as a tool of international co-operation gained momentum “as 
part of the efforts of the world community to combat piracy.”122 By the nineteenth century, 
economic and technological forces, including the development of new forms of transport 
(steamship and railway), the increasing cosmopolitan nature of cities, and the general increase in 
commerce between states and concomitant international mobility of populations had vastly 
increased the need for inter-state co-operation.123 As noted by Shearer “if a state did not take 
effective measures against the incursion of foreign criminals it would quickly find itself a 
seething haven for the undesirables of other lands.”124 
Extradition law flourished in the latter half of the nineteenth century. These laws were generally 
formulated through treaties, and also, through the passage of acts and statutes. The development 
took place in states with both civil law codes and common law codes. As noted above, the 1759 
Treaty between France and Wurttemberg “represented the prototype for the modern extradition 
treaty.”125 Other French treaties during the nineteenth century set the legal standard for 
subsequent extradition agreements and practices. French concepts were to shape future treaties 
and extradition practices where the French were setting the trends in this field. 
While France was leading in the domain of executive aspects of extradition in civil law 
countries, the United States emerged as an early leader in the development of a substantial body 
of extradition jurisprudence. “Judicial decisions in the United States have been important in the 
early development of modern extradition law.”126  
As Clarke noted: 
“In the matter of extradition, the American law was, until 1870, better than that of any 
country in the world; and the decisions of the American judges are the best existing 
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expositions of the duty of extradition, in its relation at once to the judicial rights of 
nations and the general interests of the civilisation of the world.”127 
A good degree of modern U.K. extradition law was based on the Extradition Act of 1870.128 
Jones and Doobay argued that the Act of 1870 was the first in the United Kingdom to actually 
use the term “extradition.”129  According to Shearer,130 the word is of French origin, first used in 
a decree of 1791, and used in official US contexts from 1848.  Clive Parry however, cited several 
government papers between 1868 and 1901, which appeared to confine the use of the word 
‘extradition’ to surrenders affected pursuant to formal treaties, whereas the word ‘surrender’, or 
‘rendition’ were appropriate to the return of, for example, military deserters under particular 
military agreements.131 Extradition was never used to apply to the return of fugitive offenders 
within the British Empire.132 The Act of 1870 emphasised particular issues: that, for instance, 
treaties were recognised to allow flexibility in new treaties with other states without requiring a 
new Act of Parliament for each case.133 It acknowledged that extradition was primarily a political 
act: that is, the surrender by one government to another of an alleged criminal.  Thus, the 
Secretary of State was given discretion in every case whether to issue an order to proceed, under 
Section 7 of the Act.  At the end of the court process, he would be given, by Section 11, further 
discretion for whether to surrender.  
The 1870 Act recognised that arrest might be affected without an order from a Secretary of State, 
though he had the power to cancel such a warrant and to decline to order further proceedings.134 
The courts had a slightly different role. Their duty was to determine whether the evidence 
produced by a foreign state would be sufficient to justify committal for trial, if the alleged 
criminals’ conduct had been committed in England.135 In determining this question, the courts 
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were given the same jurisdiction and powers as near as may be as if the Court were dealing with 
a defendant in ordinary committal for trial proceedings.  
The Act also recognised the principle of double criminality in that the foreign crime alleged 
should be an extradition crime, or “a crime which if committed in England would be one of the 
crimes described in the first schedule to this Act.”136 
The Act required that a magistrate must inform a fugitive, on committal, of his right to apply for 
a writ of habeas corpus, and that he would not be surrendered before the expiry of at least 15 
days after committal to allow for such an application.137 However, there was a restriction in 
respect of political offences. Extradition would not be applied for offences of a political 
character, or even if it were proved that “the requisition for his surrender has in fact, been made 
with a view to try, or punish the offender for an offence of a political character.”138 Nor should a 
fugitive criminal be surrendered unless provisions were made by the law of the foreign state that 
he: 
“shall not, until he has been restored to or had an opportunity of returning to Her 
Majesty’s Dominions, be detained or tried for any offence prior to his surrender other 
than the extradition crime proved by the facts on which his surrender was grounded.”139 
Jones and Doobay argue that the English constitutional mind was offended by even the 
possibility that an autocratic foreign power might pursue a refugee and enlist the English courts 
for that purpose.140 A detailed review of 19th century attitudes to the political offences exception 
appears in the speech of Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison.141 
The Act itself failed to deal with delays and oppressive use. In contrast, the Fugitive Offenders 
Act of 1881 provided a wide power to the High Court to discharge a defendant committed by a 
magistrate, on the grounds that it would be unjust or oppressive to return him.142 
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The importance of a treaty for extradition cannot be over-emphasised, as this may influence 
judges, as Jones and Doobay suggested. They argued that modern judges are not troubled in the 
absence of statutory encouragement by the dangers posed to political offenders by requests from 
a foreign power friendly enough to share common extradition arrangements with the U.K.143 
They might, however, be disposed to treat with more sympathy the problems of a fugitive who 
the requesting state had failed, through inefficiency, to pursue for many years, or who had, in 
other respects, been treated oppressively. 
The Extradition Act of 1873 slightly amended the 1870 Act by adding indictable offences under 
the Malicious Damage Act, the Forgery Act, the Coinage Act, and the Offences Against the 
Person Act.  It is notable that the Royal Commission of 1877 recommended that; “even if any 
State should fail to concede full Reciprocity, there is no principle which should make this 
country unwilling to surrender, and so get rid of, the fugitive subjects of other States, whose 
subjects have been guilty of crime and his surrender is asked for.”144 
 
The concept of reciprocity is important in extradition, though it is not always essential.145 
Reciprocity, as a principle, was formulated through the many international legal assistance treaties.146 
Generally, states will only give legal assistance to another state if there is reciprocity for such legal 
assistance.147 Therefore, it was suggested that statutory powers should be given to the government 
to surrender fugitive criminals in the absence of treaties, whose purpose was to ensure 
reciprocity. Ultimately, this was not accepted.148 The Commission was concerned with 
provisions in existing treaties, which forbade the extradition of a country’s own nationals to 
another.  The reason for this restriction they said, was that a state fails in its duty to its subjects if 
it hands them over to a foreign jurisdiction; that unqualified confidence could not be placed in 
the capacity of foreign courts to try the subjects of other states; the subject would have to defend 
                                                 
143
 See Jones and Doobay, n.78, 1-016, at 17-18, citing T v. Home Secretary [1996] AC 742. 
144
 Ibid at 19. 
145
 See H. Grützner, ‘International Judicial Assistance and Co-operation in Criminal Matters,’ in M. Bassiouni and 
V. Nanda (eds.), A Treatise on International Criminal Law: Jurisdiction and Co-operation (Springfield, Illinois: 
Thomas 1973), at 189, 230. 
146




 See Jones and Doobay, n.78, 1-018, at 19. 
 35 
himself where his language was not understood, and where he was unable to call character 
witnesses.149 
The Commission’s view was that this restriction should be omitted in subsequent treaties for as 
long as Parliament saw necessary.150 It is submitted that such issues can easily be resolved in the 
modern environment by the use of interpreters, expert witnesses, and the allowance of character 
witness in respect of extradition crimes. 
Great Britain’s Extradition Act was enacted in 1870 and was of great importance. This, as it went 
along, put extradition practice onto a new footing and in the twentieth century it took new forms. 
The emergence of international and human rights laws influenced extradition in a meaningful 
way. Ultimately, the approach to convicted criminals was brought into line with the general law 
of extradition via the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1967. It incorporated aspects in relation to 
double criminality; the powers of the Secretary of State and the executive, the duties of 
magistrates and the judiciary, the political exception, and the particular rules of habeas corpus.151 
After the adoption of human rights in the UN Assembly, it became an overarching effect, and 
human rights concerns have now to be accommodated by all statutes concerning extradition.152 
Also, enactments on extradition have to allow for the norms of international law. While these 
aspects gave depth to extradition practice, they also created a tension between sovereign rights 
and human rights. This relationship is discussed later (in Chapter 3, section 3.8) in order to 
thoroughly express its importance vis-à-vis extradited alleged offenders. 
Modern law became consolidated in the form of the Extradition Act of 1989, which essentially 
brought together the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1967, and the 
Extradition Act of 1870 (as amended).  Ultimately, there were further legislative changes 
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resulting in the Extradition Act of 2003 incorporating various changes to extradition law as 
approached by the European Union. 
2.7 Extradition Exists Within National and International Frameworks 
Having discussed the historical background and the traditional evolutionary process of 
extradition on how it used to be approached in Europe and the US, it is now crucial to identify 
extradition as a concept. As shown by its historical development above, extradition inherently 
involves both national and international law.153 However, because of diverse approaches to 
extradition by states, it was, and still is, a direct reflection of nation-states’ national and legal 
interests. While treaties govern the extradition of alleged fugitives between states, domestic law 
ultimately decides whether or not to extradite an alleged fugitive.154 Yet, extradition law from 
state to state “differ fundamentally in respect of a wide range of matters, including the 
incorporation of extradition treaties, the respective roles of the executive and the judiciary in the 
extradition process, the quantum of proof required for extradition, and the extradition of 
nationals.”155  
States may also have different human rights obligations under their respective constitutions or 
under international law, as interpreted and applied by states.156 Further, as discussed in more 
detail below, some states like the U.K. treat extradition under its criminal law, while other states 
like Saudi Arabia treats extradition as part of its administrative law, a distinction that impacts the 
procedures for extradition and often the existence of safeguards to individual rights.   
Within the framework of international law, extradition falls under international criminal law, 
meaning that it must also fall within the limits of international agreements and principles of 
international law, including human rights obligations.157 Additionally, since international 
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criminal law “addresses the content of international crimes,”158 extradition is limited to 
extraditable crimes within the framework of an international agreement. Alternatively, however, 
extradition can be viewed as part of procedural international criminal law.159 When viewed 
within the procedural framework of international criminal law, states may be able to justify the 
ad hoc use of extradition outside international obligations, and resort to alternatives to extradition 
such as irregular rendition. Viewing extradition as part of international criminal law and thus 
with the aim towards a unified body of law, moves closer to an international convention on 
extradition that can balance competing human rights obligations. 
It is hopeful that with the current rising threat of a number of crimes of a trans-national character, 
such as international terrorism, human trafficking, money laundering, and the spread of 
organised crime, countries’ approaches to and definitions of extradition began to bridge their 
differences. Offences, which used to be individual, national concerns, have not only become 
international, but call for a global united response. The trend toward a more uniform view of 
extradition is reflected in a number of international and regional gatherings. One of these was the 
Global Response to Global Terrorism Conference held at the Royal United Services Institute, in 
which Mr. Jack Straw addressed the attendees (on January 16th 2006) by declaring that: 
“this terrorism is global in another sense too – its overarching goal is to change the world 
in which we live. Guy Fawkes and the 19th Century revolutionaries justified their actions 
by saying that they wanted to bring down specific forms of government. The Irish 
Republican Army said that all they wanted was for Northern Ireland to be incorporated 
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into the Irish Republic. In contrast, the aims of today’s global terrorism go beyond such 
relatively narrow national or political objectives. We are seeing an attack on the 
international community as a whole – on our common values and on our shared future. 
Today I want to set out how our response must match the scale and breadth of this attack. 
On the one hand, we need to co-operate at an international and multilateral level to share 
evidence and intelligence, to disrupt terrorists’ networks, to cut off their sources of 
financing and to bring terrorists to justice.”160 
So, a shared threat of this nature called for shared and mutual tasks and efforts. He added, in this 
respect that  
“At the same time, we need a global effort to confront the propaganda of the terrorist, to 
address the sources of discontent which terrorists seek to exploit and to build a sense of 
common commitment to prosperity, peace and security based on freedom and the rule of 
law.”161 
However, a shared threat, a common interest of this sort remains purely rhetorical if it does not 
translate into concrete deeds. The call and necessity for a formal agreement of some sort would 
form a good and legitimate venue for countries to claim and request the extradition and return of 
particular alleged offenders, as well as terrorists. However, as discussed earlier, nation-states still 
perceive and define concepts like extradition according to their own national laws and legal 
judicial systems. So, in order to better clarify this issue, it may perhaps be useful to define 
extradition and the types of extradition systems.  
2.8 Traditional and contemporary definitions of the term extradition 
The concept of extradition has existed for over three thousand years, and originated from the 
Middle East.162 The term extradition, however, was not well established until the mid to late 
nineteenth century. In Great Britain, the term was not commonly accepted until after the passing 
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of the Extradition Act of 1870.163 The word extradition is derived from the Latin extradere, 
which means ‘forceful return of a person to his sovereign’. Bassiouni, on the other hand, 
speculated that the term is a contracted form of ’extra-tradition’ referring to “the surrender of a 
person who has been granted the privilege of presence of the traditions of asylum and hospitality 
of the requesting state.”164 However, Shearer maintained that extradition was a “term of art”165 
which was imported into England from France.  
It is important to discuss first the history and development of the definition of extradition in both 
the West and under Islamic law. This section shows that regardless of its origins and the 
development of contemporary definitions of extradition, the international community still lacks a 
universal definition for a legal process that has such international dimensions. This lack of a 
universally accepted definition creates challenges when proposing an international extradition 
convention, or even an extradition treaty between the U.K. and Saudi Arabia. This section 
proposes a definition for extradition that takes into account individual rights and international 
obligations. 
2.8.1 Common Definitions of Extradition 
The common definition of the word extradition is a formal legal process where one nation 
surrenders an individual to another nation, usually for criminal prosecution.166 The above 
definition, however, is too general and simplistic and neither describes the circumstances or the 
purpose for which the person is to be handed over and returned. The United States Supreme 
Court in Terlinden v. Ames defined extradition as: 
“the surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an 
offence outside of its own territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, 
which being competent to try and punish him, demands the surrender.”167 
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The U.S. Supreme Court definition, although useful, does not explain what kind of offences may 
be involved. It is the concept of “offenders” (with all the variety of specific offences that the 
term may include) that lends itself to disagreement about the return or extradition of alleged 
offenders.  The U.S. Supreme Court definition is, thus, deficient because it fails to address, for 
example, the issue of reciprocity, an issue upon which modern extradition is based and often 
used as justification.  
Generally, Halsbury’s Laws of England has provided a more comprehensive and inclusive 
definition of extradition. It covers all aspects of extradition, including that it is a formal process 
based on mutual arrangements between the countries involved, concerns an individual who has 
been accused of an extraditable crime, and is subject to trial under his own country’s law. He 
noted that: 
“Extradition is the formal surrender by one country to another, based on reciprocal 
arrangements partly judicial and partly administrative, of an individual accused or 
convicted of a serious criminal offence committed outside the territory of the 
extraditing country and within the jurisdiction of the requesting country which, being 
competent by its own law to try and punish him, demands the fugitive’s 
surrender.”168 
This definition is more appropriate and accurately, applicable to the practice used in common 
law countries such as Britain, Australia and New Zealand. On the other hand, Bassiouni defined 
extradition as involving “processes whereby one sovereign [state] surrenders to another 
sovereign [state] a person sought after, an accused criminal or a fugitive offender.”169 This 
definition can be viewed as taking a more formal quality. Further, he saw that a “contemporary 
practice means a formal process by which a person is surrendered by one state to another based 
on a treaty, reciprocity, or comity.”170 This definition places emphasis on the formal quality that 
characterises the contemporary extradition process.171 
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Blakesley, in contrast, stressed the judicial character of modern extradition practice, especially 
when he defined it as “the international judicial rendition of fugitives charged with an 
extraditable offence and sought for trial, or already convicted and sought for punishment.”172 
In the U.K., the Home Office has put forward a clear definition: “the return of a wanted criminal 
from a country where he or she is accused of, or has been convicted of, a criminal offence.”173 
Extradition prevents criminals escaping punishment by fleeing to another country. In the U.S., 
extradition also applies between states to stop criminals evading justice by crossing internal 
borders. Congress passed a law shortly after the Constitution was adopted, imposing upon the 
Governor of each state the duty to deliver up fugitives from justice found in that state.174 
2.8.2 Definition of Extradition in Islamic law 
In the Islamic world, a number of definitions of the term ‘extradition’ have also been advanced. 
For example, Alfadil stated that extradition is “a procedure by which a particular state hands in a 
person, who is present within its jurisdiction, to another state in order to be tried for punishable 
acts or to carry out a court verdict against him.”175 
According to this definition, which is commonly used in the Middle East, there are two kinds of 
criminals who might be subject to extradition. These are firstly persons who have committed a 
crime within the jurisdiction of state A, but have not been convicted and have escaped to state B. 
The second category includes people who have been convicted under the jurisdiction of state A, 
but have escaped to state B. 
Abu Amir defined extradition as: 
“[a] procedure, which involves one state requesting another state to hand in an accused or 
convicted person in order to serve his or her sentence or stand trial. Such a request is, 
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usually, based on the grounds that the party which requests extradition has a full 
jurisdiction to try or sentence the individual concerned.”176 
2.8.3 There exists no internationally recognized definition for extradition 
There is currently no internationally agreed upon definition for extradition.177 The United 
Nations Model Extradition Treaty gives no definition to extradition.178 To facilitate extradition, 
sovereign states enter into bilateral extradition treaties.  Such treaties spell out the terms of any 
extradition and would include a list of all crimes for which a person can be extradited, or else 
covers them with more general descriptions, such as any crime punishable with three years’ 
imprisonment or some heavier penalty.  
Internationally, thus, extradition may have numerous definitions depending on the treaty. This 
definitional problem creates difficulty when discussing the possibility of an international 
extradition convention or even an extradition treaty between the U.K. and Saudi Arabia. For 
example, whether the process is judicial or administrative, as discussed later, creates significant 
procedural challenges. Additionally, from the perspective of international law, these definitions 
do not usually take into account international obligations since they are entered into between two 
countries. Even more problematic is when countries do not have an extradition treaty to work 
from. It is, thus, imperative for the international community to arrive at an agreed upon definition 
for extradition.  
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2.9 There are two types of extradition systems: judicial and administrative.  
The process of extradition will largely depend on the legal system of a country, as influenced by 
a number of factors like the system of government, constitutional law, and history among 
others.179 In this regards, extradition developed primarily in two types of systems: judicial and 
administrative. This section shows that the distinction between a judicial and administrative 
system for extradition is significant in discussing the interplay among extraterritoriality, 
extradition, and individual rights. A country’s extradition system exists within the framework of 
that country’s legal system. The rule of extraterritoriality protects this sovereign choice. Yet, the 
judicial extradition system, for instance, may arguably be more conducive for protecting 
individual rights than the administrative system. The distinction, thus, affects how a country may 
reconcile its extradition system within its international obligations vis-a-vis its obligations to 
protect individual rights. This section explains each system, discusses its advantages and 
disadvantages, and proposes that the international community should adopt a hybrid judicial-
administrative system that could be reconciled with various legal systems. 
2.9.1 The judicial system 
Under this process, an extradition request would be submitted to the court with jurisdiction in the 
country where the fugitive criminal resides. The court studies the case and the evidence provided 
in the request. If the court is satisfied that the conditions of the extradition are met, it issues an 
arrest warrant against the individual and sets the date for a trial. The court subsequently holds a 
public session where the prosecution is required to provide all the evidence and documents 
submitted by the country requesting the extradition. The individual concerned would have an 
access to a lawyer who would conduct the defence on his behalf. Upon the completion of this 
process, the court decides whether to allow the extradition, or to reject the application. In both 
cases, it grants the right of appeal to both parties. However, if the court allows the extradition, it 
will not be able to oblige the government to carry it out. On the other hand, if it rejects the 
application, the government would not be able to proceed and extradite the individual. The 
judicial system is most commonly followed by the majority of developed and democratic 
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countries, including the United Kingdom, Argentina, Brazil, Finland, Italy, Sweden, and 
Turkey.180 
The judicial extradition mechanism evidently recognises the importance of due process. It is 
transparent and reflects the democratic values that support human rights. This process however, 
suffers from a few disadvantages. Firstly, it can take a long time to extradite someone. For 
example, if the country requesting the extradition has not completed its investigations regarding 
the person it seeks to extradite, it will not be able to provide solid evidence that would 
substantiate its request. In this case, the court in the country hosting the individual concerned 
might reject the extradition request. Secondly, the fact that judicial extradition requires the 
conduct of a fair trial might create an impression in the minds of the judges in the country 
requesting the extradition that the individual concerned is actually guilty, otherwise the 
extraditing country would not have handed him over. Thirdly, there may be instance where, 
despite the individual’s guilt, he cannot be extradited, because of the absence of clear compelling 
evidence. The relevant evidence may not be available as the individual concerned may have left 
the country soon after committing the alleged crime, making the task of gathering evidence 
against him very difficult for the responsible authorities. 
2.9.2 The administrative system 
By virtue of this system, extradition is perceived as an act of sovereignty on the part of the host 
country and accordingly, the executive branch in the state requesting the extradition would 
submit the extradition request to the country concerned. In turn, the country receiving it would 
refer it to the competent authorities, which under the administrative system is the executive 
branch of government. The process is carried out by diplomatic channels181 through which the 
request is passed to the ministry concerned with justice. The ministry studies it and makes a 
decision. Whatever the outcome, it is communicated to the ministry dealing with foreign affairs, 
which informs the state requesting the extradition through its diplomatic mission.182  
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Thus, under this system, the judicial machinery is not involved in the extradition process even if 
it requires the arrest of the individual concerned, as the security agencies carry out such arrests. 
Furthermore, the individual concerned is not a party in this process and will not be notified until 
a final decision has been reached. The administrative system prevailed in France until 1927, 
when it was replaced by the judicial system. However, many countries still follow the 
administrative system. These include, for example, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Cuba, Portugal, 
Panama, Egypt, and numerous Eastern European countries. Extradition through the 
administrative system was also followed in the U.S. from 1794 to 1842. 
Like other systems, the administrative mechanism has both advantages and disadvantages. 
Amongst the advantages it offers, it plays an important role in terms of improving relations 
between the country requesting the extradition and the recipient of the request, as the latter 
would expect that, should it submit an extradition request, its request would be treated in the 
same way. Another is the speediness of its process, because complex and lengthy judicious 
interventions are side-stepped.183 The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) may be an example of 
this administrative mechanism that has made it easier to extradite an individual among countries 
with an EAW.184  
As for its disadvantages, under an administrative system, the individual concerned might become 
a victim of injustice. This could happen when a particular country, coming under enormous 
political pressure, or seeking to enhance its relations with the country requesting the extradition, 
hands over an individual without being satisfied that all the conditions for the extradition are 
met. This is similar to the criticisms over the adoption of the EAW in the U.K., where the U.K. 
requirement for determining whether an arrest warrant has actually issued has been amended to 
allow an EAW arrest warrant if there is a likelihood that the arrest warrant would issue. 
Additionally, the requirement of double criminality, which requires that an act must constitute a 
crime in both countries for it to be an extraditable offence, has been abandoned in the EAW 
regime.185 In other cases, the country requesting the extradition might, in order to secure the 
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extradition of a particular individual, provide false accusations then sentence him for completely 
different reasons.186 
Additionally, administrative extradition is often conducted by the executive branch of 
government, which does not have the legal competence to examine extradition request 
documents and to reach, accordingly, an informed, judicious, and sound decision. Moreover, it is 
always conducted with a total lack of transparency, thus excluding any form of accountability 
from the judicial and legislative authorities. It is, therefore, more likely that it would undermine 
human rights and democratic values. The decision may be driven more by politics than any 
compelling evidence.187 
Personal contacts and connections might also play a role in administrative extradition. This, 
could occur when the individual concerned is well connected and can influence the decision of 
the host government. 
2.9.3 The dual (judicial-administrative) system 
Because of the strong criticism of the administrative system due to its neglect of the rights of the 
accused, and the difficulty of extradition through the judicial system, which grants the accused 
legal guarantees that make extradition a difficult matter, the dual system came into existence to 
mitigate these shortcomings. The international community ought to adopt the dual system to give 
more flexibility for various countries with conflicting extradition systems. The dual system, for 
example, may be able to help reconcile differences between the U.K. and Saudi extradition 
system, and make it possible for both countries to arrive at an extradition treaty.  
The dual system is also referred to as the Belgian system. It first appeared in 1927.188 It is based 
on granting the judicial machinery the right to study extradition requests and gauge their legality. 
The role of the judicial authority, in this case, is an advisory one, as it leaves the final decision in 
the hands of the executive branch of government, because extradition is considered to be an act 
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of sovereignty. The dual system seeks to strike a balance between two opposing interests: the 
interest of the country seeking the extradition, and the interests of the individual concerned. 
Thus, the judicial authorities examine the legality of the extradition request, while they leave the 
actual decision of extradition in the hands of the government.189 The main advantage of this 
system is the flexibility of its procedures, while safeguarding the interests of the country 
requesting the extradition and the individual concerned.190 This system is followed by a number 
of countries, including Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Poland, and Belgium.191 
This appears to be more efficient than purely judicial or administrative systems, as it seeks to 
achieve the following: 
• Safeguard the interests of the individual concerned by giving him the right to defend 
himself. Access to due process and judicial mechanisms ensures that the individual’s civil 
liberties can be protected. 
• Safeguard the interests of the government by giving it the right to exercise its 
sovereignty. This is particularly important after 9/11 as it allows for a more expeditious 
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Chapter Three 
Towards an International Extradition Convention:  
Shortcomings and Obstacles 
3.1 Introduction 
Attitudes towards extradition (in all its types and systems as well as related theories) differ from 
country to country, conforming to the particular national interests and legal and judicial legacy, 
as well as the cultural and religious values at play. Extradition, as a process, is essentially a 
national concern.192 However, there are other aspects and dimensions to extradition. How does 
extradition fit within international law? How does extradition fit with human rights? What 
international bodies are involved in the process of extradition?   
This chapter first frames the current international extradition system within the framework of 
international law, which does not impose any obligation on states to extradite individuals. 
Despite the broad acceptance of jus cogens193 and the growing internationalisation of crimes, the 
current international extradition system remains unable to entice, much less obligate, large 
number of states to agree to an international extradition convention. Yet, steps must be taken 
toward an international extradition convention. 
This chapter argues that the current United Nations Model Extradition Treaty, which does not 
oblige U.N. members as it is only a model treaty, is insufficient to address modern concerns over 
international extradition. This chapter argues that, in light of the historical development of 
extradition law and international law at large towards the protection of individual rights, United 
Nations Model Extradition Treaty lacks a necessary definition for extradition and fails to fully 
protect human rights. The international community, however, should still use United Nations 
Model Extradition Treaty as a starting point for an international extradition convention. This 
paper argues that countries may be able to agree to a set of universally extraditable crimes 
following universal jurisdiction jurisprudence.  
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Finally, this chapter argues that the current international extradition system simply fails in 
adequately protecting human rights. While many countries, including the U.K. and Saudi Arabia, 
has international obligations toward the protection of human rights by virtue of their membership 
in the U.N., numerous reasons exist for countries to loosen individual rights protection or 
circumvent extradition agreements to achieve their aims of extraditing individuals. The trend in 
the international extradition system has been to achieve the ends of extraditing individuals at the 
expense of human rights and international obligations. An examination of the increased use of 
alternatives to extradition and the erosion of the political offence and death penalty exceptions to 
extradition reveal a troubling trend away from protecting human rights. To create a more 
effective balance between the aims of extradition and human rights, the international community 
must act towards the creation of an international extradition convention.   
3.2 Extradition and international law 
The idea that there should be a body of “higher law,” a jus cogens, within the international 
community has gained broad acceptance over the past few decades.194 International law can “be 
characterized as a system of law regulating the interrelationship of sovereign states.”195 The 
notion of the creation of a jus cogens was first articulated in the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
Law Treaties,196 which states that a treaty is invalid if it conflicts with the norms of general 
international law. With regard to what is an international norm, a norm is what has been 
accepted and recognised by the international community of states as a whole from which no 
derogation is permitted.197 
The status of international criminal law, however, is still in its infancy.198 This view has been 
voiced by Gilbert, who holds that no clear consensus exists, and even when agreement is clear, 
it remains quite limited. He says that: 
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 “Despite the efforts of many academic commentators over the years, there is still no 
universally recognized, comprehensive system of international criminal law. Whether 
an offence qualifies as an international crime is a matter of experience and empirical 
study…there are no hard and fast rules that are always followed by all states and the 
number of infractions given this ‘international status is very few.”199  
Similar fears have been expressed by Lord Slynn in the Pinochet case, in his emphasis on the 
still developing character of international criminal law. He held that: 
“It has to be said, however, that at this stage of the development of international law 
that some of those statements read as aspirations, as embryonic. It does not seem to me 
that it has been shown that there is any state practice or general consensus let alone a 
widely supported convention that all crimes against international law should be 
justiciable in National Courts on the basis of the university of jurisdiction…I am not 
satisfied that even now there would be universal acceptance of a definition of crimes 
against humanity.”200 
International law is generally better developed than international criminal law, although most 
analysts would maintain that the former remains in a constant state of flux and development.201  
International law, however, holds regard for the primacy of sovereign nations and in this role 
”remains subsidiary to the law of individual sovereign nations”202 as affirmed in the Lotus 
case.203 The rules of law binding upon states therefore issue from their own free will as 
confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua case.  The ICJ clarified 
that “in international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the 
states concerned.”204  
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As stated in Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,205 there are four 
primary sources of international law, which emphasise the primacy of the sovereign state. These 
are:  
(a) International conventions establishing rules expressly recognised by the contesting 
states.  
(b) International customs, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law. 
(c) The general principles of law recognised by civilised nations. 
(d) Judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations, as ‘subsidiary’ means for the determination of rules of law.  
From these stipulations of the sources, it is obvious that the highest priority is accorded to the 
consent of the sovereign states, which serves as the primary source for international law. The 
recognition of state sovereignty “vests a state, in the absence of any other authority, with 
complete independence in action in its international external activities.”206 This principle is the 
‘oldest and best’ established principle of international law.207 By virtue of this independence, a 
state has the right to refuse or to grant admission to a foreigner. By the same token, a state has 
independence with regard to making a decision whether to surrender or not an individual within 
its territory to another state.208 It is not obliged unless it chooses to do so by its own volition. A 
sovereign state has no obligation to respond to another state’s demand for extradition. At the 
same time a state has the right to “place any limitation or restriction on its own sovereignty it 
chooses by entering into an agreement with another sovereign state.”209 By virtue of this 
conferment of independence right, a state may choose to grant extradition even in the absence of 
a treaty.  
“Customary international law imposes no obligation of surrender to fugitives accused of 
crimes unless it has contracted to do so. Moreover, the refusal to grant such request does 
not involve derogation from the sovereignty of the requesting state. It is a reasonable 
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exercise of its exclusive right of jurisdiction within its own domain, and a state is 
believed to violate no legal duty, in declining, in the absence of a treaty, to surrender a 
fugitive criminal found within its territory to any demanding state.”210  
The point made is that whether to surrender a fugitive criminal to the requesting state is at the 
discretion of a sovereign state and this right is recognised and accepted by the norms of 
international law. Despite this discretionary power, a state also owes an obligation towards the 
international community. The ICJ draws a distinction between inter-state obligations on the one 
hand, and obligations towards the international community as a whole, on the other. The former 
is the concern of only the contracting parties while the latter is the “concern of all states.”211  
Alotaibi notes that since currently “there is no broad-based multinational convention on 
extradition or any statutory body of criminal law which would confer an obligation to 
extradite,”212 no legal obligation to extradite can incur outside of a treaty or other binding 
agreement. This principle has been well established through both extradition jurisprudence and 
extradition statutes.  
Whether extradition can occur without a treaty was debated in the U.S.  The positions taken 
were (a) that there was no obligation to extradite unless specified by a treaty, in Holmes v 
Jennison and Factor v. Laubenheimer,213 and (b) that there was no obligation but the primacy of 
state sovereignty in extradition decisions.214 The issue was finally settled in the case of 
Valentine v. United States215, when the U.S. Supreme Court took a stronger position, ruling that 
not only was there no obligation to extradite in the absence of a treaty, but also that there was no 
clear authority to extradite in the absence of a treaty or other legislative provision. The Court 
held that: 
 “[the] fundamental consideration is that the constitution creates no executive prerogative 
to dispose of the liberty of the individual. Proceedings against him must be authorised by 
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law. There is no executive discretion to surrender him to a foreign government, unless 
that discretion is granted by law…Legal authority does not exist, save as it is given by an 
act of Congress or by the terms of a treaty.”216  
This does not mean that a lack of discretionary powers in extradition is absolute. Blakesley notes 
that:  
“some fugitives may feel that they are protected from the long arm of US justice, when 
they have taken refuse in countries with which the United State has no extradition treaty 
or, if there is one, it does not clearly cover the offence charged. Although United States 
law will not allow a fugitive to be extradited from the United States, except pursuant to 
the terms of an extradition treaty, this does not mean, contrary to what many 
commentators have written, that the US government will not seek extradition from 
another state despite the absence of treaty coverage. In reality, extradition will be sought, 
as a matter of comity, despite lack of treaty coverage.”217 
British law also accepted the need for a statutory basis. The genesis of a requirement of statutory 
backing lies with Lord Brougham, who argued that: 
“the interests of good neighbourhood required, that in two countries bordering upon one 
another, as the United States and Canada, and even that in England, and in the European 
countries of France, Holland and Belgium, there ought to be laws on both sides giving 
power, under due regulation and safeguards, to each government to secure persons who 
have committed offences in the territory of the other.”218 
Lord Brougham’s plea to enact statutes to legalise surrender was heeded and led to the most 
important development in the history of extradition when in 1841 the House of Lords took a 
unanimous view that undertaking extradition “without an Act of the Parliament was 
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unlawful.”219 From then on all treaties were to be given effect by law before their provisions 
were implemented. 
In sum, the general practice of states on extradition is based on the belief that while extradition is 
not an absolute international duty, yet if a state wishes to ensure that it secures the return of its 
own criminals it must enter into treaties with other states.220 
Nonetheless, the necessity of a formal treaty remains, to some, as a pre-condition for success in 
extraditing genuine offenders and criminals. There are four reasons why nations may enter into 
bilateral extradition treaty arrangements:221  
• Obtain reciprocal return of fugitive offenders. 
• Facilitate the punishment of wrongful conduct, and thereby promote justice. 
• Avoid harbouring within their border those who may commit offences similar to those of 
which they are accused in another jurisdiction. 
• Avoid international tensions caused by one country’s refusal to return a particularly 
wanted person. 
By contrast, courts in some South American states, including Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina 
surrender fugitives in the absence of extradition treaties on the rationale that such practice is “in 
conformity with the public law of nations.”222 This seems a deviation from the broader 
perspective of international practice. A perfect example of extradition in the absence of a treaty 
or any other formal or informal extradition agreement was Libya’s surrender of two of its 
nationals to a Scottish Court based in the Netherlands in connection with the bombing in 1988 
of Pam Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. This was not a perfect extradition case as there 
was no extradition treaty between Libya and the U.S. or between Libya and the U.K.223 This is 
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referred to as a case of “extradition by analogy.”224 This case is neither based on treaty, nor 
reciprocity of comity.225 
The post-9/11 situation has changed the situation drastically. Many Al Qaeda operatives have 
been apprehended and handed over to the U.S. authorities in the absence of any trial or the 
existence of any treaty. For example, the U.S. has asked Pakistan to surrender some criminals, 
either on the basis of an agreement dating from 1931, when what is now Pakistan was then part 
of British India, or on the basis of the more recent less formal rendition arrangements.226 
There is, however, a growing trend toward the acceptance of a generalized customary law norm 
requiring states to extradite or prosecute alleged fugitives.227 In other words, states may 
arguably have a duty to extradite or prosecute an alleged fugitive under the principle of aut 
dedere aut judicare. This principle draws support from Hugo Grotius' statement "that a general 
obligation to extradite or punish exists with respect to all offences by which another state is 
particularly injured."228  According to this argument, a state may have a natural right to punish 
the offender and other states cannot interfere with this right.229 As it stands, however, the 
principle of aut dedere aut judicare remains controversial,230 and a stronger argument could be 
made that customary international law does not impose a duty to extradite.   
Nevertheless, “the duty to extradite or prosecute appears in at least seventy international 
criminal law conventions.”231 Stronger arguments are being made that a duty to extradite exists 
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even in the absence of a treaty. A duty to prosecute could exist as to a specific crime like drug 
smuggling defined in a treaty and thus becomes part of customary international law.232 
Additionally, a broader duty to extradite could exist for a category of international crimes like 
crimes against humanity and terrorism.233 For purposes of an international convention on 
extradition, states could agree on a list of crimes where states have a duty to extradite. The 
principle of aut dedere aut judicare, thus, will likely take a prominent role in the future of 
international extradition law. The United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition discussed further 
below, for example, already takes a step towards this type of regime, although it could expand 
the list.  
3.3 The United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition 
In order to enforce international effects and to help sovereign nation states to effectively deal 
with extradition and the return of alleged offenders, it is important to discuss the United Nations 
Model Treaty on Extradition,234 and to consider its shortcomings. 
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3.3.1 Origins of the Model Treaty 
The UN Model Extradition Treaty235 owes its origin to the objectives of the Milan Plan of Action 
as adopted by the Seventh United Nations’ Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment 
of Offenders. Its Guiding Principles stipulate that the United Nations should prepare model 
instruments suitable for use as international regional conventions as well as guides for 
implementing national laws.236 Another contributory factor, which led to the birth of the UN 
Model Extradition Treaty, was recognition of the fact of the escalation of crime, both national 
and trans-national. Further, its avowed goal was to urge the member states to step up their 
activity at the international level in order to combat organised crime, including, as appropriate, 
strengthening co-operation by entering into bilateral treaties on extradition as well as mutual 
legal assistance.237 
Also underlying the basis of the Model Treaty is the conviction of the international community 
that the establishment of bilateral and multilateral arrangements for extradition will greatly 
contribute to the development of more effective international co-operation for the control of 
crime.238 
While recognising the importance of bilateral and multilateral extradition arrangements as a 
means to curbing organised crime at the national and international level, the Model Treaty is 
geared towards human rights protection and respect for human dignity by allowing to those 
extradited the rights conferred upon every person involved in criminal proceedings as embodied 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.239 
The Resolution which adopted the Model also invited member states to follow this model if they 
had not yet established treaty relations with other states in the area of extradition, or if they 
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wished to revise existing treaty relations, to take into account the contents of the model 
provided.240 This was aimed at encouraging states to update existing bilateral extradition 
arrangements by replacing outdated agreements, which take into account recent developments in 
international criminal law and human rights protection. 
In adoption of the Resolution, the international community placed their confidence in the Model 
Treaty as an instrument of dealing effectively with the complex aspects and serious 
consequences of crime, especially in its new forms and dimensions. 
3.3.2 Principal characteristics of the UN Model Treaty 
As discussed above, under international law, states are under no obligation, nor are they legally 
bound, to extradite at the mere request of another state.241 However, states may assume a binding 
obligation to extradite under international law by entering into a treaty, or other consent-based 
arrangement, which specifically imposes such an obligation, although this obligation is often 
subject to certain terms and conditions.242 The Model Treaty is primarily meant to fill a gap 
which exists due to the non-availability of a universally applicable multilateral extradition treaty, 
although there are several UN conventions containing specific clauses on extradition, usually for 
the purpose of indicating that a particular international crime constitutes an extraditable 
offence.243 Yet there is no single multilateral treaty which comprehensively covers all aspects of 
extradition. The absence of such a treaty is due to the political and cultural obstacles which have 
to be overcome. However, the Model Treaty remains a unique document of its kind, in the sense 
that it constitutes a fairly complete document on universally acceptable principles and provides 
an illustrative example which can be used as a basis for a bilateral or multilateral extradition 
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treaty between states. It serves as a kind of international formbook244 to stimulate states to adopt 
extradition treaties based on a set of general and commonly agreed standards developed by 
experts in the field.245 
Like many other extradition treaties it is a combination of certain obligations and exceptions. It 
begins by imposing on states a general obligation to extradite and provides that an extraditable 
offence is a serious crime. Seriousness of offence is usually measured by the term of 
imprisonment attached to the offence, but the Model Treaty does not stipulate in clear terms what 
is and what is not an appropriate measure, leaving states to decide whether an extraditable 
offence is one punishable by a minimum of one or two years’ imprisonment.246 
On the other hand, the Model Treaty also provides for several exceptions to the extradition 
obligations. While some of these are mandatory,247 others are optional.248 A closer look at these 
reveals that the Model Treaty gives “less weight…to traditional obstacles to co-operation like 
fiscal offences and nationality of the offender, while more systematic attention has been paid to 
the protection of human rights.”249 It is noteworthy that the mandatory exceptions in the Model 
Treaty are generally those which can be classified as the traditional extradition exceptions for 
political offences,250 military offences,251 and offences for which there has been a final judgment 
in the requested state.252 
With regard to the exception for political offences, the Model Treaty does not specify any limits, 
although the complementary provisions suggest that “countries may wish to exclude certain 
conduct, e.g., acts of violence, such as serious offences involving an act of violence against the 
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life, physical integrity or liberty of a person, from the concept of a political offence.”253 Only a 
footnote suggests that states may wish to exempt from the political offences exceptions any 
offences where an aut dedere aut judicare obligation has been assumed under the international 
convention, or where the particular countries have agreed that the offence is not political for the 
purposes of extradition. As for the third exception, no mention is made of judgments rendered by 
third states.254 
Extradition is also barred under the Model Treaty when the requested individual has “become 
immune from prosecution or punishment for any reason, including lapse of time or amnesty,”255 
although a footnote suggests that “some countries may wish to make this an optional ground for 
refusal.”256 The Model Treaty also prohibits extradition with respect of trials in absentia for 
which the convicted person has not had sufficient notice of the trial or the opportunity to arrange 
for his defence and has not had or will not have the opportunity to have the case retried in his 
presence.257 
The Model Treaty also contains a discrimination clause which extends extradition exceptions to 
risks of discrimination based on the grounds of “ethnic origin, sex or status,”258 in addition “to 
race, religion, nationality, or political opinion.”259 The clause which is directly concerned with 
human rights protections is one which provides for mandatory exceptions which bar extradition 
“if the person whose extradition is requested has been or would be subjected in the requesting 
state to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of if that person has not 
received or would not receive the minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings,”260 which is 
based on the provisions contained in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),261 an instrument which provides for the universal protection of civil 
                                                 
253
 UN Model Treaty , see n.2, Complementary Provisions. 
254
 For a modification see Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition, adopted 15 October 
1975, ETS No. 86. 
255
 UN Model Treaty , see n.2, Article 3 (e). 
256
 Ibid, Annex, Article 3 (e). 
257
 Ibid, Annex, Article 3 (g). 
258




 Ibid, see n.5, Annex, Article 3 (f). 
261
 United Nations General Assembly, ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, Resolution 
2200A (XXI), (16 Dec 1966), UN Doc A/RES/2200A (XXI).  
 61 
and political human rights. Article 3 (f) of the Model Treaty expressly acknowledges and accepts 
a role for human rights in extradition that goes beyond providing an extradition exception where 
there is a real risk of serious ill treatment in the requesting state.262 In this way, the Model Treaty 
also adds to the prohibition on extradition contained in Article 3 of the UN Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT).263 The 
latter, despite its full title, only bars extradition when there is a danger of torture, and not when 
there is a danger of other forms of ill treatment.  At the same time, the Model Treaty makes past 
incidences of unfair punishments, as well as past incidences of unfair trial, sufficient grounds in 
themselves for refusing extradition and unlike the UNCAT prohibition there is no obligation to 
link the past incident with an ongoing or future threat of unfairness.264 
As far as the optional exceptions to extradition are concerned, the Model Treaty includes a 
pending prosecution clause,265 a death penalty clause,266 and an extraordinary and ad hoc tribunal 
clause.267 In a footnote, it further suggests that the restriction on extradition where there is a real 
risk of the imposition of the death penalty in the requesting state could also be applied to “the 
imposition of a life, or indeterminate, sentence.”268 Yet another optional exception has to do with 
nationality, with the requirement to prosecute in the requested state when extradition is 
refused.269 There is another optional humanitarian clause which requires countries to take into 
account an extradited person’s “age, health or other personal circumstances.”270 The Model 
Treaty also suggested that extradition may be barred if the offence was committed within the 
territory of the requested state, or committed outside the territory of either state, or if the 
requested state, having jurisdiction over the offence, has decided to refrain from prosecuting the 
extradited person.271 
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The Model Treaty has been seen as “an important innovation in international co-operation in 
criminal matters, because of both its contents and its structure.”272 At the same time, it retains the 
key extradition exceptions applicable at the end of the twentieth century. It builds upon the 
developments and trends in both Europe and the Americas and does not mark a serious departure 
from the old notions of extradition law as a distillation of the standards which may now have 
become acceptable to a wide range of states.273 As the format of obligation rather than exception 
is the same as that used in all major multilateral treaties of the post-war period, it does not cause 
a major upset and ensures continuity. 
Another positive point about the Model Treaty is that it institutionalises human rights 
protections. It accepts the provisions of the ICCPR to be included in the UN’s list of exceptions 
to extradition.274 However, the Model Treaty has not gone without criticism. For example, the 
separate death penalty clause and its exclusion from the forms of torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment dilutes its status, which lowers its severity, and suggests that 
the death penalty, in and of itself, cannot be considered a form of torture or cruel treatment. This 
limitation also extends to the suggested exception for life and indeterminate prison sentences.275  
In addition, the Model Treaty has been criticised for not extending to “unmentioned penalties, 
such as mandatory sentences of the ‘three strikes’ variety.”276  
The Model Treaty has also been subjected to criticism for its internal inconsistencies in the 
protections accorded to human rights. For instance, the discrimination clause which has been 
extended to apply to discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin, sex or status, co-occurs with 
the nationality clause which continues to discriminate between a country’s nationals and its non-
national permanent residents on the very basis of status.277 The Model Treaty also shies away 
from characterising crimes such as genocide as non-political for the purpose of extradition,278 
even though this issue was decided long ago by the Genocide Convention.279 The Model Treaty, 
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thus, may have loosened the protection of individual rights under the political offence 
exception.280 These limitations suggest a rather haphazard approach to the protection of human 
rights.  
The Model Treaty also fails to provide a specific definition for extradition. The Model Treaty 
should add a definition, similar to that suggested in Chapter 2 of this paper that specifically 
incorporates human rights obligations and allows for the application of a dual judicial-
administrative extradition system. Adding a definition that incorporates human rights obligations 
under international law would put human rights at the front seat of extradition, instead of a 
secondary principle that can pave way whenever states deem it necessary. Such a definition 
would also signal an international recognition of a policy that aims to extradite criminals without 
forgetting internationally recognized human rights obligations. 
Despite its weaknesses, the Model Treaty remains useful for harmonising extradition instruments 
at the international level, which would contribute significantly to the promotion of international 
co-operation in the matters of combating and curbing organised crimes. It is also useful as a 
template toward an international extradition convention. 
3.4 Universal Jurisdictional Should Apply to Some Extraditable Offences 
The notion of jurisdiction, and theories developed in its domain of jurisdiction, are of critical 
importance to the practice of extradition, since they serve as the basis for the establishment of 
sovereignty in the state, and provides grounds for inter-state relationships.  This section discusses 
the various theories on jurisdiction, the reasons for their popularity, and criticisms for their 
application. This section ends by arguing that universal jurisdiction should apply to some 
extraditable offences. The use of universal jurisdiction for specific types of offences like crimes 
against humanity could be a starting point in a proposed international extradition convention.  
3.4.1 Jurisdiction and Extradition 
Jurisdiction is a concept not amenable to a single definition. One of the definitions of jurisdiction 
offered is by George, who defines its doctrine as “the authority of nations, or states to create, or 
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prescribe penal or regulatory norms and to enforce them through administrative and judicial 
action.”281 According to this definition, jurisdiction refers to an intra-state authority or 
competence to make laws and enforce them in a state. This is vital for managing the affairs of the 
state. It provides the basis for the state machinery to implements regulations in the state. 
Within the state, Gilbert identifies three main domains of jurisdiction dealing with three branches 
of government:  
1. Legislative jurisdiction that “goes to the ability to prescribe the reach of national 
laws.”282  
2. Judicial jurisdiction which refers to the power and authority of the courts to apply 
legislative jurisdiction to individual cases. 
3. Executive jurisdiction which is the power to enforce the decisions of the courts or 
legislature.283 
On the other hand, extradition operates at an inter-state level in which the question of jurisdiction 
is invoked between two sovereign states.  Jurisdiction is both a prerequisite and an integral part 
of extradition. Bassiouni explains: 
“the term ‘jurisdiction’ in international law refers to two aspects of the authoritative 
decision-making process: First is rule making, and second, is rule-enforcing. Both of 
these aspects are present in extradition, because initiating the process presupposes that 
the requesting state has a legal basis to exercise its authoritative control over the 
requested individual, because: (1) it has jurisdiction over the subject matter or a given 
interest which has been or is being affected by the conduct of the person sought (ratione 
materiae); and (2) once surrendered, that state would have in personam jurisdiction over 
the person (ratione personae).”284 
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He further refined the notion of jurisdiction by stating that “the interrelationship between 
sovereignty and jurisdiction delineates the extent and limits of a state’s power to proscribe 
conduct in relationship to other states.”285 In this sense, jurisdiction plays a key role in 
determining the nature of the relationship between states. Needless to say, in the absence of such 
a competence and authority any law, domestic or international, would not be effective. As aptly 
pointed out by Blakesley, jurisdiction “provides the only practical means for applying the law to 
reality.”286  
What distinguishes extradition from other methods of co-operation in crime control is that 
extradition is primarily a “conscious purpose to restore a criminal to a jurisdiction competent to 
try and punish him”287 and the exercise of the “principle of reciprocity secured by formal 
arrangement.”288  Similarly, Bassiouni sees jurisdictional issues, irrespective of their legal basis, 
as of primary importance, as extradition itself is a recognition of the fact that “the interests of a 
state have been affected by the conduct of a person who is not within the state’s jurisdiction, but 
is within the jurisdiction of the requested state.”289 Gilbert also regards the returning of a fugitive 
to a foreign state as recognition of the principle of “jurisdiction asserted by the requesting 
State.”290  
The importance of jurisdiction in extradition is also obvious from the fact that jurisdiction issues 
have a direct impact on other substantive requirements of extradition, particularly in terms of 
double criminality and extraditable offences since “the determination of the legal existence of an 
offence also inquires into the applicable jurisdictional theory underlying the creating of the 
offence charged.”291 Similarly, execution of extradition under the terms of treaties or through 
principles of comity and/or reciprocity also bear out the fact that the states involved have 
assumed that the requesting state has successfully established jurisdiction over the subject matter 
with which the fugitive is charged. However, there is, to date, no international consensus on how 
far a state might extend its criminal jurisdiction over offenders. As a starting point, this paper 
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argues that the international community should apply universal jurisdiction in the extradition of 
specific types of offences already recognized by courts as falling under universal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence.  
3.4.2 Theories of Jurisdiction for Extradition 
In the literature, various theories have been advanced on the matter of jurisdiction. Harvard 
Research has identified five theories of jurisdiction being implemented in various forms.292 
These are: 
• Territorial theory; 
• Nationality/active personality theory;  
• Passive personality theory;  
• Protective principle theory; and  
• Universality theory.  
3.4.3 Territorial theory 
A state is likely to make one of these five theories the basis for asserting jurisdiction. Yet in 
some cases, more than one theory can be cited in support of the claim. Of these, the territorial 
jurisdiction theory is invoked most often. This is quite popular with common law states, although 
the U.S. has recently used other jurisdictional principles more frequently in extradition cases. On 
the other hand, the nationality principle has been also commonly used by civil law states.293  
The territorial theory is linked intimately to the concept of sovereignty. Within its own territory, 
the sovereign state exercises jurisdiction over all persons, legal entities and objects except in 
cases where a special jurisdictional immunity exists. A state asserts its sovereign rights to rule 
without interference – all states are competent to prosecute any crimes within their own territory. 
The link was unequivocally spelled out in Schooner Exchange v McFadden in which U.S. 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall in 1812 stated:  
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“the jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and 
absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, 
deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to 
the extent of the restriction…All exception…must be traced up to the consent of the 
nation itself.”294  
A corollary of this position is that jurisdiction over totally extraterritorial crime would not be 
possible. The U.S. held to this position in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.295 In 
contrast, European civil law states have applied the territorial principle in a less strict manner.296 
That the language of treaties commonly uses “territory” and “jurisdiction” interchangeably, 
confirms the fact that territorial theory is one of the most widely used principles. In fact, these 
terms are not synonymous as “jurisdiction is a legal theory whereby a political entity, namely a 
state, claims the power to prescribe and enforce its laws, while territory is the object upon which 
jurisdiction is exercised.”297  Despite the equivalency of terms in treaties, the courts tend to draw 
a strict technical distinction between the two.  For example, referring to In re Stupp and 
Kossekechatko et al., the appellant in R. v. Governor of H.M. Prison, Brixton, ex parte Minervini 
argued that “territory” and “jurisdiction” were two distinct and non-equivalent concepts.298 
However, Lord Chief Justice dismissed the application holding that the word “territory” within 
the treaty was in fact synonymous with “jurisdiction.”  
Apart from the territories belonging to a state, there are territories referred to as “special status 
territories.”299  These territories are distinct from floating or airspace territories, where floating 
territorial principles apply. In most cases, where territorial exception occurs is the “area over 
which the jurisdictional control of one state extends is usually excepted from that of another 
state’s control either in whole or in part and varying in extent and duration because of peculiar 
circumstances such as military occupation, treaty or other arrangements.”300 Currently, military 
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occupation and military-related special arrangements are the most common bases for special 
status territory. Because of its military presence in special status territories, provision has been 
made in the U.S. Extradition Statute for the return from the U.S. to “any foreign country or 
territory or any part thereof” occupied by or under the control of the U.S. of any person found in 
the U.S. who is charged with committing any of certain enumerated offences in violation of the 
criminal laws in force in such foreign country or territory.301 
Lease territories for military and non-military purposes are also subject to special extradition 
arrangements which have been duly provided in agreements by including an extraterritorial 
clause or special jurisdictional clause which permits the lessee-state to exercise jurisdiction over 
the leased territory in certain circumstances. Instances of application of the special status 
territories are the Lease Agreement between the U.S. and Cuba for the U.S.’s lease of the Naval 
Base in Guantanamo, and with Panama concerning the Panama Canal Zone.302  
Territorial theory is further divided into subjective and objective territorial theories,303 which 
make it possible to assert jurisdiction based on the territorial principle even in situations when 
none of the crime or its effects occurred within the territory.  These theories allow for extension 
of jurisdiction over conduct when an element of an offence occurs within the territory 
(subjective) or when an effect of an offence occurs within the territory (objective). This practice 
is widespread in common law countries. Gilbert304  and Blakesley305 see this extension of 
territorial principles as a parallel to the German principle of doctrine of ubiquity in civil law 
countries. The doctrine of ubiquity allows the state to assume jurisdiction over an offence and 
any inchoate offence connected therewith, if a part of the offence or even, according to some 
states, if just its effects are felt in the prosecuting state.  
Articles of the French Criminal Code are cited as classic examples of subjective territoriality 
theory. The Code provides that an offence would be regarded as having been committed on 
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French territory when “an act characterising one of its elements is accomplished in France.”306 
The New Zealand Crimes Act of 1961 followed suit:  
“for the purposes of jurisdiction, where any act or omission forming part of an offence, or 
any event necessary to the completion of an offence occurs in New Zealand, the offence 
shall be deemed to be committed in New Zealand, whether the person charged with the 
offence was in New Zealand or not at the time of the act, omission, or event.”307  
The Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Libman v. The Queen308 has “demonstrated the use of 
the subjective territoriality principle to create, in effect, extraterritorial jurisdiction.”309 In this 
case, the accused was charged with fraud for telephoning U.S. residents from Canada and 
persuaded them to buy worthless shares in Costa Rican gold mines. The fraud victims sent their 
money to confederates of the accused in Panama and Cost Rica; and the money eventually 
arrived in Canada. A strict territorial view would not indict the accused, because the crime was 
committed in the U.S. and the money was received in Central America. However, the Canadian 
Supreme Court opined that the accused could be prosecuted in Canada, stretching the boundaries 
of the territorial principle maintaining that: 
“all that is necessary to make an offence subject to the jurisdiction of our courts is that a 
significant portion of the activities constituting the offence took place in Canada… [It] is 
sufficient that there be a ‘real and substantial link’ between an offence and this 
country.”310 
In contrast to the subjective territorial principle, the objective territorial principle includes 
situations where the offender is not physically present in the country where the effect of the 
offence is felt. The approach can be best illustrated by the following example: “the defendant 
shoots a gun in Italy, injuring a person in France, and the injured person travels to Switzerland 
where he succumbs to his wounds.”311 The problem this hypothetical situation presents is that an 
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act is carried out in one state, its immediate effect occurs in another and its result is 
consummated in a third. The important point to be made by this example is that jurisdiction 
could be claimed by all three states: “the first on the basis of subjective territoriality, the second 
on the basis of both objective and subjective territoriality, and the third on the basis of objective 
territoriality.”312 
Under this principle, “the presence of the offender may be constructive rather than actual.”313 
The classic U.S. case articulating the objective territorial principle and the allowance of a 
reliance on the constructive rather than actual presence of an offender was the 1911 case of 
Strassheim v. Dailey. Justice Homes stated that:  
“acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental 
effects within it, justify a state in punishing a cause of the harm as if he had been present 
at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him within its power.”314   
In this sense, the object territorial theory permits the state to assume jurisdiction where the 
effects – or a significant portion of the effects – of the crime are sustained in that state. Another 
case cited to exemplify objective territoriality is the Lotus case.315 
Blakesley identifies three main applications of the objective territorial principle, namely:  
“to assert jurisdiction to proscribe, prosecute, and punish offences committed abroad 
when the effect or result occurs within the territory of the asserting state; to seek 
extradition of the person accused of committing such an offence; and to provide 
extradition of an accused who has committed such an offence against the requesting 
state.”316  
An “effects test” has been developed to ascertain the applicability of the objective territoriality 
principle. According to Blakesley,317 the U.S. courts have traditionally allowed the assertion of 
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jurisdiction over an offence when the conduct giving rise to the offence has occurred 
extraterritorially. 
Other European states have also applied the ‘effects test’ in determining jurisdiction in objective 
territoriality cases. For instance, in 1934 the Italian Supreme Court held in In re Amper that: 
“in view of the principles of international co-operation for the suppression of crime, the 
sole duty of the court of the requested state is to determine the subjective and objective 
existence of the crime charged and to see whether it is extraditable according to the 
principles which rule the relations between the two states in the matter of extradition. It 
cannot raise questions of territorial jurisdiction if its own jurisdiction is not involved.”318 
Some courts have held that objective territorial jurisdiction may apply even in situations when 
the planned effects of an act never came to fruition. The following hypothetical situation will 
illustrate the point. Suppose an individual in state A supplies bomb making equipment from state 
B to individuals in state C to be used (exploded) in state D but somewhere along the way, the 
plans for bombing State D fall apart. The question is: can State D obtain jurisdiction even though 
neither the elements nor the effects had any impact on it? The Brussels Court of Appeals was 
prepared to extradite an individual to Britain (State D in the above situation) under the objective 
territorial principle.319 
British courts are known for being “among the strictest and most conservative in matters of 
jurisdiction.”320 British courts would not be reluctant to assert “constructive jurisdiction” so long 
as the act was intended to have an effect on the state, but generally their treatment of territorial 
jurisdiction is very narrowly construed with all crimes divided into one of two categories: 
conduct and result. Gilbert has described the situation thus: “in the case of conduct crimes, such 
as blackmail or all varieties of inchoate offence, jurisdiction is asserted only if an element of the 
actus reus of the crime occurs within the territory of England and Wales. Result crimes, such as 
murder, only fall within the jurisdiction of the courts if the result occurs within the territory. 
Thus, if a person is attacked in England, but died in Scotland, a separate jurisdiction, the 
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assailant cannot be tried before the English courts.”321 Whereas British courts may take too 
narrow or strictly constructed an approach, in U.S. courts a too broadly constructed approach is 
used.322 
Despite its widespread usage, the subjective-objective approach has received criticism. One 
problem is that the theory is stated too broadly. It is nothing more or less than a form of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, or “disguised extraterritorial jurisdiction.”323 In the Noriega case, in 
which the district court asserted an expansion of international law principles to encompass an 
“intent doctrine” in objective territoriality, Bassiouni protested that “there is very little support, if 
any, in international law for the proposition that criminal jurisdiction can be exercised 
extraterritorially on the sole factor of ‘intent’ as the court claimed.”324 
Another criticism brought against subjective-objective territoriality is the inherent conflict that it 
“recognises jurisdiction in more than one state without ranking priorities.”325 The approach in the 
U.S. is that “the state that has physical custody has de facto priority.”326 Yet another weakness of 
the theory is “it clearly is not the proper vehicle for asserting jurisdiction over any act of 
terrorism or narcotics conspiracy that has not actually had an impact within the U.S. or for 
asserting jurisdiction over thwarted extraterritorial conspiracies.”327 
Apart from the subjective and objective principle, another non-territorial approach is floating and 
aerial territorial jurisdiction.  The high seas and the airspace above them are not regarded in 
international law as being subject to the exercise of any nation’s sovereignty or jurisdiction. 
Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas328 and Article 87 of the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention329 state that all countries, whether coastal or land-locked, have freedom to use the 
highs seas. In these territories, the “law of the flag” will be implemented, which holds that ships 
on the high seas are, as a general rule, subject only to the jurisdiction of the state under whose 
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flag they sail. In Lotus, the Permanent Court of International Justice recognised that “vessels on 
the high seas are subject to no authority except that of the State whose flag they fly.”330 
Similarly, in Lauritzen v. Larsen,331 the US Supreme Court reconfirmed the law of the flag as 
“perhaps the most venerable and universal rule of maritime law.”332 The same applies to aircraft 
by extension because “vessels, aircraft and spacecraft bearing the flag of a given state are an 
extension of the state’s territory, particularly on the high seas, in international air space, and in 
outer space. Therefore, the territoriality theory applies to them by extension.”333 
3.4.4 National/active personality theory 
The second theory of territorial jurisdiction is referred to as the nationality/active personality 
theory of jurisdiction. As the name implies, the active personality theory is based on the 
nationality of the perpetrator or accused. Like the territorial theory of jurisdiction, the nationality 
theory also derives from the principles of state sovereignty.  These “dictate that the nationals of a 
state are entitled to the state’s protection even when they are outside the state’s territory.”334 By 
the same token, the national “has a corresponding duty to obey those municipal laws which are 
recognized as having an extraterritorial affect.”335 
The active personality theory of jurisdiction is more common in civil law states, and is strongest 
on the European continent, but it has expanded to common law countries as well. According to 
Blakesley, this is the second most widely applied theory today, after the territorial principle.336 
As noted by Gilbert,337 English law has long made the crimes of murder and bigamy subject to 
extraterritorial prosecution using the nationality theory, and in more recent years, “even common 
law countries like Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom have enacted, 
or are considering enacting legislation to tackle the problem of sex tourism by their nationals or 
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residents.”338 Blakesley also noted a trend to expand the use of the nationality theory of 
jurisdiction in the U.S.339 
Harvard Research presented a survey of the implementation of the nationality principle among 
different states, paying particular attention to the legislative measures adopted pertaining to the 
theory. The study classifies statutes into five basic types:340  
1. Those statutes which made all offences punishable. 
2. Those statutes which made only those offences punishable which were also punishable 
by the lex loci delicti. 
3. Those statutes which made all offences of a certain degree punishable. 
4. Those statutes which made only those offences committed against co-nationals 
punishable. 
5. Those statutes which made only certain enumerated offences punishable.  
An example of the active personality theory of jurisdiction is illustrated by the case of Public 
Prosecutor v. Antoni in which Sweden applied the theory. In this case, the accused was a 
Swedish national who had been involved in a traffic accident in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. During the trial in Sweden, Antoni raised the defence that the Swedish Traffic Code 
had never been meant to apply outside of Swedish territory. The Swedish Supreme Court 
disagreed holding instead that in principle “every crime committed by a Swedish citizen may be 
punished, even if committed abroad.”341 Most states would require the rule of double criminality 
to apply in the nationality/active personality principle, but as shown by the Antoni case this may 
not be a prerequisite for prosecution. Other states have attached strings to the application of the 
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theory. France, for instance, will “assert jurisdiction based on nationality only if the accused 
escapes from foreign justice.”342 This philosophy derives from the belief that: 
“because nationals have the benefit and protection of their nationality and owe allegiance 
to their country, they should be answerable to the national jurisdiction for any offence 
they commit. Furthermore, any offence committed by a French national abroad actually 
injures France’s reputation and respect in the world.”343 
More importantly, “if the country of their nationality did not have the authority to assert 
jurisdiction, the national who has committed an extraterritorial offence might be immune from 
prosecution anywhere.”344 The application of the active personality theory assumes greater 
importance in the face of the latter point because “given that civil law states refuse, whether 
rightly or wrongly, to extradite their nationals, such breadth of competence is essential if 
fugitives are not to escape punishment merely by returning to their state of nationality.”345 
While the active personality theory is gaining popularity, it is still ‘subsidiary’ to territorial 
jurisdiction. What this means is that territoriality takes precedence over the active personality 
principle or they are applied in combination. As noted, “even among those states which pursue 
their right to prosecute under the nationality theory most zealously, the use of theory to obtain 
jurisdiction is generally subsidiary to territorial jurisdiction.”346 
3.4.5 Passive personality theory 
The third theory of jurisdiction is known as the passive personality theory of jurisdiction. It 
asserts jurisdiction and is based on the nationality of the victim of a crime.347 It allows states to 
obtain jurisdiction to extradite and prosecute criminal conduct aimed at harming the nationals of 
the asserting state. The passive personality principle overlaps with the protective principle, yet it 
is distinguishable in the sense that it does not take into account the location of the conduct and 
therefore the “object of its protection is the person who is a national of the state, regardless of 
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where he may be.”348 By contrast, the protective theory “allows a state to reach beyond its 
physical boundaries to protect its national interests; however it wishes to define them, from 
harmful effects arising from conduct abroad...”349  The theory has recently risen in popularity in 
Europe, as it is capable of dealing with modern criminal acts like terrorism and air travel crimes 
against nationals of the requesting state. Despite its wider application in recent years, the theory 
has attracted numerous theoretical and practical problems mainly because it represents “a very 
broad assertion of jurisdiction which may interfere with the sovereign status of the state where 
the crime occurred.”350 U.S. law and practice have traditionally rejected the use of the passive 
personality theory.351 
The Restatement Law (Second) Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. explains its position by 
stating that: “a state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching a legal 
consequences to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that the conduct 
affects one of its nationals.”352  An illustration of the U.S.’s rejection of the passive personality 
principle was the 1887 Cutting case. Cutting, an American national, was seized by Mexican 
authorities during a visit to Mexico and jailed pending prosecution for criminal libel allegedly 
perpetrated in Texas against a Mexican national. In response to this charge, the U.S. Secretary of 
State Brayard sent the following invective to Mr. Connery, to Mexico:353 
“The assumption of the Mexican Tribunal, under the law of Mexico, to punish a citizen of 
the United States for an offence wholly committed and consummated in his own country 
against its laws was an invasion of the independence of this Government…As to the 
question of international law, I am unable to discover any principle upon which the 
assumption of jurisdiction made in Article 186 of the Mexican Penal Code can be 
justified…To say that he may be tried in another country for this offence, simply because 
its object happens to be a citizen of that country, would be to assert that foreigners coming 
to the United States bring hither the penal laws of the country from which they come, and 
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thus subject citizens of the United States in their own country to an indefinite criminal 
responsibility.”354   
The passive personality principle of jurisdiction has recently made inroads into legislative 
frameworks. The Penal Codes of Sweden and Germany, for instance, have included provisions 
on the extension of jurisdiction to cases involving victims who are nationals. Following suit, 
France also modified its Code of Criminal Procedure in 1975, providing jurisdiction to prosecute 
under French law and to punish “any foreign national who commits a crime, in which the victim 
is a French national.”355   
Adoption of passive personality theory seems to be a reaction to threats posed by international 
terrorism. Its clauses have been made part of various multilateral conventions against terrorism, 
including the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents of 1973356 and the Hostage Taking Convention 
of 1979.357 
The most recent example of its application is the Lockerbie case.358 The U.S. sought extradition 
of Libyan suspects on the basis that a U.S. aircraft was attacked, though the incident occurred 
over Lockerbie in Scotland. The U.S. joined Britain in asking for the handing over of Libyan 
suspects because US nationals were killed in the attack. The reason for the widespread 
application of the theory is that it allows the assertion of jurisdiction even if offences have not 
been committed in the territory of the requesting state and thus becomes an effective tool for 
combating international terrorism. This is probably the single most important explanation for the 
growth in popularity of the passive personality theory of jurisdiction.359 
 
                                                 
354
 Case cited in Blakesley, see n.22, at 135-136. 
355
 See Blakesley, n.22, at 132. 
356 United Nations General Assembly ,‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents’, Resolution 3166 (XVIII) (14 Dec 1973) UN Doc 
A/RES/3166 (XVIII). 
357
 United Nations General Assembly, ‘International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages’, Resolution 
34/146 (17 Dec 1979) UN Doc A/RES/36/141. 
358
 Libyan Arab Jamahiria v. U.K, [1992] ICJ Rep 3; Libyan Arab Jamahiria v. U.S. [1992] ISJ, at16, para. 42 and 
at113, para. 39. 
359
 See Alotaibi, n.73, at 106. 
 78 
3.4.6 Protective principle theory 
The fourth theory of jurisdiction is referred to as the protective principle.  States claim the right 
to prosecute persons whose crimes damage their vital interests. In contrast to the passive 
personality theory of jurisdiction which operates at the individual level, the protective principle 
focuses on a much broader level involving the ‘vital interests’360 of the state. Likewise, the 
protective theory is related to subjective-objective territorial theory in that both theories require 
that an element of the offence takes place or the effects of the offence are felt in the state, but the 
former is disguisable from the latter in that it “can be exercised whenever the state’s vital 
interests are damaged or challenged even if the crime is committed outside of and its 
consequences have no direct effect within the state’s territory.”361 
The major criticism of this theory, according to Gilbert, is in its “vagueness of the ambit of vital 
interests.”362 Bassiouni joins Gilbert in the view that the protective principle represents an 
extremely broad theory of jurisdiction when he says that: 
“It is, in effect, a ‘long arm’ jurisdictional theory which allows a state to reach beyond its 
physical boundaries to protect its national interests from harmful effects arising from 
conduct abroad. The protected interest theory allows a state to assert jurisdiction over an 
alien, whether and individual or other legal entity, acting outside the state’s territorial 
boundaries in a manner which threatens significant interests of the state.”363   
“With a few exceptions, national penal codes throughout the world recognize this principle and 
its limitations,” notes Blakesley.364 It is also recognized by Harvard Research and the 
Restatement Law (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States.365 The theory fits 
particularly well in covering “counterfeiting of state documents…and to cases involving national 
security.”366 A well-known case in this group is a 1991 espionage prosecution case in which the 
head of the former East German intelligence agency was prosecuted after German reunification 
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for spying against the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The German Supreme Court 
decided that he had violated the law of the former FRG, even though his activities had all been 
carried out in what had been, at that time, a separate state. Another example of the application of 
the protective principle is in In re Urios concerning a Spanish national367 “who during World 
War I and whilst in Spain, maintained contact with the enemies of France” and as a result, was 
arrested and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. He was tried under Article 7 of the then 
French criminal code which stipulated that “any alien who…is guilty outside French territory of 
a crime against the security of the State is liable to prosecution and sentence under French law if 
he is arrested in France or if the Government obtains his extradition.”368 In French law the 
protective principle is ‘reserved’, to be exercised over  
“1. acts that threaten the general interest of the Republic, including the security of the state 
and its diplomatic or consular posts or agents, or counterfeiting the seal of national 
currency;  
2. offences against French nationals; and  
3. those very grave crimes that all states have an interest in prosecuting.”369  
The US law that comes closest to providing legislative authority for the use of the protective 
principle is the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, which provides 
jurisdiction over purely terrorist offences held to be intended “to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate 
against a government or a civilian population.”370 
3.4.7 The universality theory371 
Universal jurisdiction could perhaps be a starting point for countries to agree that certain 
international crimes are subject to universal extradition. As the name suggests, there is no 
restriction of location where a state can obtain jurisdiction for prosecution of “certain particularly 
heinous crimes.”372  On this assumption, it includes assertion of jurisdiction both territorially and 
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extraterritorially. The theory is not concerned about the location of the criminal activity, the 
nationality of the criminal or the victim(s), or even the state which was particularly affected by 
the criminal activity. On the other hand, the universal jurisdiction principal would be invoked to 
cover “certain widely recognized offences which are condemned by virtually all national 
domestic laws, i.e. genocide, war crimes, torture, crimes against humanity, crimes which would 
fall under the jurisdiction of the newly established International Criminal Court, etc.”373  The 
universal jurisdiction theory is distinct from other theories discussed above in that it does not 
recognise the concept of sovereignty, a notion which is a fundamental concept in all other 
theories. This theory is thus “extraneous to the concept of national sovereignty.”374  In particular, 
it conflicts with the basic tenet of territorial jurisdiction which recognises the right of the accused 
to be tried by the ‘natural judge’. 
Bassiouni identifies a three-part rationale behind the exercise of universal jurisdiction.375  
Universal jurisdiction may be exercised: 
1. If no other state is able to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of traditional theories.  
2. If no other state has a direct interest.  
3. If there is an interest of the international community to enforce.  
On this view, states exercise universal jurisdiction not only as national jurisdictions, but also as a 
surrogate for the international community. In exercising universal jurisdiction under these 
circumstances, a state “carries out an action popularis [popular action] against persons who are 
hostis humani generis [enemies of mankind].”376 
However broad in scope the universal jurisdiction theory is in terms of its national and territorial 
parameters, it is quite narrow in terms of its applicability. Universal jurisdiction cannot be 
applied wantonly or freely. There are certain rules which are to be adhered to before 
contemplating the exercise of this option. “The exercise of universal jurisdiction is generally 
reserved for the most serious international crimes, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
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and genocide.”377 “Since the beginnings of international law as it is known today, piracy has 
been recognised as a crime subject to the universality principle.”378 Recently, universal 
jurisdiction has been extended to encompass crimes like traffic in narcotic drugs and terrorism.379 
The second rule for invoking universal jurisdiction is that it has to be applied along with 
another principle: “it is rare for it to be exercised where some other principle would not also 
apply.”380 In this respect, “the legislation and practice of states overwhelmingly evidences a 
connection between the crime and the enforcing state based on the crime’s territorial impact 
or because of the nationality of the perpetrator or the nationality of the victim.”381 Countries 
like Switzerland, Germany, Austria, and Belgium, which have the most comprehensive 
legislation, do not provide for the direct application of universal jurisdiction. 
A third rule or principle states that when the universal jurisdiction principle is operative, it “gives 
all states the right to exercise domestic jurisdiction over the specified universal offence, 
international law does not necessarily require that states exercise universal jurisdiction.”382 States 
which have enacted domestic legislation on universal jurisdiction, however, are able to exercise 
universal jurisdiction without assigning another principle or right to exercise domestic 
jurisdiction. 
There are many factors which have contributed towards strengthening of the universal 
jurisdiction principle recently. Amongst them are the development of the International 
Criminal Court, the proliferation of international conventions aimed at control of international 
crimes, the trend towards prosecuting former heads of state (e.g. Milosevic and Pinochet), and 
the apparent accompanying erosion of sovereign immunity. The trend has been summarised 
by Professor Gibney of the University of North Carolina who noted that: 
“we presently live in the age of universal jurisdiction, best exemplified in the 
unprecedented international effort to prosecute General Pinochet. Although the 
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concept of universal jurisdiction goes back centuries – the pirates of old were 
considered hosti humani generis (the enemy of all) – this principle has now started to 
take on an entirely new meaning.”383 
Despite a considerable rise in the popularity of the universal jurisdiction principle, it is not as 
“well-established in conventional and customary international law as its ardent proponents 
profess it to be”384 and has not risen “to the level of customary international law.”385 Yet, the 
international community should consider the role it can play in an international extradition 
convention. Universal extradition could even be handled by an International Criminal Court 
(ICC) as already supported by many countries and the U.N.386 
3.5 The Current Extradition System Does Not Adequately Protect Human Rights 
Perhaps, one of the most compelling reasons for the international community to act and create an 
international extradition convention is to halt the current erosion of human rights because of the 
inadequacies of the current extradition system. The current international extradition trends of 
violating individual rights and international human rights obligations387 is disturbing, and has 
even received much attention from the media. Countries—either impatient with an existing 
extradition treaty or wanting to circumvent the lack of an existing treaty—resort to alternatives 
means of transferring persons.388  
3.5.1 The Growth of Human Rights Law 
The half-century following the Second World War and the Holocaust saw, (as a reaction to those 
horrors), a proliferation of human rights treaties and the rapid development of the field of 
international human rights law.389 This has led to a dramatic impact on domestic law. 
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The United Nations came into being through the United Nations Charter on 24th October 1945. 
This was a multilateral treaty that served as the constitution of the United Nations Organisation. 
Commitment to human rights still forms the very basis of the Organisation, as it expresses the 
determination of the ‘Peoples of the United Nations’ inter alia ”to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women.”390 
Another avowed purpose of the United Nation as stated in Article 1 (3) of its Charter is its 
commitment “to achieve international co-operation…in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion.”391 Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter further recognise the importance of “universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.”392 Thus the notion of 
human rights is at the centre of the founding instrument of the United Nations. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) seeks also to refine and build upon the 
notion of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The UDHR is “non-binding, but has, over 
time, come to be regarded as an authoritative statement of the rights that Member States of the 
United Nations have undertaken to promote under the United Nations Charter.”393  
The fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide the basis for the formulation of international 
humanitarian law, considered by some writers to be a branch of human rights law. These 
conventions are geared towards providing humanitarian protection to war victims, in particular 
prisoners-of-war, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and civilians. The ‘grave breaches’ 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 bind the member states to a mandatory ‘try-or-
extradite’ principle for specified serious violations of the provisions of the conventions.  This 
regime has been incorporated into English law through the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 as 
amended by the Geneva Conventions (Amended) Act 1995. 
The relatively recent development of human rights law has also impacted on extradition policies, 
practices, and laws. In addition to a broad spectrum of crime control conventions, there are a 
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number of multilateral conventions dealing with fundamental human rights and humanitarian 
concerns which directly or indirectly impact upon international extradition treaties and 
enactments for that matter.  
The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) incorporates the provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights394 (ECHR) into domestic law. The adoption of the law constitutes 
the “most significant development in English human-rights law.”395 The U.K., thus, is obligated 
to follow the provisions of the ECHR when implementing its extradition laws. 
3.5.2 Other types of extradition or alternatives to extradition violate international 
agreements on human rights.  
There are different types of extradition, and a number of ways of implementing it. While some 
are directly related to the term in the modern sense and meaning, others have similarities, but do 
not fall into the legal definition of extradition. For example, in modern times, although judicial 
extradition is the official process whereby one jurisdiction secures the return of a suspected or 
convicted criminal from another jurisdiction, there are also a number of quasi-judicial disguised 
forms of extradition: a backdoor extradition process employed by a number of states. The 
various forms of alternatives to extradition are discussed in more detail below. 
Many countries today, and especially those that do not formally enjoy a legal treaty on 
extradition with another country, do from time to time resort to those systems and practices 
which do not automatically belong to extradition in essence.396 There has recently been, for 
example, and increase in the use of irregular rendition to circumvent treaty obligations or 
extradition requirements, to fast track the extradition process, or when there is no extradition 
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treaty.397 These practices violate international obligations, specifically international agreements 
on human rights.  
3.5.3 Secret extradition 
Secret extradition violates the due process rights of individuals, and thus violates international 
principles as recognized in the UDHR, ICCPR, ECHR, and other international treaties and 
conventions. This form of extradition is conducted without documentation and in complete 
secrecy, whereby the media and the public do not have access to information about it. Secret 
extradition would violate the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR.398 Further, the 
Model Treaty on Extradition prohibits extradition if an alleged fugitive “has not received or 
would not receive the minimum guarantees in criminal proceeding, as contained in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14.”399 The ECHR in Soering stated 
that “the right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings, as embodied in Article 6, holds a prominent 
place in a democratic society. The Court does not exclude that an issue might exceptionally be 
raised under Article 6 by an extradition decision in circumstances where the fugitive has suffered 
or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting country.”400  
In a secret extradition, the extraditing country arrests the individual concerned and hands him 
over to the requesting country without making any announcement of this action.  Secret 
extradition could be carried out in different ways. For example: 
1. Country A may approach Country B to secure the extradition of a certain individual 
without having an extradition agreement between them. Country B might be willing to 
extradite that individual, but because of the scrutiny exercised by the judicial or 
legislative authorities and public opinion, Country B may resort to transferring this 
individual to a third country which has an extradition agreement with Country A, from 
where he could be extradited without any controversy. 
                                                 
397
 See Rebane, n.15, at 1668-1672. 
398
 ECHR, n.41, at art. 6.  
399
 UN Model Treaty, n. 2, at art. 3(e).  
400
 Soering, n.12, at 101. 
 86 
2. The extraditing country could also resort to declaring the individual concerned, if he 
enjoys diplomatic privileges, as persona non grata, or unwanted and, accordingly, he 
could be extradited administratively to the requesting country.401  
The first possibility may occur if a country was approached to extradite one of its nationals and 
the country might have an interest in doing so, but its constitution prohibits such an action. One 
response is to co-ordinate with a third country, to which its citizen has travelled, to carry out this 
action in total secrecy. One of the most striking examples is the case of the Israeli citizen Levy 
Shiem Hayeim Levy.  
Levy was wanted in the U.S. for committing, according to U.S. authorities, murder and 
involvement in drugs trafficking. The Israeli authorities could not extradite their citizen directly 
to the United States (because the Israel constitution forbids it). They informed the U.S. of his 
movements, which included a trip to Egypt. This helped U.S. authorities in turn to approach the 
Egyptian government and request his arrest and then his extradition to the U.S.402 A case like this 
does indeed indicate that co-ordination can help to extradite criminals and alleged offenders, 
despite the existence of a constitutional provision that forbids the action, and also in the absence 
of any formal extradition treaty between two countries. This is in some ways similar to the 
practice of irregular rendition discussed below. 
While the speed and swiftness of secret extradition, and the avoidance of legal controversy or 
intervention, have attracted countries to resort to secret extradition, this process simply violates 
international norms and customs, and specifically international agreements on human rights like 
the UDHR, ICCPR, and the ECHR.403 Secret extradition is a total disregard of legal and 
procedural legitimacy that ought to be strongly respected by governments. Countries that use 
secret extradition exposes itself as a direct target for international human rights organisations; 
and would have, therefore, its image tarnished. Secret extradition does indeed violate the rights 
of the individuals concerned because it deprives the individuals concerned of their right to legal 
due process, which is supposed to take place before extradition is carried out.404 
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A related concept to secret extradition is mutual extradition. This form of extradition occurs 
when a requested country agrees to extradite an accused individual on condition that the 
requesting country agrees to extradite a particular individual to the requested country. A 
prominent example of this is that of two Mossad (Israeli intelligence) agents who were arrested 
in Jordan after their attempt to assassinate Khalid abu Mish’al, a member of Hamas, the 
Palestinian resistance group, in 1997. The Israeli government offered to release the spiritual 
leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, on condition that the two agents are also released. This 
offer, or rather mutual extradition was agreed, and both sides secured the release and exchange 
of the individuals concerned.405  
However, this kind of extradition is more of a political arrangement than an action driven by law, 
as the decision to extradite was issued by the top political authorities in both countries and not 
the judiciary. This type is often conducted in total secrecy and away from media scrutiny. Mutual 
extradition, thus, often leads to a violation of individual rights. Further, it might involve 
interruption of legal proceedings, or a sentence against an individual that could be a danger for 
the national security of a particular country.406 
3.5.4 Rendition and Irregular Rendition  
Perhaps an alternative to treaty based extradition that has received much attention in recent years 
is rendition. Generally speaking, rendition is a legal term meaning “surrender,” or “turn over,” 
particularly from one jurisdiction to another, and applies to property as well as persons. It is an 
act of rendering, i.e. delivering, criminal suspects. Thus, extradition is the most common type of 
rendition. 
Rendition, however, is used where there is no formal treaty in existence between the member 
states. Instead, a rendition “arrangement” is agreed. This arrangement, to give it a formal legal 
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recognition, is then incorporated into the member states’ own legal systems through the actions 
of their legislative institutions.407  
With regard to the U.S., rendition, both judicial and extra-judicial, has become a common 
method for dealing with foreign defendants. For example, in the case of the Achille Lauro 
hijackers, who were on an airplane over international waters, a United States Air Force fighter 
forced the plane down in an attempt to turn them over to U.S. agents for transport to and trial in 
the U.S.408 Later, this extra-judicial practice expanded to include the deportation and expulsion 
of persons deemed enemy aliens, or terrorists from other countries into the U.S. custody.409 
This type of practice has grown sharply since 9/11 and now includes situations in which suspects 
are taken into U.S. custody, but delivered to a third-party state, often without ever being on U.S. 
soil. Because such cases do not involve the rendering country’s judiciary or, they have been 
termed “irregular or extraordinary rendition.”410 
Irregular rendition, or the extraterritorial abduction of individuals, when done without the co-
operation of an agent of the other nation, violates the other nation’s territorial integrity.411 
Further, in such situations, the rendered suspects are denied due process because they are 
arrested without charges and deprived of legal counsel. The UCCPR expressly prohibits arbitrary 
arrests.412 Thus, countries that are signatories to the UCCPR, though lacking in enforcement 
mechanisms, would violate their obligations under the UCCPR. Recently, irregular rendition 
have been used by the U.S. to bring a suspect into another country for the purpose of 
interrogation, sometimes involving torture and inhumane interrogation techniques that violate 
international human rights law like the ICCPR and the UDHR.  
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Certainly, irregular rendition is against the spirit of both international as well as national laws, 
and closer to what may be termed international piracy. 
3.5.5 Abduction 
The use of abduction has also increased in recent years.413 Countries often get frustrated with 
extradition procedures, or another country may refuse the request for extradition, especially in 
the absence of a treaty.414 As a result, countries will employ abduction to obtain the individual, 
thereby defeating the purpose of the extradition system. The practice of abduction is troubling 
because countries may resort to it even if there is an international extradition convention. This 
implies, thus, that an international extradition convention must have some sort of enforcement 
mechanism or penalty provision to be effective. The drawback to such a provision, however, is 
that most countries may object and therefore not sign the convention altogether.  
3.6 Exceptions to extradition are eroding  
Extradition (despite its legal status once approved) has exceptions in its practice as well as 
setbacks. Another sign of the insufficiency of the current extradition system is the erosion of 
these exceptions to extraditions originally developed to protect individual rights. Additionally, 
these exceptions create controversies that prevent some countries from concluding formal, legal 
treaties for extradition. There are controversies over what a political offence is and what is not. 
What are the boundaries of human rights in this respect? To what extent is it legal to extradite 
someone who may be tortured or executed in the requesting country? For these questions it is 
useful to identify the exceptions to extradition. 
3.6.1 Exceptions for double criminality and extradition crimes 
At the heart of any extradition request is the notion of an extradition crime predicated on the rule 
of double criminality. Double criminality is a well recognized exception to extradition. The 
principle of double criminality415 requires that a fugitive be extradited only for conduct that is 
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criminal and punished to the prescribed minimum by the law of both parties.416 This rule was 
explained by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the Pinochet case. He stated that “[f]or the purposes of 
the present case, the most important requirement is that the conduct complained of must 
constitute a crime under the law both of Spain and of the United Kingdom. This is known as the 
double criminality rule.”417 In short, if the crime or conduct alleged by the requesting state does 
not amount to an offence in the requested state, no extradition can lie.  
What amounts to an extradition crime varies according to the scheme concerned. In the U.K., the 
basic principles regarding an extradition crime remain the same under the 2003 Act, with the 
notable exception that the requirement of double criminality has been removed for European 
Arrest Warrant cases.418  What the 2003 Act has, however, sought to do, and has achieved to a 
certain extent, is to remove the onerous steps required under Schedule 1 to the 1989 Act. The 
new Act has sought to simplify the definition of ‘extradition crime’ by adhering to the definition 
provided for in s.2 of the 1989 Act, namely conduct that is punishable by imprisonment for 
twelve months or more in the requesting state.419 
Unlike s.1 (1) of the 1989 Act, which specifically pins “liability to extradition” onto the notion of 
an extradition crime, the 2003 Act simply refers to “an offence specified in the warrant.”420 The 
2003 Act divides into Category 1 territories (EAW) and Category 2 territories. Of the former, the 
EAW has two distinct categories of extradition offence: 
1. Offences punishable with imprisonment for twelve months or more.  
2. Offences contained in the Framework list (discussed in section 4.5.3 following) 
punishable with imprisonment for three years or more and which, as defined by the 
law of the issuing Member State, shall under the terms of this Framework Decision 
and without verification of the double criminality of the act, give rise to surrender 
pursuant to a European arrest warrant.421 
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Double criminality has historically been a very important principle because the criminal laws of 
various countries divergently prohibited and punished conduct.422 Double criminality protects 
states' rights by promoting reciprocity and also safeguards individual rights by shielding the 
individual from unexpected and unwarranted arrest and imprisonment.423 The necessity of the 
principle becomes especially obvious when one looks at the different prohibitions and 
punishments for offences like euthanasia, suicide, adultery, and abortion.424  
The double criminality exception to extradition may arguably be a human rights exception to 
extradition, and has been applied as such in some cases, especially in early cases like slavery.425 
As such, the principle of double criminality has been closely tied to human rights.426 At one time, 
the number of cases in which the principle of double criminality determined the outcome of the 
request was abundant.427 The principle worked to ensure fairness and as a safeguard for human 
rights. However, the double criminality exception has been so limited in current practice, at least 
in some countries like the United States.428 As stated above, the requirement has even been 
removed from the EAW. Double criminality does not work today as it once did in the past to 
protect human rights in the context of extradition.429 This pattern is also seen in other exceptions 
to extradition as further discussed below. 
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Double criminality in current practice has been largely limited to only serious offences, and 
some states like the U.S. only require that the offences be similar.430 Some states view it as an 
onerous practice, and have relaxed requirements for double criminality.431  
One could argue that double criminality has become superfluous in serious international crimes 
like crimes against humanity and terrorism. One could further argue that the realist approach to 
international law and the increasing number of treaties relating to criminal law has made double 
criminality less necessary as before. From a limited beginning, treaties first provided only for a 
small number of extraditable offences, sometimes limited to two offences like murder and 
forgery.432 Modern treaties have now come to list extraditable offences exhaustively.433 Yet, this 
debate returns to the competing views on extradition as traditionally applied to the benefit of the 
state or, as a growing view, to be applied to the individual as a subject of international law.434 
This paper argues that the protection of human rights, especially of the accused, need to focus on 
the individual. The balance between the goals of extradition and the need for human rights 
protection could only be properly struck if the sovereignty of states is also to be balanced with 
the rights of individuals.  
3.6.2 Exceptions for political offences 
Exceptions for political offences are an important component in contemporary extradition 
practices. The controversy has attracted considerable attention recently, as the distinction 
between ‘terrorist’ and ‘freedom fighter’ blurs (discussed below). The focus here is on the origin 
and developments in exceptions for political offences, whether this serves any purpose in 
contemporary extradition practice, and what legal scholars say concerning its perpetuation, or 
cessation in the modern context. 
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Exception for political offences is a defence against extradition and is a relatively recent notion 
in the history of extradition. Yet it has established itself as a mandatory element of any bilateral 
or multilateral agreement or convention on extradition. It even figures as a compulsory element 
in the UN Model Treaty.435 Article 3 (“Mandatory Grounds for Refusal”) dictates that extradition 
shall not be granted “if the offence for which extradition is requested is regarded by the 
requested State as an offence of a political nature.”436 As Van den Wyngaert observed, 
“[exception for political offence is] considered as a generally accepted principle.”437  
Despite being now commonplace and important, the phrase ‘exception for political offences’ is, 
however, poorly defined. Most treaties, conventions, and acts mention it as an exception without 
defining to what exactly it refers. Generally, exceptions for political offences are defined 
negatively, i.e. what they are not rather than what they are. The explanation for this comes 
through case law. The difficulty in defining the term accurately stems from the fact that “despite 
its commonplace status, the political offence exception is poorly defined.”438 As pointed out by 
Van den Wyngaert, the term ‘political offence’ is a broad term which can encompass a variety of 
crimes.439 Bassiouni surmises that the reason why the term is not defined in treaties and acts 
“may be due to the fact that whether or not a particular type of conduct falls within that category 
depends essentially on the facts and circumstances of the occurrences.”440 
Traditionally, the extradition of political offenders was not sought vigorously, as it was seen as a 
ridding of criminals and nuisances and their punishment was seen to be leading lonely lives 
abroad. In contradistinction to this view, political offenders who commit crimes against the state, 
or the ruler, represent a direct threat to the integrity of the sovereign. These elements are 
considered a threat to the stability of the political order, as they would be involved in 
conspiracies. Therefore, their capture was the primary function of extradition.441 
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France was the first state to codify the new perspective in its 1793 constitution, which guaranteed 
political asylum to those who were forced to flee their countries while fighting for liberty. In the 
18th century, revolutionary ideologies were romanticised and became favourable in public 
opinion and with legal scholars like Gotius.442 
The emergence of exceptions to extradition for political offence can be largely attributed to the 
rise of revolutionary ideologies and political theories on freedom, democracy, and the right to 
rebel against tyranny that caught the fancy of many states of the time and became widely popular 
in Europe. The sympathy towards political offenders who fought against autocracy and 
despotism was growing. Pyle has captured that contemporary fever,443 as has Claeys: 
“Today most politically motivated killers are denounced as terrorists, but to many mid-
nineteenth century European liberals, rebels against reactionary regimes were genuine 
heroes. Leaders of the unsuccessful revolutions of 1830 and 1848, like Mazzini, Kossuth, 
and Garibaldi were lionised by the liberal societies to which they fled...This romanticism 
dominated the writings of European criminologists. For example, Cesare Lombroso, the 
leading Italian scholar of crime, characterised political criminals as men of ‘Powerful 
intellect, exaggerated sensibility, great altruism, patriotic, or even scientific ideals.’”444 
The French Revolution sowed the seed of liberal democracies. The ideals surrounding the 
Revolution effectively upgraded the idealised image of the political offender from that of an 
especially dangerous criminal to that of a noble revolutionary. Political offenders were 
considered worthy of protection.445 By the 19th century, the concept of an exception to 
extradition for political offences was widely accepted. It was first enacted by Belgium in an 1833 
Act, which stipulated that foreigners “shall not be prosecuted nor punished for any political 
offence [committed] before extradition, nor for any fact connected to such crime.”446 From that 
point onward, Belgium included the exception for political offences clause in all the extradition 
agreements it entered into. The rationale behind adopting this exception was primarily to prevent 
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interference from neighbouring states in this newly established country. The contemporary 
situation prevailing in the regions at that time accounts for the need to incorporate this clause by 
Belgium. A great number of refugees were migrating to various states to escape the tyranny of 
their ruling governments. Belgium, which had just achieved independence from the Netherlands, 
feared an influx of fugitives, which would allow the countries from which they had fled to 
interference and create tension with those countries. This was an important function of enacting 
exceptions, as has been noted by Van den Wyngaert:  
“the introduction of the political offence exception in this new statute had a very 
important political function. It was hoped that through this provision the intervention of 
the mighty neighbour states concerning the extradition of political refugees could be 
avoided.”447 
In short, the decision of most of European countries to incorporate the exception for political 
offences was a reflection and endorsement of liberal European sentiments, which saw political 
resistance and rebellion as noble and worthy of protection, coupled with a broader shift toward a 
humanitarian concern over the likely unfair treatment of the political offenders in the requesting 
states.448 More and more states included exception for political offences in their bilateral and 
multilateral treaties and enacted statutes to accord it legal status. By the second half of the 19th 
century, the political offence exception had become commonplace in international extradition 
law, reflected both in bilateral treaties and in national legislation.449 
Even in totalitarian regimes, political prisoners were treated differently from other offenders. 
Fascist Italy used a separate system for the prosecution and incarceration of political prisoners. 
In such systems, they were treated more harshly that common criminals.450 Political offenders 
were considered dangerous as they aired anarchic views, which could pose a serious threat to 
state sovereignty, and hence, were incompatible with the strong state. Nazi Germany regarded 
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political offenders as enemies of the people.451 These facts lend support and credibility to the 
application of an exception for political offences in extradition. 
By the latter half of the 19th century, the rationale for the exception for political offences was 
well established. However, the rationale is a complex one, which intertwines political, moral, and 
humanitarian arguments. Poncet and Gully-Hart explain the complexity as follows.452 
1. The political argument that states should remain neutral vis-a-vis political conflicts in 
other states, therefore, extradition of political opponents is to be a priori refused; 
2. The moral argument based on the premise that resistance to oppression is legitimate and 
that political crimes can therefore be justified; and 
3. The humanitarian argument, whereby, a political offender should not be extradited to a 
state in which he risks an unfair trial. 
With regard to the political argument, returning a fugitive could give rise to conflicts with other 
states, as it is possible that those dissenting may become the rulers of that state which might 
injure political relation with it. Extradition of political offenders may also not be in the interest of 
the requesting and the requested state.453 
The moral arguments stems from the fact that it is considered to be a right for anyone to rebel 
against the ruling government. Dissent may be due to differences based on religious or political 
conflicts. As a political offender’s right to differ is recognised and accepted, it would, therefore, 
not be legitimate to hand him over to a state which might punish him because of those 
differences.454 
As for the humanitarian arguments, the political offenders sought by a state may not be treated 
fairly on one or other pretext. A fair trial is not something that could be guaranteed on the part of 
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the requesting state if it was determined to punish or torture political offenders to crush 
rebellion.455 
Van den Wyngaert advanced three reasons for the political offences exception, namely, the 
convergence of the interests of the requested persons, the interests of the states involved 
(requesting and requested), and the general interests of the international public order.456 These 
rationales are commensurate with those argued by Poncet and Gully-Hart.457 The interests of the 
requested persons can be mapped on the humanitarian argument, as both of them are meant to 
safeguard the interests of political offenders, as a fair trial may not be forthcoming from the 
requesting state. The interests of states can be related to the political argument, as should the 
political offender prevail and become the ruler of the requesting state, it would strain the 
relations between the two countries. Therefore, such a return would not be in the interest of 
either country. Cervasio has also advanced political, humanitarian, moral, and legal rationales for 
the political offences exception.458 
Littenberg based the exception for political offences on four principles. These were:  
1. Recognition of the legitimacy of political dissent. 
2. The desire to protect the political offender from biased or inhuman treatment.  
3. The principles of state neutrality in the internal matters of another state.  
4. A desire not to include the wealth of an insurgent group.459  
Rao put forward two primary rationales for the creation of the political offences exception. These 
were:  
1. To protect the fugitive’s human rights. 
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2. To simultaneously protect the requested state’s interest in remaining neutral in the 
internal affairs of the requesting state.460 
As can be seen from the above arguments, it appears that the interests of the political offender, 
the interests of the states involved, and the fear of inhuman treatment of the fugitive after 
extradition, are the main drivers for creating the political offences exception. Based on these 
grounds, the political offence exception has become a universal phenomenon underlying bilateral 
and multilateral treaties, created through the formulation of relevant statutes. 
The advent of a new international order, which approved and favoured revolutions, to bring 
about change in colonisation and dictatorships warranted the political offences exception in that 
the exception was seen as an indication of this change of world order. The revolution did not aim 
to replace one authority with another, but changed the underlying social system. A change in one 
country was expected to trigger a change in other countries, thus bringing about a change in the 
international system.461 Most of the earlier, political offenders falling under the exception were 
those involved in a rebellion against individual tyrants. In the 20th century, new forms of tyranny 
occurred, which were encountered by new forms of rebellion. By the mid-20th century, many 
colonisations were also seen as a form of tyranny and the struggle to liberate from the clutches of 
occupation for national independence was seen as justified. The UN’s charter pledged the 
principle of self-determination and encouraged and supported movements for independence and 
self-governance. As a result of this sanction, a number of independent countries emerged on the 
world map. From 1946 to 1960 the membership of the UN General Assembly grew from 51 to 
97, largely attributable to the struggle for self-determination and self-rule.462 
In recent times, however, there has been growing opposition to the exception for political 
offences, despite the fact that it has continued to be a standard clause in extradition treaties. In 
1854, Belgium introduced a statutory “attentat” clause which made an exception to the political 
offence exception in cases involving an attack on or attempted assassination of a foreign head of 
state or members of his family. The introduction of such an exception to the exception was 
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aimed at nullifying any possibility that the political offence exception would serve as carte 
blanch for would-be assassins.463 
However, there are other reasons for criticism of the political offences exception. One of these 
relates to the principle of national sovereignty. Cervasio argued that: 
“If a person commits a crime within a particular nation, that nation should presumably 
have the right to try him. There is no justification for other nations to step in and impose 
their values and/or judicial systems upon a criminal fugitive, or the nation from where he 
came.”464 
More importantly, protecting a criminal and refusing the requesting state return of the offender 
“may be infringing upon the national sovereignty of [that] state.”465 
Another argument advanced against making the political offences exception has to do with its 
deleterious impact on international world order. As noted above, in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, political crimes were romanticised and a right to rebel coupled to any means of 
achieving independence were accepted. Such revolutions were not seen of a particular danger to 
the international world order, because of their inherently nationalist character. This common 
wisdom was proved wrong with the increasing globalisation of politics and with the emergence 
of international crime and terrorism in the late 20th century, which posed a serious threat to the 
world order. This point of view has been further emphasised by the 9/11 and 7/7 incidents, which 
were the result of internationally organised terrorism and caused an upheaval at the international 
level. The Afghan and Iraqi crises are seen as progenies of these incidents. It has been argued 
that the political offence exception effectively, supports, or encourages any criminal activities – 
including ‘terrorism’ against the general citizenry – as long as it has political links.466 
Yet another related argument is that the overly broad character of the political offences exception 
shields serious, violent criminals from punishment. Rao argues that traditional rationales 
advanced in favour of the political offences exception, including protection of fugitives’ human 
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rights and the protection of the state’s interest in neutrality can in fact be turned around to create 
a rationale against the political offences exception. As he puts it:  
“the political offence exception has been criticised on grounds that the notion of human 
rights is actually a hindrance to combating international crime. Human rights of the 
political offender are, as a matter of fact, a domestic matter and the responsibility of the 
requesting state.”467 [Emphasis added]. 
This decline in the acceptance of the political offences exception has coincided with the 
expansion in international terrorism, and the efforts to control it. Once, the UN was concerned 
with “the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and 
manifestations”468 and recognising peoples’ right to use force to gain independence and self-
governance. Halberstam interpreted omission of “resort to terrorism as justification for self-
determination”469 in later UN resolutions, and its employment of a broader language condemning 
terrorism “wherever and by whomever”470 committed, as constituting “a clear rejection of the 
[earlier] position.”471 The erosion of international support for the doctrine of self-determination, 
and the associated support for the legitimacy of the struggle for liberation can be interpreted as a 
weakening of the political offences exception as a norm of international law. 
Interpretation of the political offences exception has been subject to various approaches. 
However, there are conditions that should be fulfilled to be eligible for the political offences 
exception. Just as there is no consensus on how to define the term ‘political offence’, no 
agreement in international law exists  in terms of how to determine whether or not a particular 
political offence qualifies for the exception to extradition. Various approaches are taken to deal 
with the exception for political offences in extradition practices and principles. Van den 
Wyngaert argues for three approaches. The first of these is the subjective approach, which 
emphasises the intentions of the perpetrator and the decisive question as to the nature of an 
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offence is whether the offender was politically motivated, regardless of whether the act had a 
political outcome.472 As is evident, this approach attaches a great deal of importance to what the 
aim of the offender was. 
The second is referred to as the objective approach. In contrast to the subjective approach, this 
takes into account the political context of the act and its actual outcome or consequences. It does 
not focus on the intentions of the perpetrator. It considers whether the actual interests ‘injured’ 
are of a political nature, regardless of the aim of the offender.473 
The third is an amalgamation of the other two, and is called the mixed approach. As the term 
indicates, it pays attention to both the political motivation of the offender, and the circumstances 
surrounded the offence. In other words, it allows that either the intention to commit the offence, 
or the outcome of the offence could be a political crime.474 
Bassiouni points out that in contemporary extradition practices, in most countries, the dominant 
element in determining the political offences exception is that “the political element must 
predominate over the intention to commit the common crime. It must constitute the purpose for 
the commission of that crime.”475 Thus, Bassiouni’s approach is much closer to the subjective 
approach of Van den Wyngaert and suggests that the objective approach is not a common 
practice.476 
Despite considerable convergence on this view, there exist significant differences in how states 
approach the exception for political offences. According to Alotaibi, the current differences in 
approach are grounded in historical divergences.477 In this context, three approaches can be 
identified as being followed in the treatment of the political offences exception in contemporary 
extradition practice. These include the French approach, also referred to as injured rights theory 
or the objective approach; the Swiss approach, also known as the political motivation theory or 
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proportionality/predominance theory, and, finally, the Anglo-American approach, commonly 
known as the political-incidence theory. 
The French injured rights theory holds that the political offences exception to extradition law is 
“dependent upon the nature of the rights injured by the accused actions.”478 The theory does not 
give weight to the motives of the offender, but measures the amount of loss caused, hence the 
injured rights approach. The leading case in this theory was heard in 1947 in In re Giovanni 
Gatti wherein the Republic of San Marino requested Gatti’s extradition for attempting to murder 
a local communist. The Court of Appeal of Grenoble granted Gatti’s claim that his act was 
political, holding that “political offences… are directed against the constitution of the 
Government and against Sovereignty …. and disturb the distribution of powers … The offence 
does not derive its political character from the motive of the offender, but from the nature of the 
rights it injures.”479[Emphasis added]. This emphasis on the outcome in terms of the rights 
injured characterises the approach as objective. Despite containing the neutrality of the objective 
test, the theory has been attacked by many critics. One concern is voiced by Littenberg, that 
neutrality apart, “it did little to achieve the humanitarian goals of the exception because it 
prevented the political characterisation of most crimes.”480 Another criticism leveled is by Van 
den Wyngaert, who finds the approach “too radical and too formal in practice”481 on the grounds 
that “the political character is denied to acts, which do not constitute a direct attack against the 
political institutions”482 and it does not draw any distinction “with respect to absolute political 
crimes committed from strictly personal motives and no attention is paid to the seriousness of the 
facts.”483 Because of these shortcomings, the injured rights test was mainly discarded by the 
1960s. 
The second main approach to the political offences’ exception is the Swiss approach, also called 
proportionality, or political motivation. As the name implies, the approach “does not look strictly 
to the nature of the rights injured, but tries to correlate the ideological beliefs of the offender, and 
the proportionate effect of his acts, or offences and the political purpose in trying to reach an 
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equitable result which lacks in other theories.”484 This theory maintains a balance between the 
political motivation and the actual offence committed. Under this approach, a crime will qualify 
for the political offences exception if it is predominantly political, that is, if the political element 
supersedes the common element. The Swiss Extradition Act of 1892 serves as the basis of this 
theory. The Swiss Federal Tribunal evolved three criteria to determine the political offences 
exception in V.P. Wassilief 1908. The three elements are:  
1. That the offence was committed for the purpose of helping, or ensuring the success of 
a purely, political purpose.  
2. That there was a direct connection between the crime committed, and the purpose 
pursued by a party to modify the political, or social organisation of the state. 
3. That the political element predominated over the ordinary, criminal element. 
 These characteristics have earned this approach the title of the political motivation 
predominance test. A good illustration of the application of this test has been cited in the 
literature in the case of re Kavic,485 who with other crew-members hijacked and diverted a 
Yugoslavian plane to Switzerland. He, together with his crew-mates, was charged with 
endangering the safety of public transport and wrongful appropriation of property. The Swiss 
court applied the proportionality test, which took into account both the injury to private persons, 
and property and the interests of the accused. The extradition was denied on the grounds that …. 
“the relation between the purpose and the means adopted for [the political offence’s] 
achievement must be such that the ideals connected with the purpose are sufficiently strong to 
excuse, if not justify, the injury to private property, and to make the offender worthy of asylum. 
Freedom from constraint of a totalitarian State must be regarded as an ideal in this sense.”486 In 
1961, the Swiss Federal Tribunal laid down a clear-cut criterion for the proportionality test in 
Kitr v. Ministere Public Federal,487 noting that “political offences include common crimes which 
had a predominantly political character, from their motive and factual background. However, the 
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damage had to be proportionate to the aim sought; in the case of murder, this had to be shown to 
be a sole means of attaining the political aim.”488 
The Swiss proportionality approach has been regarded as preferable by some analyses for the 
way it strikes a balance between the political motives and the proportionality criteria.489 This 
approach to the political offences exception has been practiced by other European countries, 
including the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, and France.490 However, the theory has also 
attracted criticism for its “innate subjectivity and its tendency to impose the values and ideals of 
one state on the other,”491 as pointed out by Van den Wyngaert, and the “theory [suffers from] 
arbitrariness because it relies on a number of subjective evaluations which cannot be measured 
by objective standards… It is virtually impossible to evaluate in objective terms whether or not a 
given act was instrumental towards the attainment of a particular political goal.”492 
The third approach is the Anglo-American. It is also referred to as political incidence theory. 
This is practiced in Britain and the U.S. The British Extradition Act of 1870 does not provide a 
definition of a political offence. It only states that extradition will not be granted for an “offence 
of a political character.”493 However, the definition emerges from case law. In Mill’s view, a 
political crime is “one committed in the course of a civil war or other political commotion.”494 
Justice Stephen built on that notion by adding that the crime should be “incidental to” and “part 
of political disturbance” from whence the term political-incidence was derived.495 
The political-incidence theory was first applied to in re Castioni in 1890 involving Switzerland’s 
request for the extradition of Castioni for having killed a member of the State Council of a Swiss 
canton.496 Castioni led an uprising against the government involving large-scale armed attacks in 
which an official was killed. There was, however, no evidence that Castioni had premeditated the 
murder, nor was there any indication that he and the victim had ever met. Under the 
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circumstances, “a more obvious case of a political offence could hardly be imagined.”497 The 
extradition of Castioni was refused on the grounds that it was a political offence. The court 
ruling also established the political incidence approach to interpreting political offences. It stated 
that: 
“The question really is, whether, upon the facts, it is clear that the man was acting as one 
of a number or persons engaged in acts of violence of a political character, with a 
political object, and a part of the political movement and rising in which he was taking 
part.”498 
The decision in the Castioni case established three criteria which must be fulfilled for a political 
offence to qualify for exception:  
1. There must be a political revolt or disturbance. 
2. The act for which extradition is sought must be incidental to the disturbance, or from a 
part of it. 
3. The ideological or political motivation must be established.499 
The criteria established in the case were further refined in the 1894 case in In re Meunier.500 In 
this case, France lodged a request for the extradition of Meunier, charged for two explosions, 
which had killed two people. Meunier described himself as an anarchist. But the court refused to 
consider Meunier’s crime as a political offence, as it failed the incidence test. This is important, 
because the political incidence notion was further refined with the addition of a requirement for a 
two-party struggle, as elucidated in Justice Cave’s statement that “in order to constitute an 
offence of a political character, there must be two or more parties in the State each seeking to 
impose the government of their own choice on the other.”501 This also served to automatically 
exclude anarchists and terrorists from consideration for the political offences exception. 
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Later, in 1954, the English courts dropped the previously “rigid requirement”502 for an uprising, 
or civil disturbance in Regina v. Governor of Brixon Prison, ex parte Kolcyznksi.503 In this case, 
Poland demanded the extradition of several soldiers, who mutinied on a fishing trawler, for 
revolt on the high seas. The case began when a group of sailors overpowered the captain and the 
rest of the crew and brought the vessel into an English port with the aim of seeking political 
asylum. The sailors applied for a political offences exception to Poland’s demand for extradition, 
on the grounds that their conversations on the vessel had been overheard with a view to later 
preparing a case against them based on their political opinions. The justices concluded that, if 
returned, the sailors would be prosecuted for the political crime of treason. The precedents of 
Castioni and Meunier were not directly applicable, since there was no political uprising in this 
case. The court decided to relax the specific requirement for an uprising, and refused the 
extradition of Kolcyznksi and his colleagues. Chief Justice Goddard held that “the revolt of the 
crew was to prevent themselves from being prosecuted for political offences and in my opinion; 
therefore, the offence had a political character.”504 
In Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Schtraks further clarification of the 
circumstances that could be used for the political offences exception was offered. In this case, 
Israel had requested the extradition of Schtraks for having refused to comply with a judicial 
order asking for the return of a child to his parents, but Schtraks refused to return the child on the 
plea that it would no longer have a strict orthodox education and claimed the political offences 
exception. The House of Lords refused the application and led Lord Radcliffe to explain this 
denial by stating that: 
“In my opinion the idea that lies behind the phrase ‘offence of a political character’ is that 
the fugitive is at odds with the State that applies for his extradition on some issue 
connected with the political control or government of the country. The analogy of 
‘political’ in this context is with ‘political’ in such phrases as ‘political refugee’, ‘political 
asylum’ or ‘political prisoner.’”505 
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In 1973, in Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, Great Britain added another requirement to 
the political incidence test.506 The U.S. sought Cheng’s extradition for the attempted murder of a 
Taiwanese vice-Premier in New York. The House of Lords denied the request for exception on 
the grounds that for it to apply the act must be directed against the opposed government and that 
the U.S. aimed to enforce its own criminal laws (against attempted homicide).507 
The political-incidence theory for the political offences exception has been applied in the U.S. as 
well. For instance, the Castioni incidence test was adopted into American jurisprudence in the 
1894 case of in re Ezeta. The Ezeta court defined a political offence as “any offence committed 
in the course of or furthering of civil war, insurrection, or political commotion”508 and offences 
committed “during the progress of actual hostilities between the contending forces.”509 U.S. 
courts also applied the second prong of the political-incidence test in that the concomitant acts 
should be geared towards furthering the political cause. In Ornelas v. Ruiz, the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that the offences were not politically based, as the “character of the foray, the mode 
of attack, the persons killed, or captured, and the kind of property taken … did not advance a 
political cause.”510 
More recently, there has been considerable opposition to this exception and many have sought its 
exclusion from treaties and acts. Its existence has been challenged on the grounds that the 
reasons for which the exception was made have undergone change. As discussed above, 
originally the exception was developed and accepted in order to maintain world order, but recent 
incidents have clearly shown that the political circumstances have taken a new turn, which 
involves terrorism and other crimes which pose a serious threat to world peace.511 
It has therefore been argued that exceptions to the political offences exception have to be made. 
Certain acts and crimes should be excluded from this exception to discourage acts of 
international terrorism, which are arising from increasing globalisation. Following the recent 
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terrorist attacks, those involved in terrorist acts should not be granted the exception and be barred 
from this privilege.512 
3.6.3 The death penalty exception 
Recently, there has been increased acceptance of human rights concerns in international 
extradition. The traditional focus on this issue has been on a fugitive being subject to torture or 
other gross injustices in the requesting state’s criminal justice system.513 Over the last two 
decades, considerable attention has been paid to human rights concerns over extradition to states 
which impose the death penalty. This has become a more pressing matter as more countries 
around the world have moved away from capital punishment. In Europe, for example, after the 
Council of Europe adopted an amendment to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Protocol 6) in 1985, which abolished the death penalty in peacetime, capital punishment has 
been abandoned.514 Protocol 6 was extended under Protocol 13 of the Council of Europe to 
abolish the death penalty even in times of war.515 Because of the adoption of the policy, countries 
which have abolished it are reluctant to extradite fugitive criminals to countries where it is 
enforced. Generally, these states will extradite a wanted person on the assurance from the 
requesting state that the death penalty will not be imposed. For instance, U.S. treaties on 
extradition are couched in terms which follow the discretionary pattern, giving each partner the 
option to refuse extradition for the death penalty or to stipulate that it is not be imposed if 
extradition is granted.  The following excerpt from the 1971 Extradition Treaty between Canada 
and the U.S. illustrate how the death penalty exception is worded:  
“When the offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under the 
laws of the requesting State and the laws of the requested State do not permit such 
punishment for the offence, extradition may be refused unless the requesting State 
                                                 
512
 See Alotaibi, n.73, at 210-216 for a fuller discussion of the exception to the exception. 
513
 Ibid at 263. 
514
 Council of Europe, ‘Protocol No.6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty’, (1983), ETSeries 114.  
515
 ‘Protocol No.13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning 
the Abolition of the Death Penalty’, (2002), ETS 187.  
 109 
provides such assurances as the requested State considers sufficient that the death 
penalty shall not be imposed, or, if imposed, shall not be executed.”516 
In 1989, the seminal Soering case was heard, in which the European Court of Human Rights 
blocked the extradition of a German man from England to Virginia, where he faced capital 
charges of murder.517 The court took the view that “the very long period of time spend on death 
row in…extreme conditions, with the ever-present and mounting anguish of waiting 
execution”518 amounted to a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states that “no one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”519 Although no direct reference 
was made to the death penalty, the fact that in the State of Virginia the death penalty was 
imposed was vital in reaching the verdict.  Sharfstein notes: “Soering inspired a series of 
abolitionist decisions in tribunals around the world. The English Privy Council and high courts in 
the Netherlands, Zimbabwe, India, South Africa, and Italy all took strong stands against the 
‘death row phenomenon.’”520  
The U.S. has been following an extradition policy whereby it remains committed to the death 
penalty, which is practiced in some of its states. Recently, there has been intense pressure from 
countries around the world, particularly from those in Europe, on the U.S. to back away from its 
commitment to capital punishment.521 
Bassiouni argues a two-fold rationale for refusing extradition on the grounds that the fugitive 
criminal is likely to incur the death penalty. These are:  
1. The abolition of the death penalty by a given state is predicated on humanitarian 
considerations and public policy. 
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2. It would be therefore abhorrent to the state to grant extradition because this would be 
using its processes to reach an outcome which is in violation of its laws and public 
policy.522 
As pointed out by Alotaibi, “while it cannot yet be said that the imposition of the death penalty is 
recognised as a violation of international law, it can be argued that the trend is leading in that 
direction.”523 
The next three chapters discuss the extradition systems in the U.K. and Saudi Arabia, identify the 
obstacles to an extradition treaty between the two countries, and argue that an extradition treaty 
between the U.K. and Saudi Arabia is possible, especially within the framework of international 
law. If two drastically different countries like the U.K. and Saudi Arabia can resolve the major 
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Extradition and the U.K. judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a description is given of the mechanisms governing the extradition system in 
Britain and the various judicial and quasi-judicial procedures involved in the process. The focus 
is on providing an overview of the U.K. context and identifying the sources of the extradition 
system in Britain, with particular attention to the Extradition Act 2003 (EA2003). This chapter 
argues that the primary concern that the U.K. would have toward an extradition treaty with Saudi 
Arabia is its concern over human rights and its international human rights obligations, for 
example, under Protocol 6 of the ECHR. The U.K. would primarily be concerned with the 
imposition of the death penalty in Saudi Arabia. This concern over human rights is further 
exacerbated because the U.K. employs a judicial extradition system, while Saudi Arabia employs 
and administrative system—criticised for its lack of due process.   
It can be noted that although Britain has a long history of extradition and is an active member of 
the EU and a number of other organisations, it is today trying hard to align its extradition system 
with the emerging norms and trends in the extradition domain, as well as meeting the new 
challenges. As there is a statutory obligation in U.K. law that all treaty and conventions 
provisions should be given a legal effect through legislation, extradition acts have been a norm in 
the history of U.K. law.  
This chapter discusses the U.K. approach to jurisdiction principles in the context of U.K. 
extradition. The U.K. follows more than one approach to jurisdiction, including the principle 
of territoriality and the active personality principle. The U.K. is obliged to extradite fugitive 
criminals present in the U.K. against a valid extradition request. At the same time, U.K. 
extradition law also meets international law principles by providing for internationally 
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recognised and accepted norms of exceptions for political offences or where there is a 
likelihood of the extradited person being subjected to treatment that contravenes human 
rights protection. 
This chapter additionally discusses the motives and purpose of introducing the Extradition Act of 
2003. The U.K. came under tremendous pressure and world focus to review the existing 
extradition act after the Pinochet case. This pressure was aided by other developments like the 
Council Framework Decision, which required Member States to enact the provisions of the 
Decision. This was given further impetus by the U.K.’s desire to match other countries in having 
a more efficient extradition system and to accommodate new provisions contained in the treaties 
and conventions. Also, an attempt on the part of the U.K. government has been made to simplify 
procedures and make the whole process less cumbersome in order to speed up extradition of 
criminals wanted by the requesting states – the avowed goals of the EA 2003. At the same time, 
as has been observed by many writers, the lengthy procedures involved in dealing with an 
extradition request afford many loopholes to the fugitive. This may result in otherwise valid 
extraditions falling though the net.  
On the whole, the system which aims at expediting the process seems to encourage delays and 
leaves huge room for adopting delay tactics to either abort the whole extradition attempt or 
protract. The efforts being made are suggestive of how keen Britain is to introduce and 
implement extradition laws to make the system even more effective - one which is fit to meet 
modern challenges like terrorism. 
This chapter also describes extraditable offences as well as their controversies and challenges. 
Under the Extradition Act, Britain follows the extradition crimes list provided by the Council 
Framework decision of 13 June 2002. Discussion of this is followed by extradition hearing 
procedures with their detailed processes. The procedures for appeals are also discussed, as were 
the authorities invested with the power to hear appeals and what procedures are to be followed. 
The High Courts and the House of Lords are empowered to hear appeals and there can be 
multiple hearings in a case should new evidence make it essential. 
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This chapter then discusses the relationship between U.K. extradition law and the human rights 
protections bestowed by the UNHRC under the ECE. This is important, as it provides 
impediments to some extradition requests from, for example, the U.S., Yemen, Egypt, and to 
some degree Saudi Arabia, when Britain refused extradition on the basis of human rights. This 
has been a victory for human rights organisations and the rule of humanitarian law. Human rights 
standards have been embedded into U.K. extradition law by imposing bars on extradition where 
there is a danger of a violation of human rights. As a signatory of the ECHR Rights Convention, 
Britain has faithfully endeavoured to accommodate the Convention’s provisions through the 
1989 and 2003 Acts, discussed at length above.  The concern for human rights standards and 
international law principles can partly account for a rigorous regimen of extradition process and 
the delays that can occur in those proceedings. 
4.2 An overview of the U.K. extradition context 
The formal history of extradition law in Great Britain begins with the “Extradition Statutes” of 
1843, which constitute the first recognisable statutory mechanism put in place.524 In the pre-1843 
era, “few references to the subject may be found in legal treatises before the first recognisable 
extradition statutes of 1843.”525 Traditionally, extradition was dealt with under criminal law 
provisions. Before the formulation of extradition law in Britain in 1843, the authority for 
refusing or granting a request from a country rested purely with the monarch. Whether the 
offender was to be ‘delivered up’ was the monarch’s prerogative and extradition was therefore 
part of the executive power, not the legislative, invested solely in the King or Queen.526 This 
gave the extradition system prevalent at the time in Britain an executive character. 
After the mid-twelfth century, Britain concluded various treaties with other countries. Since 
then treaties and agreements have become the main instruments of extradition. This practice 
continued up to the mid 19th century, until in 1843 extradition acts were introduced for the 
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first time.527 Britain falls into the category of a common law country. The traditions in law 
are the basic guiding principles. However, some departures from the traditional approach 
have been necessitated because of fast changing circumstances in the nature and extent of 
crimes.  Many factors have played a part in shaping U.K. law. “Traditionalists claim that the 
U.K. constitution is the happy and pragmatic outcome of an evolution towards freedom and 
democracy ordered by benevolent customs.”528 Modern trends like globalisation, where 
boundaries have become meaningless because of developing technologies, have seen the 
emergence of new forms of crime. 
With regard to territorial jurisdiction, in 1963 Britain adopted an approach which was local 
in character, as the House of Lords, in line with the spirit of the common law, held that “the 
whole body of the criminal law of England deals only with acts committed in England.”529 
This view was re-affirmed in Pinochet (No. 3) by Lord Browne-Wilkinson who held that 
“[in] general a state only exercises criminal jurisdiction over offences which occur within its 
geographical boundaries.”530  
However, a number of inroads have been made through both common law and statute which 
allow English courts to try persons for acts or omissions not committed within the territory 
of the U.K.531 This is referred to as extra-territorial jurisdiction. This shift was voiced in 
Liangsiriprasert v. United States in which Lord Griffiths noted that: 
“crime has ceased to be largely, local in origin and effect. Crime is now established 
on the international scale and the common law must now face this new reality… 
[There is] nothing in precedent, comity or good sense that should inhibit the common 
law from regarding as justiciable in England inchoate crimes committed abroad 
which are intended to result in the commission of criminal offences in England…”532 
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This approach to jurisdiction was formally incorporated through various enactments. For 
instance, conspiracy formed abroad to commit a crime in England became justiciable under 
the Criminal Justice Act 1993. Other exceptions to the basic principle of territoriality include 
conspiring in the U.K. to commit crimes abroad, under the Criminal Law Act 1977, while 
sexual offences were made justiciable under the Conspiracy and Incitement Act 1996. 
Similarly, crimes of torture, hostage-taking, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
were also made triable under the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the Taking of Hostages Act 
1982, and the Geneva Conventions Act 1957. With regard to jurisdiction, Britain follows 
more than one principle of jurisdiction, in addition to the principle of territoriality, a 
characteristic approach of common law.533 For instance, it follows the active personality 
principle534 in that it provides that the murder or manslaughter of a British or foreign victim 
outside the U.K. may be tried in the U.K. if the offender is a British national (Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861); the offence is bigamy; murder in Germany or on territory 
under German occupation committed between 1 September 1939 and 5 June 1945 is 
justiciable provided the offender was a British citizen or resident on 8 March 1990 (The War 
Crimes Act 1991). This Act also covers any crime performed outside the U.K. by an offender 
who was or has become a British citizen or resident in the U.K. that constitutes an offence in 
the other country; and includes rape, intercourse with a girl under 16, buggery, indecent 
assault, gross indecency, or offences in relation to indecent photographs (Sex Offenders Act 
1997). It adheres to the national security principle of jurisdiction in that the integrity of the 
proceedings in the English courts is protected by extending criminal jurisdiction to cover the 
offence of perjury, for statements made abroad, before a British tribunal or officer abroad, 
which are used in England (Perjury Act 1911).  
This was extended by the Serious Crime Act 2007, which aimed to bring in two significant 
developments in crime fighting and prevention: Serious Crime Prevention Orders (which 
place constraints on an individual’s or an organisation’s finances, business dealings, 
associations, means of communication, travel, and use of premises) and Inchoate Offences 
(which are defined as offences encouraging or assisting crime).535 Section 52 of the Serious 
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Crime Act 2007, states in pertinent part that “[i]f a person knows or believes that what he 
anticipates might take place wholly or partly in England or Wales, he may be guilty of an 
offence … no matter where he was at any relevant time.”536 
The U.K. is a member of a number of international bodies whose rules bear directly or 
indirectly upon extradition laws. As a member of the European Union, the U.K. is also a 
signatory to the European Convention on Extradition and is legally obliged to abide by the 
extradition rules contained in the Convention’s provisions.537 The U.K. has also given legal 
effect to a large number of Convention provisions through enactment. For instance, the 
human rights protection provided for by the convention has been enshrined in EA 2003.538 
4.3 Obligations and bars to extradition – a statutory requirement 
In 1841, the House of Lords took a unanimous view that extradition without an Act of the 
Parliament was unlawful, which required the formulation of extradition statutes in Parliament.539 
This rendered any extradition without statutory provision invalid. In pursuant of the House of 
Lords’ decision, the first Acts which dealt with extradition were introduced in 1843.540 After 
these, a number of extraditions acts were passed to accommodate new developments. The most 
important of these was the 1870 Extradition Act, which remained largely in force for over a 
century before being replaced by the 1989 Extradition Act, which in turn was superseded by EA 
2003. The statutes oblige Britain to extradite fugitive and accused criminals against a valid 
extradition request for the extraditable crimes, the list of which has changed from act to act. The 
latest list is given in Schedule 2 of the Extradition Act 2003 which is based on the European 
Framework List (see section 4.6.6 below). Thus, extradition is an obligation rather than an 
option.  
The Lords’ ruling also meant that from the introduction of the first extradition Acts, mere 
subscription to treaties and conventions as instruments of extradition was not sufficient to 
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warrant extradition. It was required that all the provisions of these treaties and conventions 
had to be given legal effect through legislation before they took effect. The extradition Acts 
not only imposed obligations to extradite a fugitive criminal – accused or convicted – but 
also provided bars to extradition. EA 2003, for example clearly states the situations in which 
extradition should be refused.541 These bars are primarily geared towards accommodating 
human rights protections. For instance, the statutes prohibit the return of an accused or 
criminal fugitive to a state where there is danger of the extradited person being subjected to 
torture or ill treatment or where the death penalty is imposed.542 
These obligations and exceptions are also in keeping with the international law principles 
which require states to extradite fugitive criminals against a valid request with a view to 
reducing and preventing the spread of crime in the world. Bassiouni writes of “the existence 
of an international duty to preserve and maintain world order.”543 
4.4 The motives and purposes of the Extradition Act 2003 
Because of weaknesses in the Extradition Act 1989 and a desire to make its process more 
efficient and to accommodate new developments, the Extradition Act 2003 was introduced. Its 
avowed aim is to consolidate and reinforce the legal framework for the efficient working of 
extradition law. EA 2003 has its roots in a review that commenced in 1997 to consider the 
legislative requirements of two European Union Conventions on Extradition signed in 1995544 
and 1996, as the provision of the Convention have to be given legal effect to become 
enforceable. However, this review developed into “a much more extensive inquiry following the 
Tampere Special European Council in October 1999.”545 The conclusion of the Council was that 
“mutual recognition of judicial decisions should become the cornerstone of judicial co-operation 
in both criminal and civil matters within the EU.”546  In the meantime, the Pinochet case revealed 
many weaknesses of the U.K.’s extradition arrangements and soon after the return of General 
Pinochet to Chile, the Home Secretary announced in the House of Commons that “a more wide-
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ranging review of the U.K.’s extradition legislation was to be carried out.”547 The review, which 
aimed at modernising arrangements between the U.K. and its extradition partners included:  
1. The creation of a four-level framework with countries being designated for each tier by 
Order in Council. 
2. A simple fast-track extradition procedure for member states of the EU.  
3. Retention of current arrangements for non-European Union states with modifications to 
reduce the duplication and complexity of extradition procedures.  
4. A single avenue of appeal for all extradition cases. 
5.  Accession to the 1995 and 1996 European Union Conventions on Extradition.548 
A series of other simultaneous developments also contributed to the framing of the 2003 Act. 
These were the events of the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. and the consequent onset of the ‘war 
against terror’ in Western Europe and the U.S. The review was also overtaken by progress in 
respect of extradition to other EU member states, in particular the Council Framework Decision 
on 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW),549 which created a system of mutually 
enforceable arrest warrants within the EU. The events “provided added political impetus for 
speeding up the extradition of criminal suspects.”550  The Act also sought to incorporate human 
rights concerns as approved in the UN Human Rights Convention and subsequent European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
The Act is aimed at:551 
• Simplifying the extradition process, aimed at expediting extradition cases and making the 
overall process less cumbersome. This was achieved by introducing new terminology, 
tightening the procedural time-limits, and restricting the avenues of appeal. For example, 
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under the 1989 Act, there was no definitive time period for the receipt of the Authority to 
Proceed/Order to Proceed (ATP/OTP). 
• The most significant feature of the Act is in its limiting of the role of the Secretary of 
State at the initial stages of the request. This has two effects. First, it reduces the prospect 
of any proceedings for judicial review at the initial stages of an extradition request. 
Second, it has sought to make extradition largely a judicial function, particularly in 
respect of Category 1 territories where there is no involvement by the Secretary of State 
whatsoever. In other words, the Act changed the extradition process to being purely 
judicial, rather than judicial and executive as envisaged in the 1989 Act. 
• The Act aimed at facilitating the country in discharging its international obligations by 
consolidating the ‘schemes’ (see section 4.4, following). It focused mainly on the EAW 
and in its removal of the requirement that a prima facie case be shown with respect to 
countries such as the U.S. and some Commonwealth countries. This requirement was 
already removed for European Convention on Extradition (ECE) countries.  
• The Act replicates some of the terminology used in the 1989 Act such as ‘unjust and 
oppressive’ and adopts parts of the 1989 Act. For example, s.6 of the 1989 Act is now 
contained within the bars to extradition in s.11 and s.79 of the 2003 Act. 
• At the same time, the Act introduced new terminology to describe the parties and the 
procedure. Equally, it has introduced new bodies in the extradition process. Whereas, 
under the 1989 Act a request was deemed to be from a state, the 2003 Act removes all 
reference to the term ‘state’, instead employing the term ‘territory’. The effect of removal 
of the concept of state is not yet clear. According to Sambei and Jones, this confusion 
may lead to long and protracted arguments on the validity of the request and may result in 
delays.552 
Another feature of the 2003 Act is the role of the Criminal Prosecution Service (CPS) and 
responsibility for expenses. The CPS and foreign states hold a solicitor-client relationship. The 
CPS cannot withdraw without the consent of the client.553 
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When a full order request is received by the Home Office, it is generally forwarded to those 
acting for the foreign State (which in most cases is the CPS). The file is examined to ensure that 
all necessary documents and evidence are present, including disclosure of the identity of the 
requested person, the law in question, and the offences committed.554 Once the CPS is satisfied 
that a request is in good order, a number of steps are taken.555 When the fugitive is arrested and 
brought before Bow Street magistrates, the court should be in a position to fix a committed date. 
It is important to discuss the extradition procedures of EA 2003 and describe the legal measures, 
judicial and administrative regulations that facilitate the extradition process to and from Britain. 
This detailed examination is important because a number of extradition requests from Saudi 
Arabia to Britain in the 1990s failed because of the detail of the law of the time. These matters 
are discussed more fully in Chapter 6. 
4.5 Extradition procedures under EA 2003 
The 1989 Act was the culmination of many additions and amendments to the seminal 1870 Act. 
As noted above, the 2003 was a complete review of the law. For this reason, it is used as a point 
of comparison with the following. 
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3. The propose charges are sent to Bow Street Magistrates’ Court (BSMC). 
4. The Extradition Unit at New Scotland Yard is contacted, enclosing one copy of the request and the proposed 
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The Extradition Act 2003 is geared towards consolidating the schemes conceived in the 1989 
Act. In the new Act, what were five schemes in the 1989 Act were recast into the following 
categories:556 
• Category 1 territories (gives effect to the European Arrest Warrant (EAW)); 
• Category 2 territories (covers all bilateral and multilateral treaties); 
• International conventions; 
• Ad hoc arrangements. 
For each category the procedure is specified in conformity with the Act. For example, Category 
1 territory consists of most of the European Union countries, for which the procedures are 
quicker than, for instance, those concerning Category 2 territories, which are divided into two 
sub-categories – those territories that are required to furnish a prima facie case and those that are 
not.557 ECE countries continue to submit their requests as before; that is, they do not need to 
demonstrate a prima facie case. However, in respect of all other states, the Secretary of State 
determines which territories will or will not need to show a prima facie case. The relevant 
statutory instrument, the Extradition Act 2003 (Designation of Part 2 Territories) Order 2003, 
sets out this division. First, it lists all the countries in Category 2 and second, it identifies the 
territories not required to produce a prima facie case. All other territories not contained in this 
list will be required to submit a prima facie case.558 
When a state is seeking the arrest of a fugitive it does so in one of two ways – either by 
‘provisional arrest’ or upon the submission of a full request. A provisional arrest is requested 
when there is a chance of escape, if, say, the fugitive is within a country for a short period of 
time and may leave if not arrested. By contrast, a full order request is received by the Home 
Office from where it is generally forwarded it to the CPS. 
Under the 2003 Act, Part 1 gives effect to the EAW.559 This section governs the procedure 
regarding provisional arrest for Category 1. Sections 2 to 4 of the 2003 Act govern the procedure 
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for arrest under a Part 1 warrant, as opposed to a provisional arrest.560 The following steps are 
taken in this case. First, the Category 1 territory submits a Part 1 warrant to the designated 
authority, NCIS, which must contain the following information: 
1. That the arrest warrant is issued by a judicial authority of a Category 1 territory. 
In an accusation case, a statement that the person is accused of the offence specified 
in the warrant and the warrant is issued with a view to seeking his arrest and 
extradition 
2. That the arrest warrant is issued by a judicial authority of a Category 1 territory. 
3. In an accusation case, a statement that the person is accused of the offence specified 
in the warrant and the warrant is issued with a view to seeking his arrest and 
extradition. 
4. In a conviction case, a statement that the person is alleged to be unlawfully at large 
after conviction in respect of an offence specified in the warrant and the warrant is 
issued with a view to seeking his arrest and extradition for the purpose of being 
sentenced or serving the sentence or another form of detention imposed. 
5. Other information, including: 
• Particulars of identity; 
• Particulars of any other warrant issued; 
• Particulars of the circumstances in which the person is alleged to have committed 
the offence (it is not clear what is meant by this), the conduct, the date, time and 
place of the offence and the law; and 
• The relevant sentence if one was imposed.  
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Second, the designated authority may then issue a certificate if it believes that the authority 
which issued the Part 1 warrant has the function of issuing warrants in that territory, and the 
certificate confirms this.561 Third, once the certificate is issued the warrant may be executed by a 
constable or customs officer in any part of UK and a copy of the warrant is served on the person 
after the arrest and thee person is brought before the appropriate judge as soon as practicable.562  
The last step is then dedicated to the hearing stages.563  
Under the law, a constable, custom officer, or service policeman may arrest a person if he 
believes that a Part 1 warrant has been issued or is about to be issued.564 This contrasts with the 
provisions of the 1989 Act, under which the court has to be satisfied that a warrant or any 
judicial document was in existence in the requesting state.  
The Act also provides that the Fugitives Unit may be contacted by the appropriate authority in a 
Category 1 territory or Interpol or via the Schengen Information System to request the 
provisional arrest of a person pending the issuance of a warrant in a Category 1 territory.565 
The Act details the procedure to be followed after the arrest has been made. The person must be 
brought before an ‘appropriate judge’ within the ‘required period’ (forty-eight hours) and the 
Part 1 warrant, together with the certificate issued by the designated authority, the National 
Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), must be produced. A copy of the warrant must be served 
on the person after arrest or as soon as practicable after arrest. If the documents are not produced 
within forty-eight hours (as opposed to served), the arrested person may apply for the matter to 
be discharged and the judge must do so.566 Once discharged, the person cannot be arrested again 
under s.5 (provisional arrest).567 This marks a shift from the provision in the 1989 Act, whereby 
a provisional warrant could be sought again. 
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At the first appearance, referred to as the ‘initial hearing’ in the 2003 Act, the judge must decide, 
on a balance of probabilities, whether the person before him is the person referred to in the 
warrant.568 If he is so satisfied, then the matter is remanded for the extradition hearing within the 
permitted period, which is twenty-one days starting from the date of arrest, and the person is (i) 
informed of the contents of the Part 1 warrant; (ii) provided with the required information about 
consenting to extradition and an explanation of the effects and procedure of the consent. The 
consent must be given in writing and, once given, is irrevocable; and (iii) remanded in custody or 
on bail.569 
The Act permits any party to apply for an extension of the permitted period. The application is 
only granted if the judge “believes that it is in the interests of justice to do so.”570 If the 
extradition hearing does not begin on or before the date fixed for the hearing, the arrested person 
is to be discharged, whether or not he applies for the discharge, unless a reasonable cause for 
delay is shown. As for who has to show ‘reasonable cause for delay’ either that person or his 
legal representative will have applied for an extension. Sambei and Jones observe that what is 
not clear, though, is that if the person is not in a position to proceed on the date of the hearing, 
how his application can be acceded to on that basis under s.8 (5).571 Similarly, they find it even 
odder that s.8 (8) of the 2003 Act would require the judge, in the absence of an application under 
s.8 (7) by the person, to discharge the person unless reasonable cause for the delay can be 
shown.572 
In the next step, the matter is then remanded for an extradition hearing, which comprises two 
stages, namely, “the initial stage of the extradition hearing”573 and “bars to extradition.”574 The 
above is the process for Category 1 territories. There is a process for arrest under certificate for 
Category 2 territories.The procedure for arrests under certificate consists of four steps.  
First, upon receipt of a “valid request,” the Secretary of State must issue a certificate (unless 
there is a competing extradition request under section 126 of the Act) certifying that the request 
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is made in an “approved way.” The request must contain a statement that the person is accused of 
being unlawfully at large after conviction of an offence. Second if a certificate is issued, the 
Secretary of State sends the documents to the appropriate judge, including the request, the 
certificate, and a copy of any relevant Order.  
Third, once the appropriate judge receives the above documents, he may issue a warrant of arrest 
if he has reasonable grounds to believe that the offence is an extraditable offence and that there is 
sufficient evidence/information to justify the issue of a warrant. The warrant is executed by any 
person to whom it is directed or by any constable or customs officer and it is not a prerequisite 
that the person carrying out the arrest must have the warrant or a copy in his possession at the 
time of the arrest. 
Fourth, after a person is arrested, he must be served with a copy of the warrant as soon as 
practicable. Failure to do so allows the person to apply for discharge, and the judge may order his 
discharge. The person must be brought before an appropriate judge as soon as practicable, unless 
he has been granted bail by the constable or the Secretary of State has received a competing 
extradition request under section 126 and decides that this request is not to be proceeded with. 
Failure to bring the person arrested before an appropriate judge as soon as practicable allows the 
person to apply for discharge, which the judge must grant.  
As for Category 1 territories, there are a number of steps.575 Section 73 of the 2003 Act 
prescribes the procedures for provisional arrest for Category 2 territories, which comprise states 
that are party to the ECE, treaty countries such as the U.S., Commonwealth countries, overseas 
dependent territories, and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.576 It confers upon a 
justice of the peace the right to issue a warrant if he has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
person sought is accused or convicted of an extraditable offence and has written evidence or 
information that the person sought is accused of the commission of an offence in a Category 2 
territory or is unlawfully at large after conviction.577 Unlike the provisions of the ECE578 or 
treaty provisions, there seems to be no requirement that the person in respect of whom a 
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provisional warrant is issued be a flight risk. Existing practice may well, however, govern the 
decision as to whether or not to issue a provisional warrant. 
Upon issuance of the provisional warrant, regardless of whether the person authorised to arrest is 
in possession of the warrant or a copy of it, a person may be arrested. However a copy of the 
warrant must be served after the arrest has been made and the arrested person should be brought 
before an appropriate judge as soon as possible, failing which he may be discharged upon an 
application by the person arrested.579 
At the first appearance, the judge must: 
1. Inform the arrested person that he is accused or unlawfully at large after conviction in 
a Category 2 territory. 
2. Provide him with the required information about consent and explain the effect and 
procedure of the consent. This consent must be given in writing and is irrevocable.  
3. Remand him in custody or on bail (the exception from the general right to bail in 
extradition proceedings is no longer applicable). The matter is then adjourned for receipt 
of the documents within the required period.580  
So far the procedure remains essentially the same as under the Act of 1989. Yet, the Act of 2003 
departs from the 1989 Act in that the “landmark” date is different. The 2003 Act provides for the 
days available to a foreign state for the submission of the request and a certificate to be issued by 
the Secretary of State under s.74 (11), the required period. Strictly speaking, the time limit 
remains the same as in the 1989 Act: it only sets out the time period for the Secretary of State’s 
certificate to be issued. Prior to the 2003 Act, the time limit was only specified for the receipt of 
the request for extradition, which would then be followed by an adjournment for the issuance of 
an ATP/OTP, for which no time-limit was set.  The 2003 Act does not refer to ATP/OTP, but 
requires a certificate applying a different test.581 
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The Secretary of State then has to issue a certificate insofar as Category 2 territories are 
concerned, unless deciding that the request is not to be proceeded with.582 The Act allows for an 
order of surrender to be made by the “Secretary of State, a Minister of State, a Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State or a senior official.”583 
The certificate must be issued within the time period stipulated by the 2003 Act. This means that, 
under the ECE, a European request should previously have been received by the fortieth day and 
then remanded for the ATP; the court has until the forty-fifth day for the request and certificate 
to have been received. However, the 2003 Act is identical with the 1989 one in that if the 
documents are not before the court at the end of the required period, the person will be 
discharged.584 Unlike the 1989 Act, under the 2003 Act585 necessary documents are required.586 
Once this extradition hearing commences it is divided into parts: (1) the initial stages of the 
extradition hearing,587 and (2) bars to extradition.588 Once the arrest has been accomplished, the 
hearing takes place. 
Ad hoc arrangements are dealt with under s.194 of the 2003 Act, and follow the procedures for 
Category 2 territories.589 The 2003 Act is mindful of international conventions, which are given 
effect by s.194. Although in general treated like Category 2 territories, in such cases the terms of 
the convention and the relevant U.K. statute will influence the procedure.590 The Act, however, 
does not make it clear how requests under UN conventions will work with regard to provisional 
arrest.591  
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4.6 The main stages of the hearing  
4.6.1 Export cases  
While all export cases (in which Britain is requested to extradite by another country) were dealt 
with by the 1989 Act, the scheme determined which part of the 1989 Act would apply. The 1989 
Act is essentially divided into two parts – Part III and Schedule 1. There is very little cross-
pollination between the two.592 
Part III applied to all “foreign states,” as defined by s.3 of the 1989 Act. Section 3 (2) of the 
1989 Act sets out a list of countries that are not foreign states, which means that it covers all the 
ECE countries and those states with which the U.K. does not have general extradition 
arrangements, but with which an ad hoc arrangement is made: states that have ratified the 
various UN conventions and are seeking to rely upon that convention as a basis for extradition 
and countries with which recent general extradition arrangements have been established, Brazil 
for example. 
Schedule 1 covers all extant treaties, of which there are quite a number. The U.S. is by far the 
largest ‘trading partner’ of Britain in extradition and so misunderstandings arise, as it is 
sometimes thought that Schedule 1 only applies to the U.S. If Britain received a request from 
Thailand or Uruguay, say, this would also fall under Schedule 1. Schedule 1 has its roots in the 
Extradition Act 1870.  
With regard to the steps of the extradition process under the 1989 Act, at each stage a distinction 
must be drawn between Part III and Schedule 1 cases, which also require procedural steps.593 
Under the 2003 Act, the distinction drawn is between Category 1 and Category 2 territories. The 
basic procedure for Category 1 territories, those covered by the EAW, have been summarised by 
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Sambei and Jones to include the following steps.594 The process begins with a certificate being 
issued by the NCIS. Next, an appropriate judge issues a warrant, and the person is arrested. An 
initial hearing is then conducted. After the initial hearing, an extradition hearing is held. After the 
extradition hearing, either party may appeal to the High Court and/or the House of Lords. If 
appeal is denied to the person, then the person is surrendered to the requesting state.  
For Category 2 territories, the process includes the following steps.595 First, the Secretary of 
State issues a certificate unless prohibited by section 126.596 The next step is the extradition 
hearing, which include the initial hearing and a hearing on the bars to extradition.597 The person 
can appeal the decision in the hearing to the High Court on questions of law or fact. The person 
can also afterwards appeal an unfavourable ruling by the High Court to the House of Lords.598 If 
the appeal is unsuccessful, then an order is issued to surrender the individual to the requesting 
states.599 The individual has one last chance to challenge the surrender order. 600 
4.6.2 Import cases  
Extradition in import cases (in which Britain requests another country to extradite) commences 
in the same way as in export cases i.e. either by provisional arrest or full order request. The 
export extradition procedure applies mutatis mutandis to import cases. Import requests are based 
on the Royal Prerogative. Thus the prosecuting authorities submit the request to the Home 
Office, which in turn submits the request to the foreign state. 
On that basis, the warrant should, if possible, set out all the offences for which the fugitive is 
wanted. This has assumed greater importance after EAWs came into force.601 The foreign state, 
on receipt of the request makes an arrest, on the basis that a warrant has been issued in Britain. 
Where the defendant has attended court but has subsequently failed to appear and a warrant of 
arrest is issued, either the original or a certified copy of warrant may be used. Sambei and 
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Jones602 see some confusion in respect of Crown Court warrants. The difficulty arises from the 
idea that a Crown Court warrant simple states “failed to appear” and this was deemed not to be 
an extradition crime – hence the insistence on a first-instance warrant. The difficulty that arises is 
that once a defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of the Crown Court, then the magistrates’ 
courts is functus officio, in that they are no longer seized of the matter. In such circumstances, a 
magistrates’ court may rightly refuse to issue a first-instance warrant. The procedure to be 
adopted in such circumstance is that the prosecuting authority should obtain a certified copy of 
the Crown Court warrant and the indictment. If the judge is prepared to insert the words “failed 
to appear for the offences contained in the indictment,” then it circumvents the arguments that 
the only offence upon which the prosecuting authority is seeking the fugitive’s return is failing to 
attend. If that is not possible, then a certified copy of the indictment may be submitted with the 
warrant and in the statement of facts the Crown can set out the position, namely, that the warrant 
relates to a failure to attend for trial for the offences contained in the indictment. That is usually 
sufficient.603  
The following information needs to be included in a request for a provisional arrest extradition 
sent from Britain to a requested state:604 
1. Statement of facts. This may be attached in the letter by the prosecuting authority to 
Interpol, which will be submitted to the requested state. It is usually a very brief summary 
of the facts in order to satisfy a foreign judge that the conduct alleged amounts to an 
extradition crime. 
2. Statement of law. At this stage all that is set out are the offence and the maximum penalty 
– no more. Details will follow in the formal request. 
 
3. Particulars of identity. Any information is included which will assist, including the 
address or area where the fugitive might be located. Photographs and/or fingerprints are 
sent directly to Interpol. In some instances, all the information in (1) and (2) above is sent 
by the officers and the prosecuting authority simply confirms its intention to extradite and 
the statement of law.  
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The prosecuting authority will inform Interpol confirming its intention to extradite, then, 
following the fugitive arrest, a full request is sent to the requested state. 
4.6.3 Special arrangements 
The above procedures are the general procedures which Britain applies to extradition. There are, 
however, a number of cases for which special arrangements need to be followed. In order to have 
a better understanding, four of these special arrangements are discussed further: U.S. cases, 
European cases, prima facie cases, and conviction cases. 
a. U.S. cases 
Where the request for a provisional arrest is made to the U.S., the procedure is different. Due to 
Article VIII of Britain’s extradition treaty with the U.S., all of the above information must be 
sent via diplomatic channels.605 In practical terms, all the information is sent to the Home 
Office’s Judicial Co-operation Unit for onward transmission to the U.S. The U.S. Department of 
Justice then deals with the request. 
Once the provisional request has been transmitted, the prosecuting authority must prepare and 
submit the formal request within time-limits of the various schemes. Here it is vital to consider 
any reservations/declarations a state may have entered regarding time-limits (for example, 
Holland only allows twenty-one days for submission of the request) and format (Israel and Malta 
still insist on sworn evidence to prove a prima-facie case).606 Thus, it is essential to consult 
carefully any reservations/declarations made by states to extradition treaties.  
b. European cases 
European formal requests are unsworn and contain the following: 
1. Warrant of arrest (either original, or a certified copy) in accusation cases. In 
conviction cases, a certified copy of the certificate of conviction is sent, often with a 
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certified copy of the indictment attached, as it provides a guide as to the charges of 
which the person has been convicted, unlike the certificate itself. 
2. Statement of facts. This is unsworn and generally prepared by the officer. The 
essential information is the conduct alleged, where it took place (in order to show that 
English courts have jurisdiction and exhibiting a photograph and/or fingerprints. For 
conviction cases, the information provided must contain a summary of the offences 
for which the fugitive was convicted, the chronology of events, information as to 
when the fugitive escaped, the sentence imposed and the time left to serve and 
confirmation that the fugitive is unlawfully at large. 
3. Statement of law. It must contain the speciality guarantee. 
4. Photograph and fingerprints.607 
The whole request is translated into the relevant country’s language and forwarded to the judicial 
co-operation unit at the Home Office. 
c. Prima facie cases  
The countries that require a prima facie case to be demonstrated in order for extradition to be 
granted are mostly Commonwealth countries, overseas territories, the U.S., Brazil, and the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region. Generally any country which is not in the ECE requires a 
prima facie case to be shown. It must, however, be remembered that a prima facie case needs to 
be submitted only in respect of accusation cases. Essentially such requests must contain: 
1. The warrant for arrest (or a certified copy). 
2. A sworn statement from the officer setting out the facts of the case in some detail, the 
fugitive’s whereabouts (unless that is sensitive information), exhibited photographs of 
the fugitive, and sometimes case summaries. 
3. Sworn evidence of the witnesses. The usual practice is to draw up a deposition and 
exhibit the statement that the witness made to the police as his exhibit. 
4. Other relevant exhibits. 
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5. Sworn statement of law. Section 18 of the 1989 Act (for foreign states) and s.19 (for 
Commonwealth states and colonies) are included in the ‘deposition’ in the request. 
Sections 18 and 19 are the speciality provisions. These are now contained in s.150 
and s.151 of the 2003 Act. 
6. Jurat, namely the document attached at the end of every request which authenticates 
the whole request.  
7. All the above is then sewn up and submitted to the Home Office.608  
d. Conviction cases 
These are cases for which a fugitive has been tried and convicted of a crime, but has managed to 
flee the country concerned. Normally, the prosecuting authority would send a European-style 
request, but sworn. It must contain a summary of the offences for which the fugitive was 
convicted, the chronology of events, information as to when the fugitive escaped and the 
sentence imposed and the time left to serve.  
Note, when a fugitive is sought in a country with which Britain has no extradition arrangement, 
there are two options. First, in serious cases, an ad hoc arrangement is made, or alternatively, if 
the offences fall within any of the UN conventions set out in the 1989 Act (and now the 2003 
Act) and the relevant convention is ratified by Britain, then the convention acts as a basis for 
extradition. The second option is that the prosecuting authorities simply do nothing and wait for 
the fugitive to move (the police can circulate the fugitive as wanted by means of a “red 
notice”).609 
If an attempt is made to circumvent extradition process, this may be considered as an abuse of 
process once the fugitive is before the court, causing the prosecution to be stayed.  
Generally speaking, import cases do not raise any serious issues of law. This is because the 
proceedings are conducted in a foreign state in accordance with their law. The relevant law is 
that of the state to which the request has been sent and the applicable treaty.  
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There will be no significant difference with regard to import cases under the 2003 Act, since 
imports remain an exercise of the Royal Prerogative. Part 3 of the 2003 Act does, however, set 
out the basic procedures for obtaining warrants and it divides the import scheme into Category 1 
territories (EAW) and Category 2 territories (all other countries). In essence the only difference 
from the steps set out above is in relation to requests to Category 1 territories, where the EAW 
will be the basis for returning the person to Britain.  
For the purposes of obtaining an EAW, the judge must be satisfied that a domestic warrant is in 
existence before a warrant will be issued.610 The contents of the warrant are determined by the 
EAW and must include convincing arguments as well as credible documents.611  
It is nevertheless, important to assert that the 2003 Act seeks - through its rules and procedures - 
to limit or remove the role of the Secretary of State in extradition proceedings in order to make 
them largely a judicial function and to limit the number of challenges that may be mounted.612 
Further, it divides states into Category 1 and Category 2 territories. 
4.6.4 Category 1 and 2 territories 
a. Category 1 
Part 1 of the 2003 Act gives effect to the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 between 
European Union Member States. As stated in paragraph (5) of the Framework Decision, the 
objective set for the Union to become an area of freedom, security and justice, leading to 
abolishing extradition between Member States and replacing it with a common arrangement 
between judicial authorities. 
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Thus, the EAW “represents a move away from diplomatic/judicial proceedings towards a system 
of surrender between judicial authorities.”613 The shift of emphasis necessarily entailed the 
removal of any involvement of the Secretary of State in requests from EU Member States. Thus, 
the first step with an EAW is receipt by the designated central authority (NCIS in Britain) which 
may then issue a certificate ”if it believes that the authority which issued the Part 1 warrant has 
the function of issuing arrest warrants in the Category 1 territory.”614 
The certificate must certify that the “authority which issued the Part 1 warrant has the function of 
issuing arrest warrants in the Category 1 territory.”615 Whether this will be the subject of any 
judicial scrutiny by way of judicial review remains to be seen.616  
A Part 1 warrant is by a judicial authority of a Category 1 territory, which contains a statement617 
and specific information.618 The words ‘statement’ and ‘information’ are defined for accusation 
and conviction cases respectively.619  
Once the EAW is certified, it may be “executed by a constable or customs officer.”620 This 
means that, unlike the 1989 Act, there is no requirement that a domestic warrant be obtained in 
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order to execute the foreign warrant of arrest. The person is then arrested and brought before an 
appropriate judge for the extradition hearing. 
b. Category 2 
Part 2 of the 2003 Act is concerned with all other countries except for those EU countries that 
have adopted the EAW. Thus, countries that were formerly described as Part III countries under 
the 1989 Act and those operating under Schedule 1 to the 1989 Act, for example, the U.S., all 
now fall under Part 2 of the 2003 Act. As noted in section 4.4 of this chapter above, Category 2 
countries are divided into those that are not required to submit a prima facie case, and those that 
are.621  The Secretary of State must issue a certificate upon receipt of a valid request following 
the submission of the request after a provisional arrest or a full order request,622 unless the 
provisions of s.126 of the 2003 Act apply (competing extradition requests). Also, it is important 
to note that a valid request623 is one which contains the statement referred to earlier and is made 
in the approved way. The definition of ‘statement’ for accused and convicted persons are a 
statement that a person is accused in a Category 2 territory of an offence specified in the request, 
or a statement that a person is alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction by a court in a 
Category 2 territory of an offence specified in the request.624 According to Sambei and Jones,625 
it remains to be seen how much difference there will be in the nature of information sought under 
the new Act.  
The ‘approved way’ referred to above, as the way in which a valid request is made, is defined as 
follows:626  
• British overseas territories - a request is made in the approved way if it is made by or on 
behalf of the person administering the territory.  
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• Hong Kong Special Administrative Region - a request is made in the approved way if it is 
made by or on behalf of the government of the Region. 
• All other Category 2 territories-a request is made in the approved way if it is made by: 
o An authority of the territory which the Secretary of State believes has the function of 
making requests in that territory; or 
o A person recognised by the Secretary of State as a diplomatic or consular 
representative of the territory. 
The certificate issued must certify that the request is made in the approved way. Thus, unlike the 
ATP/OTP requirement of 1989 Act is no longer be required to specify the offence(s) under the 
new Act. ”Thus the onus of proving that the fugitive has committed a crime and the burden to 
prove it now rests with the requesting state rather than the Secretary of State and he is not 
required to specify the offence(s) under British law.”627 Once the certificate is issued, the 
relevant official will send a file document containing (the request, the certificate and a copy of 
any relevant Orders in Council) through the judicial co-operation unit to the appropriate judge. 
Upon receipt, the country will either issue a warrant for the arrest of the person, or – in 
provisional arrest cases – fix a date within the permitted period on which the extradition hearing 
is to start.628 
4.6.5 The Framework list 
The Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 contains a list of generic offences which 
member states regard as serious.629 Consequently, the Framework Decision seeks to remove the 
need for the transposition of conduct in order to satisfy the double-criminality rule. This 
perceived removal of the double-criminality rule raised a huge concern amongst practitioners, as 
it was thought that extradition would be granted for offences which are not offences under 
English law. However, this concern is somewhat misplaced for two reasons:630  
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1. The reason for the removal of the double-criminality rule is plain - the EU has, after 
negotiations, identified core crimes/offences that are criminal in all the relevant 
jurisdictions and therefore there is an underlying presumption that the rule is satisfied. 
This removes the need for the conduct to be entered into a conduct transposing 
exercise.  
2. Section 10 (2) of the 2003 Act (‘initial stage of extradition hearing’) requires the 
appropriate judge to be satisfied that the offence contained in the warrant is an 
extradition offence.  
‘Extradition offence’ for the purpose of Category 1 territories is defined by s.64 of the 2003 Act. 
Unlike the simple definition contained in s.2 of the 1989 Act, the new Act has created a number 
of definitions. Sambei and Jones observe that it is not clear from the 2003 Act how the sections 
are to be read, i.e. whether they are mutually exclusive or whether the appropriate judge will 
apply the entire section in order to be satisfied that the offence contained in the warrant amounts 
to an extradition offence. The correct view would appear to be that they are mutually 
exclusive.631 Similarly, s.64 gives rise to a number of ambiguities. Such ambiguities are further 
exposed during the initial stage of extradition hearing. 
4.6.6 The initial stage of the extradition hearing 
Under the 2003 Act,632 at the initial stage of the extradition hearing the judge must decide 
whether the offence specified in the Part 1 warrant is an extradition offence. If the section does 
not provide a relevant definition, the judge would then turn to the interpretation contained in 
Section 64 of the 2003 Act. Herein lies one of the difficulties. The old Act “flowed with some 
level of elegance, the new is [in fact] extremely prescriptive and does not lend itself to easy 
navigation.”633 Furthermore, the 2003 Act sets out different types of conduct, which can be 
considered to be extradition offences.634 This may be regarded as a move away from the more 
simplified definition under s.2 of the 1989 Act. Section 64 (1) of the 2003 Act states that the 
section applies where the person is accused, or convinced, but not sentenced. 
                                                 
631
 Jones and Doobay, n.78, 4.19, at 48. 
632
 Extradition Act 2003, n.39, s.10 (2). 
633
 Jones and Doobay, n.78, 4.22, at 49. 
634
 Extradition Act 2003, n.39, s.64. 
 139 
Sections 64 (2) to (7) sets out the conditions to be met in order for the conduct to constitute an 
extradition offence. The 2003 Act divides offences into territorial and extra-territorial offences.  
4.6.7 Territorial offences 
Sections 64 (2) and (3) of the 2003 Act require the conduct to occur within the territory of the 
issuing state and set out the conditions which must be met in order for the conduct to amount to 
an extradition offence. There are three conditions set out in s.64 (2): 
1. The conduct must occur in the territory of the issuing state with no part of it occurring 
in Britain. 
2. A certificate must be issued to confirm that the conduct falls within the Framework 
list. 
3. The certificate must confirm that the penalty for the offence under the law of the 
territory is imprisonment or other form of detention for a term of three years or more.  
Extra-territorial offences are classified according to s.64 of the 2003 Act and require a number of 
conditions as well as specific procedures.635  
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4.6.8 Persons convicted and sentenced 
Section 65 of the 2003 Act applies to persons convicted and sentenced.  It provides for identical 
conditions to those set out under s.64, except that, for offences outside the European Framework 
list, the person must be sentenced to imprisonment for four months or more. 
The following points are worth noting in this respect. First, the Framework Decision purports to 
identify the most serious offences, yet the 2003 Act does not provide for their commission on an 
extra-territorial basis. It specifies the Framework list in s.64 (2) but links it squarely to conduct 
that occurs in the Category 1 territory. Many of the offences included in the Framework list are 
those which, by their very nature, often have an extra-territorial component: terrorism, human 
trafficking, drug-trafficking, and money laundering (to name a few). By fixing these offences 
firmly in the territorial sphere, while at the same time failing to reflect the Framework list in the 
sections relating to extra-territorial offences noted above, the 2003 Act is extremely prescriptive 
and, in that light, should have extended the Framework list to both categories.  The Framework 
only extends to Category 1, which is seen as a hindrance in meeting the modern challenges posed 
by terrorism. It would appear that the only recourse would be to satisfy the appropriate judge that 
the words “under the law of the Category 1 territory” means “jurisdiction” rather than “territory,” 
when strictly construed.636  
Second, in seeking to provide a comprehensive breakdown of what amounts to an extradition 
offence, the 2003 Act provides no guidance as to how s.64 is to be applied, as noted above in 
section 4.5.3. If the subsections of s.64 are indeed mutually exclusive, this will pose tremendous 
difficulties in respect of offences that contain both territorial and extra-territorial elements.637 
Third, removal of the condition, which appeared in the 1989 Act, that the requesting state bases 
its jurisdiction on the nationality of the offender, creates difficulties. The rationale behind this 
change in the 2003 Act is that there has been a general shift to allow the extradition of a state’s 
own nationals to the place where the offence was committed. The difficulty is that this would 
necessarily involve a change in the basic law or constitutions of some Member States and unless 
that is achieved they will continue to remain as Category 2 territories. The small number of 
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Member States in respect of which the EAW is in force reflects this fact.638 Out of the thirty-
eight States that are parties to the ECE, the EAW is only in force with respect to seven of them, 
namely: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the U.K.639 
The procedure for Category 2 territories is identical to that as set out above. Thus the appropriate 
judge must be satisfied that the “offence specified in the request is an extradition offence.”640 
4.6.9 The extradition hearing 
This stage was known as the “committal hearing” before a district judge sitting at Bow Street 
Magistrates’ Court under the Act of 1989.641 However, the 2003 Act provides for a substantive 
hearing. This, critically, examines the sufficiency of the request by the requesting state for a 
fugitives’ extradition, although not necessarily in terms of a prima facie case (cf. the difference 
between Category 1 and Category 2 territories). Furthermore the hearing is followed by High 
Court proceedings referred to as statutory appeals.642  
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It is important to note that the 2003 Act is much more progressive than the 1989 Act in its 
procedures and stages. It is an improvement over the older Act by, for example, creating specific 
procedural provisions for dealing with requests for convicted persons in their absence 
(conviction in absentia).643 
But, under the 1989 Act, the fugitive could raise a challenge at the magistrates’ court and 
thereafter in any application for a writ of habeas corpus.644 The court would then apply the 
‘interests of justice’ test with guidance from the jurisprudence of the ECTHR in order to 
determine the issue. The procedure under the 2003 Act is now governed by s.20 in respect of 
Category 1 territories and s.85 and s.86 in respect of Category 2 territories. 
a. Category 1 territories 
Section 20 (1) of the 2003 Act states that  
“If the judge is required to proceed under this section (by virtue of section 11) he must 
decide whether this person was convicted in his presence.”645 
Upon determining whether or not the bars are engaged, the appropriate judge then has to decide 
whether the person is alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction.646 If so, then the 
appropriate judge must proceed under s.20.647 Up until this point it would therefore appear that 
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the appropriate judge has made no determination as to the legal status of the person: is he 
accused, convicted or convicted in his absence? It seems to make little sense to go through the 
initial hearing, the initial stages of the extradition hearing, and the extradition hearing itself 
(which engages the bars to extradition) and then, only if the appropriate judge decides that the 
bars to extraditions are not engaged, is he then required to determine the legal status of the 
person.648 
b. Category 2 territories 
The appropriate judge will follow identical steps to those under s.20 save for Category 2 
territories that are required to adduce a prima facie case. Therefore for Category 2 territories the 
steps are as follows: 
1. Initial stages of the extradition hearing (s.78). 
2. The extradition hearing (s.78 and s.79). 
3. Procedure (s.85).649 
Where a Category 2 territory is required to produce a prima facie case, the appropriate judge 
must proceed under s.86 and decide whether there is “evidence which would be sufficient to 
make a case requiring an answer by the person if the proceedings were the summary trial of an 
information against him.”650 If he is so satisfied, then the next step is to consider the question of 
human rights under s.87. If he is, however, not so satisfied, then the person will be discharged.651 
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Thus the Act has been able to lay down the procedures and criteria very clearly, removing any 
room for the uncertainties which characterised its predecessor, the 1989 Act, with regard to 
“conviction in absence” cases.652  
4.6.10 Habeas corpus and appeals 
“The aim of the 2003 Act is to remove the statutory acknowledgment of the right to make an 
application for habeas corpus under the 1989 Act, and to replace it with a right of appeal to the 
High Court.”653 There are different sections for Category 1 and Category 2 territories. The Act 
lays down that once an extradition order is made by the appropriate judge, the person may appeal 
to the High Court on a question of fact, or law before the end of the allowed period.654 What 
other grounds there could be is not clear.655 However, it is worth adding here that no appeal can 
lie if the person has consented to his extradition, or if following consent, the judge is informed 
that another Part 1 warrant has been issued and has not been disposed of.656 In order for an 
appeal to be successful appeal, the Act sets out two main conditions: first, the appropriate judge 
ought to have decided a question differently, and second, having decided the question differently, 
he would have been required to discharge the person.657 
Alternatively, the court may allow the appeal under s.27 (4), which sets out three conditions: 
1. An issue is raised at the High Court that was not raised at the extradition hearing; or 
in the case of prima facie requests, there exists evidence that was not available at the 
extradition hearing. 
2. The issue/evidence would have led to the appropriate judge deciding it differently. 
3. It would have led to the person’s discharge. 
Section 28 allows the issuing authority (i.e. the Category 1 territory) to lodge an appeal on a 
question of fact or law where a person has been discharged. The legal representative for the 
Category 1 territory must inform the court immediately of their intention to appeal - so far, this is 
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identical to the 1989 Act. Thus, once the appropriate judge has given his decision, the legal 
representative must inform the court immediately after the decision is announced. No right of 
appeal exists if a warrant is withdrawn. The conditions for allowing an appeal are identical to 
those set out in s.27 of the 2003 Act. At the conclusion of a successful appeal, the High Court 
must:  
1. Quash the discharge order. 
2. Permit the case. 
3. Or direct the appropriate judge to proceed as he would have been required to do if he 
had decided the relevant question differently, at the extradition hearing.  
The 2003 Act requires the rules of court to prescribe the ‘relevant period,’ within which the High 
Court must commence the appeal hearing. The relevant period must commence from the date 
that the warrant was issued and not the date that the extradition order was made. As with the 
magistrates’ court, the High Court may extend the relevant period in the interests of justice.658 
The term ‘interests of justice’ is not defined in s.31 (4) of the Act, where the phrase occurs, and 
so is far from clear and begs many questions. In the absence of an objective criterion, the term 
lends itself to subjective interpretation. 
Still at the stage of appeals, either party may do so to the House of Lords, However, under s.32 
(4) of the 2003 Act, leave to appeal may only be granted if the High Court has certified there is a 
point of law and it is a point that ought to be considered by the Lords, or it is of general public 
importance. Accordingly, an application for leave to appeal must be made within fourteen days 
of the day that leave is refused.659 If leave to appeal is granted, the appeal must be made within 
twenty eight days, starting from the date of leave being granted.660 
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The appeal procedure and relevant criteria for Category 2 territories are set out in sections 103 to 
116 of the 2003 Act. They are largely identical to those for Category 1 territories, but there are 
some differences.661 Nonetheless, when the Secretary of State makes a decision, the following 
considerations are taken into account: 
(a) Extradition for more than one offence. Where a request is received under either Part 1 or 
Part 2 and it comprises more than one offence, the Secretary of State “may by order 
provided for this Act to have effect with specified modification.”662 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) order the person’s discharge; 
(b) quash the order for his extradition, if the appeal was against a decision of the High Court to 
dismiss an appeal under s.26. 
On the other hand, if the High Court allows an appeal under s.26 by the person in respect of whom the Part 1 
warrant was issued, and if the authority which issued the warrant brings an appeal under s.32 against the 
decision of the High Court and the House of Lords allows the appeal, the House must: 
(a) quash the order of the High Court discharging the person; 
(b) order the person to be extradited to the Category 1 territory in which the warrant was issued.  
661
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(b) National security.663 The application of this provision purely rests with the Secretary of 
State. The provision allows him to issue a certificate directing that the request is not to be 
proceeded with, provided the following conditions are satisfied:664 
• The person’s extradition is sought or will be sought. 
• Either that: 
1. in engaging in the conduct alleged the person was acting for the purpose of 
assisting in the exercise of a function conferred by or imposed under an 
enactment; or 
2. Following an authorisation given by the Secretary of State the person is not 
liable under the criminal law of Britain. 
• The person’s extradition would be against the interests of national security. 
It is entirely unclear what effect provision (a) will have, or is indeed expected to have, given that 
most extradition requests relate to more than one offence.665  
As regards the national security issue, the Act does not provide objective criteria as to who will 
determine or what tools may be used, to guide objectively what constitutes an issue of ‘national 
security’. Therefore, the Act, despite many improvements, does not provide an instrument which 
can guard against subjectivity on the part of government functionaries or unnecessary delays. 
It is, however, important to remember that the issue of national security takes priority over any 
other considerations for all sovereign nation-states. It is not surprising that the Act does not 
provide a clear definition of what constitutes national security. National security is foremost a 
state’s national interest. British law dealing with terrorism, after the 9/11 attacks in the U.S., and 
the July London bombings quickly shaped the judicial system and speeded up the process. The 
process of extradition in Britain is generally slow and lengthy. Patrick Barkham wrote in an 
article on extradition that “exemptions depend upon the complex treaties agreed. Extradition 
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from Britain is reputed to be difficult to secure although, as Pinochet discovered, this is often 
simply because of the complex judicial procedure an extradition request must go through.”666 
Nonetheless, with the security situation that was felt to exist after the terrorist attacks of the 11th 
September 2001 and subsequently, the slower and more complex procedures loosened, and 
became more flexible. 
4.6.11 Surrender 
The remaining stage relating to extradition is surrender. This is when a person is deemed to be 
extraditable at the conclusion of the judicial proceedings and must be surrendered within the 
required period. This is further broken down into two parts: First, dealing with instances when 
the person does not appeal,667 and second, when an appeal is lodged.668 
When a person does not lodge an appeal following a decision to extradite, (he or she), must be 
extradited to the Category 1 territory within ten days, starting from the date of the order, unless 
the judge and the issuing authority agree a later date, in which case it is ten days starting from the 
date agreed (referred to as the ‘required period’).669 The provision is similar for Category 2 
territories, except that the required period is 28 days.670 If the person has not been extradited by 
the end of the required period, he may apply to the appropriate judge to be discharged, and the 
judge must order his discharge unless reasonable cause is shown for the delay.671 Bearing in 
mind that the same time period applies when a person lodges an appeal - in which case the ten 
days commence from the date of the decision of the relevant court. Further, while a person may 
be extradited within the required period, no extradition may take place when the person lodges 
an asylum claim under s.39, until the outcome of that application is known. A person may claim 
asylum at any time from the commencement of the proceedings until the final stage.672 Thus, if a 
claim for asylum is not made until the end of the proceedings, then this would necessarily have 
the effect of delaying surrender and frustrating the extradition process.673 This delay, does not, 
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however apply if the Secretary of State certifies either that the Category 1 territory to which the 
person would be returned is the state which would be responsible for determining the asylum 
claim674 or that the person would not be discriminated against by the state.675 Except in 
accordance with the Refugee Convention of 1951, in both circumstances, the person must not be 
a national of the requesting state.676 Then, once a decision on asylum is made, the person may 
appeal against the findings of the Secretary of State.677 This however, does clearly bring a 
separate set of proceedings, and will only be upon the conclusion of the asylum application that 
the person may be extradited to the Category 1 territory.  
4.7 Extradition and the Human Rights: importance and impact 
As a reaction to the horrors of the Second World War, a rapid development in the proliferation of 
human rights’ treaties and international human-rights law took place.678 This in turn led to a 
dramatic impact on the domestic law of the U.K., to the extent that U.K. law is now permeated 
by consideration of human rights as well as extradition law itself. The U.K.’s human rights 
obligations under international conventions will likely be the single biggest concern it will have 
in entering into an extradition treaty with Saudi Arabia, and other similar Islamic countries. The 
source of this concern, as discussed in Chapter 5, is that Saudi Arabia is not a signatory to most, 
if not all, of the human rights conventions the U.K. must follow. This section discusses in detail 
U.K.’s human rights obligations and its impact on the U.K. extradition system. 
Britain’s ratification of treaties and conventions on human rights placed it under an obligation to 
observe their provisions. Under U.K. law, these instruments have been used as an aid to inform 
the exercise of judicial discretion and to establish the scope of the common law whenever 
ambiguity exists,679 even before the advent of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). This 
incorporates the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)680 into 
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domestic law. The adoption of the law constitutes the “most significant development in English 
human-rights law.”681 
The Soering case is perhaps the most influential case, directly pertinent to the U.K., on the 
relationship between extradition and human rights.682 The court in Soering stated that the U.K. 
was responsible for foreseeable consequences to extradition that violates human rights.683 In 
Soering, the court applied Article 3 of the ECHR and held that there was a real risk that the West 
German national would be subjected to prolonged inhumane and degrading treatment in death 
row.684 The prohibition on extradition for foreseeable human rights violations was also followed 
in Ng. In Soering, the court essentially held that the ECHR, to which the UK was a party, 
trumped the U.S.-UK Extradition Agreement of 1972.685 The Soering court, thus, gave primacy 
to human rights norms over extradition. A possible support for the Soering holding is that human 
rights receives a higher status from the notions of jus cogens, and “the superiority of multilateral 
human rights conventions that form part of the ordere public of the international community.”686 
When states must choose between competing treaty obligations, however, the deciding point will 
be the interest of the requested state.687 For the U.K., the interest seems to fall in favour of 
protecting human rights obligations, especially in light of the HRA and the ECHR, and because 
“the U.K. does not have any specific legal regulations concerning the obligation to extradite.”688 
Section 2 (1) of HRA 1998 provides that a court, when determining an issue involving ECHR 
rights, must take into account the following, whenever made or given, if they appear to be 
relevant to the case at hand: 
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• Any judgement, decision, declaration, or advisory opinion of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECrHR). 
• Any opinion of the Commission given in a report adopted under Article 31 of the 
Convention. 
• Any decision of the Commission in connection with Articles 26 or 27 (2) of the 
Convention. 
• Any decision of the Committee of Ministers taken under Article 46 of the Convention. 
These decisions are only of persuasive character and not a binding authority, however.  
Section 3 (1) of HRA 1998 places an obligation on judges that ”so far as it is possible to do so, 
primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in such a way 
which is compatible with the Convention rights.”689 
The implication of this provision is that the 1989 and the 2003 Extradition Acts have to be 
interpreted, so far as it is possible to do so, in such a way so as not to violate the Convention 
rights.690 
The 2003 Act actually incorporates HRA 1998 into section 21 (for Category 1 territories) and 
section 87 (for Category 2 territories). It states that “[i]f the judge is required to proceed under 
this section…he must decide whether the person’s extradition would be compatible with the 
Convention right within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c.42).”691 These provisions 
leave no room for incompatibility with HRA 1998. 
Section 4 of HRA 1998, provides that if it is not possible for a judge in any given case to 
interpret legislation in a way that is compatible with the Convention rights, then he does not 
possess the ultimate sanction of being permitted to strike down the law, unlike, say, a judge in 
the U.S. who might declare a U.S. law unconstitutional and therefore invalid.692 In those 
circumstances, the only recourse is for a court - in England and Wales, the High Court, Court of 
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Appeal, House of Lords or Privy Council - to make a declaration of incompatibility in 
accordance with the Act.693 
Section 6 (1) of HRA 1998 bars any public body from acting in any way incompatible with the 
provisions of the Convention. It sets forth that “it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a 
way which is incompatible with a Convention right.”694 A court or a tribunal is a ‘public 
authority’ for these purposes, which includes Bow Street Magistrates’ Court, district judges, the 
High Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. Under the provisions, none of these 
bodies can act in a way that is incompatible with ECHR rights while dealing with extradition 
cases. 
The exception to this provision is that it would not apply to the situation in which, due to primary 
legislation, “the authority could not have acted differently.”695 In such circumstances, the court 
of tribunal - if it is High Court, the Court of Appeal, or the House of Lords - may only issue a 
declaration of incompatibility.696 
This provision is also binding on the Secretary of State as he is also a public authority. Thus 
under Section 6 of HRA 1998, in deciding whether to issue an Authority to Proceed under the 
1989 Act and whether to surrender a fugitive, he too must not act incompatibly with ECHR 
rights, unless primary legislation obliges him to do so.697 
However, protected human rights under ECHR fall into three categories: (1) absolute rights, (2) 
derogable but unqualified rights, and (3) qualified rights. Absolute rights are those covered in 
Article 3, which prohibits torture, and which cannot be restricted in any circumstances, even in 
times of war or other public emergency, and that are not to be balanced with any general public 
interest. Furthermore, there are other absolute rights given in Articles 2 (except for death 
resulting from lawful acts of war), 4 (1) and 7 of the ECHR. 
                                                 
693
 Jones and Doobay, n.78, at 99. 
694
 Human Rights Act 1998, s.6(1), see n. 689. 
695
 Jones and Doobay, n.78, 8.16, at 99. 
696
 Human Rights Act 1998, s.3 (s) and s.4, see n. 689. 
697
 Ibid, s.6 (2). 
 153 
Derogable but unqualified rights are those from which states may derogate in time of emergency, 
as provided for by Article 15 of the ECHR. Article 5 (the right to liberty and security) are 
examples of such rights. Articles 4 (2) and 6 also fall into this category.  
Qualified rights are on the other hand, those which are expressly made subject to limitations, or 
restrictions in the ECHR, as endorsed in the Article on the right to respect for private and family 
life. This type of right was set out in unqualified terms in Article 8:  
1. “Everyone has the right to respect for his privacy, family life his home and his 
correspondence,”698 which is made subject to the qualifications in Article 8. 
2. “There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as in the accordance with the law and it necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”699 
Similar qualifying provisions are found in Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the ECHR. 
The ECHR does not include a right not to be extradited. On the contrary, Article 5 (1) (f) of the 
ECHR expressly allows a person’s detention for the purposes of their extradition. It recognises 
that “everyone has the right to liberty and security of person”700 and that no one will be deprived 
of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: 
“(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised 
entry into the country of a person against whom action is being taken with view to 
deportation or extradition.”701  
Article 6 of the ECHR does not cover extradition proceedings as they are not a retrial of a person 
charged with a criminal offence. The European Commission on Human Rights views that: 
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“the word ‘determination’ involves the full process of the examination of an individual’s 
guilt or innocence of an offence, and not the mere process of determining whether a 
person can be extradited to another country… and that [the Commission] find, therefore, 
that the extradition proceedings in question did not involve the determination of a 
criminal charge against the applicant within the meaning of Article 6 (1) of the 
Convention.”702 
In H v. Spain (1983), the Commission stated that “the words ‘determination of any criminal 
charge’ concern the process of examining whether the individual is guilty or innocent and do not 
refer to proceedings in which the judicial authorities of a state decide whether the individual in 
question should be extradited to another country.”703 
Arguably, Article 6 (1) would still apply to extradition proceedings if those proceedings were to 
be regarded as a determination of the fugitive’s ‘civil rights’ i.e. the civil rather than human 
rights, not to be removed from the country.704 Sambei and Jones explain that if so, then 
extradition proceedings would still have to conform to the minimum requirement that they be a 
“fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.”705 
If, on the other hand, the fugitive’s human rights are violated as a result of him being returned to 
the requesting state, the ECHR, and therefore, HRA 1998, might be engaged (see the Soering 
case).706 Both the ECHR and the Canadian Supreme Court, for example, have “developed 
jurisprudence that in most (if not all) cases prohibits extradition of capital defendants to the 
United States without assurances that the death penalty will not be sought.”707 To Sambei and 
Jones, on the other hand, the only logical interpretation is that whenever a state risks putting the 
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fugitive at risk of one of his human rights being violated by returning him to another state, then 
the returning state is itself acting in violation of that human right.708 
Another case of interest in this regards is Ng v. Canada,709 where the HRC found that Canada 
had violated the petitioner’s right under Article 7 of the ICCPR to be free from ”torture or 
…cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment of punishment” since Ng was to face the death penalty 
by gassing. The form of death may be such as to render expulsion inhumane.710  
The HRC, in a more recent case, also made a similar decision in Judge v. Canada,711 where 
Roger Judge was deported back to Pennsylvania's death row in 1998. Although Judge v. Canada 
was a deportation case and not an extradition case like Ng v. Canada, making Ng v. Canada 
more pertinent to this thesis, the HRC in Judge likewise expressed the view that Canada violated 
its obligations under the ICCPR by deporting a U.S. citizen facing the death penalty to the 
United States without receiving assurances that the individual would not be executed.712 These 
two cases show a strengthening of the HRC’s position that extraditing an individual to a country 
which imposes the death penalty violates the ICCPR.  
It is interesting to point out that the ECHR does not itself abolish the death penalty. Nor does it 
state that carrying out the death penalty is a violation of the right to life. In fact, Article 2 (1) of 
the ECHR expressly contemplates the death penalty by stating that “…no one shall be deprived 
of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of 
a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”713 However, the Sixth Protocol to the ECHR, 
which was ratified by Britain, does abolish the death penalty, at least in times of peace. Article 1 
(‘Abolition of the Death Penalty’) stipulates that “the death penalty shall be abolished. No one 
shall be condemned to such penalty or executed.”714 Yet Article 2 (‘Death Penalty in Time of 
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War’) of the Sixth Protocol contemplates that ”a State may make provision in its law for the 
death penalty in respect of acts committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war…”715  
Therefore, extradition of a person to a state where he might face the death penalty is not in itself 
a contravention of the ECHR, although it would violate the Sixth Protocol. Hence, prior to 1999, 
English extradition law did not place any restriction on the return of a person to a state where he 
might be executed. 
However, the situation changed with the European Convention on Extradition, as Article 11 
provides that a state may turn down the request to extradite a person when the offence for which 
extradition has been requested is punishable by death in the requesting state but not in the 
requested state, unless the latter receives assurances from the former that the sentence will not be 
carried out. The 1989 Act clearly states that: 
“the Secretary of State may decide to make no order for the return of a person accused or 
convicted of an offence not punishable with death in Great Britain if that person could be 
or has been sentenced to death for that offence in the country by which the request for his 
return is made.”716 
The 2003 Act prohibits extraditing a person when he may face the death penalty. Under the Act, 
a state will cease to be designated as a Category 1 territory “if a person found guilty in the 
territory of a criminal offence may be sentenced to death for the offence under the general 
criminal law of the territory.”717  The provision for Category 2 territories (s.94) states that: 
1. The Secretary of State must not order a person’s extradition to a Category 2 territory if 
he could be, will be, or has been sentenced to death for the offence concerned in the 
Category 2 territory. 
2. Subsection (1) does not apply if the Secretary of State receives a written assurance 
which he considers adequate that a sentence of death: 
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(a) will not be imposed, or 
(b) will not be carried out (if imposed).718 
Article 3 of the ECHR covers torture, deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and 
cruel suffering; inhuman treatment, treatment that causes intense physical or mental suffering; 
and degrading treatment, treatment that arouses in the victim a feeling of fear, anguish and 
inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing the victim and possibly breaking his or her 
physical or moral resistance.719  
In view of the laxity of definition associated with these terms, they are liable to be interpreted 
variously. However, their definitions are evolving as a matter of international national case 
law.720 
Britain has not only refused to extradite suspect territories to the U.S. (despite the existence of an 
extradition treaty), but has remained firm in not sending back alleged offenders to the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia. This dual rejection is for a number of reasons. Some were directly related to the 
lengthy and complex system of extradition as well as the lack of witness testimony and proof, 
whereas others were subject to a lack of an existing extradition treaty.721 More important is the 
growth of human rights organisations and their pressure (occasionally backed by other non-
governmental organisations).722 For example, when King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia visited 
Britain (the first by a Saudi monarch in twenty years), British protesters, coming from a number 
of political and human rights circles, were enraged. In other instances, Britain has refused to 
hand over a number of Islamic militant to Egypt in the past, by fear that they would be executed. 
One example is Anwar Sadat. 723  
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The existence of a formal extradition treaty with a country does not necessarily guarantee the 
handing over of the alleged offenders to the requesting country. This, as has been discussed 
earlier,724 is for a number of legal, administrative, judicial, and human rights considerations, as 
well as economic pressures. This is discussed later in this chapter. For example, there are some 
instances of failed extradition requests between Britain and the U.S., despite the existence of an 
extradition treaty. 
On the prohibition of torture, Article 3 of the ECHR provides that “no one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”725 Article 3 is a fundamental 
human right from which no deviation is allowed under the ECHR.  
The United Nations Convention against Torture 1984 entered into force on 26 June 1987. The 
provision was incorporated into English law by virtue of s.134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
which applies to torture wherever committed by any offender irrespective of his nationality. In 
this way, the crime of torture knows no bounds and has universal jurisdiction. This was of central 
relevance in the case of Pinochet.726 The House of Lords reheard Spain’s appeal against the 
Divisional Court’s decision to grant judicial review and to quash the provisional warrant issued 
by Bow Street magistrates for Pinochet’s arrest. The issues before the House were whether 
Pinochet, who was accused of committing acts of torture in the capacity of a public official or 
person, was charged with an extradition crime within the meaning of s.2 of the 1989 Act. The 
House ruled that “only those parts of the conspiracy to torture and the torture charge relating to 
the period after 29 September 1988 (the date when Section 134 (1) of the 1988 Act came into 
force) were extradition crimes.”727 The House also ruled that Pinochet, who was a senator, did 
not enjoy immunity in respect of acts of torture and conspiracy to torture which he had allegedly 
committed after the Torture Convention had been ratified by Spain, Chile, and Britain. The case 
is important in that it establishes the universality of the crime of torture and renders it an 
extraditable crime in English law, in conformity with the human rights law. However, there is a 
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loophole in cases where offenders are ill or pretend to be so. The Pinochet case was a good 
example. 728  
What it implies is that extraditing a person to a state where it is likely that he would be subjected 
to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment would be in violation of ECHR 
provisions. Soering is an illustration of this phenomenon.729 As a general practice, the courts do 
not pay particular deference to the Secretary of State’s factual conclusion if there is a risk of 
torture if the fugitive is returned. 730  
The burden of proving that there is a real risk of treatment in the requesting state which would 
reach the Article 3 threshold is on the fugitive. Another string attached is the risk is to be 
assessed at the time when the court considers the case. Under the 2003 Act, the judge hearing the 
case must decide whether the extradition would be compatible with the ECHR.731 
Article 5 of the ECHR exists to protect citizens from arbitrariness. Subsection (1) (f) of the 
Article does contemplate the lawful arrest and detention of a person for the purposes of 
extraditing him subject to certain safeguards. Article 5 (4) of the ECHR establishes the right to 
challenge the legality of the arrest and/or detention by providing that “everyone who is deprived 
of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness 
of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not 
lawful.”732 
Challenging the legality of detention is a “self-standing right.”733 What this means is that even if 
a person has in fact been lawfully detained for extradition proceedings, if he is not able to 
challenge his detention before a court, Article 5 (4) is violated. Another question raised by 
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Sambei and Jones is whether the challenges to extradition that may be raised by a person 
detained in Britain satisfy the requirements of Articles 5 (4) of the ECHR, as the scope of the 
review in these cases is somewhat limited.734 For example, for a judicial review the challenge to 
the decision taken must fall within certain grounds which may not be broad enough for the 
purpose of Article 5 (4) of the ECHR. 
“Detention for the purposes of extradition has to be in good faith.”735 Extradition cannot be 
achieved through deportation or other form of disguised extradition. It has to be conducted with 
due diligence, or it will cease to be lawful.736 
The right to a fair trial is another fundamental right which is dealt with in Article 6 of the ECHR. 
This basically has to do with the criminal law within the country. Although extradition 
proceedings are concerned with whether or not a fugitive should be returned to the requesting 
state, the proceedings are characterised as criminal for the purpose of domestic law. Hence the 
Article interacts with English extradition law, as the U.K. is likely to violate the provisions of 
Article 6 “if it were to return a fugitive to a requesting state where he would not receive a fair 
and public trial.”737  
This consideration led the ECHR to hold in Soering that:  
“the right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings, as embodied in Article 6, holds a 
prominent place in a democratic society. The Court does not exclude that an issue might 
exceptionally be raised under Article 6 by an extradition decision in circumstances where 
the fugitive has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trial in the requesting 
country. However, the facts of the present case do not disclose such a risk.”738 
Article 8 protects the human right to respect for a person’s “private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence.”739 However the right has been qualified by providing that: 
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“there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”740  
Circumstance like “disproportionate infringement of his right to family life, or that returning 
him to the scene of traumas suffered in the requesting state would infringe his psychological 
integrity, which has been recognized as part of the right to private life”741 are the grounds 
often invoked by those claiming in immigration and asylum cases. These are also common 
grounds raised in extradition proceedings, mostly in applications for habeas corpus where 
the fugitive may claim that it would be oppressive to return him given the passage of time or 
because he has started a family life in this country. Despite the enormity of adopting these 
potential infringements of Article 8 of the ECHR, the chances of their success are not very 
high as it is hard to sustain such arguments. The European Commission in Launder took the 
stance that “[the Commission] considers that it is only in exceptional circumstances that the 
extradition of a person to face trial on charges of serious offences committed in the 
requesting state would be held to be an unjustified or disproportionate interference with the 
right to respect for family life.”742 
The 2003 Act makes explicit reference to human rights in sections 21, 87, and 195. In 
particular, section 21 of the Act is unequivocal in providing that “[i]f the judge is required to 
proceed under this section (by virtue of section 11 or 20) he must decide whether the 
person’s extradition would be compatible with the Convention rights within the meaning of 
the Human Rights Act 1998.”743 
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4.8 Extradition arrangements with other countries 
This section considers, as a cautionary note before continuing to discuss the possibility of a 
U.K.-Saudi extradition treaty, how even the closest of allies can have disagreements over 
extradition and refuse to co-operate. The United Kingdom and the United States are very close 
allies and have collaborated intimately in dealing with international situations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The union for the so-called war on terrorism has been subject to criticism at home and 
abroad. Despite this willingness and readiness to co-operate, the two countries are very different 
when it comes to the legal systems they practice. Britain has a common law traditions shaped by 
her various roles as a sovereign state in her own right, a former colonial power, a member of the 
Commonwealth and more recently a member of the European Union. By contrast, the United 
States practices civil law, which disallows the handing over of its nationals to other countries. In 
particular, the extradition of political criminals and diplomatic immunities has been stumbling 
blocks in the smooth functioning of extradition requests from either side. This has always been a 
matter of political dispute between governments for various reasons. These differences appear to 
stem from the approach taken to viewing political offences.  There is a wide gap between the 
laws and systems of these two countries based on their different cultures, traditions and customs. 
Theoretically, these differences should be a source for inspiration, building on their experiences 
in order to create an effective mutual co-operation in the extradition of criminals, but that does 
not seem to be the case. These arguments often block extradition of political criminals, as states 
either cite their sovereignty or human rights as causes preventing them from extraditing political 
criminals, regardless of the existence of treaties of extradition between them. The following 
cases illustrate the point. 
In Mackin,744 the British government requested the U.S. government in 1972 to extradite 
Mackin, who was a member of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and was accused of injuring a 
British soldier.745 The U.S. government rejected the British request, arguing that the crime was a 
political crime, citing in this respect, the precedent in Castioni.746 The court explained that (1) 
Mackin was involved in a political uprising in Belfast where the crime was committed, (2) he 
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was an active member of the PIRA, and (3) the crime committed against the British soldier was 
incidental to the role of Mackin’s role in the PIRA’s political uprising.747 
McMullen illustrates how difficult extradition can be even among close allies.748 The events of 
this case took place in 1979, when the United Kingdom requested the United States to extradite 
McMullen, a member of the IRA, who was accused of attacking a British military camp called 
Cloro. The U.S. court concluded in McMullen that the accused was involved in political violence 
that aimed to achieve political objectives.749 Consequently, what he committed was a 
requirement of the uprising and, accordingly, the crime was a political offence that did not 
warrant extradition. The McMullen court held that “[a] political disturbance with terrorist activity 
spanning a long period of time cannot be disregarded even if, in fact, the PIRA lifted not one 
single finger in either Northern Ireland or Great Britain...”750 
No extradition case was as controversial as Doherty,751 in which Britain requested the U.S. in 
1984 to extradite Doherty, an IRA member, who was accused of murdering a British soldier and 
escaping his jail sentence.752 The Doherty court held that the crime was of a political character 
and that the attack was not a random attack and did not target civil servants or cause 
indiscriminate injuries.753 The court also noticed that there was no hostage taking involved and 
no flagrant violation of the basic principles of international law, and that the incident took place 
in a land experiencing political upheavals.754 The court verdict caused immense anger in the 
United Kingdom, and even an American official described the verdict as being outrageous.755  
Constant rejections by American courts of efforts to extradite accused members of the IRA to 
Britain prompted the latter to sign, in 1985, a protocol to the extradition treaty of 1972 with the 
United States. The main objective of the protocol was to tighten the principle of non-extradition 
for political offences. Article 1 of the Protocol stipulated that several crimes would not be 
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covered by the principle of non-extradition for offences of a political character.756 These offences 
are the following: 
1. Any offence or crime that the parties agreed upon by virtue of the extradition treaty that 
require the extradition or the trial of the person concerned.  
2. Homicide, any aggression with the intention to create dangerous physical injury, or 
crimes of rape. 
3. Crimes of kidnap, hostage taking, or unlawful detention.  
4. Crimes involving the use of bombs, missiles, automatic weapons, explosives, mail or 
parcels, if it put the life of others in jeopardy. 
5. Commission of any of the above mentioned crimes or complicity with others attempting 
to commit these crimes. 
It is clear from the cases cited here why there was an immense resentment in the United 
Kingdom at the lack of co-operation on the part of the American courts with respect to 
extradition; especially when the United Kingdom was fully co-operating and was duly 
responsive to United States’ requests for extradition. In numerous cases, extradition requests 
from the United States were successful. The following case is an illustration of British co-
operation with the United States.  
In 1972, the U.S. requested the U.K. to extradite individuals who were accused of theft and 
burglary from the offices of the U.S. Internal Revenue Services and the Ministry of Justice, from 
where they stole secret government documents relating to the church of which the accused were 
members. The accused argued that their crime was a political one and they should not be 
extradited. However, the court found that the church was involved in a long dispute with the 
Internal Revenue Service in order to be exempted on the grounds that it was a religious 
organisation. The church also had a dispute with the Food and Drugs Standards Agency 
regarding the use of unauthorised materials for praying purposes. There was also additional 
evidence that the church and its members were involved in criminal activities. Accordingly, the 
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court concluded that the theft and other crimes committed did not qualify as political offences. 
Thus, the court stated that:  
“The applicants did not order these burglaries to take place in order to challenge the 
political control or the government of the United States; they did so to further the interest 
of the Church of Scientology and its members…it would be ridiculous to regard the 
applicants as political refugees seeking asylum in this country.”757 
If the arguments and the position of the British court in the previous case are as legal as they 
seem, it should be noted that this is not always the case, as the personal convictions of the 
politicians or government might affect the outcome of an extradition request.  This is 
exemplified by a case in which the government of Israel requested the U.S. to extradite Ziad Abu 
Eain in 1979. Abu Eain was a member of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. He was accused 
by Israel of placing a bomb in a market, causing the death of two persons and injury to thirty-six 
in 1971.758 The Judge presiding over the proceedings allowed the extradition of Abu Eain and 
rejected his arguments that his offences were of a political character. The court said that “there is 
no link between the method used and the intended objective, where the act does represent an 
aggression against the state.”759 The court went on to say that:  
“the exception does not make a random bombing intended to result in the cold blooded 
murder of civilians incidental to a purpose of toppling a government, absent of a direct 
link between the perpetrator, a political organization’s political goals and the specific act. 
Rather, the indiscriminate bombing of a civilian populace is not recognized as a protected 
political act even when the larger political objective of the person who sets off the bomb 
may be to eliminate the civilian population of the country.”760  
Furthermore, the court emphasised that the position of the United States depended on the 
following tests:761 
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1. The existence of a war, revolution, civil strife, or civil upheavals. 
2. The ideological motivation of the actor. 
3. The target is the state or its political structures. 
4. The existence of a link or nexus between the motive of the actor and the target of the act.  
Abu Eain appealed to the Supreme Court of the United Sates to reverse the decision, but his 
appeal was rejected, and he was extradited on 12th December 1981, according to the American 
Israeli extradition treaty of 1963.762 The extradition caused huge anger and resentment in the 
Arab diplomatic community in the United States, and prompted ambassadors from the Arab 
world and other countries to condemn it. In this context, the Spanish ambassador said: “the 
extradition of Abu Eain is illegitimate and begs questions about the American judicial 
system,”763 while the Jordanian ambassador considered the extradition as an insult to human 
rights and international law and dignity.764 
The U.N. General Assembly “strongly deplored” the extradition.765 The American representative 
to the U.N. General Assembly made a statement defending the fairness and integrity of the 
American judiciary. He stressed that all legal procedures had been exhausted in this case and that 
the accused was given full and independent judicial review.766 
Although the extradition decision in the Abu Eain case was a judicial one, it is clear that when a 
state adopts a particular ideology or political stance, it inevitably bears upon its judicial 
decisions, directly or indirectly. This has always been the case with the U.S. vis-a-vis Israel, 
where the U.S. does not consider Israel to be a country that occupies Palestinian land and, 
therefore, does not recognise resistance activities by the Palestinians as political offences. This 
view would influence decisions on extradition requests. It is inconceivable to believe that the 
court, which was entertaining the case of Abu Eain, took its decision in isolation of the general 
political stance of the U.S. vis a vis Israel. This also proves that decisions relating to extradition 
are not always purely judicial. In fact, it has always been informed by the political position of the 
state concerned. Similarly, in the Ahmad case, extradition of the defendant was sought by Israel 
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for actions against settlers on the West Bank.767 Initially, this was blocked on the basis that his 
actions were those of a political offence.768 After three years and repeated extradition requests, 
the original decision was reversed and the defendant was extradited.769 As the case took place 
during the Palestinian intifada, clearly there was a political element at work in the resolution of 
the case. 
The case of the Bondelwarts natives provides an excellent example of the situation in which 
political considerations dominate decisions regarding extradition requests. The events of the case 
took place in 1904, when the German Consul General in the Cape requested the governor of the 
Cape to extradite twelve persons from the indigenous tribe of Bondelwarts. They were accused 
of committing homicide, intending to commit homicide, burglary, and burning of properties. The 
governor of the Cape colony rejected the extradition request, arguing that these persons were, 
according to the description cited in the extradition request, in an uprising against German rule 
and, therefore, their offences were of a political character. Both the Ministry for the Colonies and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the decision of the governor.770 It is notable that this 
case did not go through the normal procedures which are followed in such cases, and that the 
judiciary was not involved in the process.  Thus, the decision on the extradition request in this 
case was obviously a political one. 
In the next chapter, the extradition system operating in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is 
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Chapter Five 
Extradition in Saudi Arabia 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the Saudi judicial system and investigates, more specifically, its extradition 
system. Sources of legislation in Islamic Shari’a (henceforth Shari’a) as well as its tenets and 
schools are discussed. Without this diagnosis it would be difficult not only to understand the 
extradition mechanisms and process but to comprehend the context of Saudi law as a whole. This 
chapter argues that Shari’a law implicitly allows for extradition, as evidenced by the existence of 
extradition treaties with other Arab countries. 
There is, thus, a section dedicated to a number of extradition treaties and memoranda on 
extradition which Saudi Arabia has already concluded with other countries. Extradition 
procedures, as recorded in the Islamic tradition, of alleged offenders and criminals are presented 
and discussed, in theory as well as in practice, in order to test to what degree the Saudi approach 
is authentic to the tenets of Islamic Shari’a. Throughout this discussion, other crucial issues are 
examined: the role of the King and Islamic scholars (Ulamas) and their impact on matters of 
extradition and the interpretation of pertinent Shari’a texts. There follows an investigation of the 
impact of these factors on extradition, and reflection on the significance of these factors on the 
signing of formal agreements with other countries. At the same time, sight is not lost of 
important controversies over, for example, human rights, the death penalty, national security, as 
well as economic and national interests. Without these elements, it would be very hard to reach 
any understanding of the Saudi systems, and thus of the necessary issues to be considered in any 
future extradition treaty.  
This chapter argues that an important obstacle for Saudi Arabia on entering into an extradition 
treaty with the U.K. is the Shari’a prohibition on the extradition of Muslim individuals to a non-
Muslim state, and vice versa, as argued by some Islamic law scholars. Saudi Arabia’s adherence 
to this prohibition may explain largely why Saudi Arabia has entered into extradition treaties 
with many Muslim countries, but only a memorandum on extradition with non-Muslim 
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countries. This paper argues that this Shari’a principle, however, could be overcome, as 
explained by competing schools of Islamic law scholars, through another Shari’a law, where the 
Prophet Mohammad encourages the fulfillment of obligations like treaties. Saudi Arabia, thus, 
could legally enter into an extradition agreement with the U.K. In turn, under Saudi Arabia’s 
already existing U.N. obligations, Saudi Arabia could also enter into an international extradition 
agreement.     
Another concern for Saudi Arabia and the U.K. both is the difference between the countries in 
their extradition systems. Saudi Arabia follows the administrative system, while the U.K. follows 
the judicial system. As argued generally by this paper, such differences could be overcome 
through the adoption of a dual judicial-administrative system—one that could be designed to fit 
with Saudi Arabia’s existing system under Islamic law.  
There have been several difficulties in the achievement of this particular chapter, due to the lack 
of study into extradition – as we comprehend it today - in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the 
lack of secular, legal tools as understood in the West. This, as a result, has had an impact on the 
availability of materials which tackle the Saudi-British comparative case with international 
agreements, or with the jurisprudence of international, criminal law.  
However, to overcome this difficulty, investigation of key factors related to extradition and its 
tenets, exploration of the Saudi Islamic heritage, as well as the interviewing of a number of key 
personalities in the field has been undertaken. By looking thoroughly, for example, at an 
overview of the Saudi context of law-making, with particular reference to extradition, at Islamic 
sources of law for the extradition of criminals, at bilateral and multilateral agreements to which 
Saudi Arabia is party, as well as an examination of extradition in practice in the Kingdom, it has 
been possible largely to compensate for the lack of materials referred to earlier. This examination 
is also significant for the hypothetical questions asked in Chapter 1. The all-encompassing nature 
of Shari’a on all aspects of life is a source of much misunderstanding in the West. The following 
sections are a necessary description of the role, scope, and relevance of Shari’a in law-making in 
general, and extradition in particular.  
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5.2 An overview of the Saudi Arabian context for extradition  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of implementing Shari’a law is strictly committed to 
the application of Shari’a rules to every aspect of the country’s life. Thus, the Shari’a forms the 
basis for all kinds of legislation, be it administrative or judicial through the Shoura Council, by 
Royal Decree, or through the legislative body in the Kingdom.771 Any legislation which clashes 
with the basic principles of the Shari’a is invalid. The royal decrees and formulation of 
legislatives have to be within the bounds of the Shari’a. In this sense, the Shari’a is the 
overarching concept and the source of all legislation.772  
As in other domains, Islamic principles also govern criminal legislation and the penal code in the 
Kingdom. This is why Saudi Arabia has not issued internal regulations to organise the 
extradition of criminals and suspects, as is the case in other parts of the world. These have to be 
decided in the light of the provisions of the Shari’a.773 However, this has not prevented the 
authorities from signing several bilateral and multilateral agreements on the extradition of 
criminals (discussed later in this chapter), so Saudi Arabia does not lag behind in this area, but 
may even be considered to be a pioneer in the Islamic world. An important point to be 
emphasised is that in spite of signing such agreements, the Saudi government’s over-riding rule 
is that these agreements may not conflict with Islamic Shari’a principles and the Islamic penal 
system. 
Since the inception of the Kingdom, the Saudi government has been concerned about its security. 
This could explain why the Saudi government in 1931 signed its first agreement on the 
extradition of criminals and suspects with the Kingdom of Iraq,774 followed by another in 1934 
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of Islamic friendship and Arabic brotherhood with the Kingdom of Yemen, which inter alia 
included the issue of extradition of criminals and suspects775 and in 1942, another agreement was 
signed with the Mashikhat of Kuwait,776 In 1953, Saudi Arabia was one of seven states to sign an 
Arab League agreement on the extradition of criminals between the member states.777 
Saudi efforts continued with the signing of extradition agreements with the Gulf states, namely 
the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Qatar, the Sultanate of Oman, and the United Arab 
Emirates in 1981-1982.778 Beyond the Gulf area, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with the 
Islamic republic of Pakistan in 1984,779 in addition to the Riyadh Arab Agreement on Judicial 
Co-operation signed in 1983.780 Moreover, the Saudi government signed the United Nations 
agreement on combating the illegal trading of drugs in Vienna, in December 1988.781 
Furthermore, the Kingdom participated actively in several conferences held in different parts of 
the world aimed at combating organised crime, and has been fully active in all international 
efforts aimed at providing security and stability world-wide through bilateral or multilateral 
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agreements on extradition.782 Even in the absence of such agreements, the Saudi government 
uses direct contact with the governments concerned to secure the extradition of criminals and 
suspects. More recently, the Kingdom, because of security and stability concerns in the region, 
and the implication of some Saudi nationals in the insurgency in occupied Iraq, approached the 
Iraqi government with the view of concluding a formal extradition agreement. It was noted in 
this respect, that: 
“‘We have completed the drafting of an extradition accord which will be signed soon 
between the Kingdom and Iraq,’…treaty stipulates ‘the exchange of convicted prisoners 
... so that they serve the rest of their sentences close to their families…’”783 
Within the context of direct contact, the Saudi government, after a series of successful meetings 
with the British government, signed a memorandum of understanding on April 12, 1989, on the 
extradition and pursuit of suspects and criminals.784 On a practical basis, the Saudi government 
uses diplomatic channels for the extradition of criminals,785 provided, as noted previously for all 
aspects of Saudi life, that this does not contradict the Shari’a. 
It should be noted that the ratification of all the agreements concluded by the Saudi government 
has been undertaken in accordance with Saudi laws, involving the relevant ministry (the Ministry 
of the Interior), the Council of Ministers, the Shoura Council, and finally the Monarch.786 
What this suggests is that Saudi diplomacy and participation to reach various but diverse 
agreements with other countries on extradition and the return of alleged offenders, despite the 
Kingdom’s Islamic orthodoxy that appears somewhat rigid to the western and secular world,787 is 
able to conclude and reach any sort of agreement or understanding as long as it does not 
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contradict its Shari’a principles. This only proves relatively controversial when issues of the 
death penalty, human rights, and the role of the King as the final decision maker, are involved.788 
5.3 Sources for extradition in Islamic Shari’a 
5.3.1 Sources and principles of Shari’a law 
It is beyond the scope of this work to provide a detailed study of Shari’a law, as the source of 
Islamic jurisprudence. However, a brief summary is necessary for an understanding of the 
background to Islamic jurisprudence on extradition and its practice in Saudi Arabia. In the 
following, the primary and secondary sources of Shari’a are examined. Then, the appearance and 
development of Islamic legal schools of thought are discussed, and finally Islamic criteria for 
defining crimes according to the Shari’a are explained. 
The Shari’a is an overarching concept covering all aspects of life. It primarily provides general 
principles and premises and may not specify details. For instance, on numerous occasions the 
Qur’an says ‘Pray’, but does not explain how exactly to do it. The Sunna (see below) elaborates 
and elucidates the ritual, as revealed by God to the Prophet, and was then taught to Muslims.789 
The Shari’a is not limited to the domain of law but is a more holistic concept. It covers wide 
areas of secular laws and ordinances. It is a complete code which provides for all areas of life.  
For example, it guides Muslims on behavioural matters, obligations and rights, such as how to 
deal with relatives, ageing parents, how to eat, instructions to pray, how to behave in public, do 
business, and what the duties of government functionaries and subjects are. In other words, the 
Shari’a is diverse and wide-ranging in its application and there is hardly any area of life which it 
does not touch upon.790 It consists of both primary and secondary sources, and while the former 
are the ultimate authority for the law, the latter are in fact interpretations and methods of 
interpretation of the primary sources. 
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a. Primary sources  
i) The Holy Qur’an (henceforth the Qur’an) which for Muslims is the actual word of Allah, not 
created but revealed for the benefit of all humanity, is the major source of Shari’a. Its 
different verses contain much jurisprudence for all areas of life, whether spiritual, 
intellectual, political, social, or economic. It is divine and cannot be challenged. “The Qur’an 
announces that it lays down a law for mankind… The law is perfect.”791 Moreover, it is 
aimed at establishing standards for Muslim societies and leading them in terms of their rights 
and obligations. However, the Qur’an is a religious text and not a legal document per se. 
From over 6,000 verses, Nasr claims that 350 deal with legal topics, some of which pertain to 
specific issues and penalties for illegal acts.792   
ii) The Sunna, the model behaviour and tradition, as well as the practices of the Prophet 
Mohammed, is the second principle source of Islamic jurisprudence. It details and explains 
what is revealed in the Qur’an. The Sunnah cannot be incompatible with the strictures of the 
Qur’an in any conceivable way, as the Prophet could not possibly ‘do’ or ‘say’ anything 
which contradicts the injunctions of the Qur’an revealed through him. As noted above, a 
good example is the details of prayer explained by the Sunna itself. “The Quran orders 
Muslims to pray, but how to pray was learned from the model established by the Prophet.”793 
The same goes for other legislative and behavioural matters.  
The Prophet Mohammed can be said to be a prophet of law because it was he who concerned 
himself with giving the details and explanations of what God had revealed to him in the 
Qur’an. The Sunna of the Prophet Mohammed is recorded in the Haddith, which are his 
sayings, written down by his companions.794 
b. Secondary sources 
As noted above, the Qur’an deals with broad general principles, not the specifics, which could 
possibly lead to more than one interpretation in certain cases. In particular, there is a strong 
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possibility of ambiguity arising when the original context is unclear. During his life, the Prophet 
was there to offer an explanation or remove any ambiguity. After his death, this important source 
was withdrawn. Farah refers to the “numerous obscurities in the Quran’s format,” and the actions 
taken as a result.795 
Confronted with unprecedented situations for which no unambiguous guidance or analogy was 
available from the Qur’an or Sunna, and where there existed room for ambiguity and more than 
one interpretation was possible, considerable jurisprudential differences appeared amongst 
Islamic scholars. In order to deal with unprecedented and unforeseen situations for which the 
guidance from the Qur’an and Sunna was not convincing, the following secondary sources of 
Islamic jurisprudence were evolved to develop consensus and unity amongst Muslims:796 
a) Ijima, which means consensus. It is the vehicle of the Islamic nation to reach agreement 
and is important in the understanding and interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna. It has 
become a very powerful source for conformity. 
b) Qiyas, which means application by analogy or deduction in the absence of concrete 
answers from the Qur’an and Sunna. 
c) Ijtihad, which means the use of independent legal reasoning in search of an opinion. 
c. Islamic schools of legal thought  
Over time, differences arose in interpretations of the Quran and Sunna when there was room for 
ambiguity, and certain incidents and circumstances led to the development of different schools of 
thought by Islamic jurists. The two major branches are the Sunnis and the Shias.797 This 
divergence appeared because of disagreement over the issue of succession of the Prophet. The 
Shia school believes that it was the right of honourable Ali, the fourth caliph, to succeed the 
prophet Mohamed after his death, whereas Sunnis favour Abu Bakar, who became the first 
caliph elected through democratic means.798 The growth of differences between Sunnis 
themselves gave further rise to four diverse Islamic legal schools of thought: 
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a) The school of the Hanafi founded by Abu Hanifa around the year 767. It is regarded as less 
rigid in its doctrinal interpretations compared to the other three schools.799 
b) The school of the Malikia. This was established in Medina around the year 795 by Malik 
Ibin Anas. He was a supporter of living the life and tradition of Medina. The followers of 
this school regard juristic preferences and public interests as key sources for judicial 
decisions.800 
c) The school of the Shafia founded by Muhammed Ibin Idris al-Shafi around the year 820. 
The founder was a student of Malik but he concentrated more on the prophetic Hadith, 
rather than the living tradition of Medina as Malik did. This school established the Qur’an, 
the Sunna, Ijima, and Qyas as the four roots of law.801 
d) The school of Hanabalia founded by Ahmed Hanbal around 855. He was a strong believer 
in a rigorous interpretation of Islam. For this reason he is regarded as a traditionalist 
theologian.802  
It is important to point out, however, that none of these sects challenge or dispute what has been 
said in the Qur’an or in the Sunna. There is a complete agreement over the primary sources of 
the Shari’a. They tend to differ only over the interpretations of the Shari’a, where different 
inferences can be drawn without compromising the basic principle. In other words, the secondary 
sources of Shari’a, Ijima, Qiyas and Ijitihad are the points at which differences of interpretation 
can potentially emerge. “It is important to note that these four rites are in agreement on all points 
vital to Islam.”803 Extradition of criminals is a good example in this context. Different sects have 
different views on whether a criminal can be extradited to a non-Muslim state. The signification 
for extradition of the differences between these schools in explored in more detail in the 
following section. However, it is worth noting from the outset that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
adopted the Hanbali school of thought, which, as will be progressively revealed, favours the 
conclusion and honouring of treaties and agreements with non-Muslims states,804 and thereby 
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allows the extradition of criminals guilty of committing crimes elsewhere that flee to or seek 
refuge in the Kingdom. 
5.3.2 Sources for extradition in the Shari’a 
This section argues that extradition is allowed under the Shari’a. Since the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia is an Islamic country, it is bound to follow the Shari’a in its letter and spirit and to make 
sure that no government actions are in violation of its provisions. Naturally, the question of 
extradition is no exception. It is, therefore, essential to determine the status of extradition in the 
light of the Shari’a. In what follows, an attempt has been made to see how extradition is viewed 
from this perspective.  
Although there is no explicit mention of extradition law as such in the Shari’a, there is also no 
provision which forbids the extradition of a criminal to where he has committed the crime, 
suggesting that extradition is allowable. In other words, there is nothing in the Shari’a that 
prevents legislation relating to extradition and penalising of criminals for the crimes they have 
committed.  
In fact, there are a number of verses in the Qur’an which relate to the prevention of corruption 
and anarchy, indeed to protect human society from the spread of crime: it states “help ye one 
another in righteousness and piety, but help ye not one another in sin and rancour.”805 If 
extradition of those committing crimes and taking refuge at other places (in another ‘territory’) is 
viewed as a means of preventing and combating crimes in society, it indeed is permissible in the 
Shari’a, as one of the best methods of co-operating to help ‘promote righteousness and piety’ for 
the protection of society. 
Another piece of evidence which has a bearing on the issue of extradition is one which is from 
the perspective of pursuing justice and the concept of forbidding evil, and that is the verdict in 
the Qur’an that “the Believers, men and women, are protectors, one of another; they enjoin what 
is just and forbid what is evil.”806 
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The injunctions of the Qur’an are ‘reinforced’ by the Haddith which lends further support to the 
view that Islam places a great deal of emphasis in favour of extradition if it is essential for the 
prevention of crime and the promotion of ‘righteousness and piety’ in society. The Prophet 
Mohammed urged in favour of the handing over of criminals and was against giving any kind of 
protection or opposing punishment for the crimes committed. Imam Muslim refers to Ali Ibin 
Abi Talib quoting the Prophet Mohammed as saying that “curse upon any one who gives refuge 
to any criminal.”807 By this he meant obstructing justice by protecting wrongdoers.  
Since the Qur’an warns of harbouring criminals and stresses severe punishment for this, no 
interpretation is possible other than that the handing over of criminals is not forbidden in Islam. 
However, ‘handing over’ or extraditing is closely tied to an act of reciprocity by the other party 
involved. In ‘handing over’ a criminal, a reciprocal behaviour is expected from others (states or 
territories). Reciprocity is, in fact, an ancient principle which is endorsed and stressed by Islam: 
“none of you is a believer as long as he does not wish his brother what he wishes himself.”808 
Reciprocity normally means justice in dealing with people regardless of whether they are 
Muslims or not. This was expressed by the Prophet Mohammed when he said “treat people the 
way you wish people to treat you.”809 
As a matter of fact, Islam allows Muslims to enter into arrangements and conclude agreements 
with non-Muslims, provided that this does not contradict the principles of the Islamic faith or 
Muslim interests or security. The Shari’a urges Muslims to respect and honour their agreements: 
“those who break Allah’s covenant after it is ratified and who sunder what Allah has ordered to 
be joined, and to do mischief on earth, these cause loss (only) to themselves.”810 In another 
instance, it states that “Then anyone who violates his oath, does so to the harm of his own 
soul.”811 Though there is no specific mention of extradition, the returning of criminals can be 
safely included in permissible arrangements Muslims can concluded with non-Muslims. 
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In the history of Islam, there have been significant instances demonstrating the Prophet 
Mohammed’s emphasis on honouring a covenant. The following cases are notable in this regard. 
The first incident happened during the ‘Houdibia Pact’812 when Abi Jendel fled from the infidels 
to the Muslims as a believer. The prophet ordered him to return to the infidels’ side and said to 
him “be patient and wait because God came as a way out for you and weak people like you. We 
have concluded with your people a reconciliation covenant. We gave them and they gave us an 
oath not to betray them.”813  This incident clearly points to the conclusion that (i) the Prophet 
returned a newly converted Muslim from Medina to the infidels in Mecca as provided by the 
‘pact’, proving that ‘extradition’ is permitted in Islam and (ii) Muslims are allowed to conclude a 
covenant even with infidels and honour it as they would with a Muslim.  
The second instance happened to Ibin Houzifa, one of the companions of the Prophet, who said 
the only cause preventing him from participating in the Badar Battle was the following incident. 
He [Ibin Houzifa] was with Abi Hassel when they were stopped by the infidels of Qouraish who 
asked them if they were on their way to join the Prophet Mohammed. To deceive them they told 
them that they were on their way to Al Medina, and they took an oath not to fight on the side of 
the Muslims. On hearing this, the Prophet, ordered them to keep their oath with the infidels and 
not to take part in the battle. This is further evidence of the importance the Prophet attached to 
covenants.814 
The evidence provided by these incidents shows that the Shari’a permits concluding covenants 
(agreements or arrangements) with other ‘parties’ including non-Muslims and emphasises 
abiding by the provisions of such covenants. This would be the equivalent in modern times of 
concluding an agreement with a secular, non-Muslim country like Britain or the U.S., and 
dealing with all secular matters relating to extradition and the return of alleged offenders and 
criminals. In the Saudi case, an orthodox Muslim country, founded on Shari’a law and traditions, 
the situation would not be as difficult as it may seem.   
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As discussed in section 5.6 of this chapter in the various modern treaties examined there, with 
the growing threats to security, states are turning to what has been termed fast-track responses 
through security as well as legal means. The fact is that with globalisation has come global crime 
(in all its forms, including international terrorism) which requires a global response. From this 
particular perspective, states find the need to meet and conclude agreements between themselves, 
and find themselves less reluctant to do so. As the world becomes better connected, joining 
cultural mix with ethnic and religious diversity, it is becoming a single global village. The more 
so with modern mobility and migrations, by which diverse people are settling in various 
continents and adopting shared factors. This is well illustrated in the case of Great Britain and 
Saudi Arabia, despite their apparent differences.  
A good example of this unexpected commonality was revealed when Jack Straw (former Home 
Secretary) addressed an audience at an international conference stating those shared factors. He 
noted that: 
“of course, the United Kingdom shares much with Saudi Arabia; above all it is the 
spiritual and religious home for the U.K.’s near two million British citizens of the 
Muslim faith. Tragically, this year’s Hajj has been marked by the death of over 350 
pilgrims. The Saudi authorities have been working tirelessly to help those affected by the 
tragedy. The U.K. is the only Western country to send an officially sponsored and 
officially funded delegation to support its Hajj pilgrims – we expect more than 25,000 
British people to go on the Hajj this year. This delegation, headed by Lord Patel of 
Blackburn, was on the ground quickly to do all it could to help British victims of the 
disaster. Our thoughts and prayers are with all those affected by this horrible accident.”815 
5.3.3 Rules of extradition in Shari’a  
Before awarding punishment, the Shari’a first considers protection, advice, guidance, education, 
example, and sermon. The Shari’a places a great deal of emphasis on combating crime, and as 
shown above allows extradition of criminals, should it be necessary for the elimination of crime 
from society. 
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It is advisable to discuss in this section traditional Islamic doctrine on international crime, and to 
outline the basic rules of extradition from an Islamic to an Islamic country as well as from a 
Muslim to a non-Muslim one. Traditionally Islamic scholars divide the world into two parts.816 
One is the House of Islam or Salam (House of Islam or Peace), and the other is the House of War 
(Darul Harb).  
With regard to the former, the Darul Salam or Al Islam (House of Islam or House of Peace), 
there are some differences between scholars about its definition but generally agreement circles 
around one shared belief in the non-existence or insignificance of boundaries or geographical 
separations between Muslims. Based on this fact, they also believe that all Muslim countries 
must be governed by one system based on one constitution, which are the Qur’an and the Sunna 
of the Prophet Mohammed.817 Islamic scholars tend to differ on the definition of an Islamic state. 
Some use the application of Shari’a rules as a yardstick; others use the number of Muslims in the 
country as a criterion: if the majority of the people of the country are Muslims then the country is 
to be defined as an Islamic country, regardless of whether Shari’a rules are applied. Turkey and 
Indonesia are good examples. Neither is ruled by Islamic Shari’a law but both enjoy a Muslim 
majority. Based on the above two definitions, it can be asserted that the House of Islam or Salam 
includes all countries where Islamic laws are applied and any country under the control and 
governance of Muslims, even if the majority of people are not Muslims, in addition to any 
country under the control of non-Muslims but in which Muslims can observe their religion and 
follow its rules.  
In contrast, Islamic scholars defined the “House of War” as including all the lands which are not 
under the authority or control of Muslims, regardless of whether this is one country or more.818 
On this basis, authority or sovereignty is the criterion in designating the two houses. If Islamic 
sovereignty is achieved in a country, it is the “House of Islam;” if not; it is the “House of War.” 
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a. Application of Islamic law in places where the Shari’a is used 
Due to the sensitiveness of Shari’a as a concept and practice as to where and upon whom it 
should be applied, a number of diverse schools of thought have tackled the issue while focusing 
on its application.819 Amongst the first of these is the doctrine of the majority of Muslim 
scholars, including the Imam Malik, who was of the opinion that Shari’a should be applied in 
any case of crimes committed within the House of Islam, regardless of whether the perpetrator 
was Muslim or not.820  
Their argument is based on the premise that the Muslim is bound to the rules of Shari’a and the 
Dhimy (non-Muslim citizens who enjoy protection of money and property in return for the 
payment of a levy to an Islamic state) are also bound to the same Shari’a rules for the full 
protection that they enjoy of themselves and their property.  
The second school is the doctrine of the imam Abu Hanifa who believes that Islamic legislation 
is applicable in the case of crimes committed in the House of Islam, regardless of the religion of 
the wrongdoer, because Muslims have no rules other than Shari’a, and the Dhimy accept the 
rules of Islam primarily by accepting the protection agreement. 
However, Imam Abdu Hanifa makes a distinction between crimes against God and crimes 
against a person. According to him, the non-Muslim (moustaman) is not subject to the rules of 
Shari’a if he commits a crime in connection with God’s rights, but he has to be punished by 
Shari’a rules if he commits a crime against a person’s rights, as he is temporarily living in the 
House of Islam for trade or other purposes. His request for security and safety is not sufficient to 
bind him to the rules of the Shari’a.821 
b. Application of Islamic legislation in non-Shari’a places 
Islamic jurisprudents agree that the rules of Shari’a are not to be applied to non-Muslims, the 
people of the House of War. The dispute among them is whether, if a Muslim or zimmy commits 
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a crime in areas that do not apply the rules of Shari’a, he should be punished upon his return to 
the House of Islam. 
Experts in Islamic jurisprudence hold two positions on this matter.822 The first is that of the 
majority, who have decided that Shari’a should be applied in the House of War to those who are 
eligible for this in the House of Islam. An exception is the al harbi al moustaman, ‘an entrusted 
warrior who is not a Muslim but enjoys an agreement with an Islamic country to live in peace 
and protection’, who will not be judged for any crime he committed before embracing Islam. In 
the case of the Muslim and the Dhimy, the difference between the two houses will not affect 
them, as the rules of Islam apply. 
The majority of experts also agree on the application of Shari’a where an activity is not a crime 
in the House of War but is not permissible in Islam, as with usury; but if the action is permissible 
in the House of Islam, there is no punishment. 
The second position is that of imam abu Hanifa and his colleague Abu Yousif, who held that 
Shari’a is not applicable in the case of crimes committed in the House of War, even if such 
crimes are committed by residents of the House of Islam. Their argument is that criminal 
legalisation does not extend outside the House of Islam. In the light of this, no Muslim or Dhimy 
or Harbbi moustaman will be punished if a crime is committed in the House of War. 
Based on the above discussion, the rules of extradition in the Shari’a vary according to whether 
it is a) between two Islamic countries; or b) between an Islamic and non-Islamic country. 
i. Extradition between two Islamic countries823 
Fundamentally, all Muslim countries are viewed as one country, in spite of differences in regions 
and the separations of states. Islamic scholars address the rule of extradition of criminals in the 
light of two instances. First is when a Muslim commits a crime in an Islamic country and flees to 
another Islamic country without being prosecuted. In this case, the punishment is to be in 
proportion to the crime committed, in accordance with the view of the prosecution initiated in the 
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country fled to, and to be subject to the rules of the Shari’a if convicted by the judge. Should a 
country requesting extradition wish to prosecute a suspect on the basis of the Shari’a but does 
not implement or intend to use the Shari’a law of limits (or Hudood), it is the right of the 
receiving state to refuse the extradition.  
The second instance includes two variations. The first is if the culprit is prosecuted and convicted 
in his own country, and flees to another Islamic country to avoid the execution of the verdict, and 
if the country where he committed the crime then requests his extradition to fulfill the verdict. 
The country he flees to must extradite him if the verdict passed on him is based on the Shari’a. 
In the case of a non-Islamic verdict, extradition is not allowed.  
The second variation is if the criminal commits a crime in his own country and flees to another 
Islamic country, and if his own country does not ask for his extradition but only requests that he 
should serve the verdict passed against him. In such a case, there is no reason for refusing the 
request since it is compatible with the rules of the Shari’a.  
ii. Extradition between an Islamic and non-Islamic country824  
Essentially, it is not permitted in principle for any Islamic country to extradite any of its Muslim 
or Dhimy subjects to be prosecuted in a non-Islamic country for a crime they have committed 
there, as those subjects, from the legislative point of view, are the subjects of the Islamic country. 
Moreover, the power of Islamic criminal legislation is valid to deal with such crimes. “This is 
based on the divine principle, there is no guardianship of a non-Muslim over a Muslim (and 
Allah will never grant the unbelievers a way [to triumph] over the believers).”825 
The issue of extradition of criminals between Muslims and others arises in two ways. In the first, 
a Muslim or Dhimy commits a crime of murder or theft in the House of War and then flees to the 
House of Islam. There is a dispute among scholars, as noted above, as the majority argues that 
punishment should take place in the House of Islam if such crime is evident. However, the 
Hanafi argue that no punishment is applicable, because the Islamic guardianship is not valid. 
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In the second, case a Muslim or a Dhimy commits a crime in the House of Islam and escapes to 
the House of War. In this circumstance, the Islamic country is allowed to ask for extradition 
when a treaty or an agreement exists between the two countries. This reveals a new argument 
among scholars about the possibility of a covenant or agreement between Muslims and non-
Muslims, by which Muslims should extradite any criminals who commit a crime in other 
countries and then flee to the House of Islam. The issue is whether this condition can occur in 
practice. In fact the condition is fulfilled in the case of non-Muslims who live for a short period 
in the House of Islam without relinquishing the right of guardianship of their non-Islamic state 
within the context of fulfilling the oath “….and fulfill (every) engagement, for every 
engagement.”826 
Nevertheless, no Islamic state is permitted to extradite any of its Muslim or Dhimy subjects to 
any non-Islamic country for prosecution. Similarly, no Islamic state is permitted to extradite any 
subject of another Islamic state to a non-Muslim state. Moreover, no Islamic state is allowed to 
extradite anyone who immigrated to the state and converted to Islam for prosecution of a crime 
committed before conversion.827 
Where an agreement on extradition between two countries can exist, scholars disagree on the 
issue according to the following points of view. The Hanifa and some of the Maliki schools 
maintain that this condition is invalid, because extradition of a Muslim to a non-Muslim state is 
not allowed. Moreover, the process of extradition clashes with the execution of the verdict, 
because this comes under the issue of guardianship of the Muslim over the Muslim. 
The Hanbilis and others of the Malikis, however, maintain that this condition is valid, and 
extradition of a Muslim or Dhimy is permissible, as long as there is an agreement or treaty, 
because an agreement is a covenant and a covenant is to be honoured and respected. This is in 
accordance with the instructions of Allah in the Qur’an, affirming that “O ye, who believe, fulfill 
all obligations.”828 They also support this argument by referring to what the Prophet agreed to in 
the Al Houdibia pact, noted above.  
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The Shafi School differentiates between two cases. For one who has family members to protect 
him in the non-Islamic state, the condition of extradition becomes valid and correct. In such a 
case, extradition is permissible. However, someone who has no family protection may not be 
extradited. In all cases and circumstances, extradition of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim state 
from which she has emigrated is not allowed, even if her husband and children are there.  
Any condition or agreement which states otherwise is invalid, because of what Allah said in the 
Qur’an:  
“O ye who believe when come to you believing women refugees, examine them; Allah 
knows best their faith; if ye ascertain that they are believers, and then send them not back 
to the unbelievers. They are not lawful wives for neither the unbelievers nor the 
unbelievers lawful husbands for them, but pay to unbelievers what they have spent and 
there will be no blame on you if you marry them on payment of their dower to them. But 
hold not to the ties of unbelieving women; ask for what you have spent on their dowers 
and let the unbelievers ask for what they have spent on the dowers of women who came 
over to you. Such is the command of Allah. He who judges with justice between you and 
Allah is full of knowledge and wisdom.”829 
Furthermore, extradition of anyone who is subject to the jurisdiction of an Islamic state is not 
permissible, even if he is a foreigner.  However, he should not be set free; he rather should be 
tried for the crime he has committed under the existing law.  
The scholars state clearly that a non-Muslim cannot prosecute a Muslim. Also, a Muslim should 
not be subject to trial under non-Islamic laws.830 Scholars do not agree about warriors who flee 
from the House of War to the House of Islam. Some scholars argue that if the crime is committed 
before converting to Islam, the charge should be dropped, on the basis that what happened before 
conversion is invalid, in accordance with the holy verse “say to the unbelievers, if now they 
desist from unbelief their past would be forgiven them, but if they persist the punishment of 
those before them is already.”831 Other scholars argue that after conversion to Islam, the 
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perpetrator is punished if he is aware of his wrongdoing, but if he is not, then he will not be 
punished. 
c. Extradition of criminals in Shari’a 
The Shari’a is the basic reason why a Muslim should not be extradited from the House of Islam, 
to avoid being subject to sedition in his belief, or, if he is Dhimy, to avoid breaking his 
agreement. However, there is an argument on the possibility of exiling Muslims on exceptional 
grounds of necessity and to drive evil works away from the Islamic state. This argument is under 
reconsideration, because in Islamic legislation there is adequate provision of measures for 
reformation and adjustment. These help the rulers of Muslims to maintain security and order.832 
For the Harbbi, a warrior or warlike individual whose presence represents any threat to stability 
or risks becoming a traitor, it is confirmed that his deportation is allowed. Allah said in the 
Qur’an that “if thou fears treachery from any group throw back their covenant to them so as to be 
on equal terms, for Allah loved not the treacherous.”833 It is stipulated that the warrior is to be 
deported to a safe place from whence he came to avoid any threat to his life. Allah said that 
“…and then escort him to where he can be secure….”834  
This review of rules of the Shari’a demonstrates that in spite of the fact that extradition was not 
directly dealt with in books of Islamic doctrine, it has been dealt with indirectly. This is because 
at that time in the House of Islam, there was pressing need for extradition rules. The Shari’a can 
be shown to include basic principles which serve as a source of useful rules and procedures for 
dealing with the issue of the extradition of criminals. The seeming conflict between the concept 
of extradition of a Muslim to a non-Muslim country and the absolute interdiction of this 
expressed in section 5.3.3 (b) (ii) above, is resolved by the fact that “Muslims could make 
treaties of peace and live at peace with countries outside of dar al-islam if they themselves were 
not threatened by them.”835 
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5.4 Treaties in Shari’a 
As noted above, Muslims have – according to Islamic rules and traditions – the right to conclude 
agreements as well as, treaties with others, provided they do not contradict the principles of 
Islam, and do not harm the interests of Muslims, or their security. When treaty836 or an 
agreement is concluded between two or more parties, the conditions that bind them do not 
contradict the Shari’a and its principles.837 For this reason, the term “treaty” in Islam includes all 
agreements between countries, or between countries and individuals, as in the case of a safety 
agreement.838  
The fact that Muslims are allowed to have a truce with enemies under Shari’a means there is no 
reason why, for instance, they cannot conclude a long term treaty with non-Muslim countries. If 
a truce is to stop a war or fight with a non-Muslim tribe or country, a treaty aims to prevent and 
forestall the crime from happening or extradite those criminals who have committed a crime 
elsewhere. There is no explicit mention in the Shari’a of Muslims not being allowed to conclude 
a treaty with a non-Muslim country. However, permission is qualified with the condition that no 
provision of the treaty should violate the provisions of the Shari’a.   
5.4.1 The legality of treaties in Shari’a  
The evidence for the legality of concluding agreements can be found in the Qur’an and the 
Sunna, in addition to the consensus of Islamic scholars. In the Qur’an this can be seen in, for 
instance, “except those who join a group between whom and you there is a treaty (of peace).”839  
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5.4.2 Sources for extradition in Saudi Arabia 
Apart from the first basic government law issued in 1982, and amended in 1992, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, as an Islamic state, does not have a formal constitution as understood in the west 
and the world at large. Viewing itself as purely Muslim, it has adopted the holy book of the 
Qur’an as its first and ultimate official constitutional document.840 Nonetheless, the Basic Law 
addresses a number of fundamental legal issues. Its importance is that it represents the first man-
made law in the country. However, it remains subordinate to the Shari’a. Further, it outlines the 
general functions and duties of the courts in the Kingdom.  
It is nevertheless vital to emphasise that the bulk of the legal system cited, including the criminal 
justice system, is based on the Shari’a and its interpretation, the Basic Law, and royal decrees. In 
practice – as will be seen – the role of the latter proves to be the most influential on the whole 
system. Also, in matters of extradition, besides what is stipulated through the Shari’a, royal 
decrees tend to have direct or indirect implications for Saudi practice. A good example of this is 
Article 42 of the Basic Law,841 which deals with asylum and extradition. There are other articles 
in this Law which relate to extradition practices. For example, Article 81 states that the 
enforcement of the law will not prejudice treaties and agreements to which Saudi Arabia is 
committed.842 In addition, it contains articles dealing with the rights of individuals accused of 
crimes – Article 38 says that there can be no punishment without the “effectiveness of a statutory 
provision.”843 In spite of the absence of a right to legal representation, it contains some articles 
on the basic right of residents and citizens to be heard in the justice system, such as Article 47, 
which grants a right of litigation to all citizens and residents.844 
Based on this legal framework, the Saudi government uses the following to decide on 
extradition:845 
1. Bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements with other countries.  
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2. Reciprocity, especially in the absence of an agreement, or treaty. 
Nonetheless, the role of the King is crucial. In order to better portray this, it may perhaps be 
helpful to examine his relationship in relation to the constitution, as well as his effect on 
extradition treaties and human rights.  
5.5 The relationship between the King and the Saudi constitution and the impact and 
effects on extradition treaties and human rights 
Alotaibi noted that “Saudi Arabia does not have a separate constitution in the traditional sense of 
most other nations. Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law… addresses a number of fundamental legal issues, 
but it is not a constitution.”846 According to Article 1 of the Basic Law of Governance, “the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a fully sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion shall be Islam and its 
constitution shall be the Book of God and the Sunnah (Traditions) of His Messenger,”847 and the 
system of governance shall be monarchical848 whereby citizens shall pledge allegiance to the King on 
the basis of the Book of God and the Sunnah of his Messenger, and on the basis of submission and 
obedience in times of hardship and ease, fortune and adversity.849  
Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the Book of God Most High 
and the Sunnah of his Messenger, both of which govern the Basic Law and all other laws of the 
State,850 which are also based on justice, shura (consultation), and equality in accordance with 
Islamic Shari’a.851 
Governance in the State consists of judicial, executive and regulatory authorities. The promulgation 
of regulations or other forms of legislation is always subordinate to the divine rules; hence the term 
‘regulatory authority’ is used, rather than ‘legislature’.852 The Law requires these authorities to co-
operate in the discharge of their functions in accordance with this and other laws. The judiciary are a 
quasi-independent authority in that the Basic Law says that there is no power over judges in their 
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judicial function other than the power of the Shari'a,853 but Article 44 makes it clear that the King is 
the final authority854 and he delegates his judicial powers to the judicial authority in accordance with 
the previous article of the Basic Law of Governance. The most notable of the King’s interventions 
are pardons. For example, the recovery of King Fahd from illness in 2005 was marked by the 
pardoning of prisoners guilty of petty offences.855  
The right of litigation is guaranteed equally for both citizens and residents in the Kingdom, and 
the Law shall sets forth the procedures required thereof.856 
The courts have to apply the provisions of Shari'a to cases before them, as indicated by the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah, and any legislation not in conflict with the Qur'an and the Sunnah which 
the authorities may promulgate.857  
Subject to the provisions of Article 53 (which refers to the Board of Grievances, which is a body 
whereby citizens may gain redress), the courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate all disputes and 
crimes.858 The King or whomever he deputises shall be responsible for the enforcement of 
judicial rulings.859 
The Basic Law declares that the King shall run the affairs of the nation in accordance with the 
dictates of Islam. It is his duty to supervise the implementation of the Shari'a and the general 
policies of the State, and the protection and defence of the country.860 “The King and the Council 
of Senior Scholars (who are appointed by the King) are the only legal interpreters of the 
constitutional rules implicit in the Shari’a.”861 
The King presides over the Council of Ministers. He is assisted in the discharge of his functions 
by the members of the Council of Ministers in accordance with the provisions of this and other 
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laws. The Law of the Council of Ministers862 sets forth the power of the Council with respect to 
internal and foreign affairs, and to the organisation of the agencies of the Government and co-
ordination among them. It also sets forth the requirements ministers must meet, their powers, 
accountability, and all their affairs. The Law of the Council of Ministers and the powers of the 
Council can be amended only in accordance with this Law.863  
Members of the Council of Ministers are appointed, relieved of their posts, and their resignations 
accepted by Royal Order. Their responsibilities are specified in accordance with Articles 57 and 
58 of the Basic Law of Governance. The internal regulations of the Council set forth its rights,864 
whereas the Basic Law sets out its structure:865  
(a) The King shall appoint vice presidents of the Council of Ministers and member 
ministers of the Council of Ministers and shall relieve them by Royal Order. 
 (b) The vice presidents of the Council of Ministers and the member ministers of the 
Council of Ministers shall be considered collectively responsible before the King for the 
implementation of the Islamic Shari'a and the laws and the general policies of the State.  
(c) The King may dissolve the Council of Ministers and reconstitute it.  
Ministers and heads of independent agencies are considered responsible before the King for the 
ministries and agencies they head.866 A minister is the direct head and has the final authority in 
running the affairs of his ministry, and carries out his duties in accordance with provisions of this 
Law as well as other laws and regulations.867 
The constitution of the United Kingdom is a mixture of written laws, historical precedents, and 
written accepted practices: “the U.K. constitution is an untidy mixture of different kinds of law 
practices and customs, and has a substantial informal element.”868 The House of Commons has 
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claimed sole sovereignty and there is nothing in theory to prevent any and all of these existing 
constitutional elements being replaced by new (man-made) laws. “The ultimate authority in the 
English Constitution is a newly-elected House of Commons….a new House of Commons can 
despotically and finally resolve.”869 
By contrast, however, in Saudi Arabia the Shari'a is, in effect, the constitution, and being the 
Word of God can never be replaced, revised, amended, or discarded. The most that can happen is 
that its application can be refined, but always upholding its basic truths.870 
So, despite the fact that the King is the only interpreter and decision maker on a number of 
matters (helped by Islamic scholars and council), he is not viewed as an absolute monarch. He 
does not have unlimited authority, only that bestowed by the Shari’a,871 although his opponents, 
at least from outside the Kingdom, still see him as the sole decider in all matters of life. 
Nonetheless, the role of the King is to be, literally, the Defender of the Faith.872 It is because the 
King is subservient to the Shari'a that the executive, legislative, and judicial functions of the 
state are not separated in a manner familiar to the western world (expressed by Bagehot, in 
describing the British constitution as idealised as “the legislative, the executive, and the judicial 
powers are quite divided – that each is entrusted to a separate person or set of persons – that no 
one of these can at all interfere with the work of the other”873). Because of this he not only has a 
right but also a duty to be involved in all matters that concern the nation. The administrative 
arrangements in the Kingdom are designed to assist him in this role. No one person could run a 
modern state single-handedly; hence the King has a Council of Ministers to advise him and to 
provide him with a forum for debate on important matters that affect the Kingdom.874 The 
Ministers, like ministers in Western governments, deal with specific aspects of government, 
including extradition. 
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The state grants political asylum if public interest so dictates. Laws and international agreements 
specify the rules and procedure for the extradition of ordinary criminals.875 Hence, the 
international agreements and treaties that have been approved by the Saudi State are considered 
part of its basic law. This involves a positive recommendation from the Council of Ministers and 
the Shura Council, as laid down in the Basic Law of Governance.876 
The Ministry of the Interior is the body responsible for the procedures for requesting or 
extraditing criminals, as well as the signing of the official papers. These are undertaken 
according to Act 83 dated 13 February 1975 (1/2/1395 AH), which states that the Ministry of the 
Interior is responsible for finding suspects and criminals and requesting them from outside the 
Kingdom using official processes and procedures. The Extradition Requests’ Committee consists 
of three consultants from the Ministry877 and carries out the investigation of requests for those 
who are wanted from abroad or for extradition, as well as dealing with the necessary documents. 
These activities are carried out according to the relevant regulations so that the Committee can 
fulfill the legal requirements agreed to in the extradition treaties. The regulations also guide them 
in deciding whether to accept or reject requests and whether additional documentation is needed. 
They also govern the procedures for arrest or investigation within the Ministry of the Interior and 
how to communicate with specific countries, by diplomatic means or Interpol. 
The investigation of extradition files were delegated later to the General Bureau of Investigation 
and Prosecution. Article 54 of the Basic Law of Governance indicates the link between the 
Bureau, its organisations, and its authority.878 
The Saudi procedure in requesting recovery or extradition of criminals is of the administrative 
kind, which is quick and efficient in combating crimes. However, the guarantees granted to the 
accused are closely aligned to the requirements of justice. Extradition authorities follow the 
required judicial procedures to ensure the accuracy of the charge attributed to the person required 
for recovery and to provide basic guarantees for him. Human rights are protected in accordance 
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with the Shari'a.879 To fulfill this, authorities are keen to call any one who is requested for 
extradition on important or dangerous issues for questioning, to make sure of the facts of the 
charge and to ascertain whether he had been tried before for this crime and whether there are 
hidden motives that would argue against this extradition. 
Extradition requests are usually dealt with by the Ministry of the Interior, both requests from 
other countries and requests to other countries. In all cases, the King as the supreme authority 
and as the chair of the Council of Ministers has the right to intervene and make decisions or 
measures and directives in all sectors and sections of state affairs.880 He may, therefore, elect to 
sanction a request or to decline it.881 The Basic Law, as well as Shari'a, has guaranteed him this 
right; hence he can intervene by accepting or refusing extradition. This is not considered to be 
interference in judicial matters because extradition decisions, in Saudi law, are administrative 
and not judicial.  
Hence, the wide authorities of the King are not practised except in accordance with Islamic 
Shari'a. The enforcement of the Law of Governance should not prejudice treaties and agreements 
with states and international organisations and agencies to which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is 
committed.882 The Kingdom is a member of many international organisations and linked by good 
political and economical relationships with many countries for many decades. Because “the 
Islamic view of international law… regards all law – municipal and international - as resting on a 
unified set of higher norms,”883 the Shari'a has never been an obstacle for any developments, 
including extradition of criminals. There is nothing in the Shari'a that prevents the signing of 
agreements and treaties in these matters. Even when there is no treaty, reciprocity and 
international norms through normal channels which do not contradict with Shari'a are available 
solutions that can be used effectively and efficiently. 
Subject to the provisions of the Shura Council, laws, treaties, international agreements and 
concessions shall be issued and amended by Royal Decrees after being reviewed by the Council 
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of Ministers.884 The Shura Council shall express its opinion on the general policies of the State 
referred to it by the President of the Council of Ministers.885  
The Kingdom is linked with many international charters and respects human rights, ensured by 
the Shari'a more than 1400 years ago. As noted above, Article 26 of the Basic Law of 
Governance states that “the State shall protect human rights in accordance with Islamic 
Shari'a.”886 
Some countries refrain from signing extradition agreements with Saudi Arabia because it applies 
the death sentence. The description above of Shari’a shows why the death penalty cannot simply 
be abolished in Saudi Arabia. It is not in the remit of anyone, from the King downwards, to 
change mandatory parts of the Shari’a, particularly those in the Qur’an itself. The fact is that 
these are imposed by the Shari'a and this renders them an immutable element in justice. However, the 
degree of punishment may be optional. The granting of an amnesty or pardon is in the prerogative of the 
King, who can modify certain legal rulings, for example by remitting or reducing sentences, or imposing 
lighter punishments, or by pardon. However, in the Shari’a law of limits (Hudood), crimes 
concerning personal rights, such as murder, cannot be forgiven by the ruler because this is the 
right of God and the relatives of the murdered person, so the decision is theirs.887 They may 
forgive the murderer completely or through reconciliation on payment of a certain amount of 
money more or less than Ad-Diyat (blood money) or exile the murderer to another city. They 
also have the right to accept or refuse the compensation and adhere to the right of Qasas or death 
penalty as granted by the Shari’a. Against this, the King does have the duty to consider the best 
interests of the state,888 as shown by the pardon extended to U.K. citizens accused of terrorist-
like activities, following a series of explosions in Riyadh related to alcohol-smuggling gangs.889 
The news report reveals that the King extended his pardon on the basis of best serving the 
interests of Saudi Arabia and maintaining good relationships with the United Kingdom. 
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The UN General Assembly’s resolution of 2007890 regarding the freezing of executions paving 
the way to cancel them completely may be noted here. The UN General Assembly previously 
adopted a resolution of the second optional protocol on 15/12/1989 at the International Institute 
of Civil and Political Rights to cancel the death penalty. However, this new resolution of 2007 
clearly interferes with the internal affairs of the member states. Although the resolution is non-
binding for the member states, it also contradicts section seven of the second Article of the 
United Nations Charter (“there is nothing in this charter that justifies interference in matters 
which are the internal affairs of a country. The members are not required to resolve their 
problems according to this charter”).891 It is clear that the disciplinary subjects of criminal 
legislation and laws of personal circumstances are not suitable to unify provisions between 
different countries other than trade, investment, and work that express financial and economic 
interests and are not reflections of philosophies of laws or religions and privacy of communities.  
It is unlikely that there would be agreement between all countries about the cancellation of the 
death penalty, since each country adopts what suits its national security, which is its 
responsibility.892 
There is no doubt that the problem of the death penalty can be solved in a way which does not 
conflict with the Shari'a, but which fulfils the need of the Kingdom and other countries to 
combat crime. The agreement between Saudi Arabia and Bulgaria is a good example.893 In 
September 2003 the two countries co-operated but Bulgaria set conditions of exception 
concerning the death penalty. It refuses to extradite for crimes that can end only with a death 
sentence. Other European countries can do the same and set such conditions in their agreements 
with the Kingdom for more and greater security co-operation. All parties would benefit both in 
terms of security as well as the effects at the political and economic levels. One such effect may 
be seen in that the goodwill generated by the agreement with Bulgaria led to a general treaty of 
co-operation. This treaty – covering many areas such as economic interests, culture, tourism, and 
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trade - between Saudi Arabia was signed on 14 April 2007, after a resolution of the Council of 
Ministers, acting in turn upon a resolution of the Shura Council.894   
As can be seen from what has been stated above, the relationship between the King and the 
Shari'a is very strong, because he draws his authorities, rights, responsibilities, and commitments 
from it, and exercises all his duties within its framework because the Qur’an and Sunnah together 
(the Shari'a) in effect are the Saudi constitution, and adopted in all aspects of life. 
As noted above, the King has a wide role in the extradition of criminals, in accepting or refusing 
it, as the head of state and head of the Council of Ministers. This is his right according to the law 
and the Shari’a, and he has a particular duty when there is danger to the security and interests of 
the country.895 This does not affect the extradition of criminals negatively because there are 
channels other than treaties, such as reciprocity and international norms, through which 
extradition can happen.  
Perhaps one of the most sensitive issues in relations between Saudi Arabia and the West are 
human rights (which also includes the death penalty), for which a number of countries, as well as 
human rights and women’s rights organisations criticise the Kingdom. These pressures, 
portrayed in a number of spoken and printed media, directly criticise Saudi Arabia for violating 
human nights (discussed in more detail below), despite its commitment to the spirit as well as the 
letter of international charters on these sensitive issues. In part, these critiques may be related to 
the fact of poor monitoring and mechanisms in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia itself, giving an 
impression of uncompromising harshness with the severe punishment – as it may appear from a 
Western point of view – of the execution of genuine criminals. These stringent punishments are, 
as noted above, part of Islamic Shari’a law, which neither the King nor the Shura council could 
cancel or suppress. Nonetheless, pressures on the Kingdom from important countries and human 
rights organisations are still being maintained. For example, a report of Human Rights Watch 
(World Report 2009) wrote that: 
“Human rights conditions remain poor in Saudi Arabia. International and domestic 
pressures to improve human rights practices remained feeble, and the government 
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undertook no major reforms in 2008. The government systematically suppressed the 
rights of 14 million Saudi women and an estimated 1 to 3 million members of minority 
Shia communities, and failed to protect women and the rights of foreign workers. 
Thousands of people received unfair trials or were subject to arbitrary detention. Curbs 
on freedom of association, expression, and movement, as well as a lack of official 
accountability, remain serious concerns.”896 
The report continues with: 
“The government continues to treat women as legal minors, denying them a host of 
fundamental human rights. The government requires women to obtain permission from a 
male guardian to work, study, marry, travel, and even receive a national identification 
card. The Ministry of the Interior did not implement a cabinet recommendation from July 
to abolish the requirement for a guardian’s permission to issue ID’s to women. 
In addition, the government neither set a minimum age for marriage nor adopted any 
comprehensive policies to combat forced and early marriages. Marriages of Saudi girls as 
young as 10 to much older men were reported in 2008, although the human rights 
commission intervened in one such case to delay marriage for five years. 
Strictly enforced sex segregation hinders a Saudi woman’s ability to participate fully in 
public life. Women are prohibited working in offices or entering government buildings 
that lack female sections, or pursuing degrees in disciplines not taught in women’s 
colleges. The Ministry of Labour places prohibition on mixed workplaces with vaguely 
worded obligations to respect Islamic law on the matter, and so the current workplace 
environment remains highly segregated. The Ministry of Justice denies women the right 
to be judges or prosecutors, or to practice law. In February 2008 religious police arrested 
a 36-year-old Saudi businesswoman for ‘illegal mingling’ while meeting with a male 
colleague in a Starbucks in Riyadh… [On foreign workers’ status and treatment went on 
to note that]… An estimated 8 million foreign workers, primarily from India, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Sri Lanka, fill jobs in the construction, domestic service, health, and 
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business sectors. Many suffer a range of abuses and labour exploitation, sometimes rising 
to slavery-like conditions. 
Despite renewed announcements in July, the Ministry of Labour did not implement its 
commitment to end the restrictive kafala (sponsorship) system. The policy ties migrant 
workers’ residency permits to their employers, fuelling abuses such as employers 
confiscating passports, withholding wages, and forcing migrants to work for months, or 
years against their will.”897  
Further, the report went on to include serious violations of human rights in a number of domains, 
including arbitrary detention and unfair trials, the detention of children, lack of freedom of 
speech, lack of freedom of religious practice and discrimination, especially towards the Shia 
minority.898  
Within this environment, Saudi Arabia was forced to reform in a number of ways in order to 
defend its external image abroad and to placate its own citizens. However, these reforms began 
to show faults also. In the aftermath of the events of 9/11, it was noted that Saudi Arabia saw 
increased pressure for reform in the 21st century. In May 2002 a revised criminal justice system 
was instituted.899 The following year there were small-scale demonstrations calling for reform. 
These were broken up by the police.900 It was announced that there were would be municipal 
elections held within the year. These were tentatively scheduled for October 2004 and represent 
the first democratic elections in the country’s history. There was even conjecture that women 
would be able to both vote and stand as candidates. King Fahd also gave wider powers to the 
Majilis as-shura (the consultative assembly). In the event, the municipal elections were delayed 
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until February 2005. Women were not allowed to vote, but the authorities described the 
exclusion as one based on logistical problems rather than policy.901  
Among the more flexible moves of recent years by the Saudis was when the King granted a 
pardon to two British women. In May 1997 two British nurses working in Saudi Arabia faced 
possible severe penalties for the murder of an Australian nurse in a Saudi hospital: 500 lashes 
and eight years in jail for the first (Lucille McLaughlin) and beheading for the other (Deborah 
Parry), unless the victim’s family in Australia granted mercy in exchange for money (in Saudi 
law, diya). Several months were spent, following the arrest in December, in deciding whether the 
brother of the murdered woman had the right to insist on the death penalty or exercise clemency 
if the two nurses were found guilty. That right is established under Shari’a law. The nurses’ trial 
opened on May 19 before an Islamic religious court in Khobar. The court upheld the right of the 
victim’s brother, Frank Gilford, to decide whether to call for the death sentence for Deborah 
Parry. On November 16 Gilford agreed to accept the diya and thus effected the waiving of the 
death penalty for Parry. On May 18 1998, both nurses were granted a pardon by King Fahd and 
their sentences were commuted.902 
Another, more controversial, example was when the Saudi Arabian government passed an 
amnesty to former Al Qaeda operatives, and which as a result, attracted further criticism from 
mainly American politicians, lawyers, and the general media.  
It should be noted that as well as the paucity of legal materials for the study of extradition in 
Saudi Arabia that has been referred to previously, there is also a corresponding shortage of 
commentary supporting and defending the Saudi Arabian position. The above examples should 
therefore be understood to be principally from a Western perspective. A refutation of the more 
extreme views of Saudi Arabia as an unremittingly barbaric country may be seen in the Gilford 
case above. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is trying hard to balance its orthodox Islamic rule 
(usually coming from the powerful, religious establishment) and current pressures and events. Its 
active diplomacy and participation in a number of international gatherings are points in case. In 
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the domain of religious as well as international gatherings, the Kingdom has managed to 
conclude a number of friendship and extradition agreements. Some of these are historical (like 
the Mecca, Al Taif, and Jeddah treaties),903 others are seen as modern.904  
5.6 Modern treaties  
Saudi Arabia continued its efforts to sign extradition agreements at bilateral and multilateral 
levels. These efforts resulted in several modern treaties of a more advanced form than 
previously. None are recorded in the United Nations Treaty Series. 
5.6.1 Agreement on co-operation between the Ministries of the Interior of Saudi Arabia 
and Iraq 
This Agreement was signed in Riyadh in 1977.905 It covered scientific, technical, and 
administrative issues and consisted of sixteen articles. One part referred to the two parties 
agreeing to co-operate in pursuing suspects and criminals for extradition upon request. The 
Agreement stipulated the establishment of a joint committee to draft an agreement for 
extradition, taking into consideration the following guidelines906: 
• Search and stopping of criminals and suspects to take place upon direct 
communication between the two liaison offices for the Arab criminal police in the 
two ministries. Name, description, nationality of the wanted person and accusations 
directed at him to be included in the application. 
• Extradition request to come directly from the Minister to his counterpart in the other 
country. The application to include details of the crime. 
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The Agreement did not stipulate specific rules for extradition, but was a hopeful nod towards the 
conclusion of an extradition treaty. The joint committee referred to in the agreement was not 
established and subsequently the proposed extradition treaty between Saudi Arabia and Iraq has 
not been concluded to date. 
5.6.2. Bilateral agreements for co-operation on security issues with the Council of Gulf 
States. 
In 1981 and 1982, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia concluded individual bilateral agreements with 
some of the Gulf States including the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman.907  
These Agreements cover co-operation on security issues. The second part of the Agreements 
contains sixteen articles on the extradition of criminals. The Agreements stipulated that the 
extradition of criminals is mandatory if the crime constitutes in the requesting country a crime 
for which the punishment is a minimum period of imprisonment for six months. They also 
stipulated extradition for cases in which the crime was committed outside the territories of the 
two countries and the two countries would punish such crime. Extradition includes the subjects 
of the state requested to extradite the criminal.908 These aspects of the Agreements were decided 
on the principle of the seriousness of the crime, as well as the principle of the regionalisation of 
criminal law, without objecting to the extradition of subjects. 
The Agreements also covered the conditions under which extradition would not be allowed. 
These are: 
• Where charges are dropped in accordance with the judicial system of the 
requesting state.909 In addition, consideration must be made of the principle of the 
application of an appropriate law for the suspect. 
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• In cases of a political nature, the agreements do not define the concept or the 
limits of political crimes and follow the manner of exclusion for crimes of treason 
as not being political and allowed the extradition of those who commit it.910  
• When a crime is committed in the territories of the state requested to extradite.911 
In this case, the agreements give the priority to the principle of criminal law 
regionalism. 
• When the person to be extradited enjoys diplomatic immunity, in accordance with 
international law or any other international treaties or conventions.912 
• When more than one request for extradition is received, for the same person or 
where that person is on trial. The agreements covered three possibilities.  
o
 If more than one application is received for extradition for a person for the 
same crime from different states, the priority is given to the state where the 
crime caused the most harm and then after that to the state where the crime 
was committed.913   
o
 If multiple extradition requests are received for the same person for 
different crimes, the agreements give priority to the seriousness of the 
crime, the date of the crime, and the date of receipt of the extradition 
applications, as well as requiring an undertaking from the requesting state 
to return the suspect after his trial.914 However, the agreements did not 
specify which state has priority. In the case of judicial pursuit of a wanted 
person or if he is convicted for another crime, the state receiving the 
request has to decide on the extradition and to retain it until the pursuit has 
ended or the judicial system has cleared or convicted him. His extradition 
to the requesting state is then permissible, for him to stand before its 
judicial system, on condition that it will return him after his trial and 
passing sentence.915 
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However, the agreements do not oblige the parties to comply with a specific system for the 
submission of an extradition application. The documents required for extradition are listed in the 
agreements and the relevant authorities in the two countries were named as channels for 
transactions.916 Where an extradition file is absent, the consent of the suspect is needed.917 The 
decision to extradite is the responsibility of the authorities in the two countries, providing that the 
requested state informs the requesting one of its decision, and a full explanation given in cases of 
rejection, within a period of two months.918 
In addition, the agreements allowed for requests for extradition by cable or telephone in 
exceptional circumstances. It is then the duty of the country responsible for extradition to keep 
the wanted person under surveillance until the extradition procedures are completed, which must 
be within thirty days, with the right to release him if the complete file is not received. The 
agreements permit an extension of this initial period to another thirty days, all such periods to be 
deducted from the term of sentence.919 
The agreements oblige the country requested to extradite the wanted person to hand over to the 
requesting country all belongings which the suspect has upon him at his arrest.920 With regard to 
the financial cost of extradition, the agreements oblige the requesting country to bear all the 
costs.921 In addition, they fixed a period of thirty days for the requested country to extradite the 
suspected person. The requested country has no right to release the suspect or extradite him to 
another country.922 
These agreements do comply with those concluded on the principles of international law, and 
they did strike a balance between the right of the requesting and the requested states. At the same 
time, they did not disturb the rights of the suspects and gave them a guarantee of justice. 
By way of demonstrating that the Kingdom is actively participating in respecting and honouring 
its commitment to such treaties, thus setting an example for other Islamic states to follow, a few 
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cases of extradition of criminals between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are 
described. The handling of these cases was in accordance with the bilateral extradition 
agreements.  
The first case was a request from Saudi Arabia to the UAE for the extradition of an Emirates 
national to Saudi Arabia accused of owning and drinking alcohol and smoking opium, and also 
driving a car under their influence while in Saudi Arabia. The request was based on the fact that 
the crime committed by the Emirates national was in accordance with the first article of the 
second part of the agreement.923 This Article stipulated that extradition is obligatory if the two 
following conditions were fulfilled. 
•
 If the crime is one which carries a penalty of physical punishment or carries a 
minimum imprisonment period of not less than six months. 
•
 If the crime was committed within the requesting state or outside the two countries but 
the rules in the requesting country punishes for the crime, even if committed outside its 
territory. Extradition is allowed for the wanted person even if he is not a subject of the 
requesting country.924 
The second case between Saudi Arabia and the UAE was the case of a Syrian citizen whose 
extradition was requested by the UAE when he was in Saudi Arabia. He was accused of issuing a 
cheque without supporting funds. The suspect accepted the accusation and agreed to his 
extradition to the UAE without an extradition file. The Kingdom agreed to his extradition. 
The UAE based its request on Article 1 of Part 2 of the Agreement in accordance with Article 
7,925 which reads: 
“if the arrested suspect admits that he is the wanted person, and agrees to the accusation 
directed to him, And if the concerned authorities in the two countries find the crime is 
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one of the crimes that allow extradition according to the Articles of the Agreement, with 
the consent of the suspect to his extradition without a request for an extradition file, the 
appropriate authority is to extradite him.”926  
The third case concerns the extradition of an Indonesian suspect who was living in Saudi Arabia. 
The United Arab Emirates requested her extradition with an accusation of betrayal of trust in 
accordance with Article 1 of the agreement between the two countries. The extradition was filed 
in accordance with paragraph B of Article 6 of the agreement.927 Under the same articles, an 
Egyptian national who was living in Saudi Arabia was extradited to the United Arab Emirates, 
accused of issuing a cheque with criminal intent.928 
The fourth case was between Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman. The latter requested the 
extradition of a Portuguese national accused of circulating fake banknotes and sentenced to five 
years, reduced by half. The request was based on Article 1 of Part 2 of the agreement between 
the two countries. The Kingdom agreed to the extradition, in accordance with paragraph B of 
Article 6 of the agreement.929 The same articles were used for the extradition of an Egyptian 
citizen, accused of theft, to the State of Qatar, again in accordance with Article 1 of Part 2 of the 
agreement.930  The documents were submitted in accordance with Article 6/B. 
The similarities in the articles of the various agreements between Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
States are evident. As with the Syrian noted in the second case above, there was a similar case of 
a Saudi citizen who issued cheques without supporting funds and was therefore accused of 
embezzlement and cheating. The Office of Settlement of Commercial Bonds convicted him and 
he fled the country to Bahrain. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia based its request for his extradition 
                                                 
926
  United Arab Emirates Agreement, see n.924, Article 7. 
927
  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Department of Investigation and the Attorney General, Extradition Department, 
Case number 208. 
928
  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Department of Investigation and the Attorney General, Extradition Department, 
Case number 47.   
929
 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Department of Investigation and the Attorney General, Extradition Department, 
Case number 380. 
930
 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Department of Investigation and the Attorney General,  Extradition Department, 
Case number 333. 
 208 
upon Article 1 of Part 2 of the agreement. The necessary documents were filed by the Saudi side 
in accordance with Article 6 of the same agreement.931     
5.6.3 Agreement for security co-operation with the Republic of Yemen 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen signed in the city of Jeddah on 27th 
July 1996 an agreement for co-operation on security and the combating of crime. The Agreement 
was ratified on 8th January 1997.932 The main thrust of the Agreement is co-operation on 
security, and consists of 25 articles. Section 2 covers co-operation on the extradition of 
criminals, Articles 11 to 25. These included the following provisions: 
• The terms are identical to those of the agreements that Saudi Arabia signed with 
the Gulf States. 
• Extradition of a wanted person is permissible if he is a subject of the country 
requested to extradite.933   
An example of the application of this latter provision is the case of a Yemeni citizen who was 
living in Saudi Arabia and accused of killing another Yemeni national living in the Kingdom. 
The government of Yemen requested the extradition of the suspect in accordance with Article 11 
of the Agreement, which reads “the extradition of criminals is obligatory if the application fulfils 
the following conditions: 
a) if the crime according to the details provided by the requesting country is one 
of the Hudood or Qusas crimes or the minimum punishment for the crime is 
not less than six month of imprisonment. 
b) If the crime is committed in the land of the requesting country or committed 
outside the territories of the two countries and the law in the requesting 
country punishes for the crime if committed outside its territory, extradition of 
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the citizen in such case is permissible if he is a national of the country 
requested to extradite.”934 
In accordance with Article 11 of the Agreement, the Saudi government requested the extradition 
of a Yemeni national935 who was involved in a crime. The extradition file arranged by the Saudis 
was in accordance with Article 16 of this Agreement.936 In accordance with these articles, the 
Saudi government requested the extradition of several Yemeni citizens suspected of other 
crimes. A good example is the case of a Yemeni citizen who was accused of breach of trust.937 
Another case was that of a Yemeni national who was accused of embezzlement of the sum of 
two hundred and five thousand eighty Saudi Riyals when he was working in Saudi Arabia. The 
Kingdom requested his extradition in accordance with Article 11 of the Agreement and the 
extradition was arranged in accordance with Article 16.938 
The outcome of this agreement is well reflected in more serious crimes, such as terrorism, that 
the Kingdom suffered greatly from for a long period, in particular after September 11 2001. 
Security co-operation has been very fruitful under the umbrella of this Agreement. Of late, the 
two countries have exchanged the extradition of groups wanted for security reasons. A number 
of commentators have noted the volume of extraditions between the two countries. For example, 
Yemen and Saudi Arabia have exchanged numerous suspects pursuant to a security agreement 
between the two countries in 2004.939 The government of Yemen has extradited to Saudi Arabia 
more than 37 suspects in the last two years. The latter has extradited to the former more than 35 
suspects, including some suspected of taking part in the attack on the French oil tanker (the 
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Limborg) along the Yemeni coast in October 2002.940 On 21st March 2004, the Saudi extradited 8 
suspects to Yemen and in return, Yemen, extradited 5 Saudi nationals to Saudi Arabia.941  
The success of this Agreement between Saudi Arabia and Yemen may be attributed to many 
factors. Primarily, it is the harmony in the security policies of the two countries and similarities 
in the punishment systems. Because the Yemeni punishment system contains severe punishments 
for the seven Huduud crimes, which are considered to be offences against God, each crime 
carries a specific, severe punishment.942 These crimes are: 
• Apostasy - the rejection of Islam by word. The punishment is death. 
• Theft - the punishment is severing the right hand. 
• Transgression - the punishment is death. 
• Highway robbery - punishments include execution, crucifixion, or exile. 
• Adultery - the penalty is flogging, with 100 strokes for the unmarried, and 
flogging plus stoning for the married. 
• Slander or defamation - the penalty is flogging with 80 strokes. 
• Drinking alcohol - the penalty is flogging, the number of strokes not being 
specified. 
This means Yemen has the right to receive criminals for most of these crimes. The punishment 
for these crimes is only limited to Yemeni and Saudi nationals. This condition is 
disadvantageous to the Agreement, because it is not enough for extradition if the penalty for the 
crime upon which the extradition case is built exists in the law of the requesting country but does 
not exist in the law of the of the country to which the suspect belongs.943  
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It can be seen that the Agreement between the two countries does not add anything with regard 
to the non-extradition of nationals, because this was the case in the Riyadh Agreement, in 
accordance with Article 39 of the Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 1983. Before 
the signing of this latter, Yemen in several cases rejected the extradition of its own citizens to 
Saudi Arabia, sticking to the principle of non-extradition of its nationals. Amongst these 
examples was one of a Yemeni, suspected of involvement in a murder case, and another who was 
suspected of theft while working in Saudi Arabia. The Yemeni government decided not to 
extradite them, but also decided not to allow them to escape justice.944 In accordance with the 
Riyadh Agreement, it was the duty of the government of Yemen to put them on trial. The 
legislation of the Yemen government does not allow the extradition of any national, stated in 
Article 29 of the constitution, which reads: it is not allowed to extradite any Yemeni citizen to 
any foreign authority. Article 16 of the Law of Criminal Procedure in Yemen indicates that it is 
not allowed to extradite any Yemeni subject for a crime committed abroad. This is in line with 
the Riyadh Agreement, which in Article 39 stipulates the permissibility of non-extradition of 
subjects.945 
The same goes for the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in Article 11 Section B of 
the more recent Agreement, which referred to the permissibility of the extradition of nationals.946 
Despite the provisions for both the Yemen and Saudi Arabia using the right of non-extradition of 
their subjects, neither party has exercised this right and has adhered to the international principle 
of permissibility of extradition of their own nationals. 
Some scholars argue that there are three sources947 for this international principle. Firstly, a 
direct text could be found in the constitution of the state requested to extradite, leaving no space 
for argument or discussion. Secondly, although there might not be a direct article in the 
constitution on the matter, but a continuity of rejecting extradition of national subjects over a 
period of years will allow reference in such cases to there being a customary law. This practice is 
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based on the principle of maintaining the sovereignty of the state requested to extradite. Thirdly, 
in international and bilateral agreements, part of the text of the agreement might be the 
permissibility of extradition of criminals between the two countries or the contracted countries. 
In such cases, a request for the extradition of a national from the other country is only a request 
to bring the citizen who holds the nationality of that country to trial according to the judicial 
system of that country and no extradition is forced in these cases.  
It is much easier, therefore, to request the extradition of, say, a Yemeni living in Yemen than 
requesting the extradition of a Yemeni citizen living in another country, to avoid the application 
of the principle of permissibility of subjects referred to above. One example is that the Saudi 
authorities made a request on 17th May 1985 to the Egyptian government for the extradition of a 
Yemeni national who was living in Egypt and wanted in Saudi Arabia for issuing cheques 
without credit when living in Riyadh. The Egyptian authorities arrested the said Yemeni national 
and the Attorney General agreed to his extradition to Saudi Arabia. While the extradition file 
received from Saudi Arabia was being investigated, the Egyptians discovered that there were 
outstanding charges against him in Egyptian police stations in 1986, a short time after his arrest. 
He was convicted in front of the Egyptian courts upon his confessing, in an attempt to avoid 
extradition to Saudi Arabia. After passing sentence, the Egyptians informed the Saudi side that 
extradition would take place on 28th. March 1990. Before the arrival of the representatives of the 
Saudi government to finalise the extradition, the Egyptians discovered a new judicial verdict 
against the same national from the Egyptians courts. The date of extradition was amended on 
April 8, 1990. The suspect was finally extradited to Saudi Arabia on July 11, 1990.948    
Perhaps, amongst the most important extradition and security agreements the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia has concluded are those signed with Pakistan and Iran. Regionally, in the context of the 
Middle East, and Asia, these two meetings represented both a step forward and a development in 
the field of extradition to reaching out to non-Arab states. However, it is important to add that 
both countries (Iran and Pakistan) do share with Saudi Arabia an Islamic heritage and interests. 
Both Pakistani and Iranian workers are to some degree very visible in the Arabian Gulf, and in 
                                                 
948
  Egypt, Ministry of the Interior, Department of General Security, Interpol Information Centre, File number 
123/2Ex. 
 213 
Saudi Arabia itself. These shared factors probably contributed to the genesis of such agreements 
and understanding with Saudi Arabia. 
5.6.4 Agreement for the extradition of criminals between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of 
Pakistan 
This Agreement was concluded between Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan in 1984.949 It consists of 19 articles, including the following important provisions. The 
Agreement listed twenty-two crimes for which extradition would be permitted,950 on the 
condition of dual incrimination in the systems of the two countries and the crime would be 
penalised by not less than one year in jail.951  
The Agreement stipulated non extradition in the following cases:952 
•
 If the crime was of a political nature, leaving the criteria for deciding that to 
the country requested to extradite. The Agreement referred to specific crimes 
which would not be regarded as political crimes and for which, therefore, 
extradition would be permissible.953  
•
 If the crime was committed in the territory of the country requested to 
extradite. Here, the Agreement adopts the regional principle for the 
application of the criminal script. 
•
 If the person wanted for extradition was tried or is under investigation for the 
same crime in the requested country, or if his trial took place in a third 
country for the same crime. The wording of this paragraph is lacking in 
precision, in spite of so many details. The Agreement allows for extradition in 
cases in which the person had been on trial previously or under investigation 
in the same country. With regard to third countries, this was covered only in 
the case of the trial of a wanted person. This gives the possibility of 
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extradition if he is under investigation. The Agreement stated the right of 
every country to decline the extradition of its subjects provided that it would 
take responsibility for dealing with the crimes committed.954 
The wording of the text gives the possibility of each party waiving its right of non-extradition, 
just as the text gives the right of declining extradition. 
With regard to an application for extradition and the documents requested, the Agreement stated 
that requests for extradition are to be submitted by the relevant authorities in the requesting 
country to the requested party through diplomatic channels.955 The request could be sent either 
through those channels or directly by post or through Interpol. When it is important to 
temporarily hold a suspect, the Agreement permits the use of any means of communication, 
provided that the basis for the decision to hold, or a court decision, is attached to the application. 
Moreover, the application should include the type and description of the crime, such as date, 
place, and description of the suspect.956  
In addition, the Agreement detailed the documents to be included in the application. If the 
documents not be received within thirty days, it is the right of the requested country to cancel the 
holding or to extend it to a maximum of another 15 days. The cancellation of the holding of a 
suspect will not affect the right of extradition when the documents are received. Any holding 
period is to be deducted from the punishment period in the requesting country.957 
The Agreement follows typical bilateral agreements by giving the authority for deciding on an 
extradition application to the relevant authorities in the country requested to extradite. When an 
application is rejected, the reasons should be explained within 60 days. The Agreement added 
that where the information provided is inadequate for deciding on the extradition, it is the right 
of the receiving country to ask for more information to be provided by the requesting country 
within a month, unless this period can be extended under the terms of the bilateral Agreement for 
another month.958 In the case of delay in the extradition, if a wanted person is under trial or 
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convicted of a different crime in the requested country, it is the right of the requested country to 
take a decision to delay the extradition up to the completion of the trial. It is also the right of the 
requested country in such a case to extradite the suspect temporarily for investigation or trial, 
with an undertaking from the requesting country to keep him under arrest or to re-extradite him 
within 90 days if the person in question is one of its subjects. With this, the Agreement 
established the principle of extradition for trial only.959 
Furthermore, the agreement covered the handing over procedures by stating that the requesting 
country is to be informed of the date and venue of handing over of the suspect, which should 
take place within ten days unless the requesting country agrees otherwise.960 The wording of this 
part of the Agreement fixes the minimum period for extradition without fixing a maximum 
period. This could be taken as a weakness. 
According to the Agreement, if the requesting country fails to receive the extradited person 
within the fixed date, it is the right of the requested country to set him free, unless the requesting 
country requests a delay in the handing over, at least two days before the end of the fixed date, 
for a period not exceeding 15 days.961 
When a person has already been set free for the same crime, it is the right of the requested 
country to reject the application. In the case of the escape of a suspect and his return to the 
territory of the country requested to extradite him, it is the right of the requesting country to 
submit an application for his extradition without attaching any documents with the application.962 
The Agreement endorsed the principle of speciality by stating that the person is not to stand trial 
except for the crime for which the application is submitted or for crimes committed after 
extradition. Despite this, it is permitted to hold a trial if the opportunity of leaving the territory of 
the country he was extradited to was not taken within thirty days of the date of being set free or 
upon his voluntary return to it after his departure.963 
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In the case of multiple extradition applications from more than one country, whether for the same 
or different crimes, the Agreement leaves it to the requested country to make a decision, taking 
into consideration the conditions and circumstances, including the nationality of the wanted 
person, the place of the crime, and the importance of the crime, in addition to the dates and 
sequence of the extradition applications. The Agreement permits the requesting country to 
delegate the right to re-extradite a person to a third country on condition it has submitted an 
application for extradition within the same period.964 
It is clear that the Agreement gives priority to the principle of character in applying criminal law; 
followed by the principle of the regionalism of the application. Note that this is not in line with 
the standard bilateral agreements between Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. The other area in 
which this agreement is different from that between the Saudi Arabia and other countries 
concerns properties, as this agreement obliges the requested country upon receiving the 
application for extradition to enumerate the tools used in the crime or preparation for it. 
Moreover, the requested country has to enumerate the property found with the suspect upon his 
arrest, including any obtained as a result of the crime. Such tools and properties are to be handed 
over to the requesting country, even if extradition fails or if the suspect escapes.965 The 
Agreement also determines that in the case of large losses resulting from the handing over of any 
tools and properties, the cost is to be met by the requesting country. The cost of transporting 
these items is also the responsibility of the requesting country.966 
The Agreement includes other provisions, covering matters such as obliging the two countries to 
permit transit through their territories for a wanted person the subject of an application by a third 
country, provided that the requesting country specifies the transit permission required without 
any obligation on the receiving country to grant transit facilities for its citizens or for individuals 
on trial in its territories.967 
Furthermore, the Agreement arranged the details of extradition expenses:968 
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• The requested country to bear all costs up to the arrest of the wanted person. 
Apart from that, all other costs to be met by the country requesting the extradition, 
on condition that the extradition is fulfilled. 
• The requesting country to bear transit costs. 
• The requesting country to meet costs arising from the return of the person to the 
place he was in at the time of his extradition, if it becomes evident that he is 
innocent or not convicted of the crime for which he was extradited. 
The Agreement obliges the requesting country to inform the requested country of the results 
of the investigation into the extradited person, and to send an authenticated copy of the final 
verdict on the conviction of the extradited person.969 This is more detailed than previous 
agreements and includes provisions and articles not part of prior agreements. 
One example of the practical application of the Agreement is the case of a Pakistani citizen 
who committed a murder in Saudi Arabia and fled to Pakistan. Based on Articles 1 and 2 of 
the agreement between the two countries, Saudi Arabia970 applied for the extradition of the 
suspect.  
Article 1 reads that the two countries agree to extradite criminals to each other, subject to the 
conditions specified in the Agreement, if the person is available within the boundaries of the 
country requested to extradite him and he is suspected of or indicted for one of the crimes 
listed in the annex to this Agreement, if the conditions provided in Article 2 are fulfilled. 
Article 2 of the Agreement stipulates the crimes for which extradition is permissible: 
• Crimes punishable by the laws of the two contracted countries and with 
imprisonment for not less than one year if the sentence has been issued, or with 
more punishment. The second case is imprisonment for not less than three 
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months, or with more punishment but in this case the sentence has not been issued 
yet. 
• Crimes that the laws of the two countries punish for a period of not less than one 
year of jail. 
• If the extradition application contains more than one crime punishable in the laws 
of the two countries. Some of these crimes are not covered under the provisions of 
paragraph A of this Article and extradition for crimes that fulfill the conditions of 
extradition.971    
In addition to the detailed provisions and new principles not included in previous agreements, 
this is notable for the adoption of a mixed style in outlining the crimes that permit extradition. 
This combines the minimum punishment for such crimes and the listing of very serious crimes. 
No reference to the degree of seriousness or punishments is made. For example, Article 2 of the 
Agreement states the following “criminals are to be extradited for crimes that the laws of the two 
contracted countries punish with imprisonment for not less than one year, or with more 
punishment or imprisonment for not less than three months, or with more punishment.”972 An 
appendix designating 23 serious crimes that require extradition was attached to the 
Agreement.973 The details of this Agreement reflect the mutual interest of the two parties in 
combating crime. Such details are necessary to avoid any ambiguity arising from the fact that 
Pakistan is an Islamic country but not an Arab country, has its own languages and traditions, and 
does not border Saudi Arabia. Both English and Arabic were adopted as the official languages of 
the Agreement. This makes it different from the agreements with the Gulf and other Arab 
countries, which have a conformity and similarity in their articles.  
This is mainly due to the fact that the six Gulf States are united under the umbrella of the 
Council for Gulf Co-operation. The member states of the Council live under the same security, 
economic, social, and religious conditions. The same can be said of countries like the Yemen. 
The historical, religious, and cultural ties between these countries are very helpful in solving 
problems, especially in security matters. Nevertheless, despite some political, social, and cultural 
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differences between Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries, common interests, especially in 
security matters, necessitates co-operation between them, to combat crime through bilateral 
security agreements. The last few years have witnessed the signing of several agreements aiming 
at combating terrorism, which has become wide-spread throughout the region after September 
11, 2001. A good example is the security agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran.  
5.6.5 The security co-operation agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran 
In response to new threats to security, Saudi Arabia, through Interior Minister, Prince Naif bin 
Abdulaziz (who justified the meeting between his country and Iran) emphasised the special 
relationship between the two countries and the necessity for dialogue and co-operation to reach a 
meeting point.974 Moreover, he pointed out the importance of co-operation between the two sides 
to enhance security and stability in the region, taking into consideration the international 
agreements and treaties governing such co-operation. The Agreement was signed in Tehran on 
11th April 2001.975 It was approved by the Saudi Council of Ministers (Decree no 186 dated 
18/09/2001 (29/06/1422 AH), issued by a Royal Decree M/31 dated 26/10/2001 (6/07/1422 
AH).976 The Agreement comprises 12 articles. 
From the above discussion, it can be asserted that this agreement with Iran was not as detailed as 
that, for instance, concluded with Pakistan. The detail in the latter was probably due largely to 
the religious similarity, with both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia being Sunni majority countries and 
the fact that there is a strong Pakistani workforce presence in the Kingdom, as well as other 
interests through this community. As for Iran, the Saudis probably thought a security agreement 
and co-operation would be a step forward towards a stronger arrangement in the near future. This 
is justified by the deterioration of the Iraqi situation and the indirect involvement of the two 
countries there. Further, with the existence of a Saudi minority of Shias, mainly concentrated in 
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the Eastern province, and which occasionally, protest, often publicly,977 a good agreement with 
the Shi’ite Republic of Iran would help contain this trouble and ease it. 
No doubt, the level of the relationship between Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Pakistan and 
Iran on the other, has had its impact on the two agreements. The strong relationship between 
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan has been translated into a very detailed agreement. The political 
differences and atmosphere of non-confidence that characterised the relationship between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran after the Islamic revolution in the latter in 1979, has been translated into an 
agreement that is more general. Political developments in the international arena led to some co-
operation between the two countries in the late 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium 
at the economic, political, and security levels. However, the American National Council on US–
Arab Relations considers that despite the Iran Agreement, considerable difficulties still 
remain.978 It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia has a considerable number of its subjects wanted 
for justice who fled the country to Afghanistan and made their way to Pakistan or Iran. The 
widening spread of terrorism after September 11, 2001 is one of the main reasons for regional 
co-operation on security issues, with bilateral agreements aimed at combating terrorism and the 
extradition of criminals and suspects. 
Through its diplomatic efforts and activities, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia managed to further 
conclude a number of multiple/multilateral agreements on extradition. There were both regional 
as well as international. The idea beyond the display and discussion of the said agreements and 
treaties is to show to what extent is extradition becoming an important issues, especially those 
concerning national and state security matters, and also, to further confirm the will as well as the 
ability of Saudi Arabia in making efforts in this area. As noted above, the tragic events of the 
9/11 attack, and the London July bombings, succeeding a barrage of terrorist sabotage incidents 
in Saudi Arabia, the security factor therefore became a subject of concern not only in the 
Kingdom, but in the Arab region and internationally. For example, on Friday November 16 2007, 
the Kingdom embarked on providing a tough and high tech security force to secure the oil 
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facilities in the country. It was noted in this respect that “Saudi Arabia is building up a special 
35,000 strong rapid reaction force to protect its energy installations from attacks by militants 
targeting the world’s largest oil exporter.”979  
This move brought both encouraging solidarity as well as expert help from other countries. This 
can be explained by both the shared, perceived threat of terrorism to the national and economic 
interests of those countries.980  
Whether in the U.S., Britain, or the Middle East and North Africa, national and internal security 
as well as stability, became many countries’ highest priority, which as a result called for both 
multi- and bilateral agreements on extradition and the arrest of alleged or suspected terrorists and 
criminals and international organised crime. The latter had become, in a way, linked to terrorism 
through money laundering, illegal arms smuggling and trafficking. This called for an 
international response, and both Saudi Arabia and the U.K. were amongst the first initiators. Jack 
Straw (former British Home Secretary) noted that:  
“In the coming year we want to see further progress: for example, agreement in the 
United Nations on a Comprehensive convention on Terrorism and agreement to a 
European Evidence Warrant. In my speech at the UN General Assembly last September, I 
called for an international Arms Trade Treaty which, among other things, would help to 
keep weapons out among other things, would help to keep weapons out of the hands of 
terrorists. The international community needs to continue to strengthen and uphold the 
international consensus against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction…and 
also working to ensure the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 which 
creates legal obligations on all states to crack down on terrorists, their supporters and 
their sources of finance. The swift extradition from Italy to the United Kingdom of a 
suspect in the attempted bombings on 21 July demonstrated the effectiveness of the new 
European Arrest Warrant. We are very grateful to the Italian government and authorities 
for implementing both the spirit as well as the letter of that warrant.”981  
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But this shared, perceived threat, and its global response, required not only common will, but 
significant finances. For instance, the U.K. has acquired thousands of surveillance cameras, 
which have cost millions of pounds (10,000 in London alone, costing £200 million).982 
Recruitment for an expansion of security personnel has required further equipment, training, and 
therefore funding. In the Saudi case, the Kingdom dedicated to its oil companies’ facilities 
millions of dollars in order to safeguard its own oil installations.983 
But this shared threat from what has become termed “terrorists” is also controversial and 
debatable. This leads to a discussion of this term from different perspectives. Terrorism, like 
‘political offence’ (discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, section 3.5.1), is seen differently by 
different states and is thus controversial. Where one country may, for instance, see an individual, 
group, or even a state as a terrorist, others may see a liberator, and a freedom fighter. Many 
views would not disagree that acts of terrorism might cause devastating consequences, 
destruction, and the killing innocent civilians. 
“Terrorism refers to the use of violence for the purpose of achieving a political, religious 
or ideological goal the target of terrorist acts can be government officials, military 
personnel people serving the interest of governments, or civilians. Acts of terror against 
military targets tend to blend into a strategy of guerrilla warfare. However, one man’s 
terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Random violence against civilians 
(noncombatants) is the type of action most widely condemned as ‘terrorism.’ 
Acts of terrorism can be perpetrated by individuals, groups or states, as an alternative to 
an open declaration of war. They are often carried out by states, or those who otherwise 
feel powerless. States that sponsor or engage in the use of terrorist tactics tend to use 
more neutral or positive terms to describe their own combatants, - such as freedom 
fighters, patriots or paramilitaries while the state or states become fought tend to use 
more negative terms like terrorism.”984 
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Others see it differently. Noam Chomsky, the American intellectual, argues that terrorism is 
often sponsored by governments via funding of organizations that train paramilitary groups 
supposedly to counter terrorism.985 
According to the 1937 definition of the League of Nations Convention, terrorism is about all 
criminal acts directed against a state and intended, or calculated to create a state of terror in the 
minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public.986 But more recently, in 
November, 2004, a UN panel defined the term as: “any action intended to cause death or serious 
bodily harm to civilians, non-combatants when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, 
is to intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or 
abstain from doing any act.”987 
Perhaps the most comprehensive definition, covering aspects of this type of political violence, is 
that given by Truth and Justice. “Terrorism is destruction of people or property by people not 
acting on behalf of an established government for the purpose of redressing a real or imaginary 
injustice attributed to an established government and aimed directly or indirectly at an 
established government.”988 
Not all cases of destruction of people or property are terrorism. The important definitive 
characteristics of terrorism are: 
1. The act of destruction is performed by a person or group of persons not acting on behalf 
of an established government. 
2. The act of destruction is performed to redress a real or imaginary injustice.  
3. The act is aimed directly or indirectly at an established government, who is seen as the 
cause of the injustice.  
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Without these characteristics an act of destruction of people, or property is not terrorism. It is 
either an accident, or an act of war, or a matter internal, or an ordinary, common law crime 
(murder, arson etc). 
• If destruction of people or property is caused unintentionally, it is an accident. 
• If destruction of people or property is undertaken by or on behalf of an established 
government against another country it is considered war not terrorism 
• If destruction of people or property is undertaken by or on behalf of an established 
government on its own territory, it is considered a matter of policy, not terrorism. 
• If destruction of people or property is undertaken without justification, it is considered an 
ordinary common law crime, not terrorism. 
• If destruction of people or property is not aimed against an established government, but is 
aimed at private individuals or groups, it is considered an ordinary common law crime, 
not terrorism, even if such act is aimed at redressing a wrong, because disputes between 
private individuals should be settled through an established legal system operated by an 
established government, not by taking the law into one’s own hands.989 
Regardless of the above definitions and controversies over the term ‘terrorism’, nation-states are 
still calling for global gatherings to combat terrorism, or are concluding bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements on the subject. In the Saudi case, the Kingdom has concluded – besides those 
discussed above – bilateral and multilateral agreements on extradition and other related issues. It 
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5.7 Multilateral agreements 
5.7.1 The Arab League extradition agreement 
The Council of the Arab League approved this agreement on 14th September 1952 in its sixteenth 
regular session. It was signed by six states.990 The Agreement consists of 22 articles that included 
the following provisions. 
Extradition is obligatory if the person is wanted, convicted, or on trial for one of the crimes 
stated in the Agreement when the crime for which extradition is requested was committed on the 
soil of the state requesting extradition, or committed outside the requesting and requested 
countries.991 Also, extradition is obligatory if the crime for which extradition is requested is for a 
crime subject in the laws of the two states to punishment by imprisonment for one year or 
more.992 The Agreement increased the minimum punishment of crimes for which extradition is 
permissible to one year, unlike the bilateral agreements with the Gulf States, which had a 
minimum punishment of 6-months imprisonment. Moreover, this Agreement followed the 
condition of dual incrimination.  
With regard to the gravity of the crimes, the Agreement used a three-fold classification of 
misdemeanour, felony or violation. In spite of extensive discussion among the delegates on this 
point, the Saudi and Yemeni delegations registered their reservations about this article. They 
explained their position with the fact that the judicial systems in their countries do not follow 
such a system. In addition, in their criminal systems, the two countries include punishments of 
lashing and amputation that are more severe than imprisonment. To avoid disputes that might 
arise from this article, the Agreement stated that where there was no identical punishment for the 
crime in the requesting country, then extradition would not be obligatory unless the person 
wanted for extradition is a subject of the requesting country or a subject of another country 
applying the same punishment.993 This is regarded as a violation of the condition of dual 
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incrimination, and is also taken as proof that this Agreement takes into consideration the laws of 
the country requested to extradite, stipulating as it does that the crime committed must be 
punishable according to the laws of the requested country.  
This condition has always been seen as one of the hindering factors in the extradition of 
criminals for three reasons. Firstly, the crime could be one that could happen on the territory of 
the country requested to extradite because of its location or its own system. Secondly, the crime 
might be a dangerous one that has a direct connection with the country’s interest, but this might 
not be true for the country requested to extradite. Finally, the condition that the crime must be 
punishable in the country requested to extradite is a real constraint. For instance, if someone 
committed a crime in Saudi Arabia and fled to another country where the crime was not 
considered to be of the same level of seriousness, the Saudi authorities would find real 
difficulties in extraditing the suspect to face justice. 
The Agreement covered circumstances in which extradition would not be permissible. 
• If the person requested for extradition was already on trial for the same crime and found 
not guilty or had sentence passed, or was under investigation for the same crime. In this 
case, extradition is to be postponed until the end of the trial. The agreement approves 
temporary extradition to the requesting country on condition that it will return him after 
the trial but before serving the sentence.994 This is also the case in the bilateral 
agreements between Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. 
•  If the case is dropped, based on the rules of the requesting and requested countries, the 
rules of Islamic criminal legislations being applied in those countries.995 
• In cases of crimes of a political nature, the Agreement left the definition of a political 
crime to the country requested to extradite. This is taken to be one of the disadvantages of 
this Agreement, because it leaves the door open to include political crimes in the widest 
meaning.996 In the bilateral agreements between Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, 
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political crimes excluded aggression against Heads of State and their families, as well as 
murder or crimes of terrorism.997 
• The agreement incorporated the principle of the non-permissibility of the extradition of 
subjects, although a decision to extradite is open to the requested state. When extradition 
is refused, the requesting state should take responsibility for trial and could make use of 
the investigations carried out by the requesting state.998 
In the case of multiple requests for the extradition of the same person for the same crime from 
different countries, the Agreement stated that when the requested state received such multiple 
extradition requests, the priority was first the state most affected by the crime, then the state on 
whose territory the crime was committed, and then the state to which the suspect belongs.   
When the extradition requests are for different crimes by the same person, the highest priority is 
to be accorded to the state requesting extradition first.999 This agreement follows the same lines 
as the bilateral agreements between Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, in which the regional 
principle comes before the principle of the personality. That is, the crime is tried at the place of 
the crime and not the country of the criminal. This Agreement is more precise in dealing with 
multiplicity of extradition requests. In the bilateral agreements, this was left to the circumstances 
and events surrounding the crime. The language of the bilateral agreements gives determination 
of the priority to the state requested to extradite. 
It also decided on the principle of competence. According to this, the extradited person is only to 
stand trial for the crime he is extradited for, or that he commits after his arrest. Furthermore, the 
Agreement decided on the non-departure of the extradited for the territories of the requesting 
country within 30 days even if the chance is given to him to leave. In such a case, he would be 
eligible for trial for other crimes. This agreement contains only this exception, whereas the 
bilateral agreements added another exception to the principle of competence, for when the person 
extradited agreed to stand trial for other crimes. 
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The Agreement stipulated that extradition requests be made through diplomatic channels. The 
decision for each request is left to the relevant authority of the country requested to extradite, 
according to its rules.1000 This procedure is seen as disadvantageous because it causes loss of 
time and might give the suspect the chance to leave the country before the arrival of the 
extradition request. Experience has shown this to be true. Going directly through the authority 
responsible for extradition or through Interpol is more effective. Article 8 of the Agreement 
stated that the decision on the extradition request is the responsibility of the relevant authority, 
without naming that authority. Each country has the choice of which of the four extradition styles 
to follow, whether administrative, judicial, mixed administrative-judicial, or optional. Every 
country has its own style, and appoints specific authorities to decide on applications. Such 
differences in style often cause difficulties in the extradition process. They, too, may give the 
suspect the opportunity to flee the country.  
The Agreement stipulated that a number of key documents should be attached to the extradition 
request.1001 
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This Agreement did not include any general provisions to make its execution obligatory, and this 
is why it is rendered impotent in many cases that face its member states. This has pushed the 
member states to sign bilateral agreements or to withdraw.1002 Furthermore, this agreement did 
not touch on the issue of co-ordination of extradition requests between member states and the 
Arab Interpol. More recent agreements have overcome this disadvantage. A good example is the 
Riyadh Agreement on Judicial Co-operation (in section 5.7.2 following). Saudi Arabia is one of 
the signatory states and ratified it according to the rules and procedures of the Kingdom, which is 
obliged to adhere to its provisions. In many cases, Saudi Arabia has used Articles 2 and 3 from 
this Agreement as an official reference for extradition. Article 2 of the Agreement stated that 
extradition is obligatory if the person requested for extradition is under persuasion, suspected, or 
convicted of one of the crimes listed in Article 3 of the Agreement,1003 if the crime was 
committed on the territory of the requesting country. If the crime was committed outside the 
territories of the two countries, extradition is not obligatory unless the laws of the two countries 
punish for such a crime if committed outside their territories. Moreover, Article 3 of the 
Agreement states that for extradition the offence must be of a criminal nature or its punishment 
at least one year’s imprisonment or more severe punishment in the laws of both the requesting 
and requested countries, or the person requested for extradition has been sentenced for a 
minimum of two months imprisonment. If the crime is not punishable in the laws of the country 
requested to extradite, or the punishment for the crime in the country requesting the extradition 
has no equivalent in the requested country, extradition is not obligatory unless the suspect is a 
subject of the requesting country or another country that would give the same punishment.  
A practical example of the execution of this agreement is a case of an Egyptian national. The 
Egyptian government requested his extradition from the Saudis with the accusation of 
squandering his wife’s property. He was sentenced in his absence to 6 months. Egypt based its 
request on Articles 2 and 3 of the Arab League agreement on extradition. The Saudi government 
agreed to the extradition and executed it according to Article 9 of the agreement.1004 In another 
case, the Saudi government did not extradite a Saudi national to Egypt, accused of possessing 
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drugs. While Egypt based its request on Articles 2 and 3, the Saudi government based its 
rejection on Article 7.1005 In such a case, extradition is optional, and the Saudis retained the right 
to try him themselves, with the help of the investigations undertaken by the Egyptians.1006 
Another example of the use of Articles 2 and 3 is the case of an Egyptian citizen accused of 
breach of trust, and the Saudi authority requested his extradition according to Article 3.1007 There 
were four more cases in which there were extradition requests from both sides. For instance, 
Egypt requested the extradition of one of its nationals from the Saudi authorities for drugs-
related crime, sentenced to ten years in his absence. The Saudis agreed to this extradition.1008   
They also, agreed to the extradition of another Egyptian subject accused of possessing an 
unlicensed weapon, and who was sentenced to three years imprisonment in abstentia.1009 
But when Egypt requested the extradition of a Saudi Arabian national accused of possessing an 
unlicensed weapon and sentenced to two years imprisonment,1010 the Saudi authorities declined 
on the basis of Article 7.1011 
Despite the criticisms and observations directed at this Agreement above, it remains from the 
legal and drafting point of view one of the best Arab agreements available up to date. This is 
because it is widely used, and according to Article 4 of the Agreement is applicable to normal 
crimes as a basis and obliges extradition for four types of important crimes, such as terrorism.  
5.7.2 The Riyadh Arab agreement on judicial co-operation 
This agreement was signed in Riyadh on 4th April 1983 by 23 Arab States, including Saudi 
Arabia.1012 The Council of Arab Ministers of Justice adopted the draft bill of this agreement, 
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regarding it as a comprehensive bill for co-operation between Arab judicial organisations. 
Chapter 6 of this Agreement included provisions for the extradition of criminals and sentenced 
persons, from Articles 38 to 57.1013  
The Agreement took into consideration the provisions of the 1952 Arab League Agreement on 
the issue of the optional extradition by member states of their subjects.1014 This would include 
people committing a crime in the territories of any of the contracted states. In addition, the 
Agreement stipulated dual incrimination. The Agreement took into consideration the issue of 
specifying the nationality of the person requested for extradition and the date of committing the 
crime. In this respect, it is different from the 1952 Arab League Agreement.  
• The Agreement decided the following would be subject to obligatory extradition.1015 
Anyone facing an accusation of committing a crime not punishable in the laws of the 
country requested to extradite; or the punishment in the laws of the requesting country is 
not the same in the country requested to extradite; or if the wanted person is a subject of 
the requesting country or a subject of another country party to the agreement that awards 
the same punishment. 
• Any one facing an accusation of committing a crime punishable by locking-up for one year 
or more in the laws of both the requesting and requested parties. 
• Any one sentenced in his presence or absence from the courts of the requesting country for 
one year of imprisonment or more, according to the laws of the requested country. Note 
that the Agreement is very strict about the possible punishment of the person wanted for 
extradition, unlike the 1952 Arab League Agreement, which stipulated a sentence of two 
months imprisonment minimum. 
• Any one sentenced in presence or absence from the courts of the requesting country for a 
crime punishable in the laws of the requested country; alternatively, with a punishment that 
is not identical in its laws; alternatively, if he is a subject of the country requesting 
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extradition or a subject of another country party to the agreement permitting the same 
punishment.  
Extradition is not obligatory for all crimes.1016 The Agreement followed the 1952 Arab League 
Agreement in making political crimes non-obligatory, with exemption for the crimes listed by 
the Arab League and the bilateral agreements between Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. 
Moreover, the Agreement added crimes related to the disruption of military duties. This is seen 
as a new development. The Agreement also stipulated that extradition is not permitted if a final 
sentence is pronounced in the country requested to extradite.  
The Agreement dealt with the delivery of pardon for the crime in the country requesting 
extradition. Furthermore, the Agreement adopted the principle of the regionalism of the criminal 
text. It did not support extradition in the case of suits served or dropped by prescription, which 
should be dealt with in accordance with the laws of the requesting country. When a crime is 
committed outside the territories of the requesting country by a person who does not hold its 
nationality and the laws of the requesting country do not allow the person to be sued, in this case 
extradition is not permitted. 
On the issue of extradition applications, the Agreement followed the same procedures as the 
bilateral agreements between Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, by stipulating that extradition 
applications are to be submitted by the competent authority in the requesting country to its 
counterpart. The Agreement did not impose a specific system for submitting applications to the 
signatory parties, leaving this to the discretion of each country. In this respect, the Agreement is 
different from that of the Arab League, which chose diplomatic channels for communication. In 
addition, the Agreement made the attachment of information and details about the suspect 
obligatory for extradition.1017 Moreover, the Agreement gave the requested country the right to 
ask for more information about the suspect within a fixed period.1018 With regard to the 
procedures for holding a suspect, his temporary extradition or release, the same path as the Arab 
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League Agreement was followed. In addition, there is deduction of the precautionary locking up 
period from the punishment.1019  
For multiple extradition requests for one suspect, the Agreement took the principles of the Arab 
League and bilateral agreements. The only development is that this Agreement gives the 
requested country the right to decide how multiple extradition requests should be dealt with.1020 
The Agreement is more precise on the issue of the handing over of the tools used or connected 
with crime and uses the same language as in the Agreement between Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan.1021 The Agreement gave the right of deciding on an extradition request to the 
competent authorities in the country requested, according to its laws valid at the time of 
submission of the application. With a positive decision, the requested competent authority is to 
inform the requesting authority with its decision, and to fix the date and venue for finalising the 
extradition process. The release of the suspect is permissible after 30 days if the extradition did 
not take place after the date fixed for handing over, and his extradition for the same crime is not 
permissible except in unforeseen circumstances.1022  
This Agreement does not oblige the requested party to give reasons to the requesting party for 
declining a request. Nor does it fix any period for the release of the suspect in exceptional 
circumstances, and left this for agreement and decision by each party separately. Furthermore, 
the Agreement follows the rules of the Arab League and the bilateral agreements in giving the 
right of deciding on extradition requests for suspects held temporarily, or under trial for another 
crime, to the country requested to extradite. It is to inform the requesting party of its decision. 
Extradition can take place after the trial.1023 Moreover, the Agreement introduced a new article, 
one not included in the Arab League or the bilateral agreements with the Gulf States or Pakistan. 
This is the adaptation of flexibilities between the contracted countries about which crime under 
consideration should be tried first. This means the trial of the subject or directing an accusation 
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at him is not permitted unless the components of the crime with its new adaptation permit 
extradition.1024  
Dealing with the principle of competence, the Agreement took a position well known in 
international law. An extradited person cannot be put on trial, locked up, or be accused for a 
crime committed before extradition for a crime which is not related the crime which the person 
was extradited for. This also takes into consideration exceptions that are internationally 
recognised, such as the non-departure of the person to the country where he/she was extradited 
before 30 days, even if he had the opportunity or he chooses to return voluntarily to the country 
he was extradited from.1025 The Agreement also dealt with cases of re-extradition, stating that the 
country receiving the extradited person is not permitted to re-extradite him to a third country, 
with two exceptions.1026 One is when an extradited person is given the opportunity but does not 
leave the country within 30 days or return to it voluntarily. The other exception is with the 
consent of the extradited person on condition that the requesting country submits an application 
for re-extradition and that the documents submitted by the third country are attached to the 
extradition request.  
In the general provisions, the Agreement stipulated the rules governing the transit of the 
extradited person through the territories of the signatory parties.1027 It was decided that the 
consent of the signatory parties to the transit of extradited persons would be given upon a written 
request, supported with documents proving that a crime permitting extradition had been 
committed. Furthermore, the Agreement introduced an article without precedent, requesting the 
contracted parties to co-ordinate the procedures for extradition between themselves and the Arab 
Organisation for Social Defence against Crime (the Arab office of Interpol) through the relevant 
liaison department. The Agreement obliged the party requested to extradite to provide the Arab 
Office for Criminal Police with a copy of the extradition request.1028  
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One example of this Agreement in practice is the case of a Moroccan woman whose extradition 
was requested by the Saudi government with an accusation of corruption, organising prostitution, 
and money laundering. The request was based on Article 40. The extradition documents were 
arranged according to Article 42. Based on the same articles, Jordan requested the extradition of 
a Saudi subject accused of forgery and sentenced in his absence to 3 years imprisonment. The 
Saudis declined the request, basing their decision on Article 39 of the Agreement.1029 In another 
case, Saudi Arabia agreed to the extradition of one of its nationals upon a request from Syria, 
accused of a crime of killing. Here, Syria based its request on Article 40 of the Agreement.1030  
5.7.3 The security agreement between countries of the Co-operative Council of the Gulf 
States 
This Agreement was concluded on 29 November 1994 in the city of Riyadh, and signed by five 
of the Council members.1031 The Agreement was ratified by three states: Saudi Arabia,1032 the 
Sultanate of Oman, and the State of Bahrain. For constitutional reasons, the states of Qatar and 
the United Arab Emirates did not ratify it. Chapter 5 of the Agreement devoted Articles 27-40 to 
the rules of the extradition of criminals. These are identical in their rules and principles to those 
of the formal bilateral agreements between Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. The differences are 
in two articles. One allows the re-arrest of a suspect and the taking of extradition procedures 
against him. The second stipulates that its rules do not contradict or nullify the bilateral 
agreements signed between its parties.1033 
5.7.4 The Arab Agreement for Combating Terrorism  
On 22nd April 1998, during their joint meeting in the headquarters of the Arab League, the 
Ministers for Justice and the Interior of the majority of Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, 
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signed the first Arab agreement for combating terrorism.1034 The Agreement contained 41 
articles divided into 4 chapters, to cover definitions, the bases of co-operation to combat 
terrorism, mechanisms for executing the rules, and concluding rules.1035 The Agreement included 
several articles governing the extradition of criminals, including the crimes for which extradition 
would be allowed. According to the Agreement, the signatory countries are obliged to extradite 
criminals or those sentenced for terrorist crimes in accordance with the rules stipulated.1036 The 
Agreement defined terrorism, and terrorist crimes, by stating that terrorism is any act of using or 
threatening to use violence under any circumstances, in an individual or collective manner, 
aimed at terrorising people and putting their lives at risk or destroying public and private 
properties by occupying or taking them over. This is in addition to damaging the environment or 
putting national resources at risk.1037  
With regard to terrorism, the Agreement defined this as crimes committed for terror in any one 
of the signatory countries or against its subjects or interests and punishable under its national 
law.1038 The Agreement focuses on terrorist crimes taking place in the signatory countries and 
aims to provide a means of combating this menace. Moreover, the Agreement considered in its 
listing of terrorist crimes all similar crimes included in international agreements, with exceptions 
for crimes already in the national laws of the signatory countries, but did not include such 
activities as armed struggle against foreign occupation or the right of self-determination.1039  
The Agreement also stipulated the cases that do not permit extradition. First were political 
crimes, leaving the decision as to the nature of political crime to the country requested to 
extradite, based on its national laws. As in the 1952 Arab League and 1983 Riyadh agreements, 
this Agreement followed the pattern of exclusion by considering crimes of aggression against 
monarchs, heads of state, or their wives or families, and their ministers as political crimes, if 
committed for political reasons.1040 The same is true of the terrorist crimes listed in this 
                                                 
1034
 Decree of the Saudi Council of Ministers no. 135 dated 30 September 1998 (8/06/1419 AH) and Royal Decree 
no. M/66 dated 2 October 1998 (10/06/1419 AH). 
1035
 The full text of the Agreement for Combating Terrorism was published in the Daily Riyadh. Issue no. 10868 
dated 28 March 1998 (29/11/1418 AH). (Hereafter called the Agreement for Combating Terrorism). 
1036
 Ibid, Articles 5, 7, and 8,19,22,28. 
1037




 Ibid, Article 1 paragraph 3. 
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 237 
Agreement. Under the Agreement, exclusions from extradition for political crimes were further 
limited by permitting extradition for acts of violence against people enjoying international 
protection, i.e. the ambassadors and diplomats accredited to the contracted parties. The same 
applies also to cases of killing or armed robbery, sabotage of public utilities, manufacturing or 
possessing weapons, military crimes, crimes that happen in the territories of the state requested 
to extradite, and crimes for which a verdict has been proclaimed in the signatory country 
requested to extradite or a third signatory state.1041 Furthermore, the exclusions include cases in 
which punishment has been dropped or pardon announced,1042 crimes committed outside the 
territories of the requesting country by someone who is not its subject, and terrorist crimes 
committed by a subject of the country requested to extradite but whose national laws do not 
permit extradition.1043  
In dealing with extradition requests, the Agreement used the same principles as in the previous 
multilateral or bilateral agreements, by giving the country requested to extradite the right to 
delay extradition up to the end of trial or investigation of the suspect. Moreover, the Agreement 
permits temporary extradition from the requested country even if the suspect is under trial or 
investigation, on condition that the requesting country returns him.1044 This means the 
Agreement gives the right of temporary extradition to the discretion of the country requested to 
extradite. In dealing with the issue of adoption of specified crimes into the national laws of the 
contracted parties, the Agreement decided not to deal with these differences, stipulating that the 
crime committed is punishable in the two countries for a period of imprisonment of one year or 
more.1045 
For the handling of extradition applications, this Agreement is more flexible than that of the 
Arab League. It stipulates the use of the appropriate authorities or the Ministries of Justice or 
diplomatic channels for the exchange of the extradition documents.1046 The Agreement adds that 
a written application is needed and stipulates the necessary documents to attach to 
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application.1047 Moreover, the requested country is to notify the requesting country with its 
decision on the request.1048 The Agreement allows the requesting country to ask, in writing, the 
requested country to put the suspect requested under temporary arrest until it receives the formal 
extradition request,1049 the temporary arrest period not to exceed 30 days.1050 If the requested 
country needs more clarifications or documents, it has to inform the requesting country. In all 
circumstances, the temporary arrest period is not to exceed 60 days.1051 Equally, the Agreement 
permits the temporary release of a suspect during the precautionary arrest period on condition 
that the requested country takes all necessary measures to avoid the escape of the suspect from 
its territories.1052  
The Agreement gives the right of deciding, if there are multiple applications for extradition, to 
the requested country, provided it takes into consideration all circumstances, such as the date of 
arrival of applications, the degree of seriousness of the crime, and the place where it was 
committed. Moreover, the Agreement stipulates that when the requested country agrees to 
extradition, then it becomes its responsibility to collect and hand over to the requesting country 
all the tools and material evidence related to the crime. The said tools and materials to be handed 
over, even if the suspect dies or is killed while carrying out the terrorist attack.1053 This 
Agreement does not contain any articles on the principle of competency, the rules governing 
extradition costs, or the procedures for passing extradited people though the territories of the 
contracted countries. 
Within this culture and environment of multiple agreements, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has 
not hesitated to be part of international agreements concluded on crime and other alleged 
offences. Amongst these may be mentioned the Hague agreement on the illegal taking-over of 
aircraft,1054 the Montreal agreement on combating crimes against civil aviation safety 1971,1055 
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the United Nations Convention Against the Illegal Trade in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances,1056 as well as the Arab Declaration for Combating Illegal Activities against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation, signed in Baghdad.1057  
                                                                                                                                                             
held in The Hague on 16th. December 1970. The Agreement contained several articles on the extradition of 
criminals: 
• It adopted the universality of the criminal text by requiring of any of the signatory countries that anyone 
committing or suspected of committing the crime and living within its territories to arrest him or take the 
necessary arrangements to keep him under its control until the start of criminal or extradition procedures.  
• The Agreement adopted the principle of extradition and trial by obliging signatory countries to extradite a 
suspect living on its soil regardless of whether or not the crime was committed in its territories. If they do not 
extradite, they are obliged to put suspects on trial, in accordance with their national laws.  
• This Agreement took hijacking to be an extraditable crime. The signatory countries undertook to list it in any 
extradition agreements they may conclude in future. 
• The Hague Agreement is the legal basis for any extradition request for hijacking aircraft between any two 
countries that treated at a bilateral level. 
• For those countries that regard hijacking as an extraditable crime, the extradition procedure is subject to the 
laws of the requested countries. 
• Hijacking, for extradition purposes among the signatory parties, is taken as if it did not happen where it did, 
but in the countries having competency according to the Agreement. 
• All signatory parties are to inform the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organisation in the shortest 
possible time, with procedures taken in accordance with national laws towards the criminal, in particular 
extradition procedures. For more information refer to the following sources: Hague Agreement, Article 6 
paragraph 1, Article 7, Article 8, and Article 11. 
1055
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Decision of the Council of Ministers no 373 dated 6 June 1974 (15/05/1394 AH) and Royal Decree no. M/9 dated 
13 June 1974 (22/05/1394 AH). 
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11 February 1990 (15/07/1410 AH). 
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With reference to the practicalities of these agreements, especially those dealing with extradition, 
signed by Saudi Arabia, it is worth exploring the main extradition procedures followed in the 
Saudi Kingdom, and also, the key bodies responsible for extradition requests. 
5.8 Extradition procedures in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
5.8.1 The body responsible for extradition requests 1058 
The Ministry of the Interior is the body responsible for the procedures for requesting or 
extraditing criminals, as well as the signing of the official papers. These are undertaken 
according to Act 83 dated 13 February 1975 (1/2/1395 AH), which states that the Ministry of the 
Interior is responsible for finding suspects and criminals and requesting them from outside the 
Kingdom using official processes and procedures. The Extradition Requests Committee consists 
of three consultants from the Ministry1059 and carries out the investigation of requests for those 
who are wanted from abroad or for extradition, as well as dealing with the necessary documents. 
These activities are carried out according to the relevant regulations so that the Committee can 
fulfill the legal requirements agreed to in the extradition treaties. The regulations also guide them 
in deciding whether to accept or reject requests and whether additional documentation is needed. 
They also govern the procedures for arrest or investigation within the Ministry of the Interior and 
how to communicate with specific countries, by diplomatic means or Interpol. 
The procedure used in Saudi Arabia to request criminals from abroad or to extradite them is an 
administrative process. It was noted above that this process is easier than a judicial or mixed 
process, as it is possible for the Extradition Committee to simplify the process of extradition, to 
or from, according to the regulations of a particular treaty or agreement signed by the Kingdom. 
As for the organisation of the extradition bodies and the orders issued by the Ministry of the 
Interior, as well as written instructions, these are all considered to be internal procedures, which 
aim to achieve and implement what is in the extradition treaties. 
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 Instructions of the General Organisation of Law, General Law, Interior Ministry No. 3976 date 3 July 1993 
(13/01/1414 AH). 
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 Order of the Interior Minister, see n.877. 
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5.8.2 Documentation and information 
As noted in the discussions above of the various treaties and agreements described, these would 
require all documents, and information related to the extradition request. Generally these should 
contain the personal details of the wanted person, his description, photograph, the time and place 
of the crime, the rules concerning the punishment of the said crime as well as the arrest warrant 
or ruling of the court against him. All these must be certified and endorsed by the relevant 
authorities.  
Naturally, the organisational procedures in the Kingdom necessitate the fulfillment of all the 
appropriate documents, which must be related to the relevant treaty according to its particular 
requirements. Because it is important that all requests for extradition contain all the necessary 
documentation, a committee was established for specifying the necessary documents and 
information in order to facilitate the notification process for the search of wanted criminals in the 
Kingdom and their arrest. This committee also specifies suitable processes for obtaining these 
documents. The necessary documents and information are organised by two circulations.1060 
5.8.3 Procedures for handing over and bringing back criminals to the Kingdom 
It was noted above that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is very careful to support international co-
operation for the prevention of crime and pursuing escaped criminals. It also abides by the 
principle of handing over criminals requested by other countries in accordance with international 
treaties signed by itself and those countries, or just following the principle of similar treatment. 
Regarding this matter, the Committee of Extradition in the Interior Ministry has issued a number 
of procedures, which organise the handing over process of people wanted in other countries, as 
well as the organisation of the process for requests by the Kingdom for the extradition of people 
wanted from other countries. The procedures used are as follows.1061 
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 Instructions of the Extradition Committee, see n.1058. 
 242 
a. Procedures for handing criminals over 
 A country which asks for the handing over of a person who was sentenced or accused and is in 
the Kingdom must forward a request to the Foreign Minister through the appointed embassy or 
consulate of that country in the Kingdom. The request for extradition must be complete, contain 
all the required information, and accompanied by the necessary documents. Another option is to 
ask for the detention of the accused or criminal until the full file is completed and in this case the 
Under-Minister will refer the file to the Interior Ministry using official channels, where the case 
will be decided by representative of the responsible body, the Extradition Committee. The 
Extradition Committee, which, as noted above, consists of three consultants, carries out the 
consideration and organisation of the extradition file and makes sure that all necessary 
documents are included according to the internal regulation of the Kingdom and the country 
requesting the extradition. This Committee has full control over the process as well as the powers 
of investigating judges. For example, it has the right to take statements from the person 
requested, detain or release him on bail, and use the legal regulations for the process. The 
Extradition Committee examines the extradition file, checks the legal conditions, and completes 
the process, making sure that the evidence for the crime is included. The Committee can appoint 
an investigator to carry out the necessary investigation. That person will present to the 
Committee, after finalising the process, a complete file about the case which the Committee will 
study before giving its final decision regarding the extradition. The wanted person is asked to 
appear before the Committee or the appointed investigator and informed about the documents 
regarding the extradition.  
In the case of a request by a country to detain a person who is in the Kingdom but without a 
complete file, the Committee can detain the person until the arrival of the complete file. The 
country forwarding the request will be notified about the situation and the detainee will be 
released after two months from the start of detention if the complete file is not received. 
However if the country has a new request which states that the complete file will be sent 
immediately, the period of detention could be extended if the Extradition Committee is 
convinced with the reasons forwarded from the country requesting detention. The Extradition 
Committee can release the wanted person on bail, which will be until the arrival of the 
extradition file or the finalising of the extradition procedures. The Committee can continue 
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the examination of the extradition request after the arrival of the file of the released detainee. 
In the case of rejection of extradition by the Committee, the accused is released immediately 
if he was detained. However if the Committee decides to hand over the accused, this will 
need an order from the Interior Minister1062 with the permission of the high commission of 
legal affairs. This will need a promise from the requesting country to comply with the rule of 
extradition and the final decision of the Committee cannot be appealed against. If the accused 
chooses voluntary extradition, the Committee can accede to this, even if it does not receive a 
complete file, and this is permitted with the following conditions. 
o The wanted person has to agree to this in front of the Committee. 
o The voluntary choice has to be officially recorded and clearly states that 
the accused has voluntarily accepted the extradition. 
o The crime must be of a kind that allows extradition. 
If the Committee is satisfied that all the necessary requirements are fulfilled, it will get in touch 
with the country which requested the extradition and ask it to send somebody to receive the 
wanted person. 
Although the extradition treaties state that the costs of the process should be agreed between the 
parties, the Kingdom bears all the costs as a sign of its seriousness in fighting crime. It also sends 
a Saudi Policeman with the suspect to the country wanting that person. 
In the case of an arrest warrant issued by Interpol and that person has returned to the Kingdom, 
the person should be looked for and if found should be arrested. 
b. Procedures for bringing criminals back 
In the case of a suspected or sentenced person put on trial in the Kingdom who has escaped to 
another country, the following procedures are followed:1063 
• The request for extradition is sent through diplomatic channels. 
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• The extradition file is prepared before issuing the arrest warrant and it stays with the 
Extradition Committee, which can decide if it wants to send it to other bodies for 
finalisation. A spare copy must be retained for future use. In exceptional cases it is 
permissible to issue an arrest warrant before the preparation of the extradition file, if 
sound evidence is collected but minor documents are not yet available. For example, in 
the case of forgery, the forger can be detained for not more than 15 days until a forensic 
expert looks at the collected evidence. 
• If Interpol is notified about an arrest warrant for a person wanted by the Kingdom, the 
General Organisation of Law must also be notified within two days of the date of the 
arrest warrant, excluding weekends. The latter body must send the extradition file 
through diplomatic channels within 5 days after receiving the notification letter. 
• Interpol must be notified of extensions of the detention period according to the agreed 
treaties, if the file is not completed yet. 
• If the period of detention for serious cases is near the end, two representatives from the 
General Administration of Law and the Interpol Connection are appointed to follow the 
extradition with the Foreign Ministry and then the embassy of the particular country, 
which can then communicate with the foreign ministry of that country and also in 
connection with the different legal bodies of the requested country. This should be 
undertaken in connection with Interpol or the Arab police in the countries concerned. 
• The Extradition Committee and the Interpol Connection exchange photocopies of the 
procedures of both parties in order to complete the files of the wanted persons in both of 
these administrations. 
• The arrest warrant should include whenever possible a report about the criminal methods 
used. 
Finally, it may be judged that Saudi Arabia – from what has been said and explored – as fully 
committed to the application of the rules of Shari’a, despite the criticism and the existence of 
weaknesses. As discussed above, the Islamic criminal code does indeed govern the system for 
criminal law and punishment. Under the influence of the roles of the King and the Islamic 
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religious scholars and council, the legislative process proceeds to make a major contribution to 
judicial sources, the courts, judges, and ensuing fatwa.1064  
The Islamic Shari’a encourages the use of different rules that govern the extradition of criminals. 
What Islamic jurists have endorsed over the years does not contradict what has been approved by 
the international community with regard to the extradition of criminals. Just as the right of any 
sovereign country not to extradite its subjects is internationally recognised, the Shari’a does not 
permit the extradition of Muslim subjects to non-Islamic countries.  The same applies to the right 
of non-extradition of subjects of another Islamic country to a non-Islamic country, because 
according to the Shari’a they are regarded as its subjects.1065 One of the main principles in Islam 
is that there is no governance of non-Muslims over Muslims.1066 
The strong influence of the Hanabli doctrine over lifestyle and traditions in Saudi Arabia for 
more than 400 years can be felt very clearly, because it is the doctrine adopted by Mohammed 
ibn Abdel Wahb when he allied with the founder of the Saudi state Al imam Mohammed ibn 
Saud. Both of them contributed to the liberation of the Arab peninsula from a lack of ethical and 
religious values that led to a lack of security and stability.1067 Examining the Hanabli doctrine for 
this research on extradition, it can be concluded that both the Maliki and Hanabli are the most 
flexible Islamic doctrines with regard to the extradition of criminals. For example, in the case of 
an Islamic country requesting the extradition of a criminal who has fled to a non-Islamic country, 
the basis for such a request would be the existence of an agreement between the two countries by 
which the non-Islamic country is obliged to hand over the criminal. In the case of the non-
existence of such an agreement, custom would be used. Islamic jurists, depending on the Islamic 
doctrine they follow, disagree over the question of the impact of an agreement over the 
extradition of a Muslim criminal to a non-Islamic state. Whereas the Shafi School posit the 
existence of clan for the Muslim, to protect him in a non-Islamic country where no agreement 
exists, the Hanifi totally reject the extradition of criminal Muslims to non-Islamic countries, even 
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if an agreement exists between the two parties.1068 In contrast, the Malikia and Hanabli schools 
see this agreement as correct and must be honoured, because it does not contradict the Qur’an or 
Suna, citing the example of the Prophet Mohammed when he honoured the agreement of Al 
Houdiay.1069 
The majority of Islamic jurists agreed with the non-extradition of Muslim women in all cases, in 
accordance with the Qur’an.1070 This does not mean that women are protected from punishment. 
If proved guilty, they would stand trial and be punished. 
Moreover, the design and management of prisons should take into consideration the integrity of 
women and their non-exposure to men. This may not be possible in non-Islamic countries where 
a Muslim woman may not be allowed to wear the veil or pray five times a day in a clean place 
and have her own separate toilet. From the point of human rights, it is believed that it is her right 
to stand trial in her own country and remain close to her family. Other sovereign states, 
particularly non-Muslim countries, doubtless see this issue otherwise. 
Until now, there has been no internal procedure dealing with extradition in Saudi Arabia unlike 
in other countries. This has not stopped the authorities in the Kingdom from concluding several 
bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements covering the issue of extradition of criminals. 
Saudi Arabia may be regarded as a pioneer in this respect, as there is nothing that prevents it 
extraditing criminals in accordance with international courtesy or on a reciprocal basis.1071   
In spite of that fact that Saudi Arabia is also a party to several agreements covering the 
extradition of criminals, it also still has an urgent need for internal procedures to deal with the 
issue of the extradition of criminals in line with Islamic principles, and to keep up to date with 
international efforts to combat terrorism and violence. Such situations necessitate the creation of 
new security organs and mechanisms to deal with new developments. Among the steps to be 
taken is the creation of institutions that work on combating crimes. Saudi Arabia, however, is 
still lacking such expertise, and if not dealt with, the Kingdom might suffer setbacks in the near 
future and have negative consequences for its systems, and therefore, stability. This would 
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require an inter-injection of other countries’ systems, notably countries that do, to some degree, 
share some factors with the Kingdom but also international co-operation and exchange of 
experiences.  
Despite this relatively weakness, Saudi Arabia is still keeping sight of new developments, 
because of its regional leadership and economic weight in the Arab world, and its growing 
importance internationally, especially under the current credit crunch and global financial crisis. 
Considering the difficulties of concluding extradition agreements between the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and western countries, for religious or political reasons, the Kingdom has to be satisfied 
with memoranda of understanding with the western countries on a reciprocal basis. There is no 
justification for the non-existence of extradition agreements between Saudi Arabia and other 
Islamic countries, apart from Arab League states, because the Kingdom keeps very strong ties 
with Islamic countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe. Every year, Saudi Arabia receives millions of 
pilgrims from these countries. Inevitably among these numbers are some criminals, and the 
existence of extradition agreements would make it easier to pursue and arrest them. In this 
respect, the security agreements between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and Iran would represent 
good examples to be followed. 
However, under the current perceived global threat of rising terrorism, money laundering, 
organised crime, and drugs trafficking, a formal agreement of extradition between the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia and western powers is not only necessary, but vital and beneficial for both 
parties.  
Technically, as noted above, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia follows the administrative procedure 
for the extradition of criminals. No doubt every country has its own reasons for following either 
the administrative, judicial, or mixed procedure. For example, Egypt, Spain, and Portugal follow 
the administrative procedure, whereby the executive authorities have the major role in such 
systems in either submitting extradition requests to other countries or when receiving feedback 
from these countries. Because requests are submitted through diplomatic channels, they come 
under executive powers, which give the discretion to accept or decline extradition. This system is 
also known to be the easiest and more direct, for both the requesting and requested country. The 
administrative system that Saudi Arabia follows has some disadvantages, because it favours the 
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requesting country, so it does not take into consideration the safeguards that should be available 
for the subject requested for extradition, and does not differentiate between crimes for which 
extradition is requested, whether criminal or political. In addition, the administrative system for 
extradition comes at the cost of the personal freedom of the suspect requested for extradition by 
restricting his movements in a country whose rules he has not violated, and allows him to be 
handed over to another country without having the chance to defend himself.1072  
This is in contrast to the judicial system, which is followed by Britain, the U.S., and India, where 
the judicial authorities issue arrest warrants, taking into consideration the type of crime and the 
evidence presented.1073 Because of this, the interests of the suspect are secured and all the 
assurances for his personal freedom are there. However, the system also has its disadvantages 
because it places many obstacles before a requesting country and procedures may be long drawn-
out.1074 This contradicts the principle of competency, because it gives the judge of the requested 
country the right to look into the case, and that represents a clear violation of the competency of 
the judge in the requesting country.1075  In all cases, an integrated system is required to avoid the 
disadvantages of the two other systems. This is the mixed system (administrative and judicial) 
which is in use in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan. Such a system gives the judicial 
authorities the right to look into extradition requests, and give an opinion, which is a consultative 
one over the extradition request itself, not the suspect, with the final decision being for the 
executive authorities. By this means, the interests of both the suspect and the state are 
considered. 
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Chapter Six 
Comparative case study between the British and Saudi extradition systems 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, British and Saudi laws are compared and 
contrasted, in the light of the descriptions and analysis presented in earlier chapters. The focus 
will be on in what respect these two examples (Britain and Saudi Arabia) are similar and in what 
ways they differ. The sources of legislation are also discussed. The UN Model Treaty, also 
discussed previously, is used as a point of reference to see, for example, whether, either of the 
systems has been able to reform its extradition laws, to make them compatible with the Model 
Treaty. 
As for part two, the research analysis and findings are presented. It is also dedicated to 
exploration of the possibility of an extradition between Britain and Saudi Arabia, and whether 
they do provide both ability and will to conclude any formal form of extradition, or whether 
there are any serious hurdles in the way of concluding an extradition treaty between the two 
sovereign entities. Further, there is a discussion and attempt to answer the key questions asked in 
earlier chapters as well as an investigation into how the proposed treaty between the two 
countries could possibly lead to global co-operation, with the view to effectively containing, 
reducing, or totally suppressing international crimes, principally terrorism. 
6.2 A comparison of the Saudi and British extradition systems 
The most striking difference between the systems of Saudi Arabia and Britain has to do with the 
statutory provisions of either country on extradition. In Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law, there is a terse 
three-line provision relating to asylum and extradition which reads: “The State shall grant the 
right to political asylum when the public interest demands this. Statutes and international 
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agreements shall define the rules and procedures governing the extradition of common 
criminals.”1076 
As can be seen, the provision is rendered in very general terms. Statutes and international 
agreements, which may include treaties, conventions, memorandums of understanding, and 
agreements, are to determine the modalities of the extradition arrangements between the party 
countries. The point to be emphasised here, is that Saudi Basic Law (and therefore Shari’a, as 
the Basic Law is based on this) expressly allows the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral 
agreements with other countries. It does not make a distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim 
states for that matter. So, from this Article alone, a formal extradition agreement between Saudi 
Arabia and Britain would be possible, because there does not seem to be any restrictive 
stipulations as to which countries Saudi Arabia can enter into arrangements with. Another point 
to be noted is that the Basic Law does not specify for which crimes extradition is to be made. 
The term “common criminals” allows sufficient room for the state to make arbitrary decisions as 
to who is to be extradited. The Basic Law also does not prescribe a procedure for extradition 
proceedings. Here again, it leaves the government to adopt any procedures it deems appropriate.   
In sharp contrast to this generality, Britain has very elaborate statutory provisions on extradition. 
Extradition law has a long history in the country – the first statutes directly concerned with 
extradition were enacted in 1843. The latest extradition act (EA 2003) is discussed extensively in 
Chapter 3, but in contrast to the Saudi Basic Law consists of approximately 228 subsections and 
is divided into five Parts and four Schedules. It divides countries into Category 1 and Category 2 
territories, which comprise countries or territories by designation and outlines procedures for 
each category separately. 
Note that so far Saudi Arabia has entered bilateral and multilateral extradition treaties or security 
arrangements only with Arab or other Muslim countries. With non-Muslim countries it has 
special arrangements or memorandums of understanding, for example that with Britain,1077 
which govern extradition arrangements. Saudi Arabia has also been party to many international 
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conventions1078 yet it has not signed any treaty with a country outside the Muslim world. 
However, this situation does not prevent the Kingdom from signing a formal extradition treaty 
with a non-Muslim country, especially in the current world situation, in which a significant 
number of countries are sharing the same threat of global terrorism. Also, given the fact that 
there is nothing in Shari’a and Basic Law which expressly forbids Saudi Arabia from signing a 
bilateral or multilateral treaty with non-Muslim countries, it is interesting to ask why Saudi 
Arabia has not done so.  An answer to this question is explored below.  A closer look is now 
taken at the similarities and dissimilarities between the Saudi and British extradition systems. 
6.2.1 Similarities 
One of the similarities between Saudi Arabia and Britain, as far as their extradition systems are 
concerned, is the desire on the part of both countries to make the extradition system an effective 
tool in preventing and curbing crime at the international level, in particular controlling the 
increasing acts of terrorism in any of their forms and manifestations. This determination and 
commitment has gained added political impetus after the 11 September 2001 event and the 
consequent ‘war on terror’ phenomenon.  The incident was a significant reason for the United 
Kingdom’s Extradition Act of 2003.1079 For instance, the avowed goals of EA 2003 included 
consolidation and reinforcement of the legal framework in general (and the extradition system in 
particular), the introduction of the European Arrest Warrant, provision of a single-track appeal 
system, and aligning it with other EU countries.1080 This intent is demonstrated by Britain being 
party to many multinational conventions, and being signatory to many bilateral and multilateral 
extradition treaties and other arrangements.1081  
Likewise, Saudi Arabia’s determination and commitment to combat terrorism at the regional and 
international levels has been sufficiently demonstrated by deeds. For example, Saudi Arabia 
extended full co-operation to the allied forces in bringing an end to the Iraqi occupation of 
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Kuwait in the 1990s.1082 At a regional level, it has also shown its commitment to combating 
terrorism and extremism by participating in and signing the Accord of the Arab Convention on 
the Suppression of Terrorism,1083 held in April 1998.  It should therefore be noted that Saudi 
Arabia’s strenuous opposition to terrorism springs from the religious precepts it follows, which 
prohibit both violence and terrorism.1084 The word ‘Islam’ itself means ‘peace’.1085  One of the 
avowed goals of the Convention was “to promote mutual co-operation in the suppression of 
terrorist offences, which pose a threat to the security and stability of the Arab Nation and 
endanger its vital interests.”1086 The accord pressed the member states to adopt measures to make 
sure that their lands were not used “as a base for planning, organizing, executing, attempting or 
taking part in terrorist crime in any manner whatsoever”1087 and included commitments on part 
of the member states to “establish effective co-operation between the relevant agencies and the 
public in countering terrorism by, inter alia, establishing appropriate guarantees and incentives 
to encourage the reporting of terrorist acts, the provision of information to assist in their 
investigation, and co-operation in the arrest of perpetrators,”1088 and “extradite those indicated 
for or convicted of terrorist offences whose extradition is requested by any of these states in 
accordance with the rules and conditions stipulated in this convention.”1089 Article 1 defines 
terrorism as “any offence or attempted offence committed in furtherance of a terrorist objective 
in any of the Contracting States, or against their nationals, property or interests that is punishable 
by their domestic law.”1090 Additionally, terrorist offences are defined as including the Tokyo, 
Hague, and Montreal Conventions, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons, the International Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages, and the applicable provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas, “except 
where conventions have not been ratified by Contracting States or where offences have been 
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excluded by their legislation.”1091 These provisions are in line with the international extradition 
law which gives due importance to the local laws. Saudi Arabia is party to all these conventions 
except the last.  
The Convention also conforms to international law in its provision of standard exceptions. 
Article 6 specifies the exceptions and limitations on extradition with ‘exceptions to the 
exception’ specified for terrorist offences and any attacks on heads of state or their families, 
military offences, expiration of the statute of limitations, and double-criminality and extraditable 
offences in cases of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Convention also adheres to the international 
theory of the protective principle of jurisdiction.1092 The provision stipulates that extradition will 
not take place for an offence for which extradition has been sought which was committed in the 
territory of the requested contracting state “except where the offence has harmed the interests of 
the requesting State and its law provide for the prosecution and punishment for such offences 
and where the requested State has not initiated any investigation or prosecution.” 1093 
Another common ground between Saudi Arabia and Britain is their concern for human rights in 
the process of extradition. Both countries are committed to upholding human right standards by 
signing relevant conventions, which bind the member countries to observe human right standards 
in their legal and executive proceedings, and which also apply to extradition processes. As noted 
in Chapter 5, a hostile attitude to Saudi Arabia’s human rights record is largely promulgated by 
Western commentators. As noted, documentary materials relating to Saudi Arabia are lacking, 
and this issue is typical of that imbalance – commentary in support of Saudi Arabia’s position is 
in short supply. However, contrary to common perception in the West,1094 Islamic law guarantees 
human rights in all criminal procedures. As observed by Bassiouni, Islamic criminal justice 
procedures encompass a range of due process and human rights protection regardless of which 
category of crime is involved, “[including] the right to life, liberty and property; the right to 
petition for redress of wrongs and grievances; the requirement of a fair and impartial trial 
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without distinction of colour, creed, or origin are fundamental to them.”1095 Protection against 
unreasonable deprivation of any such right is subject to judicial scrutiny, and prompt legal 
determination is commanded. This is deemed essential not only as a human rights, but as a 
political right that is indispensable for “the maintenance of a scheme or ordered liberty and 
fundamental freedom.”1096  In fact, as Al Saleh notes, “Islamic jurisprudence is unique in 
guaranteeing the right of individual security…Islam guarantees five essential things to all 
persons and prevents unwarranted infringement of them by the State…1) religion, 2) life, 3) 
mind, 4) prosperity, and 5) property.”1097 He further divides human rights protections into four 
topics including these two: 
1. The presumption of innocence. That is, under Islamic jurisprudence people are 
presumed innocent until proved guilty. On this view, “the burden of proof rests 
with the accuser”1098 and “doubt is construed strictly against the accuser.”1099 
2. Rights during the investigation and primary questioning state. Three categories of 
guarantees are ensured to the accused during the investigative and primary 
questioning stage, namely: freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; 
determining the limits to which the investigator can go; extension of the right to 
remain silent; guarantees against having to take an oath or put up money or 
property; and prohibitions against torture or cruel and inhuman treatment and 
rights of the accused during preventive detentions. Similarly, rights are guaranteed 
to the accused during trial including protections related to the rules of evidence, the 
presumption of innocence, the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and the right to be tried before a fair and impartial court and right to counsel 
(albeit this latter is not without controversy).1100 
 
Like other stages of the criminal proceedings, rights are also guaranteed to the accused during 
imprisonment. Although there is a considerable disagreement among Islamic jurists as to the 
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lawfulness of imprisonment as a punishment, as well as about the scope of its use, as Al Saleh 
notes, “most jurists agree that regardless of the offence, no prisoner should be insulted, 
humiliated, beaten, tortured or chained (except to prevent flight).”1101  
Nonetheless, in practice, and as noted earlier,1102 Saudi Arabia is still perceived as doing very 
little in improving human rights. According to many human rights organisations and countries in 
the west, issues like the treatment of women, the treatment of foreign workers, the death penalty, 
torture and beating by the religious police, and the lack of free political speech, all remain 
obstacles, if not a deterrent, for those countries that might wish to approach the Kingdom for a 
formal treaty, or agreement on extradition.1103 
So, from this perspective, what was claimed, above, to be a similarity appears instead to be a real 
contrast between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Britain. However, in reality, the two entities, 
despite their different views, do share this noble principle, endorsing it and respecting it, 
although a number of weaknesses are still present. The United States Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor wrote in 2009 on this issue that:  
“the Basic Law prohibits torture, and Shari’a prohibits judges from accepting confessions 
obtained under duress. Nevertheless, during the year the non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) Amnesty International (AI) continued to report that authorities systematically 
subjected prisoners and detainees to torture and other physical abuse. Government 
contacts claimed privately that measures were taken to ensure that torture did not occur in 
the penal system, such as alleged Ministry of Interior (MOI) formal rules prohibiting 
torture. The government occasionally, withheld medical care from prisoners.”1104 
Similarly, the case of Mitchell, Walker, Sampson, and Jones shows the divergence between 
human rights as perceived in the West and their perceived practice in Saudi Arabia. The four 
men were arrested for alleged involvement in terrorist bombings in Riyadh and Khobar in 2000. 
Jones was released without charge after 67 days in prison. Mitchell and Sampson were 
                                                 
1101
 See Al-Saleh, n.1097, at 124. 
1102
 See Chapter 5, section 5.5. 
1103
 See, for example, reports from Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/en/middle-eastn-africa/saudi-arabia 
(accessed 12 March 2010).  
1104
 U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, see n.897.  
 256 
condemned to death, and Walker was given a sentence of 18 years in prison. The four men 
alleged they were tortured while imprisoned. Having been released as an act of clemency, they 
attempted to sue the government of Saudi Arabia for torture, assault and battery, trespass to the 
person, and unlawful imprisonment.1105 Lord Bingham said that: 
“that the issue at the heart of the case was the relationship between two principles of 
international law. One was that a sovereign state will not assert its judicial authority over 
another. The second, and more recent, principle was one that condemned and 
criminalised the official practice of torture, required states to suppress the practice and 
provided for the trial and punishment of officials found guilty of it.”1106  
Reconciling conflicting international law obligations like that between torture and sovereignty in 
Jones v. Saudi Arabia, is at the heart of extradition analysis within the context of international 
human rights obligations. After the initial High Court hearing followed by a hearing by the Court 
of Appeal, there was an appeal to the House of Lords, the judgment was that sovereignty over 
jurisdiction was the stronger force in international law, despite abhorrence in the U.K. at the use 
of torture.  
There seems to be a presumption in the West that Islamic countries with similar competing 
international obligations do not treat those obligations seriously, especially when it comes to 
human rights. However, contrary to many Western misconceptions, the protection of human 
rights is a familiar concept within Islam.  
Islam granted human rights fourteen hundred years ago, which are being emphasised now in the 
principles of international law and extradition practices and procedures. Included among these 
inalienable rights are the rights to life, the right to freedom, the right to equality and prohibition 
against impermissible discrimination, the right to fair trial, the right to protection against abuse 
of power, the right to protection against torture, the right to asylum, the right to freedom of 
belief, thought, and speech, the right to freedom of religion, the right to free association, the right 
to protection of property, the right to social security, the right to education, and the rights of 
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privacy.1107 Being an Islamic country, these human rights are guaranteed in the Saudi Basic Law. 
There may be weaknesses in practice, but this law grants rights to individuals accused of crimes. 
For example, Article 26 declares that “the state protects human rights in accordance with the 
Islamic Shari’a.”1108 Article 36 states that “no one shall be arrested, imprisoned or have their 
actions restricted except in cases specified by statutes,”1109 while Article 37 pledges that “the 
home is sacrosanct and shall not be entered without the permission of the owner or be searched 
except in cases specified by statutes.”1110 Likewise, Article 38 promises that “penalties shall be 
personal and there shall be no crime or penalty except in accordance with the Shari’a or 
organizational law. There shall be no punishment except for acts committed subsequent to the 
coming into force of the organisational law.”1111 The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human 
Rights, issued by the Islamic Council on September 19, 1981 also affirms these “inviolable and 
inalienable human rights that the [Council] consider are enjoined by Islam.”1112 
Whereas the Saudi Basic Law “does not provide the accused with the right to legal 
representation,”1113 imparting the right to be heard in the justice system has compensated for this 
lack.1114 For instance, Articles 43 states that “the King’s court and that of the Crown Prince shall 
be open to all citizens and to anyone who has a complaint or a plea against an injustice.  Every 
individual shall have a right to address the public authorities in all matters affecting him.”1115 
Similarly Article 47 provides that “the right to litigation is guaranteed to citizens and residents of 
the Kingdom on an equal basis.”1116  
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The emphasis on human rights stems from Islam’s emphasis on the importance of individual 
dignity, which is regarded as supreme. Bassiouni observes that “in Islam the dignity of man is 
foremost for this is the prize creation of Allah; equality and justice are therefore a natural 
corollary.”1117 Weeramantry confirms this, saying that “individual dignity ranks high in Islamic 
law and the concept of human rights fits naturally within this framework. The Qur’an warns 
repeatedly against persecution, denounces aggression, warns against violations of human dignity 
and reminds believers of the need to observe justice in all their dealings…Since this elevated 
position of the individual is preordained and eternal, human freedom cannot be transitory or 
dependent upon a rule. It inheres in the human condition and is immutable…”1118  
It is also noteworthy that the injunctions of Islam are also in consonance with the international 
law framework. As Bassiouni observes that “nothing in Islamic international law precludes the 
applicability of [the] international obligations [accepted by signing and adhering to the UN 
Charter by all Muslims and Islamic States] to the domestic legal system of an Islamic state 
provided these obligations are not contrary to the Shari’a.”1119 Saudi Arabia, by being a member 
of the UN, fully subscribes to the human rights conferred under the UN Human Rights 
Convention. Nonetheless, it is important to note that it is only in perception rather than 
implementation of these rights that Saudi Arabia differs from other legal systems. Bassiouni 
observes that many Muslim states have in fact adopted a Western model, with modifications in 
procedure to the application of human rights and individual rights.1120 Saudi Arabia, which 
rigidly adheres to traditional Islamic law in the application of the recognition of human rights 
under the Shari’a, drastically differs from the Western model. Nonetheless, the Islamic law 
scholar, Ali Ahmad argues “Islamic states can reconcile the Islamic view of international law 
with the Western-dominated view of international embodied in the United Nations Charter.”1121 
Likewise, Britain is also committed to observing human rights standards by virtue of being a 
signatory to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which provides the basis for international 
humanitarian law formulations, considered to be a branch of human-rights law by some writers. 
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These Conventions are geared towards providing “humanitarian protection to war victims, in 
particular prisoners-of-war, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and civilians.”1122 The ‘grave 
breaches’ provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 bind the member states to a mandatory 
‘try-or-extradite’ principle for specified serious violations.1123 This regime has been incorporated 
into English law through the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 as amended by the Geneva 
Conventions (Amended) Act 1995. 
Britain’s ratification of the convention on human rights placed it under obligation to observe its 
provisions. In English law, these instruments have been used ‘as an aid’ to construct and inform 
the exercise of judicial discretion and to establish the scope of the common law1124 wherever 
there was ambiguity, even before the advent of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
Further, Britain is also a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights. By ratification 
of the Convention, Britain is bound to enact its provisions. With the enactment of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998), Britain has incorporated, to a large degree, the provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law. The adoption of the law is seen as the 
“most significant development in English human-rights law.”1125  
The European Court of Human Rights was established to adjudicate human rights disputes. The 
functions of the court included hearing human rights violation cases referred to it by the member 
states.  As noted earlier in this study,1126 the HRA 1998 provides that a court, when considering 
an issue involving ECHR rights, must allow for the following, whenever made or given, if they 
appear to be relevant to the case under consideration: any judgment, decision, declaration or 
advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights; any opinion of the Commission given 
in a report adopted under Article 31 of the Convention; any decision of the Commission in 
connection with Articles 26 or 27 (2) of the Convention; or any decision of the Committee of 
Ministers taken under Article 46 of the Convention. These decisions are only of a persuasive 
character, and are not a binding authority.  
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From the facts described above, it can be noted that both Saudi Arabia and Britain are upholders 
and exponents of human rights standards and are also concerned to implement them in their 
respective countries. Their roles in observing them are of great significance, in view of their 
standing, both in the world generally and at a regional level. For example, while the kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia – being at the centre of Islam – is something of a role model for the rest of the 
Islamic world particularly, in the Middle East (due to its political and economic weight), Britain, 
similarly, is seen as a major power, and an important member of the European Union with a 
persuasive role. 
The two countries are also linked through the International Criminal Police Organisation, 
commonly referred to as Interpol. By becoming a member of this organisation, the two countries 
are obliged to abide by the rules. This commitment and engagement indicates a full willingness 
on their respective parts to co-operate and collaborate in efforts with the international community 
in curtailing, or preventing if possible, international crime. Both countries are also fully aware of 
the modern challenges posed by the ease and mobility of communication and transport. From 
this angle, it can be asserted that this is more supporting evidence that the two countries could 
enter into a formal agreement on extradition (that would exceed the current simple Memorandum 
of Understand1127). As both sovereign states therefore possess the ability to interact on subjects, 
such as the shared threat of terrorism, there will be no obstacles for them to formally, conclude 
an agreement on this subject matter. 
Saudi Arabia takes the terrorism threat very seriously, and is prepared to go to great lengths, 
whether by extending co-operation in terms of the exchange of information or by taking practical 
steps permitted within the broader scope of Shari’a. The phenomenon of terrorism is particularly 
in conflict with Islamic teachings1128 and is diametrically opposed to the chief goal of Islamic 
philosophy, which is, establishing peace and harmony not just at the state level but also 
internationally.1129 For instance, after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., Saudi Arabia was quick to 
support the United States and its sponsorship of anti-terrorist resolutions in the United Nations. 
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Speaking in the UN General Assembly on October 2, 2001, Saudi Ambassador Fawzi A. 
Shobakshi spoke of the position of Saudi Arabia on the situation by declaring that: 
“Saudi Arabia, its monarch, its government and its people have condemned those 
criminal acts which result in the great losses of human life and tremendous 
destruction and damage to property…H.R.H. Prince Abdullah expressed the full co-
operation of Saudi Arabia with the American Government in all its efforts to uncover 
the identities of the perpetrators of these criminal acts and bringing them to 
justice.”1130 
The speech established beyond any shadow of doubt Saudi Arabia’s strenuous commitment to 
eradicate terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Yet there is a perception in Western 
countries that all terrorist activities carried out anywhere in the world have the approval and 
backing of Islamic countries, particularly Saudi Arabia as the spiritual centre for Muslims 
worldwide. This perception was implicit in the 900-page inquiry report into the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11 by the Congressional Joint Inquiry Commission.1131 The Commission’s decision to 
censor 28 pages of the report excited media speculation about the linkages between the attacks 
and the Saudi Arabian Government. Protesting at baseless and unfounded speculation, Saudi 
Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal released a statement expressing Saudi Arabia’s position 
on the matter by stressing that: 
“it is an outrage to any sense of fairness that 28 black pages are now considered 
substantial evidence to proclaim the guilt of a country that has been a true friend and 
partner to the United States for over 60 years. Saudi Arabia has been wrongfully and 
morbidly accused of complicity in the tragic terrorist attacks…This accusation is based 
on misguided speculation and is born of poorly disguised malicious intent…The report 
seems to have overlooked or intentionally ignored Saudi Arabia’s continuing efforts to 
fight terrorism. [Saudi Arabia and the U.S.] are both victims of terror and partners in the 
war against it, making it incumbent upon [both the countries] to work together effectively 
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in an environment of trust and mutual confidence if [both the countries] are to prevail in 
this war [against terrorism].”1132 
Contrary to popular perception in the West that Islam perhaps patronises or abets terrorism, 
Islam is entirely and totally against any form of violence which results in great losses of human 
life and tremendous destruction and damage to property. If terrorist attacks are occurring, the 
motive for these definitely lies elsewhere and it is in vain to associate it with Islam, since it 
preaches peace and harmony and wishes to see the world where tolerance, peace and harmony 
prevail.  
6.2.2 Differences 
Despite the similarities in the extradition systems of the two countries discussed above, the two 
differ from each other in a number of respects. This starts quite clearly from the fact noted 
above, that Saudi extradition provisions as laid down in the Basic Law are very broad and leave a 
lot to the discretion of its government to be mutually determined between the contracting states, 
while the British extradition system is very detailed and elaborate. The ‘weakness’ of Saudi 
flexibility in fact can be a positive virtue for dealing with crimes like terrorism. The difference 
also stems from the traditions of the two countries. Britain has a long tradition of extradition, 
which has matured through a process extending over centuries. The differences range from 
questions of sovereignty to the legal basis and procedures for executing an extradition process. In 
what follows, the nature and extent of the principal differences between the two systems are 
examined.   
a. The different concepts of sovereignty 
The first and foremost difference between Islamic law and Western philosophy relates to the 
concept of sovereignty. In the 17th century, the word ‘sovereign’ itself was equivalent to ‘king,’ 
and referred to monarchies which were believed to have been invested with ’divine rights’ and 
wielded supreme authority over the state or kingdom, “a high view of monarchy resting on 
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biblical texts which associate kings closely with God through their anointing.”1133 In Western 
jurisprudence, various sovereignty theories have been advanced which enunciate doctrines of 
absolute sovereignty, as argued by Hobbes,1134 or some form of limited sovereignty, as advanced 
by Locke.1135 The modern so-called positivist school of legal philosophers has “formulated 
doctrines of sovereignty based upon the concept that no source of authority stands higher than 
the sovereignty of a state, within the limits of sovereign’s dominions.”1136 Bassiouni explains 
that “Western political thought imparts the precept that sovereignty is in the ‘people’ and is 
absolute. The conduct of affairs of state by its own people is original, unbridled, absolute, un-
derived, independent, permanent and exclusive, even when self-imposed limitations are included 
in certain constitutions to indicate the need for a higher order of legality.”1137  
In sharp contrast to the Western view of sovereignty, “the Islamic construction of sovereignty 
begins with the doctrine that sovereignty belongs to God alone.”1138 A ruler’s or a state’s 
sovereignty is that of a trusteeship or a vice-regency.1139  This means that the ruler or state 
authorities are merely representing Him and carry out His commands. The ruler of a state in this 
sense has a limited sovereignty, which is an implementational role. Of course, this concept of 
sovereignty and vice-regency has been revealed through the words of God, the Qur’an. This 
means that the heads of an Islamic state exercise their invested powers well within the 
boundaries of the Shari’a and they are not ‘authorised’ to enforce any rules which conflicts with 
the basic precepts of the Shari’a or the Sunnah. Weeramantry notes that while “there have been 
tyrants and despots in Islamic history…whatever their abuses of power, not one of them could 
controvert the central proposition that sovereignty belonged to God alone and that the law ‘never 
conceded to any human being any greater right than that of enforcing His law and protecting and 
leading His people.’”1140  Bassiouni explains the concept by saying that “Islamic polity is a 
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‘theo-democracy’. It is, therefore, distinguishable from the democracy in which constitutional 
principles place sovereignty in the people.”1141  
The difference then, essentially, is the extent of sovereignty invested in people. While in a non-
Muslim democracy like Britain the unbridled, absolute, permanent and exclusive sovereignty lies 
with ‘people’, in an Islamic country, Islamic law reigns supreme and ‘people’ can only function 
within the rights conceded to them by the Shari’a, revealed through the Qur’an and the Sunnah.  
Talking in relative terms, Britain is free to enact new extradition statutes to meet modern 
challenges and subject to the approval of the people through Parliament. This is possible through 
the supremacy of Parliament.1142 Further the State interest is the guiding principle in formulating 
rules from time to time and a statute relevant today may be obsolete and hence can be discarded 
tomorrow, through the means by which it was made. In contrast, Saudi Arabia, being an Islamic 
country, has to obey certain divine precepts and can never overstep the boundaries drawn by the 
Shari’a.    
b. The legal bases 
Another difference between the two extradition systems is the very foundations underlying 
extradition practices and procedures. As discussed earlier,1143 in the earlier phases of extradition 
history, the authority to ‘deliver up’ (the older term for extradition) the criminal to the requesting 
state rested purely with the King. In this sense, extradition law had an exclusively administrative 
character. This practice continued up to the latter half of the nineteenth century when ‘delivering 
up’ a fugitive criminal without a legal backing was deemed to be unlawful.1144 In 1870, the 
treaties governing extradition were given legal effect through an enactment, after which 
processes and procedures would be governed through statutory provisions, which means every 
extradition request has to be routed through a specified and prescribed channel.1145 Similarly, 
extradition proceedings would be conducted under the procedures laid down in the relevant act. 
The right of appeal of habeas corpus was also granted under which the accused could lodge an 
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appeal to the High Court or House of Lords. It was meant to give the person under trial a fair 
chance to defend himself.1146 The statutory provisions, as the history of extradition acts indicates 
by the subsequent Acts of 1989 and 2003, are a dynamic and responsive instrument, subject to 
change from time to time.  
By contrast, as discussed in Chapter 5,1147 Saudi Arabia does not have a separate constitution in 
the traditional sense of most other nations. Saudi Arabia is governed by the Basic Law of 
Government, established in 1982 and revised in 1992.1148 This “addresses a number of legal 
issues, but it is not a constitution.”1149 The Saudi Basic Law declares that “the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as its religion; Gods Book and the Sunnah of 
His Prophet, God’s prayers and peace be upon him, are its constitution…”1150 Thus, Saudi 
Arabia is ruled not by a constitution, but by the Islamic Shari’a. Vogel contrasts Islamic Shari’a 
with Western-style rule of law as set forth in codes, statues and regulations by stating the 
primary difference between the two. He notes that “[Shari’a] is properly the ideal divine law 
which encompasses all human ideals and goods, both for this world and the next, both social and 
individual. But in practical context, it may refer to either the Qur’an or Sunnah, the two 
revelations from which Shari’a is known; or to the classical law found in the books of medieval 
scholars and their modern successors called the fiqh…”1151 He further notes that all man-made 
laws (nidhams), stipulated through the Basic Law and through other Royal Decrees, are 
subordinate to the Shari’a as the “rule in Saudi Arabia draws its authority from the Book of God 
Most High and the Sunnah of His Prophet. They are sovereign over all regulations of the 
state.”1152  The method of making law has been laid down in Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law, which 
states that “all the governmental authority and laws of Saudi Arabia derive from the Holy Qur’an 
and the Prophet’s tradition.”1153 From this view, the criminal justice of Saudi Arabia is “derived 
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entirely from Islamic Law.”1154 In other words, Islamic rules have supremacy over the man-made 
laws.  
Where the rule of Shari’a is not clear, the King and the Council of Senior Scholars, appointed by 
the King, will interpret the constitutional rules implicit in the Shari’a. The Basic Law establishes 
a hierarchical legal administrative structure encompassing a Higher Council of Justice, a tribunal 
of complaints, an investigative body, a prosecutor-general, and a system of courts.1155  
Saudi Arabia has no specific laws (statutes) pertaining to extradition.  The Basic Law addresses 
both asylum and extradition - albeit rather generally - stipulating that “the state shall grant the 
right to political asylum when the public interest demands this. Statutes and international 
agreements shall define the rules and procedures governing the extradition of common 
criminals.”1156 The important point to note in this regard, however, is that “there is nothing in 
Saudi Arabia’s Basic Laws or within the principles of Islamic Law which would forbid the 
extradition of nationals.”1157  
There are a number of other articles in the Basic Law which have implications for international 
extradition practice. As discussed in Chapter 5, there are injunctions in the Qur’an which refer to 
how to deal with enemies and refugees. However, there are none which directly forbid Muslims 
from entering into extradition arrangements with ‘enemies’. This flexibility has been codified in 
Article 70 of the Basic Law, which stipulates that “international treaties, agreements, regulations, 
and concessions are approved and amended by Royal decree.”1158 This provides the government 
“with considerable discretion in extradition arrangements.”1159 
The differences in the legal basis of the extradition practice outlined above, has “important 
implications in terms of comity, double criminality, extraditable offences, the principle of non-
inquiry, the principle of specialty, and recent trends in international extradition practice related to 
human rights.”1160 As seen in Chapter 3 (section 3.1), Britain belongs to the category of countries 
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that follow common law. In terms of extradition practice, this means that Britain has transparent 
and objective procedures which are open to contest and can be challenged. Every step of the 
proceeding is laid down in the relevant act and the accused has the right to appeal against the 
decision at a higher level in the hierarchy. In sharp contrast, the latter, because of the absence of 
statutes governing extradition processes has a system where extradition practices and procedures 
are quite opaque1161 and thus contain no requirements of comity, double criminality, and the 
other aspects listed above. In this sense, virtually any mutually binding requirements and 
conditions can be determined through bilateral and multilateral treaties or arrangements. As 
extradition requests and responses are traditionally handled through confidential diplomatic 
channels, “the Saudi extradition procedures are also rendered less easily decipherable.”1162 This 
is borne out by the reliance on comity as a basis for extradition and the fact that “Saudi Arabia is 
party to relatively few bilateral extradition treaties.”1163 Saudi Arabia is a party to a number of 
multilateral conventions that include extradition provisions rendered in general terms. This 
provides the country with “considerable discretion on extradition practices.”1164 This also means 
that the conditions such as double criminality, extraditable offences, and the principle of 
specialty, which are strict requirements in Britain extradition law, are not binding on Saudi 
Arabia.  
The facts divide the two countries in a significant way. Britain having an elaborate and 
transparent extradition statutory provision is bound to follow a strict regime, whereas Saudi 
Arabia has a free hand in taking discretionary measures to facilitate extradition. This may partly 
account for the delay in the process (some cases might take as long as five years) or relatively 
larger number of refusals in the extradition process in Britain. Appeal is allowed in Britain for 
human rights concerns, human rights standards in the requesting state, and other concerns such 
as torture or fear of torture, or the death penalty, and international laws can be invoked in 
defence against extradition.  
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c. Types of extradition systems: Process for Requesting Extradition 
Another difference related to statutory provisions and procedures is the types of extradition 
system the two countries adhere to which then affects the process for requesting the extradition 
of an alleged fugitive. A comparison of the two systems reveals that the Saudi extradition 
procedures, specifically the request for extradition, due to its administrative system, is more 
susceptible to political influence and perhaps violations of due process. Though there are 
criterions that the Extradition Committee considers, the process lacks transparency and the 
assurance that the process is fair. The U.K. system, on the other hand, requires a warrant in some 
instances and has transitioned into a judicial system of extradition, providing more due process 
rights for the alleged fugitive. Nevertheless, EA 2003 has also done away with some 
requirements like the arrest warrant, especially under the EAW regime. In regards to the arrest 
warrant requirement, both systems seem to favour efficiency over the protection of due process 
rights, which may be cumbersome in the context of extradition, though necessary. Overall, the 
Saudi system provides less protection to the alleged fugitive though the process is faster, and the 
U.K. system provides more protection to the alleged fugitive, especially with the warrant 
requirement and the hearing, though the process may seem more cumbersome. The U.K. has 
tried to balance the need for a faster extradition system by waiving some requirements. Saudi 
Arabia, however, continues to follow its administrative system.   
Under the Saudi Arabia administrative system, extradition requests are received through 
diplomatic channels and processed by the Ministry of Justice. Although a judicial opinion is 
occasionally sought on an issue, it is mainly an administrative decision whether to hand over an 
accused or convicted fugitive to the requesting state. The role of the judiciary in the process is 
purely recommendatory and is not binding on the administration. Political considerations and 
relations with the requesting state drive extradition decisions under this system. For instance, it is 
possible that a state might agree to extradite a required person in order to avoiding souring 
relations. The opposite may also be true. A state might not, for example, be willing to return a 
wanted person because it does not enjoy good relations with the requesting state. Other 
considerations might also come into play under the administrative system. A state might decide 
not to return a person accused of political offences because of the fear that the revolutionary or 
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political dissident may come into power at some future point, which might have a negative 
influence on the political relations between the two countries should that happen. 
Foreign policies are said to bear upon a state’s extradition practice profoundly, particularly in 
situations where the state has considerable discretion in extradition decisions. Saudi Arabia is not 
a party to any extradition treaties with North or Latin American or European countries, although 
it has formal extradition agreements with many countries in its region. Yet Saudi Arabia is a 
party to a number of international treaties on mutual co-operation that could theoretically serve 
as the basis for extradition with developed world countries who are also a party to these 
conventions. Thus, extradition between Saudi Arabia and most of the developed world occurs 
only outside the framework of formal extradition agreements. In this context, “Saudi Arabia’s 
basic foreign policy positions are therefore germane to Saudi extradition practice and 
procedure.”1165 For example, it has a “special relationship” with the U.S.1166   
Another weakness of the administrative system of extradition is its denial to the accused of a fair 
trial and the failure to provide the accused with a chance to defend himself. This disallowance of 
the right to be tried in a free and fair manner runs counter to the human right standards which 
have been the main concern of international law and human rights activists.  
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., a number of wanted persons, who were alleged to be 
involved in conceiving, planning or executing attacks, were handed over to the Americans. 
Pakistan captured many terrorists who were thought to be involved in the attack in some way, or 
were connected with Al-Qaeda, and handed them over to the U.S. without any trial.1167   
By contrast, Britain, which started off with the administrative type of extradition practice, has 
gradually shifted to a complete judicial system of extradition, via the administrative-judicial 
path. As discussed in Chapter 4 and suggested in the preceding paragraphs, the extradition 
process has go through the steps prescribed as laid down in the Extradition Act of 2003. The Act 
has been designed to converge, as far as possible, with principles of international law and human 
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rights standards as prescribed by the UN Charter and provisions of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Britain is notorious for its delayed extradition process and lower success rate, but 
this is not a high price for providing the accused with a fair trial.1168 The major reasons for the 
delay and requests becoming unsuccessful may be partly attributable to the right of appeal given 
to the accused in the High Court and House of Lords. Occasionally, the process takes such a long 
time that by the time the proceedings come to completion, the accused may invoke human rights, 
such as the right to family and the right to life.1169  
Another contrast in extradition practices and procedures between the two countries is the method 
of modifying the extradition rules. As noted above, any modification in the Extradition Act of 
Britain has to be routed through Parliament, while in Saudi Arabia the modification can be 
effected through Royal Decree.  
d. State organs involved in the extradition process 
Being adherents of two different types of extradition mechanism, administrative and judicial, it is 
quite predictable that the state organs and functionaries involved in the extradition processes in 
the two countries are different. This prediction is borne out by the fact that in Saudi Arabia, the 
Ministry of the Interior is the body responsible for the procedures for requesting or extraditing 
criminals, as well as the signing of the official papers. Act 83 of the Council of Ministers 
stipulates that the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for finding suspects and criminals and 
requesting them from outside the Kingdom using official processes and procedures, with a 
committee dedicated to dealing with extradition requests. This consists of three consultants from 
the Ministry1170 and carries out investigation of requests for those who are wanted from abroad 
or for extradition, as well as dealing with the necessary documentation. It decides whether to 
accept or reject requests in the light of existing statutes and regulations and if additional 
documentation is needed. The committee also ascertains whether the procedures for arrest or 
investigation within the Ministry of the Interior are being adhered to within the provisions of the 
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treaties and agreements, and communicates with relevant countries by diplomatic means or 
through Interpol.1171 
In contrast, Britain has a hierarchy in its judicial system. The main state organs involved are the 
Secretary of State, the judges, the High Courts and the House of Lords. The Secretary of State is 
lynchpin in the whole process. Prior to EA 2003, the Secretary of State enjoyed many powers. 
He was responsible for initiating the extradition process and could terminate it whenever he 
deemed it appropriate. Under EA 2003, however, his powers were somewhat curtailed, but he 
still holds a key position in the whole process.1172 First, he is empowered to designate a territory 
as being either Category 1 or 2. He is responsible for issuing a certificate if he receives a valid 
request for extradition. For Category 1 territories, the Secretary of State is responsible for issuing 
a certificate to the effect that the arrest warrant has been issued by the authority designated by 
him. He may also designate more than one authority or designate different authorities for 
different parts of the United Kingdom. As regards Category 2 territories, he issues a certificate if 
he receives a valid request for extradition of a person who is in the United Kingdom. He can also 
order proceedings, if he receives another valid request, for one of the requests to be deferred until 
the other has been disposed of, or in he may take account the relative seriousness of the offences 
concerned; the places where each offence was committed, the date when each request was 
received; if the person is alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction.  
e. Categorisation of territories  
For the purpose of extradition, the British Extradition Act 2003 (EA 2003) divides territories, 
roughly equivalent to countries, into two classes, referred to as Category 1 and Category 2 
territories. EA 2003 does not provide any guidance as to which countries should be designated as 
Category 1 territories. A state can belong to either of the categories by designation of the 
Secretary of State. The list of territories in a category is liable to change and any country can be 
placed in the other category by designation. However, generally, European countries are 
included in Category 1 territories for which the main mechanism for initiating an extradition 
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request is through a European Arrest Warrant, which requires a certificate by the appropriate 
authority for the extradition proceedings to start.  
The list of Category 2 territories includes countries with which Britain has extradition treaties. 
Nearly 110 countries fall into this category, but not so Saudi Arabia. As the two countries 
(Britain and Saudi Arabia) are only connected in this context by a Memorandum of 
Understanding,1173 there exists no formal treaty between them (a treaty signed in 1942 was never 
ratified).1174 By contrast, Saudi Arabian’s Basic law does not make any distinction. All countries 
are equal in the eyes of the Saudi law in respect of extradition matters. The fact that the Kingdom 
is not restricted has allowed it to be active in concluding both bilateral and multilateral treaties 
and conventions  
f. Extradition crimes 
Yet another difference between the two countries is in terms of extraditable crimes. As noted 
above, the Saudi Basic Law is opaque as to the crimes for which extradition can be sought, rather 
than the nature of the crime, the gravity of which the Kingdom considers as stipulated in bilateral 
and multilateral treaties. According to Saudi law, extradition can be requested for any crime for 
which the punishment is a minimum of six months imprisonment (as in its agreement with the 
Gulf States).1175 
In contrast, Britain has listed as many as 32 crimes in Schedule 2 of the Extradition Act 2003, 
which are referred to as extradition crimes. Under the Act, accused fugitives can only be 
extradited to the requesting state if the crimes for which he has been alleged or convicted are 
included in the list. Another important difference in relation to extraditable crimes between the 
two countries is that in Saudi Arabia, murder, or attempt to murder the King or his family 
members is not a crime immune to extradition, whereas it could qualify for exception in British 
law. 
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With regard to extradition crimes, there is no stipulation provided in Saudi Basic Law, or in the 
Shari’a. This allows Saudi Arabia to determine extraditable crimes and mutually agree with the 
contracting country. Basically, any conduct which jeopardises or threatens the peace, both at 
home and abroad, qualifies as an extraditable crime in Islam. As it envisions a world that 
“consists of friendly or non-threatening nations, the interstate relationship is to be based on a 
standard of fairness and justice that is universal and not limited by state boundaries.”1176 
Weeramantry maintains that Islamic doctrine holds that peace is the basic norm for international 
relations and stresses international relations based on equality, not dominance and 
submission.1177  
Although there are no explicit guidelines on what extradition crimes would be in the Basic Law 
or in the Shari’a for that matter, the Arab Extradition Treaty of 14th September, 1952 (enforced 
on 28th August 1954) to which Saudi Arabia is a party, relies on the eliminative method for 
determining extraditable offences, with the general guideline that the fugitive must be accused of 
an offence punishable under the laws of both the requesting and the requested states by one 
year’s imprisonment or a more severe penalty, or, in the case of convicted offenders, the fugitive 
must have been convicted of a crime that carries a sentence of two months’ imprisonment or 
more. The treaty also allows for the extradition of persons sought in connection with an 
extraditable offence (i.e. persons not yet convicted or accused of an extraditable offence).1178 
On the other hand, crimes for which extradition can be sought are specified in Schedule 2 of EA 
2003 in Britain. There are 32 types of crime which qualify for an extradition request.1179 The 
crimes draw upon the European Framework List – a list common to all the member states of the 
EU.1180 The other conditions attached to extradition offences are separately given for Category 1 
and Category 2 territories, most of them overlapping. 
The concept of an ‘extradition offence’ is fundamental to extradition law. This is because only 
those accused or convicted of such offences in the requesting state can be extradited. Therefore 
the importance question to be decided by the judge at the extradition hearing is whether the 
                                                 
1176
 See Ahmad, n. 1121 , 157, 159. 
1177
 See Weeramantry, n.1118, at 160. 
1178
 See Alotaibi, n.73, at 290. 
1179
 Extradition Act 2003, Schedule 2, see n. 39.  
1180
 See Chapter 4, section 4.6.6. 
 274 
defendant is accused or has been convicted of an extradition offence in the requesting state. It is 
important to point out the condition of ‘dual criminality’, that is, the alleged conduct has to be 
both an offence under the law of the requesting state and, had it been committed there, an 
offence in the U.K. This condition was removed in EA 2003 for Category 1 territories, which 
means that defendants can now be extradited for conduct that does not amount to a criminal act 
under U.K. domestic law. 
In England and Wales, at the extradition hearing, the appropriate judge has the same powers as a 
magistrates’ court would have if the proceedings were the summary trial of an information 
against the person in respect of whom the Part 1 warrant was issued.1181 In Scotland, he has the 
same powers as if the proceedings were summary proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to 
have been committed by the person in respect of whom the Part 1 warrant was issued, while in 
Northern Ireland, at the extradition hearing the appropriate judge has the same powers as a 
magistrates’ court would have if the proceedings were the hearing and determination of a 
complaint against the person in respect of whom the Part 1 warrant was issued.1182  
Either party can lodge an appeal with the High Court against the decision of the judge. The High 
Court must begin to hear the appeal before the end of the relevant period, failing which, either 
the appeal must be taken to have been allowed by a decision of the High Court or the person 
whose extradition has been ordered must be taken to have been discharged by the High Court; or 
the order for the person’s extradition must be taken to have been quashed by the High Court.1183 
Also, either party may appeal to the House of Lords, which is the highest court in Britain. Leave 
to appeal to it may only be granted if the High court has certified that there is a point of law of 
general public importance, or it is a point that ought to be considered by the House of Lords,1184 
or if leave is granted by it. 
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g. Bars to extradition 
Saudi Arabia and Britain differ in many ways with regard to bars to extradition. Saudi Arabia’s 
Basic Law is silent on the subject. On the other hand, Britain has a number of bars which 
prohibit the extradition of an accused person, on the grounds discussed below. 
h. Extradition of nationals  
As discussed above, Saudi Arabia does not have any statute in the Basic Law barring extradition 
of a criminal. However, all the Arab treaties to which Saudi Arabia is a party and the Islamic 
Conference Convention1185 allow parties to refuse extradition based on nationality. As Alotaibi 
noted, “Saudi Arabia has never stated that its refusal to extradite a Saudi national was based on 
the individual’s status as a Saudi national.”1186 This can be interpreted as an attempt on its part to 
align its extradition rules in accordance with the principles of international law. 
Likewise, British law does not base extradition on the basis of nationality. For example, s.11 of 
EA2003 imposes other bases on it, but the issue of nationality is not included. This means that 
any British national is liable to be extradited if he is accused, or convicted of an extraditable 
crime of any national guilty of committing a crime included in the list of extradition crimes. 
i. Double jeopardy  
Saudi Arabia does not any provision in the Basic Law to forbid extradition on the basis of double 
jeopardy.  In sharp contrast to this lack of Saudi statutory provision, Britain’s EA 2003 states 
that:  
“A person’s extradition to a category 1 territory is barred by reason of the rule against 
double jeopardy if (and only if) it appears that he would be entitled to be discharged 
under any rule of law relating to previous acquittal or conviction on the assumption (a) 
that the conduct constituting the extradition offence constituted an offence in the part of 
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the United Kingdom where the judge exercises jurisdiction; and (b) that the person were 
charged with the extradition offence in that part of the United Kingdom.”1187 
The rule relates to Article 9 of the European Convention on Extradition which stipulates:  
“Extradition shall not be granted if final judgment has been passed by the competent 
authorities of the requested Party upon the person claimed in respect of the offence or 
offences for which extradition is requested. Extradition may be refused if the competent 
authorities of the requested Party have decided either not to institute of to terminate 
proceedings in respect of the same offence or offences.”1188  
The echo of the rule is also provided in the Framework Decision which permits the judicial 
authorities in the executing state to refuse to execute the warrant; The Framework states: 
“Where the judicial authorities of the executing Member State have decided either not to 
prosecute for the offence on which the European arrest warrant is based on to halt 
proceedings, or where a final judgment has been passed upon the requested person in a 
Member State, in respect of the same acts, which prevents further proceedings.”1189  
j. Extraneous considerations 
Within the British context, the British extradition Act of 2003 states in s.13: 
“a person’s extradition to a category 1 territory is barred by reason of extraneous 
considerations if (and only if) it appears that (a) the Part 1 warrant issued in respect of 
him (though purporting to be issued on account of the extradition offence) is in fact 
issued for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing him on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinions, or (b) if extradited he might 
be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by 
                                                 
1187
 Extradition Act 2003, s.12, see n. 39.. 
1188
 European Convention on Extradition, n.254, Article 9. 
1189
 Framework List, n.611, Article 4 (3). 
 277 
reason of his race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political 
opinions.”1190   
This exception expresses the principle of ’non-refoulment’ which has its roots in the UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, which found its way into the European 
Convention on Extradition and the Commonwealth Rendition Scheme. It was present in the 
British 1989 Extradition Act and incorporated into EA 2003l. The provision resembles the 
ECHR, under which the responsibility of a state is engaged if it extradites or proposes to 
extradite a person to a place where he will be subjected to treatment which falls short of the 
standard to be expected under the ECHR. These standards include freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion, and freedom of expression. The political offence exception, which 
survived up to the Extradition Act 1989, under which there was no extradition for crimes 
incidental to and forming part of political disturbances no longer finds a place in the scheme.1191 
This may be seen as the logical conclusion of a series of cases in which the English courts had 
tried to address the fact that the political offence exception had, in the 20th century, come to be 
used by terrorists seeking to undermine democracy rather than the liberal idealists for whose 
benefit it was first developed. “There are few who regret the passing of this exception.”1192  
In contrast to this exception, although Saudi Arabia supports human rights in its criminal justice 
system, no provision to this effect has been made in the extradition system. However, provisions 
like the political offences exception have been promised by means of treaty provisions.1193 As 
noted previously, Saudi Arabia’s preference is to adopt international law principles and 
accommodate emerging trends through treaty provisions as far as possible. Therefore, despite the 
fact that the Saudi Basic law does not cover this issue, other instances can still be helpful, since 
these matters are generally taken care of by international arrangements. 
k. Passage of time 
The British EA 2003 provides that:  
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“a person’s extradition to a category 1 territory is barred by reason of the passage of time 
if (and only if) it appears that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him by reason 
of the passage of time since he is alleged to have committed the extradition offence or 
since he is alleged to have become unlawfully at large (as the case may be).”1194  
However, it is not entirely clear how to determine when extradition would be `unjust or 
oppressive’ as no eligibility test has been laid down. These terms are very broad and liable to 
subjective interpretation. Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law, as for the cases discussed above, is also 
silent on this. 
l. Age 
Another bar in British extradition law is the issue of age, which may make the person incapable 
of committing the crime for which the extradition is sought. The Act provides for instance, that  
“a person’s extradition to a Category 1 territory is barred by reason of his age if (and only 
if) it would be conclusively presumed because of his age that he could not be guilty of the 
extradition offence, on the assumptions (a) that the conduct constituting the extradition 
offence constituted an offence in the part of the United Kingdom where the judge 
exercises jurisdiction; (b) that the person carried out the conduct when the extradition 
offence was committed (or alleged to be committed); (c) that the person carried out the 
conduct in the part of the United Kingdom where the judge exercises jurisdiction.”1195 
Note that the age of criminal responsibility is lower in British jurisdictions than in other 
European countries. It is therefore unlikely that many cases would resort to this exception.  
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m. Hostage-taking 
Hostage-taking considerations are also a bar to extradition in British extradition law (and again, 
Saudi extradition practice has nothing to say on this). EA 2003 provides that:  
“a person’s extradition to a category 1 territory is barred by reason of hostage-taking 
considerations if (and only if) the territory is a party to the Hostage-taking Convention 
and is appears that (a) if extradited he might be prejudiced at his trial because 
communication between him and the appropriate authorities would not be possible, and 
(b) the act or omission constituting the extradition offence also constitutes an offence 
under the Taking of Hostages Act 1982 or an attempt to commit such an offence.”1196  
n. Speciality 
The specialty condition originates from the consideration that when states surrender fugitives, 
they do so in relation to the offence for which extradition has been sought and not for any other 
offence. The purpose of this bar on extradition is intended to avoid abuse of the extradition 
process, so that “a person extradited is not dealt with in the extraditing state any offence other 
than that for which he was extradited.”1197 EA 2003 provides that “[a] person’s extradition to a 
category 1 territory is barred by reason of specialty if (and only if) there are no specialty 
arrangements with the category 1 territory…”1198 The original formulation of the rule stipulates:  
“[a] person who has been extradited shall not be proceeded against, sentenced or detained 
with a view to the carrying out of a sentence of detention order for any offence 
committed prior to his surrender other than that for which he was extradited, nor shall he 
be for any other reason restricted in his personal freedom, except…(a) when the Party 
which surrendered him consents…(b) when that person, having had an opportunity to 
leave the territory of the Party to which he has been surrendered, has not done so within 
45 days of his final discharge, or has returned to that territory after leaving it.”1199 
                                                 
1196
 Extradition Act 2003, s.83 (1), see n. 39 . 
1197
 See Nicholls, n.1080, 5.77, at 82. 
1198
 Extradition Act 2003, s.17 (1), see n. 39. 
1199
 European Convention on Extradition, see n.254, Article 14 (1) 
 280 
There is no such provision in Saudi Basic Law dealing with extradition. Yet there does not seem 
to be any hurdle in incorporating this condition in a mutually agreed bilateral or multilateral 
agreement with a country or countries. 
o. The death penalty 
Further, there is also the imposition of the death penalty. It is abolished in Britain, but that is 
impossible in Saudi Arabia. Capital punishment once allowed in Britain has been relatively 
recently abolished, but in Saudi Arabia the death penalty is still applicable and practiced under 
Shari’a law.1200  
The EA 2003 provides that the Secretary of State must not order a person’s extradition to a 
Category 2 territory if he could be, will be, or has been sentenced to death for, the offence 
concerned in that territory. However this condition will not apply if the Secretary of State 
receives a written assurance, which he considers adequate, that a sentence of death (a) will not be 
imposed, or (b) will not be carried out (if imposed).1201 The provision has its roots in Protocol 6 
of the ECHR, which sought to abolish the death penalty. The Canadian Supreme Court noted 
that:  
“while the evidence does not establish an international law norm against the death 
penalty, or against extradition to face the death penalty, it does show significant 
movement towards acceptance internationally of a principle of fundamental justice 
Canada had already adopted internally.”1202 
In sharp contrast, Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law allows the death penalty, which has been prescribed 
in the Shari’a for Hadud and Quesas crimes, as discussed previously.1203 Primarily, capital 
punishment in Islamic law is aimed at preventing the spread of crime and is used as a deterrent to 
others to persuade them to refrain from committing crimes prejudicial to the well being of 
society. In order to understand how the punishment of crimes operates, the following provides a 
brief sketch of crimes and punishment under the Shari’a.  
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With regard to the punishment of crimes, Islam recognises three categories of crimes, namely, 1) 
Hadud; 2) Quesas; and 3) Ta’azir.   Hudud (plural of Had ‘penalty’) crimes are considered to be 
offences against God. These crimes are set forth in the Qur’an or the Sunnah and in strict Islamic 
law are therefore mandatory and cannot be commuted or lessened. There are seven Hadud 
crimes for which a specific severe bodily punishment is prescribed. These are 1) Ridda 
‘apostasy’; 2) Theft; 3) Baghi ‘transgression’; 4) Haraba ‘highway robbery’; 5) Zena ‘adultery’; 
6) Badhf ‘slander’; and 7) Shorb al-Khamr ‘drinking alcohol’.1204 A comparison of punishments 
with those of non-Islamic countries and their justifications is outside the scope of this study. The 
death penalty is only imposed for Apostasy (Ridda) and Transgression in Hadud crimes and in 
Quesad for equivalence1205.Generally two types of death penalties can be distinguished:  
(a) the death penalty for acts committed against God – apostasy;  
(b) the death penalty awarded on the basis of ‘equivalence’ as the word Quesas ‘equality’ 
or ‘equivalence’ implies.  
Apostasy means to reject Islam by word, deed or omission. The person must commit the act of 
omission with the awareness of the penalty for it to qualify as apostasy. The offender is allowed 
a certain length of time to repent. If the offender fails to repent within the proscribed time period, 
the death penalty is imposed. Transgression refers to rising against legitimate leaders (Imam) to 
overcome them by force “equivalent to treason and armed rebellion.”1206 Those who get killed 
during the fight are regarded as having been punished; those who surrender or are arrested are 
forgiven, but those who continue to fight the Imam are punished by the death penalty. For 
Quesas, the death penalty is imposed as a means of ‘equivalence’, not as a vindication. Bassiouni 
notes that Quesas, the word for ’equality’ or ’equivalence’ “implies that a person who has 
committed a given violation will be punished in the same way and by the same means that he 
used in harming another person.”1207  Also referred to as ’retribution’ or ’retaliation’ by some 
Western writers, Quesas crimes and punishments are analogous to the Judeo-Christian teachings 
of an eye for an eye. 
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Recently there has been a growing trend of refusing extradition to countries where the death 
penalty is allowed. The increase in application of the death penalty exception stems from human 
rights concerns. The focus has shifted from the possibility that the extraditee could be tortured 
and/or subjected to gross injustices within the requesting states’ criminal justice system, to the 
human rights implications of requesting states which impose the death penalty. Most developed 
nations would be compelled to deny requests for extradition from Saudi Arabia, based on human 
rights considerations, because the death penalty can be imposed there. 
The issue of the death penalty has been raised by the U.K. in the past to deny the extradition of 
individuals to states that allow the death penalty. Yet, the U.K. does extradite individuals to the 
U.S., which also has the death penalty under its federal system and most U.S. state systems. The 
death penalty, thus, by itself will not likely bar the formation of an extradition treaty, though it 
could create a heated political issue.  
It is also possible for Saudi Arabia to grant a pardon from the death penalty through the family of 
the victim. Keeping this in mind, Saudi Arabia could agree to an extradition treaty whereby it 
does not impose the death penalty to extradited individuals who have not been convicted and 
sentenced in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia could make the procedural applicability of the 
extradition treaty contingent on the victim’s family agreeing to waive the death penalty, and/or 
agreeing to payment of money. In other words, a system could be designed that takes into 
account the differences in the two countries’ positions on the death penalty.  
p. Immunity to extradition 
Under British extradition law, the defendant may in appropriate cases claim sovereign or 
diplomatic immunity from arrest or detention for the purposes of extradition proceedings. The 
immunity provisions came into U.K. law through the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations 1961, adopted in the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964. The convention confers absolute 
immunity from arrest for diplomats, members of their families, and their immediate 
households.1208 
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The State Immunity Act 1978 confers the same immunity mutates mutandis on visiting heads of 
state. However, the issue that attracted a lot of world attention was the immunity of former heads 
of state in respect of offences committed during the period they were in power. This issue was 
considered at length by the House of Lords.1209 The majority of the seven Law Lords held that a 
former head of state had immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the U.K. for acts performed 
in his official capacity as head of state pursuant to the State Immunity Act 1978.1210 However, 
because torture was an international crime against humanity, after coming into effect after the 
United Nations International Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 1948, there had been a universal jurisdiction in all the Convention state 
parties to either extradite or punish a public official who committed such a crime. 
Immunity to crimes of torture had therefore, come to an end with ratification of the convention. 
As the U.K., Spain, and Chile were parties to the convention, Pinochet had therefore no 
immunity from extradition for offences of torture, or conspiracy to torture.1211 Although Saudi 
Basic law does not deal with this issue, it has nevertheless, accepted clauses in its extradition 
treaties pertaining to diplomats and officials for immunity from arrest for all official acts 
committed in office. 
q. Physical or mental condition  
Under EA 2003, a defendant can be discharged on the grounds of his physical or mental 
condition at any stage of the proceedings.1212 The rule applies if at any time in the extradition 
hearing it appears to the judge that the physical or mental condition of the person in respect of 
whom the Part 1 warrant is issued is such that it would be “unjust or oppressive” to extradite 
him. If the unstable condition is confirmed, the judge must either order the person’s discharge, or 
adjourn the extradition hearing until it appears to him that the condition that the person should be 
in good physical and mental health to stand the trial is satisfied. Article 3 of the ECHR also 
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requires that if the physical or mental illness of the person is sufficiently severe, he should not be 
extradited.1213  
In Saudi Arabia, the Basic Law has no provision to this effect. Nonetheless, and despite the 
Basic Law prohibiting torture,1214 and Shari’a prohibits judges from accepting confessions under 
duress, Amnesty International reported on the violation of detainees and their state. The report on 
Human Rights practices of 2008, by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor noted 
on February 25th 2009 that: 
“During the year, these were reports of physical abuse by the police and the CPVPV, as 
well as judicially sanctioned corporal punishment. On March 9, according to the NGO 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), police in Khamis Mushayt (Asir region) seeking to arrest a 
group of 25 undocumented Yemenis, including several children, allegedly set fire to the 
garbage dump in which they were hiding to force them to come out. At least 28 persons 
suffered severe burns. The victims alleged that instead of transporting them to the 
hospital, the police took them in an ambulance to a police station for questioning before 
treating them. The government claimed the police rescued the individuals from an 
accidental fire. At year’s end the government had not investigated the incident.”1215 
r. Abuse of process and bad faith 
Under EA 2003, a person arrested can challenge their extradition on the grounds that the request 
is made in bad faith, or amounts to an abuse of process, either directly or through the human 
rights provisions.1216 This is in recognition of the right to challenge the legality of detention in 
accordance with Article 5 (4) of ECHR which provides that the Magistrates’ Court hearing the 
committal proceedings had jurisdiction to determine the question of whether a fugitive’s 
detention is lawful.  Saudi law does not contain any similar provisions. 
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s. Right of appeal  
British extradition law allows the right of appeal, against the appropriate judge’s order, to the 
High Courts, and again to the House of Lords by either party.1217 Different procedures to appeal 
have been prescribed for the Category 1 territories (EAW) and non-Category 1 territories.  
However, the appeal has to be made on a question of law or fact.1218 Also, the right of appeal has 
its basis in human rights, and aims to provide a free and fair trial while it gives the accused an 
opportunity to defend himself. 
In contrast, Saudi Basic Law does not allow any appeal in extradition proceedings. The decision 
on an extradition request is taken by the Ministry of Interior on the recommendations of the 
Committee constituted to investigate extradition cases in the light of the evidence furnished by 
the requesting state. As many human rights organisations have reported when criticising the 
Kingdom, detainees are often neglected and prevented from contacting family members or even 
lawyers. For instance, it was noted in 2007 that:  
“security forces arrested Professor Matrouk al Faleh at King Saud University on May 17; 
he had posted on a web site a three page criticism of the justice system, including 
conditions in Buraida Prison following a visit to detained reformers Isa and Abdullah al-
Hamid. Al-Fatch remained in prison without care at year’s end. According to HRW, the 
government did not permit his lawyers or international humanitarian organisations access 
to him.”1219 
t. Extradition without treaty 
Britain is a signatory to a number of international conventions which place it under an obligation 
to criminalise certain types of conduct which have come to be known as ‘international crimes’. 
In particular, these conventions require the U.K. either to prosecute or extradite those accused of 
such offences and are found within its jurisdiction.  
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Where a request for extradition for such an offence is made by a Category 1 or 2 territories, then 
no difficulty arises in giving effect to the obligation to extradite, as the former is governed under 
EAW while the latter are states which have formal extradition treaties with the U.K. When a 
request is received from a country which is not included in either of the categories but is parties 
to international criminal conventions, EA 2003 allows for them to be designated by order for the 
purposes of allowing the extradition process to start. In such cases, the requesting state shall be 
regarded as a Category 2 territory and will be dealt with under the provisions applicable.1220 
Although Saudi Arabia approaches the British position in this regard, in that it can decide in a 
particular case whether to extradite the accused and accede to the request of the requesting state, 
the procedure is different. As discussed earlier,1221 the Ministry of the Interior is empowered to 
make a decision on such a case and act through a Committee constituted for the purpose. The 
committee considers the circumstances surrounding the request, and the political relationship 
with the requesting country may decide the matter favourably or the request may be declined. 
u. Asylum claims 
Under EA 2003, a person whose extradition is requested can make an asylum claim at any time 
in the relevant period. That is, starting when a certificate is issued in respect of the request and 
ending when the person is extradited in pursuance of the request.  In the event of a person 
lodging an asylum claim at any stage of the extradition hearing or appeal, the person is not to be 
extradited in pursuance of the request before the asylum claim is finally determined. The 
authority to decide on the asylum claim is the Secretary of State.1222  
According to Saudi Basic Law, no-one is entitled to claim, as the country does not grant asylum 
under the country’s law. It was noted in this respect that: 
“the Basic law does not provide for the granting of asylum, or refugee status in 
accordance with the 1951 UN convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 
protocol, but the government has established a system for providing protection to 
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refugees. In practice, the government claimed to provide protection against refoulement, 
the forced return of persons to a country where there is reason to believe they feared 
persecution. The basic law provides that the state will grant political asylum, if so 
required by the public interest.”1223 
v. Consent to extradite 
EA 2003 provides that at any point in the extradition proceedings, a person arrested under a 
warrant may express his consent to be extradited to the Category 2 territory to which his 
extradition is requested.1224 Similarly, a person arrested under a provisional warrant may consent 
to his extradition to the Category 2 territory in which he is accused of the commission of an 
offence or is alleged to have been convicted of an offence. Such a consent given in writing is 
irrevocable.1225 The point, in brief, is that this alternative route to extradition has been provided 
to expedite the process and avoid unnecessary procedures if the person is willing to be extradited 
to the requesting state.1226 
In contrast, there is no provision in Saudi law to allow for consent to extradition, nor do the 
bilateral or multilateral treaties have a provision to this effect. However, the government may 
make an administrative decision to allow voluntary extradition if it so deems. 
6.3 The UN Model Treaty as a measure 
Having compared and contrasted the similarities and differences between the extradition systems 
of Britain and Saudi Arabia, it is now possible to see how each of the systems has gained 
maximum proximity to the ideal presented by the Model Treaty. This has been selected due to its 
consistency of objectives, which may make co-operation between Britain and Saudi Arabia in the 
control of crime more effective by the concluding of a treaty on extradition. The key notion 
implicit in the model is that extradition can be used to control crime and promote co-operation 
between member countries to ultimately foster global co-operation between the states of the 
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world to collectively combat crime. In the previous discussion of its motives and purpose,1227 the 
Model Treaty acts as an example since it contains most of the principles of international law, 
which traditionally recognises exceptions and stresses obligations. Apart from this focus, the 
Model Treaty is geared towards protecting human rights. 
Although it has not been adopted in a bilateral treaty between the two countries, the ideals 
enshrined in this model are used as criteria for judging the quality of the extradition systems of 
Britain and Saudi Arabia against international law principles and human rights provisions. This 
gives a point of reference against which the standard of each extradition system can be measured. 
In what follows, the criteria laid down in each article of the Model Treaty are taken to assess 
whether the British and Saudi extradition systems fulfill the proposed ideals. There are 18 
Articles in the Model Treaty, but here the focus is on the Articles which are important to this 
study. Only those Articles which have a bearing on international law principles and human rights 
protection are discussed. 
Article 1: Obligation to extradite 
With regard to the liability to extradite, the British Extradition Act of 1989 explicitly laid out the 
state’s liability to extradite a fugitive criminal against a valid request. Although it has not been 
stated unequivocally in EA 2003, such an obligation is implicit in the Act. In contrast, Saudi 
Arabia’s Basic Law does not make extradition mandatory. Yet it is obvious from the bilateral 
and multilateral treaties that Saudi Arabia has concluded with regional and Islamic states, that 
extradition is seen as an obligation in such circumstances.  
Article 2: Extraditable offences 
In Schedule 2 of EA 2003, a list of offences which are extraditable is presented. This list has 
been adopted from the European Union Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002. On the 
one hand, it replaced the double-criminality condition, discussed earlier,1228 on the other; all EU 
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member states agreed with it. So, Britain therefore sense follows the enumerative approach to 
extradition crimes. 
In contrast, Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law does not list crimes for which extradition can be requested 
or made. However, the nature and extent of crimes to qualify for extradition is determined 
through treaty provisions, as in the regional treaties and security agreements with Islamic 
countries.1229 
Article 3: Mandatory grounds for refusal 
This Article stipulates that extradition should be denied if: 
• The crime for which return is being sought is of a political nature. 
• There are sufficient grounds for the requested state to believe that the request for 
extradition has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on 
account of that person's race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political opinions, sex or 
status, or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of those reasons; 
• The offence for which extradition is requested is an offence under military law, but not an 
offence under ordinary criminal law; 
• There has been a final judgment rendered against the person in the requested state in 
respect of the offence for which the person's extradition is requested; 
• The person whose extradition is requested has, under the law of either party, become 
immune from prosecution or punishment for any reason, including lapse of time or 
amnesty; 
• The person whose extradition is requested has been or would be subjected in the 
requesting state to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or if 
that person has not received or would not receive the minimum guarantees in criminal 
proceedings, as contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Article 14; 
• The judgment of the requesting State has been rendered in absentia, the convicted person 
has not had sufficient notice of the trial or the opportunity to arrange for his defence and 
he has not had or will not have the opportunity to have the case retried in his presence. 
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As discussed earlier,1230 nearly all of these bars to extradition have been incorporated into the 
British Extradition Act of 2003. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, does not score on this account. As 
discussed previously,1231 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia uses confidential diplomatic channels to 
deal with extradition requests, and under such a system, there may be a greater risk of yielding to 
political pressure, and any discussion concerning an extradition request is therefore, perhaps, 
more likely to be made in the interests of the state, rather than the individual. 
Article 4: Optional grounds for refusal 
This Article of the Model Treaty states that extradition may be refused in any of the following 
circumstances: 
• If the person whose extradition is requested is a national of the requested state.  Where 
extradition is refused on this ground, the requested state shall, if the other state so 
requests, submit the case to its competent authorities with a view to taking appropriate 
action against the person in respect of the offence for which extradition had been 
requested; 
•  If the competent authorities of the requested state have decided either not to institute or 
to terminate proceedings against the person for the offence in respect of which extradition 
is requested; 
• If a prosecution in respect of the offence for which extradition is requested is pending in 
the requested state against the person whose extradition is requested;  
• If the offence for which extradition is requested carries the death penalty under the law of 
the requesting state, unless that state gives such assurance as the requested state considers 
sufficient that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if imposed, will not be carried 
out;  
• If the offence for which extradition is requested has been committed outside the territory 
of either party and the law of the requested state does not provide for jurisdiction over 
such an offence committed outside its territory in comparable circumstances;  
• If the offence for which extradition is requested is regarded under the law of the 
requested state as having been committed in whole or in part within that state.  Where 
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extradition is refused on this ground, the requested state shall, if the other state so 
requests, submit the case to its competent authorities with a view to taking appropriate 
action against the person for the offence for which extradition had been requested;  
• If the person whose extradition is requested has been sentenced or would be liable to be 
tried or sentenced in the requesting state by an extraordinary or ad hoc court or tribunal;  
• If the requested state, while also taking into account the nature of the offence and the 
interests of the requesting state, considers that, in the circumstances of the case, the 
extradition of that person would be incompatible with humanitarian considerations in 
view of age, health or other personal circumstances of that person. 
Under British extradition law, the last of the options has been given legal effect in EA 2003. The 
Act explicitly forbids extradition of a person when it considers the circumstances incompatible 
with humanitarian considerations of age, health or other personal circumstances. These bars have 
already been considered in detail.1232 Pinochet’s case1233 is an illustration of refusal on the 
grounds of health of the accused, when the then Secretary of State terminated the proceedings 
against him on medical grounds. The other options fall under the authority of the Secretary of 
State. 
In contrast, Saudi Arabia’s confidential treatment of extradition requests makes it difficult to 
claim that these options are for example, exercised in its extradition law, and accordingly it does 
not fare well on this measure. 
Article 5: Channels of communication and required documents 
This Article states that a request for extradition shall be made in writing through diplomatic 
channels, directly between the ministries of justice or any other authorities designated by the 
parties. It requires the requesting state to provide the following documentation in support of the 
extradition request: 
                                                 
1232
 See section 6.2.2 (g) (x) of this Chapter. 
1233
 See section 6.4 of this Chapter. 
 292 
• An accurate description of the person sought together with any other information that 
may help to establish that person’s identity, nationality and location should be provided 
by the requesting state.  
• The text of the relevant provision of the law creating the offence, or where necessary, a 
statement of law relevant to the offence and a statement of the penalty that can be 
imposed for the offence and, if the person is accused of an offence, by a warrant issued 
by court or other competent judicial authority for the arrest of the person or a certified 
copy of that warrant, a statement of the offence for which extradition is requested and a 
description of the acts of commission constituting the alleged offence, including an 
indication of the time and place of its commission  
• In case of convicted persons, a statement of the offence for which extradition is requested 
and a description of the acts of commission constituting the offence and the original or 
certified copy of the judgment or any other document setting out the conviction and the 
sentence imposed, if convicted, should be attached with the extradition request.  
• If a person has been convicted of an offence in his or her absence, in addition to the 
documents  
• If the person has been convicted of an offence but no sentence has been imposed, by a 
statement of the offence for which extradition is requested and a description of the acts or 
omissions instituting the offence and by a document setting out the conviction and a 
statement affirming that there is an intention to impose a sentence. 
The documents submitted in support of a request for extradition shall be accompanied by a 
translation into the language of the requested state or in another language acceptable to that state. 
Both Britain and Saudi Arabia fulfil this obligation.1234 For instance, the documentation and 
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Article 6: Simplified extradition procedure 
For Britain, EA 2003 provides for consent to extradite and has relatively simple procedures for 
extradition, if the accused expresses his willingness to be extradited. Many procedural steps in 
such a case can sidestepped to expedite the proceedings. 
Saudi Arabia’s extradition system does not expressly stipulate such a provision, but in a system 
in which confidential channels are used for extradition, voluntary extradition to the requesting 
state on the part of the wanted person should not be a problem. 
From comparing and contrasting the two systems of Saudi Arabia and Britain against the 
standard laid down in the United Nations’ Model Treaty on Extradition Britain seems to do much 
better in observing international law principles and offering human rights protection. Further, 
British extradition law is much closer to the international standard and presents a framework of 
extradition which protects individual rights by virtue of conventions and international 
instruments of extradition. 
This sharply contrasts with Saudi extradition law. Although Islam imparts all the basic human 
rights to the individual,1235 nothing of the sort has been provided through legislation. Extradition 
statutes are promulgated though royal decree, which runs the risk of disallowing human rights 
protection under the extraneous pressure of state interests. Yet there is nothing in the Islamic 
sources of criminal law which forbids these basic rights.  
Reference also needs to be made to the strengths of one country (Britain), and the weaknesses of 
the other (Saudi Arabia). These are not only well documented, but can be justified. While a 
country like Saudi Arabia may be seen as a relatively recent nation-state, ruled by Islamic 
Shari’a law, which may appear to a western country as rigid and orthodox, Britain is, on the 
other hand, a well rooted nation-state with a long tradition of liberal democracy and 
parliamentary rule. Different concepts often lead to different practices. So, for instance, gay and 
lesbian rights are seen in liberal democracies like Britain as normal citizens’ rights that need to 
be both respected and protected. In sharp contrast, such people are portrayed in an Islamic 
country like Saudi Arabia as deviant subjects who should either repent, or be punished. The fact 
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is, there exist a number of conflicts between the old and new, between the authentic and the 
alien, and more importantly, in the case of Saudi Arabia, between the religious and the scholars.  
It is also, worth adding that historically, international relations and international law and 
conventions were mostly inspired by and based on scholarly liberalism in reaction to their 
medieval, theoretical, and autocratic rules. However, it is also, vital to remember that being 
sharply different does not disqualify countries from meeting and concluding treaties and 
agreements for mutual understanding. On the other hand, being totally, or at least mainly, similar 
does not always guarantee a full understanding between countries on matters of extradition and 
legal procedures. It was noted in this respect for example, that “other governments [similar to 
Britain in terms of culture and more or less, legal traditions]….have complained about Britain’s 
lengthy extradition proceedings. French officials are still bitter about the 10 years it took for 
Britain to extradite Rachid Ramada, an Algerian later convicted of financing deadly bomb 
attacks on the Paris metro system in 1995.”1236 There are other examples between Britain and the 
U.S. where the former refused to extradite a number of Al-Qaida suspects to the latter for fear 
that they would be tortured and would not receive a fair trial. From this perspective, it could be 
concluded that a formal extradition treaty between Saudi Arabia and Britain is not inherently 
impossible, and that the two sovereign countries do not need to share legal or political systems, 
nor values and perceptions. As noted in an earlier chapter,1237 shared threats and necessity, as 
well as national interests, are the forces which push countries into approaching each other and 
appealing for such agreements and understandings. Nonetheless, in this case study, it was the 
phenomenon of global terrorism, which has helped persuade countries to exchange intelligence 
and expertise, and to seek formal agreements. Jack Straw noted this necessity, saying that: 
“on one level, the global dimension of this modern terrorism stems from the way in 
which it organizes and operates. It is not limited to one nationality or region. People from 
more than 40 countries passed through the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan before 
the September 11th attacks. It uses the tools of our modern, interconnected world - 
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whether it is the internet or the international financial system - to recruit, to co-ordinate 
and to sustain itself. 
We have much to learn from the many and skilful ways in which Saudi Arabia has from 
its own initiative and in its own interests also used their leadership in the Muslim world 
to encourage others to adopt a similarly comprehensive approach. We value highly our 
close partnership with them. And you can actually see- not least because of the efforts of 
the Saudi government - a sea change in the region.”1238 
Having compared and contrasted the extradition systems of Saudi Arabia and Britain from 
different standpoints, it is now possible to return to the research questions raised in Chapter 1 
and throughout the previous discussion. The repetition or reference to earlier questioning is 
intentional, for the sake of further classification and analysis.   
1. Judged from the perspective of their performance, are the extradition systems in 
both countries, even though founded on theological and secular bases 
respectively, functioning effectively?  
2. Are failures in any one of the systems, if any, attributable to its foundation? 
3. Are extradition arrangements possible between an Islamic and a non-Muslim 
country? 
4. How can both systems benefit from each other’s experiences, and in what way 
can they be turned into a more effective tool for the curtailment and prevention of 
organised crime at an international level? 
5. How can extradition systems be used as a means of enhancing global co-operation 
against international crimes, particularly with reference to global terrorism? 
These questions are discussed in the following sections. 
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6.4 Are the British and Saudi extradition systems functioning properly? 
Although the British system began as purely administrative, it has gradually become almost 
completely judicial. However, the Secretary of State still has an important role and a number of 
decisions in the process rest with him. The well-known and oft-cited example is Pinochet. When 
a Spanish request for the extradition of Pinochet was being processed, and his appeal to the 
House of Lord was turned down on the grounds of refusing him head of state immunity and the 
validity of the human rights violations application, he appealed to the Secretary of State on ill-
health grounds, which was granted, and he was allowed to return to his country as he was found 
medically unfit to stand trial.1239  
To the question of whether the British extradition system is working effectively, the answer can 
be affirmative in many ways. Measured against the standard of the UN Model Treaty on 
Extradition, the British extradition system does rather well. This can be accounted for in terms of 
the fact that Britain has a long history of extradition law spanning over two and half centuries. 
As pointed out above,1240 the extradition law is quite elaborate and detailed, which gives it the 
character of being transparent and ‘objective’. It lays down the functions of all the state organs 
involved in the process, the Secretary of State, the appropriate judges, the High Court, and the 
House of Lords. Every functionary has a well-defined role to play and its writ has been 
elaborately laid down with almost pinpoint precision. 
Another reason why British extradition law is appropriate is because of its accommodation of 
international law principles and human rights protection. This has been illustrated in this 
discussion by a number of examples, where Britain refused to extradite many alleged offenders 
and suspects, even to its allies like France and the U.S., on humanitarian or other grounds of 
principle.1241 The existing Act has been designed with all the emerging norms and trends in 
international law in mind. For instance, this can be seen when compared to the UN Model Treaty 
on Extradition, which places a great deal of emphasis on making extradition against a valid 
request an obligation and statutory requirement. Similarly, the international law principle of 
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making exceptions to extradition in certain circumstances has also been allowed for. For 
example, in comparing British extradition law with the Model Treaty, Britain has made it 
obligatory to refuse an extradition request to a territory where the death penalty is imposed. 
Similarly, it refuses extradition requests made for an offence of a political character. This 
conformity emerges from the desire on the part of the British government to make its extradition 
law compatible with international law principles and other developed European nations in the 
region.  
EA 2003 also incorporated the human rights standards by virtue of Britain being a member of the 
UN.  Britain tends to refuse requests for extradition to countries where human rights are not 
observed or where there is danger of the accused, if returned, being subjected to torture or 
inhuman treatment. This behaviour is in conformity with the modern requirements that pay 
attention to human rights conditions. The United Nations Model Treaty has focused on the 
protection of these rights, and British law has adopted and fulfilled these issues. 
For instance, the right of appeal bestowed on fugitive criminals under the statutory provisions is 
also motivated by and is consistent with the human rights concerns. The Act of 2003 gives the 
accused a right of appeal against the decision, either in the High Court or the House of Lords. 
However, the very virtues of elaboration, human rights standards, and a thoroughly worked out 
process, in fact can be equally presented as weaknesses of the system. There are two main 
criticisms. One is the ‘unduly’ lengthy process and the dual appeal system provides the accused 
with many opportunities to exploit the system and hence result in failure of a legitimate and valid 
extradition request. One of the best examples here is that of the Al-Qaeda suspects, who were 
claimed by a number of countries to stand trial. Britain, which is seen still as their sanctuary, 
rejected requests to extradite them for reasons of human rights, as well as for legal and technical 
reasons. Pratik Chougule noted that: 
“The seeming indifference to violence was not an isolated lapse; it represented one act in 
the Brits' larger pattern of inaction. Over the years the governments of India, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, France, Algeria, Peru, Yemen and Russia, among others lodged 
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complaints about terrorist operations in Britain. In response, Britain refused a string of 
requests to extradite suspected terrorists including: 
• Morocco's request to extradite the man who planned the May 2003 attacks, which killed 
forty-five. He was the founder of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, which the 
United Nations cited as a terrorist network connected to al-Qaeda with sleeper cells 
preparing a bombing camping in multiple European cities. 
• A Spanish request for the extradition of Abu Qatada, an al-Qaeda terrorist operation 
operating in London, on whom the French had passed information to the British. 
• Saudi Arabia’s request to extradite Dr. Mohammad al-Massari, suspected of launching 
attacks in Saudi Arabia and establishing al-Qaeda’s London office. 
• France’s request to extradite Rachid Ramda, suspected of organising a series of 
bombings in Paris in 1995. Britain allowed this extradition in 2005 [after 10 years]).”1242  
Another example is that of Abu Qatada, the alleged Al-Qaeda suspect, who has been requested 
for extradition by a number of countries. His case in the British courts is still pending.1243 
As noted in the detailed discussion of the Extradition Act 2003,1244 many terms used in the Act 
have not yet been clearly defined and are open to subjective interpretations. For instance, it is 
difficult to determine what would constitute an ’unjust and oppressive’ extradition by reason of 
passage of time.1245 The ambiguity in terms like these can be interpreted subjectively and often to 
the advantage of the criminals. The appeal system is another method of causing delay to the 
process. The disposal of appeals is rather slow and may take a long time to furnish the final 
decision. It is quiet likely that by the time a decision is reached the accused may already have 
become eligible for another ‘concession’ on the grounds of human rights.  
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As noted above, one of the bars to extradition provided for in the 2003 Extradition Act 
substitutes for the political offences exception that survived up to EA 1989.1246 It has also been 
discussed in an earlier chapter that support for political dissent, once viewed as liberal ideal, has 
eroded because generally aggressive dissent can become violent resistance which can easily 
develop into terrorism.1247 Barring extradition on the grounds of difference of political opinion 
therefore is against the doctrine of the ‘war on terror’ which aims to suppress terrorism in all its 
forms and manifestations.  
Britain has been criticised for protecting and sheltering political dissidents from various parts of 
the world. These dissidents find a safe haven where they can plot and execute plans against their 
governments and muster international support using modern technology and means of 
communication. Yet their extradition can be refused to requesting countries under the pretext of 
the right to a political opinion. One view is that these dissidents are used as leverage against their 
parent countries for political aims. A typical example of the phenomenon is Saudi dissidents who 
are operating from British soil, as described below. 
In 2004, the Saudi government sought the extradition of two ‘dissidents’ named Mohammed 
Almasri and Sa’ad Alfaqih, who were based in and operating from Britain. 1248 They were 
alleged to be planning to dethrone the Saudi government.1249 The extradition request was rejected 
on the grounds that there was not enough evidence to indict them. 1250 There is a paradox in this 
situation. The people who, in the eyes of the Saudi government are ‘dissidents’ and are guilty of 
plotting against the government, are not seen as involved in any crime in the view of the British 
government until found guilty, as in the case of Abu Hamza. 1251 Prior to that period, a number of 
suspects – who were claimed by a number of countries, including Saudi Arabia - were enjoying 
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safe haven and enjoying full protection under the British system. As noted earlier,1252 around the 
second half of the twentieth century, it was the policy of the developed nations to ‘encourage’ or 
support dissenting elements in a state to bring about a change of government with a view to 
establishing or restoring democracy. The right to dissent was backed by the UN resolutions. This 
doctrine lies at the heart of the political offences exception. Political dissidents struggling to 
compete for the establishment of a government of their own ideology were considered under the 
rubric of political offences and any extradition request for their return was more likely to fail 
than to succeed. 
The allegation of harbouring the dissidents and allowing them to operate from British soil against 
the Saudi government represents the typical predicament. The British government would say it 
does not mean any harm but since its laws allows freedom of speech, what these dissidents are 
doing comes under the category of the human rights standards. The Saudi government sees this 
situation as being against its interests and blames the British government for protecting, abetting 
and furnishing a launching pad for anti-Saudi government elements.1253 
The problem seems to stem from the lack of a clear distinction between ‘legitimate’ human 
rights and activities leading to the conception, planning, and execution of law and order 
situations and/or terrorist activities for the parent governments. What is regarded as ‘freedom of 
speech’ may in fact be an inchoate crime, leading to a more serious and horrific terrorist act. 
That seems to have happened in Mohammad Almasri’s case. The Saudi government has been 
insisting on the extradition of the two ‘wanted persons’, but the British government has been 
pleading ‘lack of evidence’ until their involvement in terrorism and links with Al-Qaeda were 
established and their extradition was demanded by the U.S. In particular, Almasri’s threat to kill 
the sitting Prime Minister of Great Britain, should the latter go to Iraq, from its very soil by 
someone the British government had been pleading as not guilty is a fine example of 
Frankenstein’s monster.  
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The right to apply for asylum granted to the accused is yet another potential source of leakage in 
the system. EA 2003 provides that the accused can apply for asylum at any stage of the 
extradition process.1254 It is not difficult to imagine many pretexts for seeking asylum in such a 
long process which diminishes the chances of the extradition failing. By and large, fugitives may 
be able to take advantage of this lengthy process and escape justice.  
On these grounds, Britain is sometimes referred to as a safe haven for criminals. Given the 
choice, for example in cases of multiple requests for extradition, many accused or convicted 
would prefer to be tried in Britain as they perceive the system provides many loopholes which 
can be recruited to the advantage of the accused or convicted. 
The extradition framework prevalent in Britain appears particularly unsuitable to deal with 
modern crimes like terrorism and other international crimes such as Internet crimes. There are 
several interrelated factors which contribute to this ‘unsuitability’. Even if able to prevent the 
crime through a co-ordinated intelligence system and international services like Interpol, these 
criminals if captured may find shelter in Britain under the protective wings of human rights, such 
as freedom of speech or freedom of opinion which in fact may be sowing the seeds of a well-
organised international group and may well qualify as an inchoate crime. Complex and lengthy 
procedures to be followed may provide a breeding ground for international crime.  
The case of Abu Hamza is a good example.1255 A number of observers, especially these who 
accused him of terrorism and inciting violence, believe that he still being protected, exploiting 
the British ‘soft’ judicial system despite his alleged crimes. Andrew McCarthy asked “did 
England have to let Abu Hamza appeal to the ECHR? Smith’s office says the U.K. was simply 
honouring its European treaty obligations.”1256 
Another challenge for the judicial system in Britain is its ability to deal with inchoative crimes. 
In international law, inchoate crimes are as serious as the principal crimes themselves. They are 
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preparatory to the main crime and are treated as such. U.K. extradition law is not able to 
circumscribe inchoative crimes efficiently. For instance, instigating to commit a crime is as 
grave as the crime itself, yet it may not be criminalised under a claim of ‘freedom of speech’. 
Another limitation of the extradition law in Britain is its listing of extraditable crimes. As 
discussed earlier,1257 extradition systems in the world can be divided into two categories – one 
that lists crimes for which extradition can be sought or granted, also referred to as “enumerative” 
crimes, and one where there is no list and it is the gravity of the crime (i.e. the punishment 
awarded) that is the eligibility criterion. The problem with such lists of extraditable crimes is that 
with modern globalisation and information technology it has become possible to devise a plan in 
one place and have it organised and carried out somewhere else. Inchoative and other types of 
crime may not appear in the extraditable crimes list. This can be harnessed with considerable 
advantage to the criminals. 
As noted above, globalisation and modern technology have made the organisation and 
commission of international crimes a lot easier than it would have been in the past. Previously, 
sedition, incitement to and instigation of aggression and violence might have local and limited 
effects and therefore be easily controllable. Now, with the availability of modern tools of 
technology, the effects are far-reaching and crime can be organised globally from posting 
provocative literature on websites, to mass producing terrorism-related training manuals, to 
establishing contact networks between terrorist groups and individuals. 
These observations point to the conclusion that British law may be out of step with modern 
developments and many steps behind meeting the challenges of terrorism facing the world today, 
because of its lengthy procedures involved in extradition requests. Based on democratic values 
and human rights concerns, presuming a person innocent until proven guilty, the system does not 
appear responsive enough to address the phenomenon of international terrorism. This was in fact, 
also, the view of Britain’s closest ally in what became known as the “war against terrorism.”1258 
Nonetheless, with the rise in the perceived threat of terror network worldwide, the British 
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government resorted to what became known as fast-track removal of terrorist suspects alongside 
the extradition of a number of them.  
Despite these new fast-track regulations, the system of extradition with legal appeals as a 
fundamental part may be used against the extradition of genuine offenders. The examples of 
Mohammad Alamasri and Sa’ad Alfaqih, discussed above, the Saudi dissidents who planned 
terrorism under the protection of British law, were revealing. What the international community 
in general, and the British government in particular, need to do is to make laws which allow law-
enforcing agencies to proceed promptly at the smallest evidence or even on suspicion. The 
evidence requirement, for instance, is one of the biggest hurdles in taking prompt action to 
counter violence. It may be the case that by the time satisfactory evidence becomes available, it 
might be too late. Viewed in this light, British extradition law requires drastic modification with 
a view to re-vamping and re-aligning it, to meet more effectively modern challenges and threats 
of terrorism. It is basically now a question of human rights versus human lives. What is 
important, in fact, is which is deemed to have the higher priority.  
Despite the British extradition system being judicial, governed by statute, it is also influenced by 
world politics and foreign policy considerations. One example of the phenomenon has been 
hinted at above. The Saudi request for the extradition of the two dissidents on the grounds of 
sedition, dissemination of hatred, and instigation to commit violence was not supported by the 
British government and the action against them was delayed, lack of evidence being given as the 
reason. On the other hand, the British government was prepared to extradite Mohammad Almasri 
to the U.S. on charges of committing terrorist acts in Yemen and his links with Al-Qaeda. This 
behaviour points to the conclusion that political relations with the requesting state play a 
considerable role in dealing with extradition requests. These circumstances are likely to have a 
negative impact on the British and Saudi relationship.  
However, as discussed earlier,1259 national interests, in the final analysis, could influence any 
decision. Further, a strong alliance sometimes plays a part in strengthening relations and 
understanding between countries that are committed. Sharing the same threat may not be the 
only factor in bringing countries together. There is probably another dimension which may 
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characterise this behaviour, and that is shared values and ideas as well as political principles. In 
the case of Britain and the U.S., these are beyond description, despite the refusal of the former to 
extradite a number of its citizens, suspects of terrorism and criminal acts, to the U.S. Jack Straw 
(the former British Home Secretary) said: “I want to underline the enormous importance to us – 
in fact, the indispensability – of our alliance with the United States in the struggle against 
international terrorism. It is a partnership which has saved many lives of many nationalities.”1260 
In view of the discussion above, it can be safely concluded that despite many of its virtues, the 
British extradition system has not been able to overcome the problems it attempted to tackle with 
EA 2003, to speed up the extradition process. The intent of the new Act has not been met. 
Particularly, there is a need to recast the statutory provision with a view to combating terrorism 
in its new forms.  
With regard to the extradition system in Saudi Arabia, the strength of the system is that because 
it is administrative and because of the way the Shari’a works, decisions on extradition requests 
can be reached without undue delay. Since the Ministry of the Interior and the committee 
established for the purpose have to deal with requests the procedure is quite quick and produces 
an outcome within a relatively short period. The system works particularly well when dealing 
with terrorism, due to the relatively quicker decision-making. Speedy disposal, however, does 
not necessarily mean denial of justice.  
“The procedures in Islamic criminal justice are distinguished by the focus on the 
individualisation of justice and the extensive discretionary powers enjoyed by the judge. 
Judges have the authority to prosecute, examine witnesses, and pass judgement 
(including determining the specific parameters of the punishment). The primary mode of 
evidence is direct testimony by eyewitnesses.”1261  
As noted above,1262 the general Western perception of Islamic criminal justice procedures is that 
they do not allow human rights to the accused. This is a misguided notion and arises from lack of 
familiarity with the Islamic justice system. As noted by Bassiouni, the Islamic criminal justice 
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procedures encompass a range of due process and human rights protection. To emphasise the 
point, it is worth repeating the protection offered: “the right to life, liberty and property; the right 
to petition for redress of wrongs and grievances; the requirement of a fair and impartial trial 
without distinction of colour, creed, or origin are fundamental to them. Protection against 
unreasonable deprivation of any such right is subject to judicial scrutiny, and prompt legal 
determination is commanded. This is deemed essential not only as a human right, but also, as a 
political right that is indispensable for the maintenance of a scheme of ordered liberty and 
fundamental freedom.”1263 
As for the Saudi extradition system, as noted earlier,1264 the Basic Law provisions are very brief 
and not as elaborate as the British extradition law. In fact, it only, consists of a few lines, and has 
been left to the statutes and international agreements to determine the modalities. This lack of 
prescription and detail is perhaps, in fact, one of its strengths. Rendering extradition law in 
general terms allows room for manoeuvre and easier alignment with the principles of 
international law and emerging trends. Saudi law does not impose any prohibitions as to what 
provisions are allowed, nor to what is barred. As a signatory to a number of regional and 
international bilateral treaties and multilateral conventions, Saudi Arabia has adopted most of 
their provisions. On the basis of these facts, discussed at length earlier,1265 it can be asserted that 
there is nothing in the Shari’a or the Basic Law in the Kingdom, which prevents Saudi Arabia 
from entering into any bilateral or multilateral treaties and conventions. 
However, the biggest drawback of the Saudi extradition system is conducting extradition 
business through confidential diplomatic channels. For example, a summary of the new accord 
by the Secretary of the Arab League noted that “appeals for extraditing should be exchanged 
between the concerned officials directly or through the Justice Ministries by diplomatic 
channels.”1266 Thus, the extradition procedures are “opaque”1267 and undecipherable, which 
means that extradition decisions are likely to be influenced by political and foreign policy 
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considerations, which can often be in disregard of the legal and human rights of the accused or 
convicted. This may constitute a violation of human rights standards.  
At a broad level, the generalisation would be that the two systems are at opposite extremes, with 
Saudi extradition law being too brief with regard to extradition procedures, whereas British 
extradition law is too lengthy. The former allows the government room to make the decision of 
its choice, while the latter allows a fugitive accused or convicted person to drag out the 
procedure whereby he may find an easy exit at any point of the process. In sum, the strength of 
one country is the weakness of the other and vice versa. 
6.5 Is an extradition treaty possible between Saudi Arabia and Britain? 
With regard to the third research question, as to whether extradition arrangements are possible 
between an Islamic and a non-Muslim country the answer seems to be a definite ‘yes’, as will 
become progressively clear below. As was noted earlier,1268 the only arrangement that exists 
between Saudi Arabia and Britain so far on the extradition and pursuit of suspects and criminals 
is a Memorandum of Understanding concluded between the two countries on 12 April 1989. This 
latter has been couched in very general terms, with nothing specific being spelled out in the 
memorandum. Saudi Arabia is neither classified as a Category 1 or Category 2 territory in 
Britain’s designation, since no formal extradition treaty exists between the two countries.1269 
This does not mean, however, that there are no close links between the two countries. Britain has 
been significantly involved in the extradition practices in Saudi Arabia as well as other gulf 
states. For instance, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, in accordance with the Jeddah treaty, concluded 
on April 20 1942, conducted their extradition business through the British commission in 
Jeddah.1270 
The non-existence of a treaty between the two countries does not appear to be due to any 
religious or legal hurdle, as might be perceived by many in the Western and Islamic worlds. On 
the contrary, as noted above, there is nothing in Islamic law which forbids Saudi Arabia from 
entering into a bilateral extradition arrangements with a non-Muslim country. In this context, it is 
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worth pointing out that Saudi Arabia and the U.S. are close allies and have a warm political 
relationship, even if some tension has crept in recently. Yet there is no formal extradition treaty 
between the two countries.  
It is also important to remember that Saudi Arabia, Great Britain and the U.S. were all part of the 
allied forces that liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. They joined to reverse the aggression 
and Saudi Arabia allowed the allied forces to use its territory to operate against the occupation 
forces in Kuwait.1271 If Saudi Arabia and Britain can co-operate and collaborate with each other 
in waging a war against an Islamic country, there does not seem to be a ‘religious’ or ‘legal’ 
hurdle in signing a formal extradition treaty. 
There are two reasons, which may be cited here to account for the absence hitherto of a formal 
bilateral treaty between the two countries. 
Firstly, it may be that if the existing arrangements between the two countries are working quite 
satisfactorily, both parties may consider there to be no serious need for concluding a formal 
bilateral extradition treaty between the two countries. Perhaps, in the same vein, Saudi Arabia 
does not feel a need for a treaty precisely because it has an administrative extradition system and 
conducts most proceedings through confidential diplomatic channels. Saudi Arabia appears quite 
comfortable with this method as it manages to avoid lengthy proceedings and open trials.  
Secondly, non-existence of a formal extradition treaty may be attributable to a traditional view. 
As Saudi Arabia has not signed any formal bilateral treaties with any non-Muslim countries, it 
appears to be more of a matter of tradition and lack of precedent than anything else.  
It is pertinent to also point out that Saudi Arabia is a member of a number of several multilateral 
conventions on terrorism including the Tokyo, Hague, and Montréal Conventions, the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons, the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, and the applicable 
provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas.1272 
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As noted earlier, there exist in Islam a number of religious schools, to explain authoritatively the 
Shari’a.1273 The Hanafi for instance, are against the idea of handing over an accused Muslim 
fugitive to a non-Muslim country or would qualify the return with certain condition. For 
example, the place to which a Muslim is extradited should have relatives or friends of the 
accused, to support him.  
Secondly, the majority of Saudis follows the Imam Hambal, and hence is called Hambali. 
According to Imam Hambal, contracting with non-Muslim states is permitted. That is, a Muslim 
state is allowed to conclude a bilateral or multilateral treaty with any country, regardless of its 
being a Muslim state or otherwise.1274 Saudi Arabia therefore does not find any religious 
prohibition that forbids it from covenanting with a non-Muslim state. Also, there is nothing in 
the basic sources of the Shari’a, the Qur’an and the Sunnah, which expressly forbids concluding 
treaties with a non-Muslim state.  
In addition, according to the Basic Law of Saudi Arabia, the King appoints the Council of Senior 
Scholars, who then assists him. He and the Council are the only legal interpreters of the 
constitutional rules implicit in the Shari’a. The King, whose authority derives from the Shari’a, 
as stipulated in Article 7 of the Basic Law, “remains in effect the final arbiter of any 
interpretation of authority, including religious authority itself.”1275  Most of these decisions are 
announced through Royal Decrees. Saudi Arabia does not appear therefore to have any problems 
in maintaining political relations with non-Muslim states.  
The major stumbling block, however, is the death penalty, which is permitted by the Shari’a. 
Human rights concerns discourage the extradition of an accused or convicted person to a country 
where the death penalty is imposed. This rule is receiving increased acceptability in most 
European Union countries. EA 2003 stipulates that “the Secretary of State must not order a 
person’s extradition to a Category 2 territory if he could be, will be, or has been sentenced to 
death for the offence concerned in the Category 2 territory.”1276 However, the second part of the 
relevant section stipulates that “subsection (1) does not apply if the Secretary of State receives a 
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written assurance which he considers adequate that a sentence of death (a) will not be imposed, 
or (b) will not be carried out (if imposed).”1277 It is to be noted, however, that Saudi Arabia is not 
the only country where the death penalty may be imposed. “The U.S. would not face European 
countries’ constraints with regards to concerns over the death penalty, since the U.S., like Saudi 
Arabia, applies the death penalty.”1278 
It is also pertinent to point out here that this human right exception clashes with the principles of 
international law. While international law encourages member countries to harmonise with 
international norms and conventions, at the same time it recognises and respects the sovereignty 
of every state by allowing a state to practice its local laws. In this sense, international law is 
superimposed at a higher level of hierarchy without compromising the authority of the state. 
Since the death penalty in Islam is permitted by the Shari’a,1279 in principle it cannot be legally 
banned – it is irrevocable and undiscardable. This difficulty is not insuperable though, and ways 
around it can be found. The Bulgarian example discussed earlier1280 could be a good solution to 
the problem. Bulgaria, which has no treaty with the Kingdom, agreed to the latter’s request for 
the extradition of a drug smuggler, distributor and manufacturer. In this case, Saudi Arabia relied 
on the help of Interpol to negotiate the said extradition with Bulgaria. As with Bulgaria, a special 
clause dealing with the death penalty could be included in a treaty, which provides that in case of 
allowing extradition the death penalty will not be imposed. 
In view of the foregoing, the answer to the as to question whether Saudi Arabia and Britain can 
have a formal extradition treaty is positive. In fact any of the European Union states could enter 
into an extradition treaty with Saudi Arabia with the precondition that if the punishment for the 
fugitive’s crime is the death penalty, it will not be imposed nor carried out.  
6.6 What lessons can the two countries learn from each other’s experiences? 
The next question investigated was how the two systems could benefit from each other’s 
experience and in what way they could be turned into a more effective tool for the curtailment 
and prevention of organised crime at an international level. 
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In answering the first two questions (in section 6.4 of this Chapter), it was concluded that the 
extradition systems in Saudi Arabia and Britain, though functioning adequately, leave something 
to be desired and hence should be reviewed to make them more effective. To begin with, the 
British extradition law, despite its emphasis on human rights standards and international law, has 
been accused of being too lengthy a process. This weakness came to light in the case of Pinochet, 
which also exposed other drawbacks of the system, and which were acknowledged by the then 
Secretary of State. Pinochet got away with the crimes he committed partly because of the lengthy 
extradition process British law affords. The appeals and re-appeals hearings in the House of 
Lords took such a long time that he fell ill and the extradition process was terminated by the 
Secretary of State on medical grounds.1281 The Pinochet case is the tip of the iceberg. Many 
writers have blamed Britain as a haven for fugitives because the process is so lengthy and lends 
itself to the accused finding ways to ‘escape’ the extradition request.   
This, as was noted above,1282 is another indication that the existence of an agreement between 
even strong allies would not guarantee a swift extradition of suspects and alleged criminals 
between them. What is probably more important is that the delaying country would meet two 
challenges in order to succeed. One, to reform its legal and judicial system to make it up-to-date 
and conform to new pressures, and second, to attempt to convince human rights organisations 
and other pressures groups that the correct balance between individual rights and justice is being 
achieved. This latter would not be an easy task, simply because of the fast growing number of 
civil organisations throughout the world. In the British case, this issue is still not resolved, 
despite the fast-track procedures noted above. Alleged fugitives may stall the legal process, 
especially with lengthy appeals.1283 
In contrast, the Saudi extradition process is quite brief and requests are disposed of quite 
speedily. It is not suggested through that British extradition law should be reduced to that of 
Saudi Arabia, but measures could be taken to shorten the process whereby extradition requests 
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are decided more speedily, while still meeting the requirements of justice. The Extradition Act 
2003 aimed to speed up the process, but in practice, it has not achieved the desired effect. 
Another area where British extradition law needs to be reviewed is in respect of bars granted to 
an accused or convicted person in respect of offences committed on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinions. This is a grey area, in which political 
considerations may appear in to influence the whole process. For instance, how would one 
distinguish between a legitimate difference of political opinion with a government and the 
planning of terrorism in league with international organisations? The situation of Saudi 
dissidents discussed above is a case in point. Saudi Arabia viewed the dissidents as miscreants 
and those advocating terrorism are indicated by their connection with Al-Qaeda, whereas Britain 
saw them as not doing anything illegal and that they had the right to freedom of speech. 
Human rights criteria are a concern. Many human rights concerns can be exploited in order to 
escape justice. For example, the right to life and the right to family are examples which have 
been invoked as a plea to avoid extradition. As has been noted, some extradition cases take a 
long time, as in the case of Rachid Ramda, (the Algerian accused of terrorism), whose case took 
ten years before the suspect was extradited from Britain to France.1284 In such cases, by the time 
the proceedings come to an end the accused may plead that he and his family have become 
accustomed to the British life style and they might not be able to adjust to the environment of the 
requesting state country environment. No one would dispute the human rights standards, but 
under British extradition law, such ‘concessions’ could be misused to escape justice and the 
system is open to such exploitation. This is another reason why Britain is called a safe haven for 
criminals. 
In particular, British extradition law can learn from terrorism cases dealt with by Saudi Law. 
This might be controversial in political and intellectual circles in Britain. However, it could be 
argued that the administrative system practiced in Saudi Arabia deals with terrorists better than 
Britain’s judicial system. With modern technology and means of communication, criminals can 
move from one country to another to cope with this new phenomenon. Lengthy procedures can 
be detrimental to any efforts to curtail and prevent terrorist acts and bring criminal justice. 
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In turn, Saudi Arabia could learn a few useful lessons from the British experience. British 
extradition law has a much longer history than Saudi law. Despite some weaknesses, British 
extradition law has matured over time and has been working adequately, though still wanting. 
Although Saudi extradition law can be characterised as ‘quicker’, it lacks a judicial aspect. Under 
Saudi law, the judiciary has a recommendatory role only. The executive component of the 
government has the ultimate authority to decide on the matter and as noted above, other factors 
such as the political position of the requesting state and foreign policy issues have a significant 
bearing on decisions. In such a system, there is no regard for humanistic considerations. 
Executive decisions driven by other forces may lead to the trampling of human rights. As 
happened after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., suspects have been delivered up to the U.S. 
without trial and adequately establishment of the allegations against them. A number of persons 
have been detained merely on suspicion and have been imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay in 
inhuman conditions. The suicides and attempted suicides in this jail stand witness to what these 
accused are being subjected.1285 Accordingly, a reasonable involvement of the judiciary and 
human rights standards could be incorporated into the current Saudi extradition proceedings.  
In a nutshell, it appears that the solution to these problems is to strike a reasonable balance 
between the judicial and administrative extradition systems of both countries. The positive 
virtues of both systems could be selected and those which either allow the accused to escape 
justice or which lead to a denial of human rights may be dropped on either side to hammer out an 
extradition system which is efficient, fast, and based on justice.  
6.7 Proposed extradition treaty and global co-operation 
The final and most important question is concerned with how extradition systems can be used as 
a means of enhancing global co-operation against international crimes, particularly, those related 
to global terrorism. 
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It was pointed out at the beginning of this study that where modern globalisation has created new 
opportunities for co-operation and coordination in the fields of technology, trade, and economic 
activities, it has at the same time facilitated the organisation of crime at an international level.1286 
The Internet is the most recent tool which has given a new impetus to international crimes. Most 
importantly, the terrorist attacks carried out in various parts of the world reveal the links between 
various terrorist groups internationally.1287  
It was also emphasised that in order to combat crimes of this magnitude a matching scale of 
response is essential. No single nation can counter this gigantic threat single-handedly. Global 
co-operation and collaboration of effort is vital to combat this problem. The allied forces 
operating in Afghanistan after the events of 9/11 is one such example. Afghanistan was accused 
of protecting terrorists and training camps on its territory organised by Al-Qaeda, which was 
later alleged to have links with the terrorists who carried out the attack on the Twin Towers in 
New York. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the attacks were launched at the U.S. alone, the 
fear that, if allowed to flourish terrorists could target other countries, brought many nations 
together in ‘the war on terror’ unleashed by the U.S. The heavy development of allied forces in 
Afghanistan is undoubtedly, one of the best illustrating examples of international co-operation 
against ‘terrorism’. 
A contemporary example of international crime requiring international co-operation are the acts 
of piracy occurring in Somali waters. The Somali state has effectively collapsed, Somali pirates 
are making successful attacks against vessels of many nations. With the lack of any government, 
the only effective response is a joint international effort to fight this international crime.1288 
Therefore, it is now possible to see the efforts of international agencies, such as the United 
Nations or the Council of Europe, combining their forces and creating laws to counter modern 
threats. In such times as these, every sovereign state has a moral responsibility to contribute to 
strengthening the hands of the international community to effectively combat international crime. 
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One such positive step would be the actualisation of a formal treaty on extradition between Saudi 
Arabia and Britain. 
In this modern era of information and technology, no state can remain aloof and unconcerned 
about what is happening around the world. An incident in one part of the world is bound to 
impact significantly on other nations, regardless of their location on the map. Political pressures 
usually force a state to choose a side. A suitable example, in this respect, is the pressure the U.S. 
put on Pakistan to support efforts to hunt down those responsible for the attack on the Twin 
Towers.1289 Similarly, Iraqi aggression in Kuwait drew many regional states into the problem, 
and a number of countries, willingly or under American pressure, collaborated to meet the 
necessary challenge.1290  
Likewise, with modern means of communication, the mobility of criminals and alleged offenders 
is easy and sometimes difficult to spot. Despite the efforts of international organisations, such as 
Interpol and intelligence services, fugitives can hide in one country with the co-operation of 
accomplices residing in that country. While in that country of refuge, they could actively, work, 
plan and even, execute terrorist acts that might harm the concerns and assets of the perceived 
enemy country. This happened in Kenya, where Al-Qaeda terrorists attacked the US embassy 
(discussed below). 
Extradition of fugitive criminals is therefore essential to prevent further crime and not allow 
terrorism in the country of refuge. Allowing such offenders to continue, under any pretext, may 
turn out to be a fatal mistake since they can organise further crime, as distance has become 
meaningless. International co-operation and collaboration is again essential to meet the 
challenge. The disputes on extradition and the frequency of refusal of requests is a clear piece of 
evidence that achieving co-operation between states on the extradition of criminals is not an easy 
task. From this particular perspective, a necessity for a formal extradition treaty that would 
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exceed a normal understanding agreement between for example, Saudi Arabia and Britain is 
essential.  
However, there are many hurdles that need to be overcome before global co-operation is 
achieved. At one level, all states need to exchange information and intelligence on criminals and 
work in close collaboration. Organisations like Interpol have already been established where 
information about criminals is pooled and exchanged amongst the member states to help in 
locating and capturing criminals at large. This network is assisted by various local offices and 
institutions which provide Interpol with necessary information so that it is able to keep pace with 
the movement of criminals.1291  
Yet not all the countries are connected through this network and criminals may operate in 
territories which do not have access to this organisation. So, from this point of view it can be 
asserted that international co-operation, intelligence exchange, and communication on alleged 
criminals and fugitives are vital. This may be seen in the American case, when the US managed 
– through its worldwide channels – to spot Al-Qaeda suspects who attacked its embassy in 
Kenya and were still operative on British soil. They quickly contacted the U.K. for their arrest. It 
was noted that: 
“Soon after al-Qaeda bombed two U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, a U.S. federal 
judge issued a warrant for Khalid al-Fawwaz, an accused conspirator in the attacks and a 
confidant of Osama bin Laden. 
British police promptly arrested Fawwaz, a Saudi national, at his home in London. Two 
other al-Qaeda suspects were later detained nearby. British authorities pledged to 
extradite the men to the United States as swiftly as possible so they could stand trial.”1292 
Another hurdle in the way of an efficient extradition system is the national laws of the state. 
Every state is sovereign and has an inalienable right to frame its own laws governing the country. 
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No country can impose their laws on another country. Doing so would be an invasion of the 
sovereignty of the country. This is an established principle in international law.1293 
The question then is how the extradition system can be transformed into an efficient tool against 
the curtailment and prevention of international crimes. This is not an easy task to tackle. Many 
extraneous national and regional interests come into play. Just as a state might be under 
tremendous political pressure to extradite a person, a state might be forced or may choose not to 
extradite a person under a different set of circumstances. For example, a country might not 
extradite the anti-government elements of a state it does not enjoy good relations with, to 
maintain pressure on that state, or it may have other ulterior motives.  
These issues still occur between countries in either extraditing or refusing to hand over suspects. 
For example, in Yemen when the U.S. requested the extradition of two suspects charged with the 
bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, the Yemeni government refused to return them to the U.S. on 
the grounds of their being Yemeni citizens. Moreover, it even refused to imprison them, ignoring 
a $5 million reward that was posted by the U.S. for their capture. So here the issue of sovereignty 
plays an important role in blocking extradition. Further, there is also the factor of independent 
decisions of nation-states in deciding whether to arrest, extradite, or free alleged suspects, who 
might be potential terrorists, and already requested by other countries.1294  
So, in order to maintain international peace and harmony it is essential that the international 
community join hands in achieving this goal. For this purpose, states need to work at various 
levels towards this end – national and international. International organisations like the UN can 
be harnessed to strengthen the hands of states in meeting the challenge.  
At a national level, the strategy would be to review and update extradition laws in order to make 
them effective as a tool against combating crime. As stated above, a state has the authority to 
frame whatever laws it deems appropriate. This sovereign right of a state has also been 
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recognised in international law, in that it is up to a state whether it adopts and adapts an 
international principle. However, it is essential that states harmonise their extradition laws with 
other states, without compromising their sovereignty, as far as possible, so that genuine and 
legitimate extradition requests have the maximum chances of meeting success. Each state may 
make attempts to conform to principles of international law as closely as possible.  
At the international level, states need to become part of international forums and sign bilateral 
and multilateral treaties and conventions so that all the nations of the world join in exploiting 
laws, including extradition, to counter the terrorist threat, which has affected nearly every 
continent and nation of the world, directly or indirectly.  
It would also be greatly helpful if all treaties and conventions accommodated principles of 
international law and human rights conventions so that disparity in the provisions does not hinder 
the smooth functioning of the system at the international level. This would greatly assist the 
efficiency of the extradition system. This is crucial, as the difference in extradition systems can 
pose hurdles which appear at times difficult to overcome. The UN, for example, has circulated its 
Model Extradition Treaty.1295 Staying as close as possible to this pattern might be helpful in the 
internationalisation of the extradition framework.  
The Pinochet and Lockerbie cases stand witness to how disparity in national laws can cause 
difficulties and can lead to confrontation, the souring of political relations, and undue delay in 
dealing with the extradition requests.1296 
Finally, it can be concluded that after having thoroughly discussed the two countries’ extradition 
systems in this chapter and earlier, the conclusion may be drawn that the two sovereign entities 
do indeed share a number of factors, with both having the desire to use their extradition systems 
to fight against crime in all its forms, and both aiming to use their systems as effective tools in 
this respect. It was this common interest, and the shared perceived threat of global terrorism, 
which brought Saudi Arabia, and Britain (as well as a significant number of other sovereign 
countries) together. In the context of this study, Saudi Arabia and Britain became even closer, 
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especially, after higher level visits between the leaders of the two countries.1297 Nonetheless, it 
may be that the two entities do have more links currently that exceed the current simple bilateral 
treaty of understanding, especially often the initiation of what has been termed the “dialogue of 
the two kingdoms.”1298 In addition, both countries do have regard for human rights, although 
from different perspectives, due to their different perceptions, history, traditions, and sources of 
law. All in all, it may be added that both entities share a will to combine efforts to combat the 
threat of terrorism. 
On the other hand, the two systems also differ from each other in a number of important ways. 
Not the least of these is that the two countries derive their inspiration from different sources. 
Saudi Arabia as an Islamic country bases its laws – those concerning extradition – on the 
Shari’a, and the brevity of the Basic Law derived from it allow the law to be expressed through 
statutes, and carried out by Royal decrees, and international agreements. Britain, as a secular 
country, has elaborate prescriptive laws. Those concerning extradition are mostly judicial and 
transparent, whereas Saudi law is administrative and opaque. The laws relating to bars on an 
extradition tend to be, in the British environment, very clear, including extraneous considerations 
linked to age and other concerns, as well as human rights considerations , whereas in the Saudi 
Basic Law they are completely missing.  
Using the UN Model Treaty on Extradition as a tool to measure how closely the extradition 
system of the two countries match its ideals in their extradition practice and procedures, it can be 
sad that British extradition was evaluated, overall, as better than the Saudi system. The former 
has largely incorporated international law principles and human rights in its extradition law 
framework, whereas the latter operates through strict, confidential diplomatic channels, and is 
therefore far less transparent.  
However, in general, the extradition systems in both countries are working adequately, but need 
to be drastically, reviewed. It has been stressed above that British extradition law is too lengthy 
and therefore too lenient, allowing a number of suspects to exploit it and avoid punishment on 
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various grounds and pretexts. It has also been stressed that Saudi extradition is faster than it 
perhaps ought to be, denying suspects the right to appeal and failing to conform to other 
international human rights conventions. So an up-to-date review, as has been suggested in the 
foregoing, is not only important, but also vital for extradition matters. It has also been suggested 
above that the Saudi Basic Law needs to be assessed and updated in the light of international as 
well as regional currents. The British have indeed required the government to pass a number of 
amendments and bills in this field. It was observed for instance, that after the September 11 
attacks on New York and Washington, the British Government acknowledged the problems and 
pledged to fix them.1299  
Finally, it was determined that both countries, because of their political weight in their respective 
domains could play important roles in promoting global co-operation and collaboration against 
the threat of terrorism. An extradition arrangement would therefore be a welcome development 
in the fight against international crime. 
Indeed, in the British Saudi case, extradition agreements became not only a reality that should be 
attained, but almost a necessity. After the tragic events of 11 September 2001, and the London 
bombings of 7 July 2005, as well as other tragedies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the security 
situation has become a priority not only in these countries, but worldwide. The world has 
experienced a significant rise in international crime, money laundering, human trafficking and 
drugs as well as global terrorism.1300 This has, in a way, worsened in the current global financial 
crisis,1301 which perhaps requires both regional and international efforts to curb it. From this 
angle, one could see a formal extradition treaty as a pre-emptive tool to not only hasten the 
process of surrendering alleged criminals if found guilty, but to curb global crime, including 
terrorism.  
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Of course, it is important to remember that agreeing and approving a treaty is not always enough. 
The real step would be in fulfilling the agreement and commitment to the cause. In the British-
Saudi case, this has not been attained yet, although the will of the two entities seems to be 
available. Apart from the need discussed above for closer co-operation and collaboration to deal 
with a growing common threat, why is a formal treaty on extradition between Britain and Saudi 
Arabia necessary? A formal treaty of this sort will not always guarantee the swift return of 
alleged criminals. The difficulty that the U.S. has faced with its close ally, Britain, to obtain the 
return and trial of Al-Qaeda suspects has been noted in this study.1302 On the other hand, it has 
been also noted that an absence of a treaty on extradition does not bar countries from exchanging 
or returning criminals. This has happened and still does.1303 This form of extradition is viewed by 
human rights and humanitarian organisations as an attack on civil liberties.1304 This view does 
not enhance or endorse the spirit of international law and justice.  
As has been noted earlier,1305 despite the radical differences between Britain and Saudi Arabia in 
history, value systems, economies, culture, and religion, necessity has dictated – under the 
current security situation – that both countries in some sense meet. There are a number of factors 
which have led to a rapprochement between the two countries, and which might, in the near 
future, allow the two sovereign entities to conclude a formal treaty on extradition. The factors 
are: 
1. International relations are relationships of competition, co-operation, and conflict, 
and both countries are benefiting from co-operation with the aim of curbing, or 
containing any regional conflict that might threaten their national interests. 
2. Globalisation and mobility of goods, ideas, and particularly people, including 
criminals and suspected terrorists that might be difficult to identify and track down. 
A Saudi-British formal treaty would play a part in deterring alleged offenders from 
operating between the two countries. 
                                                 
1302
 See, for example, section 6.3 of this Chapter, discussion of Article 4 of the UN Model Treaty. 
1303
 The example of an extradition from Bulgaria to Saudi Arabia has been given in Chapter 5, section 5.5. 
1304
 See, for example, Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL), ‘Legislative action message - stop 
expansion of U.S. Patriot Act’, Peacework March 2003, 
http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/pwork/0303/0303short.htm (accessed 16 March 2010).  
1305
 See section 6.2.2 of this Chapter. 
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3. Both countries – besides the shared security and economic interests – are 
committed to fighting global terrorism. Both are victims, and this shared experience 
may be useful if translated into a formal treaty on extradition. This would make an 
agreement legal and justified, and would honour international law and its spirit. 
4. Both countries are also committed to promoting peace and stability, as well as 
understanding. In order to become role models for regions and other countries, to 
help them overcome their differences, a formal treaty would be not only an ideal, 
but a paradigm. 
To reach this stage, the two countries need to highlight a number of issues. Two are to agree on 
key concepts like who is a criminal, or rather, what is a crime that requires extradition, and also 
to define ‘political offence’, bearing in mind political and human rights exceptions in a formal 
treaty. There is also a need to deal sensitively with the death penalty. It was observed on this 
issue that “extradition agreements usually decree that the offence which has triggered the 
extradition request must be considered a crime in both countries.”1306 A double jeopardy rule is 
also commonly evoked to protect a person from being tried twice for the same crime in different 
countries. Dealing with these issues would create a helpful legal document for both sovereign 
countries. 
Many treaties provide for political and human rights exemptions that can prevent the extradition 
of a person who is accused of political crimes from seeking sanctuary in a country which 
believes the extradition-seeking state will prosecute them. In November 1998, “French 
authorities refused a British warrant for the extradition of former spy David Shayler on such 
grounds.”1307 
In the U.K., the courts are totally independent, and the judge is master of his case even if his 
decision goes against the wishes of the government or sees otherwise. A good example of this is 
when an al Qaeda suspect, Abu Qutada, was accused of terrorism and convicted. When the 
British Home Secretary, Jackie Smith signed a deportation order against Abu Qutada, a judge 
blocked it on the grounds that he might not face a fair trial in his native country of Jordan. In 
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Saudi Arabia, the Basic Law makes it clear that the King is the point of reference for judicial, 
executive, and regulatory authority.1308 As such, the intervention of the King in a judicial matter 
is not unheard of, as the case of the two nurses convicted of murder demonstrates.1309 
A formal extradition treaty would be helpful because of its legality and transparency. The more 
covert forms of extradition,1310 particularly irregular rendition, tarnish the reputation of legal and 
judicial systems globally. It has been noted that: 
“one school of thought holds that the tightening of extradition arrangements could create 
a global legal mechanism capable of bringing dictators to justice for their crimes against 
humanity. The other interpretation is that it could come to constitute an international 
system of oppression, with extradition used against ordinary individuals such as political 
activists, allowing one states oppression to spread beyond its frontiers. 
At present, it remains easier to extradite ordinary individuals suspected of straightforward 
crimes. The extradition or prominent political figures, such as General Pinochet, arouses 
more controversy.”1311 
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This study has primarily addressed the broad question of whether bilateral extradition 
arrangements are possible between Saudi Arabia and Britain and, if the answer to this is 
affirmative, what influence would such an agreement have on global co-operation in fighting 
against international crimes, particularly the current rising threat of terrorism? 
To this end, a number of questions were framed in Chapter 1 with a view to providing answers 
that would be helpful in contributing to the overall question. In order to ascertain whether the 
two extradition systems in Britain and Saudi Arabia were functioning properly, it was necessary 
to assess them both historically and currently in relation to a number of cases and issues. The 
assembling of similarities and differences in the two systems was significant in that the issues 
raised helped prove that there is a distinct possibility of the successful conclusion of an 
agreement on extradition between the two states. This process has rebutted a number of 
perceptions still adopted today in the West. 
To answer the questions posed to evaluate the overall question, the extradition systems of Britain 
and Saudi Arabia were analysed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5, traced from a historical 
prospective, discussing major developments, until the current position was presented.  
The British extradition system, examined in detail in Chapter 4 has a much longer history, dating 
from 1843 when the first law dealing explicitly with extradition came into being, not without 
shortcomings. A significant observation of British extradition law is that compared to systems in 
Europe, it has always lagged in development and has operated sluggishly. At different points in 
time, countries like France gave notice of terminating extradition treaties with Britain, either 
because the rate of success of extradition requests was very low, or procedures were so 
demanding in terms of evidence that extradition requests stood little chance of succeeding.1312 
                                                 
1312
 See Jones and Doobay, n.33, 1-008-1-009, at 9-10. 
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In 2000, the weaknesses of the British extradition system became the focus of the world in the 
Pinochet case, which caused embarrassment to the British government. The main charge brought 
against the British extradition system was the unduly lengthy procedures involved in disposing 
of extradition requests. For example, it was noted that despite the mutual understanding that 
exists between France and Britain, as well as the common threat of terrorism, extradition 
requests have not been easy. The ten years it took to extradite Rachid Ramda (noted in Chapter 
6, section 6.3, in discussion of Article 6 of the UN Model Treaty) is a case in point. Delay was a 
feature of the Pinochet case, despite the fact that Britain and Spain had concluded a new 
agreement in 1985. As noted, some cases may take many years before a final decision is reached. 
The system of appeals and re-appeals allows the accused or convicted to buy time, which can, in 
turn, be claimed as the basis of other rights. The asylum system of Britain is another contribution 
to failure in extradition requests. For example, an accused or convicted person can lodge an 
asylum claim at any point during the proceedings. Human rights standards are yet another 
hindrance to speedy resolution of extradition cases, giving fugitives exit points from the process. 
Rights such as freedom of speech, sexual orientation, and the right to religious or political 
opinions provide many opportunities for requests to fail. The Extradition Act 2003 was 
introduced to overcome these weaknesses. Whether the new Act has produced the intended 
results remains to be seen. In practice, it is still seen by a number of critics as not being fully 
effective when it comes to speed and smoothness of extraditing alleged offenders. Dealing with a 
number of cases, Craig Whitlock remarked “despite British approval of a ‘fast track’ extradition 
law in 2003 and a new treaty with the United States, the defendants have thwarted every attempt 
to deport them, aided by a British bureaucracy in no hurry to move the cases along.”1313 
Similarly, the Saudi extradition system was analysed in Chapter 5 and found equally wanting in 
many respects. First, there is a difference of opinion between various schools of thought in Islam 
over the issue of whether bilateral extradition treaties are possible with a non-Muslim state and, 
more importantly, whether a Muslim can be extradited to a non-Muslim state. It was found that 
there is nothing in the basic sources of Shari’a, the Qur’an, and the Sunnah which expressly 
forbids Muslims from covenanting and having bilateral relationships with a non-Muslim state. 
                                                 
1313
 See generally Whitlock, n.1236. 
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The difference however is at the jurisprudence level, where scholars like Imam Abu Hanifa have 
ruled that a Muslim could not be extradited to a non-Muslim country, or if extradited at all, 
certain conditions have to be fulfilled. On the other hand, other schools of thought, for instance 
Hambalis, followers of Imam Hambal, do not see any problem in covenanting with a non-
Muslim state and having bilateral extradition arrangements. Saudi Arabia is one of the countries 
which follow the latter school of thought.  
This Saudi view is evident from its Basic Law, which provides for making statutes, mostly 
promulgated through royal decrees, and entering into international agreements. As noted 
throughout this study, this law does not distinguish between Muslim and non-Muslim states in 
regard to concluding such arrangements. One of the shortcomings of the Basic Laws is their 
brevity and lack of detail. Another view, in contrast, is that this brevity is an index of strength as 
it allows enough room for Saudi Arabia to adjust and adapt to emerging trends and changing 
circumstances. From this perspective, the Basic Law is strong, and its strength is reflected in its 
flexibility. This flexibility is aided by the opaqueness of Saudi procedures: the extradition system 
is of the administrative type, mostly operating through diplomatic channels. Saudi Arabia has 
managed to conclude a number of regional and bilateral treaties, mostly with Muslim countries. 
Most have been on a range of matters, including extradition, dealt with under co-operation and 
security treaties. Of these, it is worth adding that their provisions on extradition mostly conform 
to international law principles. 
Using the Model Treaty on Extradition as a measure, the two extradition systems were compared 
in Chapter 6, in section 6.3. On the whole, British extradition law scored higher as it was found 
to be closer to the ideals enshrined in the Model Treaty, and that the orientation of its extradition 
laws moved it towards human rights protection as well as international standards as prescribed in 
the Model. Saudi Arabia’s over-riding concern with swift disposal – in contrast – has pushed it 
away from the Model’s ideals. It is important to remember as has been noted, that the existence 
of a formal treaty, although helpful, does not always guarantee the successful and smooth 
extradition of an alleged offender. Likewise, as also noted in Chapter 6 (section 6.4), the absence 
of a extradition treaty is not necessarily an impediment to extradition, as has occurred in a 
number of instances and still does, through the use of multiple channels, often secretly. The 
Kingdom has collaborated with a number of countries on these extraditions, and other matters. 
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The close alliance with the U.S., especially after the 9/11 attack, in its war against Iraq to free 
Kuwait in the 1990s, as well as its full commitment to the war on terror are cases in point. 
As for Britain, Saudi Arabia has signed a memorandum of understanding, which outlines the 
broad areas of co-operation and collaboration, including extradition, yet there is still no formal 
bilateral extradition treaty between them. It was noted nevertheless in Chapter 6 (section 6.5), 
that there are two possible reasons for not entering into such a formal arrangement. One is that 
either one or both parties are happy with the existing situation, conforming to the dictum that has 
been developed in previous discussion: in the absence of a formal treaty, an extradition of 
alleged offenders and criminals is perfectly possible. The other reason for not concluding a treaty 
could be reluctance on the part of Saudi Arabia. It has not been the tradition for the Kingdom to 
sign such a treaty with a non-Muslim state. This is understandable, given the nature of the 
establishment of the Kingdom, as an archaic, new-born sovereign kingdom constrained by a 
strict religious orthodoxy. However, without compromising its religious principles, with change, 
the country has embraced modern institutions that allow it to further interact with both Muslim 
and non-Muslim nation-states. For instance, in practice, Saudi Arabia has handed over alleged 
suspects and offenders even in the absence of a formal extradition treaty with the other 
country.1314 Not all countries would do this, because it can be viewed as a breach of sovereignty 
and human rights conventions, especially if undertaken in secrecy. Accordingly, and with regard 
to Saudi’s interactions with a number of Muslim and non-Muslim states, the conclusion of a 
formal treaty on extradites would endorse legality, provide an element of justification, and the 
evidence presented would suggest that agreement between Britain and the Kingdom would be 
very possible. 
The most likely source of setback in this regard is the Saudi adoption of the death penalty (which 
has undoubtedly deterred a number of European countries from seeking formal arrangements 
with the Kingdom) in its laws. Given the changing attitude of Saudi Arabia, this deterrent is 
surmountable by including a special clause in any treaty that would prevent its imposition. As 
noted in Chapter 5 (section 5.5), the example set by Bulgaria in reaching agreement on such a 
clause is evidence that should agreements are eminently achievable. 
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 For example to Kuwait, see Alotaibi, n.73, at 299. 
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The question of what the two countries can learn from each other was also addressed. A better 
question would perhaps be what can both countries learn from each other’s weaknesses, rather 
than their strengths? The criticisms brought against either of the two systems could be instructive 
for both, and attempting to remove these shortcomings would benefit both systems a great deal. 
The British extradition system has been long accused of its protracted procedures. The law first 
insists on reliable evidence from the requesting country before the process gets under way. This 
is the first bottleneck. The requesting state might take a long time in gathering evidence. Then 
the law allows the right of appeal to either party after the decision at the hearing. It can be 
challenged in the High Court and if the decision is not to the satisfaction of either party, an 
appeal might be heard by the House of Lords. In some cases, there may be a re-hearing as new 
pieces of evidence emerge. By the time a final decision is reached, the accused may have become 
entitled to other rights (the right to life, the right to family, and so forth) which may serve as a 
basis for eventual refusal of the extradition request. During all this, the accused can lodge an 
asylum claim at any point. In short, there are many holes in the net and the accused has many 
‘chances’ of finding a safe passage at any of these points. For this reason, many critics refer to 
Britain as a safe haven for terrorists. 
Another accusation brought against the British extradition system is that it allows people to be 
involved in terrorist acts or inchoative crimes which may lead to terrorist acts, under the pretext 
of freedom of speech or the right of people to hold their own political opinions. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, Britain has allowed Saudi dissidents to operate from its soil. The 
justification has been that they were political opponents, who had not committed any offences 
against British law. Over time, it has been established by the British authorities that some were 
directly or indirectly linked to Al Qaeda operatives responsible for a number of terror attacks in 
Saudi Arabia as well as against American targets elsewhere.  
As for Saudi Arabia’s extradition system, it can be said that it too suffers from a number of 
serious flaws. One is to be found in Saudi’s adoption of an administrative system of extradition. 
The weakness of this appears in the conduct of its extradition proceedings, whereby diplomatic 
channels are the only means available. Furthermore, the judiciary has a very limited part in the 
entire process, with a recommendatory role only. As a result, the executive component of the 
state has wide discretionary powers as to whether to accept recommendations or to reject them. 
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Decisions in the administrative type of extradition can be influenced by other factors, such as the 
political and economic status of the requesting state. With the discreet nature of this kind of 
system, a state may be quietly coerced into acquiescing.  The extradition request may succeed at 
the cost of denial of human rights to the accused as noted previously. Extraditions requests may 
be made for a number of reasons. Disallowing a judicial proceeding may amount to denial of 
justice. The administrative system may deal more quickly with extradition requests, but this 
virtue is most compelling when compared to the denial of a chance for the accused to defend 
himself. Saudi Arabia does not, judging by how its conduct is viewed, seem to give due 
consideration to human rights in the places to where accused people may be extradited. In short, 
whereas Britain perhaps places too much emphasis on human rights and their protection, as well 
as protecting the right to a difference of opinion, Saudi Arabia, focuses upon the use of speedy 
extradition with the intent of preventing or curtailing crime to save human lives. Ultimately, this 
raises the question of which is a higher priority: human rights and their protection or human lives 
and their safety. 
As stated in Chapter 1, the final question addressed in this study is how can extradition systems 
be used as a means of enhancing global co-operation against international crimes, particularly 
with reference to global terrorism? A question like this could be dealt with from a number of 
approaches. Nevertheless, it can be said that with the advent of globalisation and the more rapid 
movement of goods and people, international and domestic crimes have both flourished and 
proliferated. As a result, international co-operation between states to curb, reduce, suppress, or 
contain crimes has become not just a duty, but also a necessity for all. In the present 
environment, no single nation is immune from international crime, particularly terrorism. Nor 
can an individual state single-handedly fight criminal activities which have become diverse, 
dangerous, and trans-national. This calls for joint international efforts. A lack of co-operation at 
the global level to combat this international phenomenon would be ruinous, as it would lay any 
country open, vulnerable to terrorist threats. The example of piracy off the coast of Somalia 
requiring international co-operation was given in Chapter 6 (section 6.7).  
Therefore, it is now possible to see the efforts of international agencies, such as the United 
Nations or the Council of Europe, combining their forces and creating laws to counter modern 
threats. In such times as these, every sovereign state has a moral responsibility to contribute to 
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strengthening the hands of the international community to effectively combat international crime. 
One such positive step would be the actualisation of a formal treaty on extradition between Saudi 
Arabia and Britain. 
There are other benefits which are likely to flow from concluding such an arrangement. It could 
be an encouragement to a number of countries to follow suit, once they realise the strategic 
benefits. For example, Saudi Arabia enjoys a special place in the community of Islamic 
countries. The position of its King as the custodian of the two holy shrines would influence, 
directly and indirectly, other Muslim countries to follow its example and look favourably 
themselves upon concluding formal extradition agreements. Saudi Arabia’s example has been 
discussed in Chapter 4, in dealing with its multiple agreements on such issues as extradition, co-
operation, and security. 
Similarly, Britain occupies a special place in the EU community and the world, and just as Saudi 
Arabia’s example would be a model for the rest of the Islamic world to follow, the European 
states may also draw inspiration from a British action, although possibly still controversial. In 
this sense, such an arrangement could lead to generally fostering and strengthening of global co-
operation in fighting international crime and terrorism. 
Regarding the current international situation, extradition is not only common practice between 
nation states but is becoming a necessity. After the world has experienced a number of terrorist 
attacks in the U.S., Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, a global response has become a real need. 
In this light, a full and formal conclusion of an extradition treaty between nations, including 
Saudi Arabia and Britain, would fit perfectly. Also, a formal extradition would be an excellent 
response to the number of lobbying organisations and human rights organisations who have 
criticised Saudi Arabia, being presented as it would within legal, visible, and conventional rules. 
Nevertheless, as the analysis in this study has shown, inevitably problems would remain 
regardless of the success or failure of extraditing criminals. Political and cultural diversities are 
always present between sovereign countries and societies. Bureaucracy, reciprocity, legal 
systems, and lobbying groups will always play their part in influencing decisions on extradition 
and related policies. However, the benefits of formal arrangements are worth the effort. 
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In exploring the possibilities of a formal extradition treaty between Britain and Saudi Arabia, the 
value of this study is in demonstrating in detail that there are no political, cultural, or religious 
reasons which would prevent such an agreement. The argument has a wider significance as it 
also holds true for such agreements between other strictly Islamic countries and Western secular 
countries. The study thereby also challenges any perception that Islam is so ‘different’ that it is 
immune to co-operative and mutually beneficial interaction with the Western world. 
As noted in Chapter 1, there is a paucity of materials relating directly to Saudi Arabia in this 
area, and a corresponding lack of comparative materials. By assembling the material that could 
be obtained, a starting point for further work has been established. Such further work might 
include the assembling of more material as it becomes available from a wider span of sources. It 
would be particularly advantageous if details of relevant cases could be analysed and published 
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